Opting out and topping up reconsidered: Informal care under uncertain altruism

We study the design of public long‐term care (LTC) insurance when the altruism of informal caregivers is uncertain. We consider non‐linear policies where the LTC transfer depends on the level of informal care, which is assumed to be observable, while children's altruism is not. Our policy encompasses two policies traditionally considered in the literature: topping up policies consisting of a transfer independent of informal care, and opting out policies entailing a positive transfer only if children fail to provide care. We show that both total and informal care should increase with the children's level of altruism. This is obtained under full and asymmetric information. Public LTC transfers, on the other hand, may be non‐monotonic. Under asymmetric information, public LTC transfers are lower than their full information level for the parents whose children are the least altruistic, while it is distorted upward for the highest level of altruism. This is explained by the need to provide incentives to highly altruistic children. In contrast to both topping up and opting out policies, the implementing contract is always such that social care increases with informal care.     

Free‐Riding and the Provision of Public Goods in the Family: A Laboratory Experiment*

We examine the provision of family public goods using experimental economics methods. With sufficient altruism and shared resource arrangements, families can provide the efficient level of family public goods. Becker's Rotten Kid Theorem asserts that transfers from altruistic parents will induce children to maximize family income even if children are not altruistic toward other family members. Consistent with altruism, parents and children contributed more to a public good when in groups with family members than when in groups with strangers. In contrast to the predictions of the Rotten Kid Theorem, however, children's behavior fell short of maximizing family income.     

Estate recovery and long‐term care insurance

Estate recovery is a policy under which the state recovers part of long‐term care (LTC) subsidies from the estates of deceased beneficiaries. This paper studies the effect of estate recovery on LTC insurance demand. This effect strongly relies on the bequest motive since the main purpose behind purchasing LTC insurance is to protect bequests from the financial costs of LTC. We find that the impact of estate recovery on LTC insurance depends on the level of parental bequests and on whether and how the parent anticipates the child's preferences with respect to informal care. More specifically, we show that estate recovery encourages the parent to purchase LTC insurance when his child is considered selfish or to like providing care. However, this policy could provide disincentives to LTC insurance purchase by the parent if his child is considered to dislike providing informal care. Our results also show that estate recovery reduces and may even eliminate public support crowding out of private LTC insurance demand. Finally, we characterize the welfare implications of financing LTC public support by estate recovery.     

Survival of the gene,intergenerational transfers and precautionary saving

This paper provides a model of bequest and investment in children's human capital at low incomes. It posits that parents and children are linked through their common concern of grandchildren and intergenerational transfers provide a material basis for the perpetuation of the family line. The model characterizes intergenerational strategic interactions in a dynamic game theoretical framework. Moreover, it explores intergenerational uncertainty as a source of precautionary saving. In contrast with the existing literature, the model implies that there are qualitative differences between precautionary saving from one's own income uncertainty and precautionary bequests from children's income uncertainty.     

Why do parents socialize their children to behave pro-socially? An information-based theory

We present a model of intergenerational transmission of pro-social values in which parents have information about relevant characteristics of society that is not directly available to their children. Differently from existing models of cultural transmission of values (such as Bisin and Verdier, 2001, Tabellini, 2008) we assume that parents are exclusively concerned with their children's material welfare. If parents coordinate their educational choices, a child would look at her system of values to predict the values of her contemporaries, with whom she may interact. A parent may thus choose to instill pro-social values into his child in order to signal to her that others can generally be trusted. This implies that parents may optimally decide to endow their children with values that stand in contrast with maximization of material welfare, even if their children's material welfare is all they care about.     

should Transfers To Poor Families Be Conditional On School Attendance? A Household Bargaining Perspective*

This article considers the welfare implications of transfers to poor families that are conditional on school attendance and other forms of investment in children's human capital. Family decisions are assumed to be the result of (generalized) Nash bargaining between the two parents. We show that, as long as bequests are zero, conditional transfers are better for children than unconditional transfers. The mother's welfare may also be improved by conditional transfers. Thus, conditioning transfers to bequest‐constrained families have potentially desirable intergenerational and intragenerational welfare effects. Conditioning transfers to unconstrained families make every family member worse off.     

Intergenerational transfer,human capital and long-term growth in China under the one child policy

We suggest that the demographic changes caused by the one child policy (OCP) may not harm China's long-term growth. This is because of the higher human capital accumulation induced by the intergenerational transfer arrangements under China's poor-functioning formal social security system. Parents raise their children and depend on them for support when they reach an advanced age. A decrease in the number of children prompted by the OCP results in parents investing more in their children's education to ensure retirement consumption. In addition, decreased childcare costs strengthen educational investment through an income effect. Using a calibrated model, a benchmark with the OCP is compared to three counterfactual experiments without the OCP. Output in 2025 without OCP decreases about 4% under moderate estimates. The output gain comes from a greatly increased educational investment driven by fewer children (11.4 years of schooling rather than 8.1). Our model sheds new light on the prospects of China's long-term growth by emphasizing the OCP's growth enhancing role through human capital formation under intergenerational transfer arrangements.     

Intergenerational transfers,demographic transition,and altruism: Problems in developing Asia

This paper develops a three‐period overlapping‐generations model where middle‐aged agents care about not only their own lifetime utility but also their old parents' and children's well‐being. The doubly altruistic agents choose amounts of intergenerational transfers to their old parents and children as well as private savings. The government specifies amounts of public transfers from working adults to the dependents. The model also takes the effects of demographic transition on the burdens of supporting the elderly and children into account. Using 23 countries' data from the National Transfer Accounts (NTA ), we estimate the degrees of filial and parental altruism and adjust them for their respective life expectancy and fertility rates. The findings suggest that people in developing countries are more parentally altruistic than those in developed ones while the adjusted degree of filial altruism tends to be low in developing Asia. Our welfare analyses reveal that the developing Asian countries must introduce more comprehensive public welfare programs for the elderly to maximize social welfare. Moreover, their low adjusted degree of filial altruism may trap the developing Asian countries at the low levels of public old‐age support and social welfare as the further demographic transition ensues.     

The consumption tax in the presence of altruistic cash and human capital bequests with endogenous fertility decisions

We provide an analysis of the consumption tax policy in the presence of cash bequests, human capital investments in children, and endogenous fertility decisions. It is shown that the consumption tax is no longer neutral if the tax rate is constant over the taxpayer's life cycle, labor supply is exogenous, and the parent expects the offspring to pay the same tax rate, if the number of children is chosen optimally by the parent. Neutrality breaks down because the shadow prices of both bequests and fertility are interlinked; it is more expensive to produce a child the larger either bequest is and it is more expensive to make a bequest of either type to each child the larger the number of children produced. Several examples are provided where imposing the consumption tax induces an increase in the number of children produced and a decrease in net capital formation.     

Raising productivity with pension premium

We argue that parents underinvest in growing their own children's capability in the absence of property rights over their future income, and that causes economic waste. No amount of collaborative choice among contemporary adults for public education could eliminate it because they face a resource constraint set by their predecessors. Such intergenerational dependence requires an intergenerational contract instead. It involves rewarding parents with a pension premium tied to their own children's taxable income paired with a matching subsidy to parental expenditure. We show how it fully internalizes the intergenerational externality, related to parenting, to eliminate economic waste and, thereby, to raise labor productivity and economic welfare. Our quantitative analysis of a baseline economy reveals significant welfare gains in economies with population ageing coupled with a low degree of parental care for children's future welfare and high returns to parental expenditure on children.     

Public pensions and growth

This paper investigates the relationship between the size of an unfunded public pension system and economic growth in an overlapping generation economy, in which altruistic parents finance the education of their children and leave bequests. Unlike the existing literature, we model intergenerational altruism by assuming that children's income during adulthood is an argument of parental utility. Unfunded public pensions can promote growth when families face liquidity constraints preventing them from investing optimally in the education of their children. We consider two alternative ways of financing a public pension system, either by levying social contributions in a lump-sum manner or in proportion to labour income. We find that there is no case for unfunded public pensions in economies where bequests are operative. By contrast, there exists a growth-maximising size of the public pension system in economies where bequests are not operative and individuals are sufficiently patient.     

Tax avoidance and intra-family transfers

We study how taxes on intra-family transfers (bequests and gifts) affect parents' transfers to their children. Our focus is on the incentives for tax avoidance. These issues are important for families and their welfare, as well as for governments and their possibilities of raising revenue from transfer taxes. Using a theoretical model, we show how altruistic parents avoid taxes by changing the timing of transfers when inter vivos gifts are taxed separately from bequests (which is the case in many developed countries). The excess burden per tax dollar of the transfer taxes is sometimes infinitely large because of tax avoidance. All tax avoidance is eliminated if bequests and gifts from the same donor are jointly taxed.     

Do Parental Networks Pay Off? Linking Children's Labor‐Market Outcomes to Their Parents' Friends

In this paper, we examine whether children are better off if their parents have more elaborate social networks. Using data on high‐school friendships of parents, we analyze whether the number and characteristics of friends affect the labor‐market outcomes of children. While parental friendships formed in high school appear long lasting, we find no significant impact on their children's occupational choices and earnings prospects. These results do not change when we account for network endogeneity, network persistency, and network measurement error. Only when children enter the labor market do friends of parents have a marginally significant but small influence on their occupational choice.     

Capital Accumulation and Fiscal Policy in an OLG Model with Family Altruism

The idea of family altruism is that parents care only about their children's income and not about the use of this income made by the children. First, we establish dynamical properties which place the OLG model with family altruism halfway between the model with pure life‐cyclers ( Diamond 1965 ; American Economic Review 55, 1126–1150) and the one with dynastic altruism ( Barro 1974 ; Journal of Political Economy 82, 1095–1117). Then, we show that this concept leads to interesting fiscal policy conclusions less clear‐cut and more realistic than those obtained with the two previous standard OLG models: a pay‐as‐you‐go social security is neutral but not a public debt.     

Social Security and Growth in an Altruistic Economy

This paper studies the macroeconomic impact of private and public intergenerational transfers in the presence of endogenous growth. It focuses on two-sided altruism implying that individuals have both a motive to make gifts to their parents and a motive to leave bequests to their children. The growth effects of social security depend on whether children are making gifts to their parents or parents are leaving bequests to their children. Which of the transfers is operative, in turn, depends on the size of social security benefits. Social security is legislated endogenously. The introduction of a social security program which definitely reduces per capita income growth and harms future generations is contemplated by altruistic individuals even if non-altruistic individuals disapprove it.     

The causal effects of parents’ schooling on children's schooling in urban China

Parental schooling is widely thought to improve child outcomes. But most studies on parental-child relations are associative, without control for estimation problems, such as unobserved intergenerationally-correlated endowments, if causality is of interest. The few exceptions are relatively recent studies that focus on high-income countries (HICs), with their much different contexts than the low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) in which the vast majority of children globally are growing up. This paper estimates the causal (conditional on the assumptions for the model) relationships between parents’ schooling and their children's schooling in the most populous LMIC, using adult identical (monozygotic, MZ) twins data from urban China. Our ordinary least-squares estimates show that one-year increases in maternal and paternal schooling are associated, respectively, with 0.4 and 0.5 more years of children's schooling. However, if we control for genetic and other endowment effects by using within-MZ fixed effects, the results indicate that mothers''and fathers’ schooling have no significant effects on children's schooling. Our main results remain with various robustness checks, including controlling for measurement error. These results suggest that the positive associations between children's and parents’ schooling in standard cross-sectional estimates in this major LMIC are mainly due to the correlation between parents’ unobserved endowments and their schooling and not the effects of their schooling per se.     

Schooling and the Intergenerational Transmission of Values

We present a model of the evolution of identity via dynamic interaction between the choice of education and the transmission of values in a community from parents to children, when parents care about the preservation of their traditional community values, different from the values of the host society. We compare the educational and socioeconomic outcomes in different scenarios (melting pot versus multiculturalism). If schooling shifts children's identity away from their parents' values, parents may choose lower levels of education for their children, at the cost of reducing their future earnings. We show how this effect can be attenuated and reversed when the school or, indeed, the host society are willing to accommodate the values of the community and/or to adjust to these values; otherwise the community gradually becomes alienated. This approach may be applied to the analysis of temporal changes in values and attitudes in a community of immigrants, as well as ethnic, religious, or other minority groups.     

Family Altruism and Incentives

This paper characterizes the pattern of intergenerational transfers that emerges in an altruistic model of the family when children's effort is explicitly made endogenous and parents have imperfect information on the stochastic income realizations of their children. It is shown that, if parents can credibly commit to a pattern of transfers, they will choose not to compensate children in bad outcomes as much as predicted by the standard (no uncertainty, no asymmetric information) dynastic model of the family. In this context, Ricardian equivalence holds whenever non‐negativity constraints are not binding.     

(Not) Valuing Care: A Review of Recent Popular Economic Reports on Preschool in the US

Abstract

Recently, a series of popular economics “Invest in Kids” (IIK) reports in the United States has called for increased investment in children's early education. These national reports articulate a new concept, the “public finance value” of children, and argue for increased investment in preschool because of its positive impact on the long-term fiscal health of the nation. This paper analyzes the IIK reports from 2003–6 to assess their attention to the multidimensional aspects of early care and education (ECE) in the US. Although the reports evaluate increased investment in preschool, they fail to recognize the need for a comprehensive system of ECE that includes support for childcare and the unpaid care and education provided by parents. As a result, the reports undervalue the contributions of women and of the ECE sector itself. Feminist economics offers a broader perspective that would help the IIK authors avoid conceptual traps and recognize the need for more comprehensive reforms.     

Does providing informal elderly care hasten retirement? Evidence from Japan

This paper examines the implications of providing care to elderly parents for adult children's retirement plans using micro data from a Japanese survey. We find no significant effect of caregiving on family caregivers’ planned retirement age if we do not take into account caregiving intensity but find a negative and significant effect on retirement plans for intensive caregivers, particularly among women. These findings suggest that relying on family members to provide elderly care can pose a serious challenge to the ongoing efforts of the government to promote the labor supply of women and the elderly as a way of addressing the shrinkage of the working‐age population in Japan. The estimation results suggest that ensuring access to formal care services can help family members reconcile their paid work with caregiving requirements, thereby alleviating the adverse effect of caregiving on their retirement plans. The results also suggest that the financial burden of formal care services could require caregivers to postpone retirement in some cases.