区域一体化、经济增长与政治晋升

我国市场分割问题比较突出，但区域经济一体化的出现以及增多已成为一个重要现象。为什么有些省区选择市场分割，而有些却致力于区域一体化？地方政府在处理区际关系上的迥异行为是否具有内在一致性的解释？我们从中央政府按照经济绩效晋升地方政府官员的假设出发，构造一个地方官员晋升博弈模型，证明了，为了政治晋升最大化，地方官员选择地方市场分割还是区域一体化因条件而异。实证分析支持模型的预测。     

晋升博弈中政府官员的激励与合作--兼论我国地方保护主义和重复建设问题长期存在的原因

过去大量的研究强调行政性分权和财政包干下地方官员的财政激励对区域经济发展及其互动的影响。本文建立了一个地方官员政治晋升博弈的简单模型 ,旨在强调地方官员的晋升激励对地区间经济竞争和合作的影响。由于政治晋升博弈的基本特征是一个官员的晋升直接降低另一个官员的晋升机会 ,即一人所得为另一人所失 ,这使得同时处于政治和经济双重竞争的地方官员之间的合作空间非常狭小 ,而竞争空间非常巨大。该模型理解我国区域经济竞争与合作问题提供了一个系统的视角和框架 ,它尤其有助于解释我国长期存在的地方保护主义、“大而全”的地区发展战略和地区间形形色色的产业“大战”和恶性竞争。     

区域经济差距、短期目标导向与市场分割

在财政分权、政绩竞赛等多种因素的交织影响下,市场分割成为中国经济发展的一大顽疾,阻碍了区域间资源和商品的自由流动与竞争,本文通过构建地方政府间的无限重复博弈模型,探讨了区域经济差距和地方政府的短期目标导向对市场分割的影响机理,并以2003-2017年间中国任意两省市的配对组合为样本进行了实证检验.研究发现,在竞争格局下,地方政府存在着一定的"经济合作空间",具有共同建设并维护全国统一市场的动力.然而,市场分割阻碍了这种经济合作,其中区域经济差距超出合理区间是地方政府放弃合作策略、形成市场分割的根源之一,而地方政府的短期目标导向则进一步加剧了这一问题.首先,两地间的市场规模差距和技术效率差距越大,地方政府越可能放弃合作策略而形成严重的市场分割;其次,地方政府的短期目标导向不仅会促进市场分割水平上升,而且还通过调节作用使地方政府的经济合作空间进一步减小,加剧了区域经济差距对市场分割的正向影响.     

中国地方政府官员的隐性激励机制——基于职业生涯考虑模型

利用职业生涯考虑模型,分析了中国地方政府官员的激励机制。研究发现,地方政府官员在职业生涯的前期会选择努力工作,树立工作能力强的声誉;而在职业生涯的后期,地方政府官员的能力已经被上级政府了解,晋升无望的地方政府官员没有了工作的动力。领导干部终身制会产生激励不足,而官员的任期制解决了地方政府官员努力不足的问题。     

整体性治理、利益协调实现区域经济一体化

当前我国区域经济一体化受到行政分割的制约日益明显,但在市场经济体制尚不完善的条件下,政府仍是区域经济发展的主导力量,依靠政府推动区域经济一体化具有内在稳定性。政府间加强合作是推动我国区域经济一体化发展的最佳选择,而区域整体性治理模式则是在我国现有体制下推动地方政府加强合作的有效途径,但要以建立科学的利益协调机制为前提条件。     

市场分割对东北地区经济一体化的影响分析

2002年后东北地区呈现出经济一体化的态势,但是地方市场分割却阻碍了这一趋势。地方市场分割对东北地区经济一体化影响的程度与产业结构关系十分密切。高层次区域协调组织对打破地方市场分割,加快区域经济一体化进程,能起到非常重要的作用。     

市场一体化与区域协调发展

消除地方市场分割、建立完善全国统一开放的市场是否有利于区域经济的协调发展?本文从理论和实证两个方面展开讨论。在理论上,我们构造了一个简单可行的旨在考察地方市场分割(市场一体化)影响区域经济协调发展的分析框架。在实证上,以1990—2002年间的长三角城市群为样本,作者发现,随着长江三角洲城市经济协调会的成立、运行,地方市场分割对区域协调发展的阻碍作用已经下降了近50%。本文的发现是稳健的,有助于进一步增进对如何实现区域协调发展的理解。     

地方政府竞争视角下的我国区域市场分割研究综述

区域市场分割问题是空间市场一体化领域重要研究方向,地方政府竞争所衍生出的地方保护是我国市场分割形成的关键所在。以此为视角,对市场分割的理论探讨形成了基于财政激励的分析路径和基于政治晋升激励的分析路径两条基本研究脉络。目前理论研究重点开始由单纯探讨市场分割机理转向解释市场分割空间差异性。此外在干预市场手段上,研究逐渐由关注产品贸易领域的地方干预转向关注资本市场领域尤其是企业跨区并购和投资上的地方干预上来。研究方法上,未来需要重点引入对区域异质性,中央政府或制度监管,信息完备性以及多阶段,多主体博弈策略的考察,以便更好解释我国市场分割程度的空间差异性以及某些地区出现的市场整合趋势。     

晋升激励与财政分权条件下的地方政府规模

对于财政分权与地方政府规模关系有着较为深入的研究,但多不涉及晋升激励问题.然而,由于中国高度集中政治体制的存在,中央政府对地方政府官员的考核晋升对于地方政府官员行为产生十分重要的影响.本文通过构建理论模型对晋升激励与财政分权条件下地方政府行为模式进行探讨,认为以经济增长为主导的横向比较政绩考核方式在地区间经济差距扩大的情况下会促使一些地方政府将更多精力投入到追求财政收入增长的努力中,从而推动地方政府规模的不适度扩张.     

区位选择、地区差距与区域经济分割

产业的空间分布存在“倒U形曲线”。为了缩小与发达地区的差距,落后地区地方政府采取贸易和要素管制政策。这种政策导致发达地区产业的提前进入,出现了区域产业结构的趋同。为了保护本地市场,地方保护性政策得以产生并不断被自我增强,最终导致区域经济分割。通过中央政府的财政转移支付政策能够改变地方政府的最优政策选择,实现区域经济一体化。     

International cross-listing and stock market development in emerging economies

Why have emerging equity markets grown so rapidly since 1990? First, it is shown how international cross-listings can transform a segmented local equity market from an equilibrium of low liquidity and market capitalization to an integrated market with high liquidity and market capitalization by altering the incentives of companies and individuals to participate in the market. Second, benefits of international cross-listings for domestic stock market development and welfare across emerging equity markets are found to be negatively related to both the degree of correlation between the domestic and world equity market and the relative size of the domestic equity market. Third, the price impact of international listing is shown to depend on the liquidity conditions in the domestic market prior to listing.     

Changes in officials,total factor productivity fluctuation and government transformation: Evidence from Chinese prefecture cities

This paper investigates the interrelationships between changes in officials and total factor productivity (TFP) in China. The tournament competition for promotion results in a series of predicaments, such as excessive investment, duplicate construction, split regional markets and misallocations; these negative effects further inhibit local TFP. Local government transformation from driving investment to providing services can promote TFP. We use data from 230 prefecture cities between 1999 and 2013 and find the following: (a) in recent years with the process of government transformation, changes in officials have typically had less impact on TFP fluctuation than in previous years; (b) changes in officials mainly affect technology efficiency (TE) in TFP; and (c) the mediation model reveals that changes in officials' positions influences TFP through economic spillovers and tax competition. Overall, our paper offers novel evidence for the impact of government administration on productivity and technology development, which is significant for policy decisions during government transformation.     

地方官员激励、制度环境与要素市场扭曲*——基于中国省级面板数据的实证研究

探寻地方官员干预要素市场的动因是治理中国要素市场扭曲的前提,而地方官员对要素市场的干预可能主要源于财政、晋升和寻租等方面的激励。本文基于对现有文献的梳理和归纳,理论上分析了地方官员激励影响要素市场扭曲的机理,并利用中国省级层面面板数据对理论假说加以检验。研究发现：地方官员的财政激励、晋升激励和寻租激励对地区要素市场都产生了显著的扭曲效应,而“入世”后的这种扭曲效应下降了。在不同制度环境中,地方官员激励对要素市场扭曲的影响存在着差异。金融和法律环境的改善以及产权明晰程度的提高,能够在一定程度上规避地方官员激励对要素市场产生的扭曲效应。本文既拓展了官员激励和要素市场扭曲等研究领域,又启发了中国要素市场扭曲的治理方向。     

If at First You Don't Succeed…: Profits,Prices, and Market Structure in a Model of Quality with Unknowable Consumer Heterogeneity*

Why are higher quality niches seen as intrinsically more profitable in business circles? Why do high quality products sometimes have a low real price, whereas it is unusual to see low quality products with high real prices? Can markets have quality differentiation as well as quality bunching? How does the rate at which fixed costs change with quality affect market structure? In this article we develop a new model of quality that casts light on such issues.     

The Lure of Ill-Fitting Unemployment Statistics: How South Africa’s Discouraged Work Seekers Disappeared From the Unemployment Rate

ABSTRACT

Unemployment refuses unambiguous definition. Its statistical representation is always open to contestation, especially where labour markets differ from the Western-industrial norm. Why do countries adopt international standards even if they may fit local conditions poorly? South Africa is an exemplary case to answer this question. When Apartheid ended in the early 1990s, South African statisticians embraced the new emancipatory spirit. Their broad unemployment indicator defied international conventions but did justice to the marginalised Black population, and to Black women in particular. Since then, however, South Africa has fallen in line with the much narrower definition of the International Labour Organization (ILO), in spite of widespread criticism. Why? We find that ILO standards were not forced upon South Africa. Instead, South African statisticians themselves embraced international standards to repel charges of arbitrary or politically motivated numbers. Counterintuitively, international standards become alluring precisely when doubts about statistics’ fit with local conditions are the greatest.     

Profitable parallel trade in unionized markets

Why do producers often accept parallel trade in some markets such as automobiles, clothing, toys and consumer electronics? This paper points to a new factor, viz., the wage reducing effect of parallel trade in unionized markets, which may make parallel trading beneficial to a manufacturer. The benefit of parallel trade disappears in our analysis when such factor is removed.     

On the welfare equivalence of asset markets and banking in Diamond Dybvig economies

Why do people choose bank deposit contracts over a direct participation in asset markets? In their seminal paper, Diamond and Dybvig’s (1983) answer this question by claiming that bank deposit contracts can implement allocations that are welfare superior to asset markets equilibria. The present paper demonstrates that this claim is false whenever the asset market participants are highly rational.     

Bad Apples: Political Paralysis and the Quality of Politicians

Why do elected officials often suffer from political paralysis and fail to implement the best policies available? This paper considers a new and intuitive explanation that focuses on the quality of the politicians competing for office. The key insight is that a “good” incumbent with preferences identical to those of a representative voter will want to keep rent‐seeking politicians out of office; he may do so by distorting his policy choices to signal his type and win reelection. The value of signaling and staying in office increases with the fraction of rent‐seeking types in the population of politicians. Electing good types may therefore not be enough to ensure that the best policies are implemented, especially when rent seeking is widespread. This provides a new explanation for why political failure is particularly severe in corrupt democracies.