零售商资金约束的双渠道供应链库存策略研究

在双渠道供应链中，受资金约束的零售商使用内部融资向制造商贷款，本文得出当零售商贷款后取得的收益小于不贷款时的收益时，零售商的初始最优订购置决定了双方的最终库存策略；反之，则制造商将一单位额外产品通过零售渠道销售所获得的利润与通过直销渠道来满足其转移蔷求时所获得利润的关系，影响了最终库存策略。     

银行监管的成本收益分析：一个新的分析框架

银行监管是有成本的．它一方面可以降低银行体系的风险，使整个社会从中获益：另一方面也有可能会造成监管成本超过由监管带来的收益．从而降低整个社会的福利。本文对银行监管的成本和收益及其构成进行了界定，分析了，影响银行监管成本收益的各种因素，建立了基于成本收益分析的最优监管模型：同时从现阶段我国银行业监管中监管对象和监管环境的特殊性出发，提出了重新塑造高效银行监管体系的建议。     

巴塞尔新资本协议与银行贷款定价——一个基于信贷市场系统性风险的模型

固定不变的资本金充足率已难以帮助商业银行有效抵御各类风险,为此巴塞尔新资本协议(BaselⅡ)规定了更富弹性的资本金要求。通过构建包含违约风险和系统性风险的银行贷款定价模型,本文研究了两类资本金弹性约束:纯粹考虑违约风险损失的最低资本金要求;兼顾违约风险损失与银行盈利能力的最低资本金要求。研究发现:(1)前一类资金本约束会导致不当的银行贷款定价决策,本文证明在巴塞尔新资本协议的内部评级法下采用这类资本金约束,会引起包含系统性风险的违约概率与贷款利率的反向联动,从而使银行失败的风险增大;(2)后一类资本金约束则能有效解决上述贷款定价与系统性风险之间存在的不合理关系。据此提出在普遍采用巴塞尔新资本协议的趋势下,我国银行业资本监管应高度重视信贷市场的系统性风险,银行的资本金充足率应兼顾风险因素与银行的赢利能力。     

科技型企业创业风险、堑壕效应与控制权配置

将创业者事后敲竹杠和创业成功后堑壕效应的前向延伸作为影响因素，构建模型对科技型企业创业过程中投资者和创业者之间风险分担、收益分配及控制权配置的影响进行分析。结果发现：完全信息下创业者最优努力水平和帕累托最优风险分担可以实现，投资者和创业者主要矛盾前移至创业开始前的收益分担；信息不对称下帕累托最优风险分担不可能实现，创业者有动机通过采取降低努力水平、事后敲竹杠和事前堑壕效应行为取得额外收益，以此分散人力资本风险；创业者首先倾向于选择后两种行为获取更高的控制权配置收益，失败时将倾向于回到降低努力水平选择上。因此，投资者适度分权可避免创业者出现降低努力水平的行为，从而提升创业成功概率。     

我国上市商业银行盈余管理与市场约束——基于投资收益及风险管理的视角

本文论述了银行盈余管理与市场约束的内涵、意义及相互关系。分析了银行进行盈余管理的方法和我国银行市场约束存在的途径。实证部分用固定效应和随机效应模型分析了基于贷款损失准备与投资收益为工具的盈余管理;用GMM动态面板分析了基于股票交易的对银行风险的市场约束。实证结果显示,股票市场交易的非系统性波动对银行的风险管理构成了市场约束。银行没有进行以提高资本充足率为目的的盈余管理,也没有通过投资收益进行平滑利润的盈余管理,但是用贷款损失准备进行了平滑利润的盈余管理。本文的结论表明,我国银行的市场化程度正得到逐步加强,并为银行监管的市场监督角度提出了相关建议。     

商业银行分支机构贷款组合优化配置模型及市场化管理思路

以商业银行的经营性分支机构为研究对象,用信贷客户综合收益和经济资本占用系数确定银行的收益目标和约束条件,建立了基于风险调整后资本收益率(RAROC)最优的贷款组合优化配置模型,改进了以往贷款组合模型需要假设收益目标或风险承受度的缺陷。探讨了综合收益RAROC最大化目标下的贷款组合"软约束"市场化管理方法,有效补充了当前商业银行行政色彩浓厚的规模"硬约束"计划管理方式。     

银行资本监管与货币政策非对称效应研究

本文基于全球危机背景,将银行贷款的自由度减小因素、监管当局对银行监管约束而产生的隐性成本因素及政治家因素等三类影响因素纳入单一约束的商业银行利润目标函数中,通过引入政治家因素的概念、简单的数学推导以及对银行利润函数和银行数量的数值模拟,得出了政治家因素具有强化货币政策的非对称效应的作用。最后本文又在前文研究的基础上提出了一些相关政策建议。     

信贷紧缩、企业价值与最优贷款利率

本文创新性地将银行的断贷决策视为一项实物期权,并用几何布朗运动刻画企业现金流的不确定性,考察贷款利率、银行断贷决策与企业价值之间的关系。研究发现,在企业现金流存在不确定性且企业破产不可逆的条件下,企业价值与贷款利率之间呈"倒U型"关系,使企业价值最大化的最优贷款利率是对企业融资成本和银行贷款激励的最优权衡。尽管较低的贷款利率有利于节约企业的融资成本,但当贷款利率低于"最优贷款利率"时,银行的信贷支持将缺乏包容性,企业反而可能因"节约"了融资成本而面临资金链断裂的风险。本文不仅为不确定环境下的银企合作问题提供了新的理论框架,还为中小企业"融资贵"现象提供了新的解释。     

信任建立与控制成本的经济学分析

文章从探讨控制与信任的关系入手,进一步阐明信任的建立对降低控制成本起到的积极作用。运用微观经济学中供求关系原理和分析方法以及需求价格弹性概念分析:控制与信任相匹配可以实现控制与信任建立成本最优水平;控制与信任不匹配造成的成本无谓损失;信任的发展带来的额外收益;以及当控制和信任分别缺乏弹性时,其对对方的影响。最后根据理论分析的结果为管理实践提出建议。     

利率互换：利率风险管理的创新工具

利率风险是所有银行必须面对的最严峻的、潜在的、最具有破坏性的风险形式。市场利率的变化，不仅改变了银行资产与负债的市场价值，也影响了银行的收入和支出情况。随着我国利率市场化的推进，利率频繁变化且难以预计，从而导致银行面临重新定价风险、收益变动风险和优质贷款客户选择权风险等。我国商业银行可以考虑金融衍生交易中的创新工具——利率互换，可以有效地规避利率风险和降低资金成本。     

Modelling non-performing loans probability in the commercial banking system: efficiency and effectiveness related to credit risk in Italy

In this article, we model the effect of the non-performing loans on the cost structure of the commercial banking system. With this aim, we comment on an increase in the non-performing loans by studying the consequences of such a change on the cost function and compute the probability of failure of maintaining a performing loan as such. In doing so, we are convinced that geography does matter and evaluate the risk propensity of the bank towards the non-performing loans accordingly. We finally stress that traditional efficiency indicators of cost elasticity do not fit properly with such a problem and propose a measure based on the costs for managing and monitoring the loans which, according to the related density function, will reveal effectively as non performing.     

基于EVA价值评估方法的我国上市商业银行价值最大化驱动因素研究

本文以我国上市商业银行作为研究对象,运用EVA价值评估方法,从多角度对影响商业银行价值最大化的驱动因素进行实证研究。实证结果表明,费用管理能力、资本实力、资产质量、客户资源以及境外战略投资者的引入,都是重要的价值驱动因素,其中不良贷款率、资本充足率、非利息收入占比等指标还会通过商誉的机制作用于银行价值。本文的研究为商业银行盈利模式转变、构建价值管理体系,尤其是实现其可持续发展提供了重要的参考价值。     

A Theory of Conflicts of Interest in Banking Relationships

Abstract

This paper highlights a dark side of banking relationships by elucidating the conditions under which a pre-existing relationship between a lending bank and a borrower can be detrimental to positive valuation effects of loan announcements. The effect of a pre-existing relationship is more likely to be negative when the pre-existing loans are large and firms' screening costs are low. A theoretical model shows that loan announcement's positive effect on borrowers' value due to the standard information advantage can be more than offset by the bank's conflict of interest when the bank's asset quality reputation is poor, i.e. when the probability of the bank holding a bad loan is large.     

THE NEW THEORY OF COMMERCIAL BANKING AND BANK LENDING BEHAVIOR

This paper studies the bank's lending decision, based on three observed phenomena: banks earn substantial profits from off‐balance sheet activities and services, which they take into account in their lending decisions. Secondly, the critical point in the customer relation is the loan decision: the probability of the customer staying with the bank is a function of the loan extended each time one is applied for. Third, what is at stake in the loan decision is the expected value of the entire customer relation, which is the probability times the present value of expected future profits. The bank is a maximizer of this expected present value, while making decisions on individual loan applications. It is shown that the bank is in a corner solution with respect to its good customers, and other customers often have an incentive to get to a corner. Therefore, corner solutions may be the rule rather than the exception in the bank's customer relations, and there is no mechanism making the bank indifferent, at the margin, between lending to different customers. It can be optimal to extend loans to (present and expected future) good customers at an interest rate loss. A rationed customer with a concave enough probability function can receive a larger loan by asking for less. Loyalty increases the customer's value to the bank but improves its loan terms only if the customer makes it conditional on the loan extended.     

我国农业上市公司的政治关联与融资便利性

本文以社会资本理论为切入点，实证分析政治关联对我国农业上市公司获取银行信贷融资及其期限结构的影响。以1996—2010年间在沪深两地上市的农业企业为样本，以董事长是否现在或曾经担任政府官员、人大代表、政协委员来判断政治关联。检验结果发现，农业上市公司的政治关联与银行贷款数量显著正相关；政治关联所带来的融资便利性，更多表现为获取银行的短期贷款。研究表明，政治关联作为一种特殊的社会资本，能够作为非正式制度帮助农业企业获得银行信贷支持。     

Market power versus efficiency under uncertainty: conventional versus Islamic banking in the GCC

In this article we estimate the effect of concentration on intermediation margins in Gulf Cooperation Council's (GCC) Islamic and conventional banking under the assumption that margins are uncertain. The empirical model, which we formally derive from an expected utility maximization problem, allows us to test for risk aversion as well as competitive conduct in loan and the deposit markets. The model also yields an expression showing that the effect of concentration on margins is the sum of its respective effects on market power, marginal cost of intermediation and marginal cost of uncertainty. The expression allows us to test whether concentration is welfare enhancing, reducing or neutral. We find Islamic banks to be risk-averse and conventional banks to be risk-neutral. We also find that concentration is welfare-neutral in Islamic loans and deposits, welfare-enhancing in conventional loans and welfare-neutral in conventional deposits. We used Nonlinear Two-Stage Least Squares (N2SLS) and Nonlinear Three-Stage Least Squares (N3SLS) to check for robustness.     

Market structure and credit procyclicality: Lessons from loan markets in the European Union banking sectors

The aim of this paper is to investigate whether the market structure has an impact on procyclicality in the European Union bank loan markets. The cyclical responses of three types of bank loans (residential mortgage loans, consumer loans, and corporate loans) are quantified separately using the interacted panel vector autoregression model at the country level and the single-equation panel regression model at the bank level. Using a sample of 26 European Union countries, we find that the procyclical responses of residential mortgage loans and consumer loans are significantly stronger and prolonged when the banking sector is more concentrated or dominated by foreign banks. However, we find that there are nonlinear relationships between the market structure and credit procyclicality based on bank-level data. We also find some heterogeneities between advanced and transitioning European Union banking sectors. Finally, our findings confirm the leading role of residential mortgages in intensifying credit fluctuations.     

Optimal bank interest margins under capital regulation in a call-option utility framework

This paper examines the optimal bank interest margin under capital regulation when the bank's preference admits an additive call-option representation including both the like of higher equity return and the dislike of higher equity risk. In the call-option utility maximization, an increase in the capital requirement results in an increased amount of loans held by a bank at a reduced margin when loan quality is in distress. We also show that the impact on the bank interest margin from an increase in the capital requirement which ignores the dislike, that we call such behavior call-option equity maximization, leads to significant underestimation. Our results cast doubt on the effectiveness of capital regulation to exert a risk-reducing and return-increasing effect on the bank in particular where loan quality becomes worse, thereby adversely affecting the stability of the banking system.     

Capital requirements and business cycles with credit market imperfections

The business cycle effects of bank capital regulatory regimes are examined in a New Keynesian model with credit market imperfections and a cost channel of monetary policy. Bank capital increases incentives for banks to monitor borrowers, thereby raising the repayment probability, and excess capital generates benefits in terms of reduced regulatory scrutiny. Basel I- and Basel II-type regulatory regimes are defined, and the model is calibrated for a middle-income country. Simulations of a supply shock show that, depending on the elasticity that relates the repayment probability to the bank capital–loan ratio, the Basel II regime may be less procyclical than a Basel I regime.