Market share dynamics in a duopoly model with word-of-mouth communication

We analyze dynamic price competition in a homogeneous goods duopoly, where consumers exchange information via word-of-mouth communication. A fraction of consumers, who do not learn any new information, remain locked-in at their previous supplier in each period. We analyze Markov perfect equilibria in which firms use mixed pricing strategies. Market share dynamics are driven by the endogenous price dispersion. Depending on the parameters, we obtain different ‘classes’ of dynamics. When firms are impatient, there is a tendency towards equal market shares. When firms are patient, there are extended intervals of market dominance, interrupted by sudden changes in the leadership position.     

Trade and industrial structure with large firms and heterogeneity

We develop a model of trade and firm heterogeneity in an oligopolistic setting. This setting generates key differences in terms of modelling setup, modelling predictions and welfare implications with respect to the existing literature on trade and firm heterogeneity. In terms of modelling setup our approach allows us to explore interaction between potentially large heterogeneous firms, in contrast to recent trade literature with heterogeneity and atomistic firms. As a result variables like market price and total sales vary endogenously as different firms enter the market. We offer a solution for the integer problem inherent in small group models, based on stochastic dominance. The model generates testable predictions deviating from the benchmark firm heterogeneity model of Melitz (2003) in terms of the effect of trade liberalisation on markups, market shares, the market price. We also derive predictions on the effect of distance and market size on the probability of zero trade flows and export prices. Our model features the possibility that welfare declines as a result of trade liberalisation. The result in Brander and Krugman (1983), the benchmark model for trade under oligopoly, that welfare unambiguously rises with free entry and might decline without free entry due to increased cross-hauling is reversed. In a setting with heterogeneous instead of homogeneous firms, welfare might decline with free entry. A negative welfare effect without free entry can be ruled out if the firm size distribution is sufficiently dispersed.     

Entry and industry evolution: the UK car industry, 1958—83

This paper models entry and the subsequent changes in market structure in three segments of the UK car industry, 1958–83. The entry equation emerges from a dynamic optimization model which allows for the costs of acquiring market share. The model is used to explore the hypothesis that the market penetration of entrants in this industry was facilitated by a post-entry advertising war which the incumbent firms lost. The basic hypothesis under examination is that advertising both facilitates and restricts entry, but that it does so in a way that varies systematically over time. The data are consistent with this view, showing that high advertising shares readily translate into high market shares, but that the escalation of industry advertising caused by entry can make high advertising entry strategies increasingly costly over time.     

Strategic pricing and entry deterrence under price-cap regulation

This paper shows that dynamic price-cap regulation allows the regulated firm to deter entry. Under dynamic price-cap regulation, the allowed prices in each period are an increasing function of the prices set in the previous period. By setting a low price before entry, the regulated firm can commit itself to charge a low price in the event of entry. If this price is sufficiently low with respect to the potential entrant's fixed cost, entry does not occur. Whether the regulated firm prefers to deter or accommodate entry depends on the level of the entry cost for the prospective entrant, on the tightness of the price-cap and on the degree of market power of the competing firms in case of entry.     

Price collusion with free entry: the parasitic competition

The market equilibrium that is generated in the presence of both price collusion and free entry is analyzed taking under consideration the case of a homogeneous product and the case of differentiated products. The outcomes of this market regime are compared with those of other regimes, including competition (or monopolistic competition), monopoly, fixed price with collusive entry limitation. Some welfare implications of the market regime of price collusion with free entry are examined, with respect to the maximum social welfare allocation and the allocations of other market regimes, so to highlight the inefficiency of price collusion with free entry. The number of producers results to be the maximum number of firms that can produce without incurring into losses. Therefore, social distress is caused by a displacement from the price collusion equilibrium with free entry. Its defence can thus be considered in reference to the desirability of social goals that are in contradiction with economic efficiency.     

Forecasting future demand for large-screen television sets using conjoint analysis with diffusion model

The methodological framework proposed in this paper addresses two limitations of the basic Bass diffusion model: that it does not reflect competition among products nor does it forecast demand for products that do not exist in the marketplace. The model consists of four steps. First, to investigate consumer preferences for product attributes, we use conjoint analysis to estimate the utility function of consumers. Next we estimate the dynamic price function of each competing product to reflect technological changes and the evolving market environment. Then we derive dynamic utility function by combining the static utility function and the price function. Finally, we forecast the sales of each product using estimated market share and sales data for each period, which are derived from the dynamic utility function and from the Bass diffusion model, respectively.We apply this model to South Korea's market for large-screen televisions. The results show that (1) consumers are sensitive to picture resolution and cost and (2) in the near future, should the market see the introduction of liquid crystal display (LCD) TVs with screens larger than 50 inches, the high resolution and steep price drop of LCD will lead LCD TVs to capture a larger market share than TVs with other display types. Finally, our results show that TVs with 40-inch screens are preferred over TVs with larger screens.     

One for all or all for one: Does the category captain play favourites

In the consumer packaged goods industry, category captain is the company (e.g., Pepsi) that retailers (e.g., Kroger) designate as the leader of an entire product category (e.g., carbonated beverages) and collaborate with to manage the product category through the process of category management. Much uncertainty exists about the consequences of category management. We use a unique data set on the ready-to-eat cereals category in which the retailer designated a category captain. In this paper, we find that category captain does not have more to gain in terms of market shares than other products within the ready-to-eat cereals category, alleviating antitrust concerns related to category management. In addition, we find that category captain increases the market share of products that are more price competitive, not necessarily that of its own products, which points to a category captain focusing on growing the category's market as it is incentivized to do so.     

Optimal Policy with Tradable and Bankable Pollution Permits: Taking the Market Microstructure into Account

This paper analyzes how the way emission permits are traded—their market microstructure—affects the optimal policy to be adopted by the environmental agency. The microstructure used is one of a quote driven market type, which characterizes many financial markets. Market makers act as intermediaries for trading the permits by setting an ask price and a bid price. The possibility of bank permits is also introduced in our dynamic two‐period model. We consider two models whether the market makers are perfectly informed about the technology of the producers or not. When the market makers have complete information, the equilibrium price of permits is the same as if the market is walrasian. When they are imperfectly informed, they may set a positive spread between bid and ask permit prices, which creates some inefficiency as the marginal abatement costs of polluters do not equalize. By allowing more flexibility in the use of the permits, banking may reduce the spread. Moreover, it may introduce price rigidities due to intertemporal arbitrage. In this framework, the circumstances under which banking should be allowed or not depend crucially on the evolution of the marginal willingness to pay for the environment.     

GRADUAL NETWORK EXPANSION AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS

ABSTRACT 1 : Universal service obligations are usually not competitively neutral as they modify the way firms compete in the market. In this paper, we consider a continuum of local markets in a dynamic setting with a stochastically growing demand. The incumbent must serve all markets (ubiquity) possibly at a uniform price and an entrant decides on its market coverage before firms compete in prices. Connecting a market involves a sunk cost. We show that the imposition of a uniform price constraint modifies the timing of entry: for low connection cost markets, entry occurs earlier while for high connection cost markets, entry occurs later.     

Strategic pricing of equity issues

Summary. Consider a general equilibrium model where agents may behave strategically. Specifically, suppose some firm issues new shares. If the primary market price is controlled by the issuing institution and investors' expectations on future equity prices are constant in their share purchases, the share price on the primary market cannot exceed the secondary market share price. In certain cases this may imply strict underpricing of newly issued shares. If investors perceive an influence on future share prices overpriced issues may occur in equilibrium. This provides an example of strategic price manipulation in general equilibrium models with sequential markets. Received: March 14, 2000; revised version: May 15, 2001     

中国股票市场流通性价值研究——基于非流通股协议转让与限售股转让的证据

文章利用股权分置改革前的非流通股协议转让样本与股权分置改革后的限售股票转让样本研究中国股票市场的流通性价值水平。研究结果表明,流通性存在价值,股权分置改革前,股票流通性价值水平均值约为66%,流通股市场的流动性显著影响股票流通性价值,但流通股的流动性与流通股价格波动率对股票流通性价值没有显著影响;股改后的股票流通性价值水平约为56%,流通股的流动性与波动性水平显著影响流通性价值。     

Modelling economic hysteresis losses caused by sunk adjustment costs

Transition from one economic equilibrium to another as a consequence of shocks is often associated with sunk adjustment costs. Firm-specific sunk market entry investments (or sunk market exit costs) in case of a reaction to price shocks are an example. These adjustment costs lead to a dynamic supply pattern similar to hysteresis. In analogy to “hysteresis losses” in ferromagnetism, the authors explicitly model dynamic adjustment losses in the course of market entry and exit cycles. They start from the micro level of a single firm and use explicit aggregation tools from hysteresis theory in mathematics and physics to calculate dynamic losses. The authors show that strong market fluctuations generate disproportionately large hysteresis losses for producers. This could give a reason for the implementation of stabilizing measures and policies to prevent strong (price) variations or, alternatively, to reduce the sunk entry and exit costs.     

中国股票市场外国投资者所有权投资的限制与市场分割

本文针对中国股票市场1992-1997年度的A股和B股的市场分割问题进行研究,并讨论了B股大幅度折价的原因.研究发现A、B股价差的主要原因是B股市场缺乏流动性.B股相对缺乏流动性导致了投资者较高的期望收益,因此定价较低,以补偿投资者增加的交易成本.但是,在这两类股票中,B股价格比A股价格更接近于市场基本面.因此,本文认为,1992-1997年度的中国股票市场,实际上是A股溢价,而不是B股折价.     

Fuel Prices,Sales Taxes and Passenger Car Market Shares in New Zealand, 1963–1978*

This paper estimates a set of market share equations for new passenger cars in New Zealand over the period 1963 to 1978. These equations are then used to determine the effects on market shares of the fuel price increases and tax rate changes that occurred in the 1970s. The results indicate that the fuel price increases had a major impact on market shares, but that the tax changes probably did not.     

Endogenous market structures and antitrust policy

I revisit the post-Chicago approach to antitrust issues examining markets whose structure is endogenous. The usual analysis of oligopolies with strategic interactions and an exogenous number of firms is extended to the case of endogenous entry, which determines the degree of market power. The role of predation is evaluated within a generalization of the contestability theory to strategic interactions. Endogenous entry requires a revision of our understanding of the role of incumbents in pricing, producing in the presence of network externalities, bundling products, price discriminating, and delegating to retailers through vertical restraints: when entry is endogenous, leaders adopt aggressive strategies typically without exclusionary purposes and without reducing welfare. Endogenous entry has also implications for the analysis of mergers, that take place only if they create enough cost efficiencies and do not harm consumers, beneficial concentration, technology transfers, and cartels. The spirit of the policy recommendations of the Chicago school is broadly supported by our analysis.     

ENTRY REGULATIONS,WELFARE, AND DETERMINANTS OF MARKET STRUCTURE

Welfare effects of entry regulations are theoretically ambiguous in differentiated product markets. We use a dynamic oligopoly model of entry and exit with store‐type differentiation and static price setting to evaluate how entry regulations affect long‐run profitability, market structure, and welfare. Based on unique data for all retail food stores in Sweden, we estimate demand, recover variable profits, and estimate entry costs and fixed costs by store type. Counterfactual policy experiments show that welfare increases when competition is enhanced by lower entry costs. Protecting small stores by imposing licensing fees on large stores is not welfare enhancing.     

Consumers with differing reaction speeds,scale advantages and industry structure

The development of an industry is seen as the outcome of a differential game in which market shares flow in response to price differences. It is hypothesized that while all consumers eventually react to price differences, some are slower than others. If scale advantages have some influence on marginal costs around average market share, then, under reasonable conditions, only skewed size distributions can be locally stable steady states. In addition, and contrary to common belief, the largest firm need not eventually monopolize the industry.     

Entry Deterrence and Entry Accommodation Strategies of a Multiproduct Firm Regulated with Dynamic Price Cap

In this paper we study the way a multiproduct firm, regulated through a dynamic price cap, can develop a price strategy that uses the regulatory policy to deter entry. We consider a firm that initially operates as a monopolist in two markets but faces potential entry in one of the markets. We conclude that the regulated firm can have the incentive to block the entry. This strategy leads to the reduction of the price in both markets. However, the final effect of the entry deterrence strategy on total consumer surplus is not always positive.     

Innovation diffusion with generation substitution effects

Markets of high technology products and services, such as telecommunications, are described by fast technological changes and rapid generational substitutions. Since the conventional modeling approaches that are based on diffusion models do not usually incorporate this important aspect into their formulations, the accuracy of the provided forecasts is consequently affected. The work presented in this paper is concerned with the development of a methodology for describing innovation diffusion, in the context of generation substitution. For this purpose, a dynamic diffusion model is developed and evaluated, based on the assumption that the saturation level of the market does not remain constant throughout the diffusion process but is affected by the diffusion of its descendant generation, as soon as the latter is introduced into the market. In contradiction to the conventional diffusion models, which assume static saturation levels, the proposed approach incorporates the effects of generation substitution and develops a diffusion model with a dynamic ceiling. The importance of such an approach is especially significant for markets characterized by rapid technological and generational changes. Evaluation of the proposed methodology was performed over 2G and 3G historical data and for a number of European countries, providing quite accurate estimation and forecasting results, along with important information regarding the rate of generation substitution.