Divergence of Opinion in Complete Markets: A Note

We consider an Arrow-Debreu model with agents who have different subjective probabilities. In general, asset prices will depend only on aggregate consumption and the distribution of subjective probabilities in each state of nature. If all agents have identical preferences then an asset with “more dispersed” subjective probabilities will have a lower price than an asset with less dispersed subjective probabilities if risk aversion does not decline too rapidly. It seems that this condition is likely to be met in practice, so that increased dispersion of beliefs will generally be associated with reduced asset prices in a given Arrow-Debreu equilibrium.     

Imperfectly Credible Disinflation under Endogenous Time‐Dependent Pricing

The real effects of an imperfectly credible disinflation depend critically on the extent of price rigidity. We examine this interaction in a model with endogenous time‐dependent pricing. Both the endogenous initial degree of price rigidity and changes in the duration of price spells during disinflation are important in explaining the effects of imperfect credibility. We initially consider a setup where the degree of credibility is fixed and then allow agents to update beliefs about the “type” of monetary authority that they face. In both cases, the interaction between endogeneity of pricing behavior and imperfect credibility increases the output costs of disinflation.     

Disagreement-induced CEO turnover

We propose and test a new explanation for forced CEO turnover, and examine its implications for the impact of firm performance on CEO turnover. Investors may disagree with management on optimal decisions due to heterogeneous prior beliefs. Theory suggests that such disagreement may be persistent and costly to firms; we document that this induces them to sometimes replace CEOs who investors disagree with, controlling for firm performance. A lower level of CEO-investor disagreement serves to partially “protect” CEOs from being fired, thus reducing turnover-performance sensitivity, which we also document. We also show that firms are more likely to hire an external CEO as a successor if disagreement with the departing CEO is higher. Disagreement declines following forced CEO turnover. Using various empirical strategies, we rule out other confounding interpretations of our findings. We conclude that disagreement, independently of firm performance, affects forced CEO turnover.     

Sampling interval and estimated betas: Implications for the presence of transitory components in stock prices

We provide a theoretical framework to explain the empirical finding that the estimated betas are sensitive to the sampling interval even when using continuously compounded returns. We suppose that stock prices have both permanent and transitory components. The discrete time representation of the beta depends on the sampling interval and two components labeled “permanent and transitory betas”. We show that if no transitory component is present in stock prices then no sampling interval effect occurs. However, the presence of a transitory component implies that the beta is an increasing (decreasing) function of the sampling interval for more (less) risky assets. In our framework, assets are labeled risky if their “permanent beta” is greater than their “transitory beta” and vice versa for less risky assets. Simulations show that our theoretical results provide good approximations for the estimated betas in small samples. We provide empirical evidence about the presence of negative serial correlation and mean reversion in the returns of the portfolios considered. We discuss why our model is better able to provide an explanation for this sampling interval effect than other models in the literature.     

Interpreting Factor Models

We argue that tests of reduced‐form factor models and horse races between “characteristics” and “covariances” cannot discriminate between alternative models of investor beliefs. Since asset returns have substantial commonality, absence of near‐arbitrage opportunities implies that the stochastic discount factor can be represented as a function of a few dominant sources of return variation. As long as some arbitrageurs are present, this conclusion applies even in an economy in which all cross‐sectional variation in expected returns is caused by sentiment. Sentiment‐investor demand results in substantial mispricing only if arbitrageurs are exposed to factor risk when taking the other side of these trades.     

A Strategic Asset Pricing Model for Relative Performance Concern

We propose a strategic asset pricing model for the relative performance concern with heterogeneous beliefs in the framework of Nash equilibrium. In our model, the presence of heterogeneous beliefs generates the upward pressure on the stock market volatility and gives rise to the separation of agents’ perceived Sharpe ratios. We show that if one of the agents temporarily wins the market, the presence of relative performance concern will reduce the impacts of the winner and make the investors who have been edged out of the market more inclined to return. Besides, the sufficiently strong concern of relative performance will bring investors the extreme aversion to losing and get them to trade similarly.     

Investment busts,reputation, and the temptation to blend in with the crowd

We provide a real-options model of an industry in which agents time abandonment of their projects in an effort to protect their reputations. Agents delay abandonment attempting to signal quality. When a public common shock forces abandonment of a small fraction of projects irrespective of agents' quality, many agents abandon their projects strategically even if they are unaffected by the shock. Such “blending in with the crowd” effect creates an additional incentive to delay abandonment ahead of the shock, leading to accumulation of “living dead” projects, which further amplifies the shock. The potential for moderate public common shocks often improves agents' values.     

Information Transparency and Coordination Failure: Theory and Experiment

We examine the effect of higher order beliefs on the ability of decentralized decision makers to coordinate and take advantage of improvements in information transparency that can increase welfare. Theories that address this question have not been empirically explored. We study coordination in a laboratory experiment with privately informed decision makers. Economic outcomes in the setting depend both on agents' rational beliefs regarding economic fundamentals and on their rational beliefs regarding the beliefs of other agents. Increasing information transparency mitigates uncertainty about economic fundamentals but may increase strategic uncertainty, precipitating multiple equilibria and less efficient group outcomes. We provide evidence that sometimes the equilibrium attained by creditors is inferior from a welfare perspective to other available equilibria. Risk dominance appears to determine equilibrium selection in our setting.     

Trading Volume and Transaction Costs in Specialist Markets

Prior work with competitive rational expectations equilibrium models indicates that there should be a positive relation between trading volume and differences in beliefs or information among traders. We show that this result is sensitive to whether and how transaction costs are modeled. In a specialist market with endogenous transaction costs we show that trading volume can be negatively related to the degree of informational asymmetry in the market. Our analysis highlights the dependence of volume on market structure, and our results suggest that the “volume effects” of corporate or macroeconomic events reflect a decrease, rather than an increase, in heterogeneity of beliefs or asymmetry of information.     

Diversification as a Public Good: Community Effects in Portfolio Choice

Within a rational general equilibrium model in which agents care only about personal consumption, we consider a setting in which, due to borrowing constraints, individuals endowed with local resources underparticipate in financial markets. As a result, investors compete for local resources through their portfolio choices. Even with complete financial markets and no aggregate risk, agents may herd into risky portfolios. This yields a Pareto‐dominated outcome as agents introduce “community” risk unrelated to fundamentals. Moreover, if some agents are behaviorally biased, or cannot completely diversify their holdings, rational agents may choose more extreme portfolios and amplify the effect.     

How Large Are Housing and Financial Wealth Effects? A New Approach

This paper presents a simple new method for measuring “wealth effects” on aggregate consumption. The method exploits the stickiness of consumption growth (sometimes interpreted as reflecting consumption “habits”) to distinguish between immediate and eventual wealth effects. In U.S. data, we estimate that the immediate (next quarter) marginal propensity to consume from a $1 change in housing wealth is about 2 cents, with a final eventual effect around 9 cents, substantially larger than the effect of shocks to financial wealth. We argue that our method is preferable to cointegration‐based approaches, because neither theory nor evidence supports faith in the existence of a stable cointegrating vector.     

Ties that bind in business ethics: Social contracts and why they matter

How should bankers respond to challenges about whether to separate stock analysis from the other financial functions of financial services companies, or whether to maintain relationships with socially discredited customers? We wrote a book recently, Ties That Bind (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1999), out of our conviction that answering many of these questions requires a new approach to business ethics, one that exposes the implicit understandings or “contracts” that bind industries, companies, and economic systems into communities. In this article we unpack the fundamental elements of our approach called Integrative Social Contracts Theory (ISCT) and demonstrate how the theory can be applied to a particular question currently asked in the financial services industry, namely, “How should accounting firms and banking institutions deal with the increasing criticism alleging that new forms of conflict of interest impair the objectivity of auditors and security analysts.”     

Informational Efficiency and Information Subsets

This paper proposes a new definition of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis with respect to information, which is more formal and precise than those of Rubinstein 13 , Fama 4 , Jensen 6 , and Beaver 1 , and which fits well as a framework for interpreting the many tests of the Efficient Markets Hypothesis in the literature. Security markets are here considered “efficient with respect to information set ?” if and only if revealing ? to all agents would change neither equilibrium prices nor portfolios. In addition to other desirable features, this definition has the “subset property”: efficiency with respect to ? implies efficiency with respect to any subset of ?.     

Consumer risk perceptions and information in insurance markets with adverse selection

Standard models of adverse selection in insurance markets assume policyholders know their loss distributions. This study examines the nature of equilibrium and the equilibrium value of information in competitive insurance markets where consumers lack complete information regarding their loss probabilities. We show that additional private information is privately and socially valuable. When the equilibrium policies separate types, policyholders can deduce the underlying probabilities from the contracts, so it is information on risk type, rather than loss probability per se, that is valuable. We show that the equilibrium is “as if” policyholders were endowed with complete knowledge if, and only if, information is noiseless and costless. If information is noisy, the equilibrium depends on policyholders' prior beliefs and the amount of noise in the information they acquire.     

Earnings Metrics,Information Processing,and Price Efficiency in Laboratory Markets

An enduring issue in financial reporting is whether and how salient summary measures of firm performance (“earnings metrics”) affect market price efficiency. In laboratory markets, we test the effects of salient earnings metrics, which vary in how they combine persistent and transitory elements, on investor information search, beliefs about value, offers to trade, and market price efficiency. We find that including transitory elements in salient earnings metrics causes traders to search unnecessarily for further information about these elements and to overestimate their effect on fundamental value relative to a rational benchmark. In contrast, separately displaying persistent elements in earnings increases the accuracy of traders’ value estimates. Prices generally reflect traders’ beliefs about value, and prices are most efficient when transitory elements are excluded from earnings metrics entirely. Our study contributes to research on salience effects in financial reporting by showing that including transitory elements in salient earnings metrics causes inefficient information search and biased beliefs about value that can aggregate to affect market prices. We also contribute to research in experimental markets by showing that redundant disclosure is not always beneficial; redundant disclosure of transitory earnings elements, in particular, appears to have negative consequences for investor behavior and market efficiency.     

The Rise of Agency Capitalism and the Role of Shareholder Activists in Making It Work

The past 50 years have seen a fundamental change in the ownership of U.S. public companies, one in which the relatively small holdings of many individual shareholders have been supplanted by the large holdings of institutional investors, such as pension funds, mutual funds, and bank trust departments. Such large institutional investors are now said to own over 70% of the stock of the largest 1,000 U.S. public corporations; and in many of these companies, as the authors go on to note, “as few as two dozen institutional investors” own enough shares “to exert substantial influence, if not effective control.” But this reconcentration of ownership does not represent a complete solution to the “agency” problems arising from the “separation of ownership and control” that troubled Berle and Means, the relative powerlessness of shareholders in the face of a class of “professional” corporate managers who owned little if any stock. As the authors note, this shift from an era of “managerial capitalism” to one they identify as “agency capitalism” has come with a somewhat new and different set of “agency conflicts” and associated costs. The fact that most institutional investors hold highly diversified portfolios and compete (and are compensated) on the basis of “relative performance” provides them with little incentive to engage in the vigorous monitoring of corporate performance and investor activism that could address shortfalls in such performance. As a consequence, such large institutional investors—not to mention the large and growing body of indexers like Vanguard and BlackRock—are likely to appear “rationally apathetic” about corporate governance. But, as the authors also point out, there is a solution to this agency conflict—and to the corporate governance “vacuum” that has been said to result from the alleged apathy of well‐diversified (and indexed) institutional investors: the emergence of shareholder activists. The activist hedge funds and other specialized activists who have come on the scene during the last 15 or 20 years are now playing an important role in supporting this relatively new ownership structure. Instead of taking control positions, the activists “tee‐up” strategic business and financing choices that are then decided upon by the vote of institutional shareholders that are best characterized not as apathetic, but as rationally “reticent”; that is, they allow the activists, if not to do their talking for them, then to serve as a catalyst for the expression of institutional shareholder voice. The institutions are by no means rubber stamps for activists' proposals; in some cases voting for the activists' proposals, in many cases against them, the institutions function as the long‐term arbiters of whether such proposals should and will go forward. In the closing section of the article, the authors discuss a number of recent legal decisions that appear to recognize this relatively new role played by activists and the institutions that choose to support them (or not)—legal decisions that appear to confirm investors' competence and right to be entrusted with such authority over corporate decision‐making.     

The role of “other information” in analysts’ forecasts in understanding stock return volatility

This study identifies “other information” in analysts’ forecasts as a legitimate proxy for future cash flows and examines its incremental role in explaining stock return volatility. We suggest that “other information” contains information about fundamentals beyond that reflected in current financial statements and reflects firms’ fundamentals on a more timely basis than dividends or earnings. Using standardized regressions, we find volatility increases when current “other information” is more uncertain and increases more in response to unfavorable news compared to favorable news. Variance decomposition analysis shows that the variance contribution of “other information” dominates that of expected-return news. The incremental role of “other information” is at least half of the effect of earnings in explaining future volatility. The results are more pronounced for firms with poor information environments. Overall, our results highlight the importance of including “other information” as an additional cash-flow proxy in future studies of stock prices and volatility.     

Monetary Policy,Asset Prices,and Liquidity in Over‐the‐Counter Markets

We develop a model where agents can allocate their wealth between a liquid asset, which can be used to purchase consumption goods, and an illiquid asset, which represents a better store of value. Should a consumption opportunity arise, agents may visit a frictional “over‐the‐counter” secondary asset market where they can exchange illiquid for liquid assets. We characterize how monetary policy affects both the issue price and the secondary market price of the asset. We also show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom, search and bargaining frictions in the secondary asset market can improve welfare if inflation is low.     

Financial statement users’ institutional logic

In this paper, we investigate what we call “financial statement users’ institutional logic,” defined as users’ expressed fundamental views and beliefs about accounting information. We analyze users’ comment letters to standard setters in response to the proposed standards on lease accounting to identify the dimensions of the institutional logic that underlie their views on accounting information. Our qualitative analysis identified and validated ten principal dimensions, namely economics and substance, due process issues, measurement, readiness and relevance for use, conceptual foundations, clarity, presentation and disclosure, cost-benefit issues, comparability and consistency, and financial statement manipulation. Quantitative analyses revealed that four of these dimensions, i.e. due process issues, readiness and relevance for use, comparability and consistency, and cost-benefit issues, occupy a medium or large amount of space in users’ comments and are referred to in strong terms, while economics and substance and measurement, although also widely discussed, are addressed in weaker terms. Overall, our study begins to fill a gap in the literature by providing insights into users’ views on accounting information. These insights challenge the “homo economicus user” currently constructed in standard-setting debates.     

Predicting the next step of a random walk: experimental evidence of regime-shifting beliefs

Barberis et al. (J. Financial Econ. 49 (1998) 307), construct a model in which investors use the prevalence of past trend reversals as an indicator of the likelihood of future reversals. While such “regime-shifting” beliefs are consistent with a variety of psychological theories, other contrary predictions are consistent with the same theories. We report two experiments with MBA-student participants that strongly support the existence of regime-shifting beliefs. We conclude that regime-shifting models can provide a useful framework for understanding market anomalies, including underreactions to earnings changes and overreactions to long-term earnings trends.