Voluntary Contributions to Multiple Public Projects

The problem of financing a set of discrete public goods (facilities, projects) by private contributions is studied. The corresponding cooperative game, the realization game , is shown to be convex. For the noncooperative setting we study a realization scheme that induces a strategic game. This contribution game is shown to be a generalized ordinal potential game ; a best–response in the contribution game implies a best response in a coordination game in which the payoff to all players is the utilitarian collective welfare function, i.e., the sum of the utility functions of the players. Strategy profiles maximizing utilitarian welfare are strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Each strong Nash equilibrium corresponds in a natural way with a core element of the realization game, and vice versa. Moreover, each strong Nash equilibrium is coalitional proof.     

Voluntary Contributions to a Mutual Insurance Pool

We study mutual‐aid games in which individuals choose to contribute to an informal mutual insurance pool. Individual coverage is determined by the aggregate level of contributions and a sharing rule. We analyze theoretically and experimentally the (ex ante) efficiency of equal and contribution‐based coverage. The equal coverage mechanism leads to a unique no‐insurance equilibrium while contribution‐based coverage develops multiple equilibria and improves efficiency. Experimentally, the latter treatment reduces the amount of transfers from high contributors to low contributors and generates a “dual interior equilibrium.” That dual equilibrium is consistent with the co‐existence of different prior norms which correspond to notable equilibria derived in the theory. This results in asymmetric outcomes with a majority of high contributors less than fully reimbursing the global losses and a significant minority of low contributors less than fully defecting. Such behavioral heterogeneity may be attributed to risk attitudes (risk tolerance vs risk aversion) which is natural in a risky context.     

Conditional Cooperation and Voluntary Contributions to Public Goods

We compare a partners condition , where the same small group of subjects plays a repeated public good game, to a strangers condition , where subjects play this game in changing group formations. From the first period onward, subjects in the partners condition contribute significantly more to the public good than subjects in the strangers condition. Strangers' contributions show continual decay, while partners' contributions fluctuate on a high level prior to decreasing in the final periods. We interpret subjects' behaviour in terms of conditional cooperation which is characterized by both future-oriented and reactive behaviour.
JEL classifications: C 91; C 92; H 41     

Getting the Ball Rolling: Voluntary Contributions to a Large-Scale Public Project

This paper examines dynamic voluntary contributions to a large‐scale project. In equilibrium, contributions are influenced by the interplay of two opposing incentives. While agents prefer to free ride on others for contributions, they also prefer to encourage others to contribute by increasing their own. Main findings of the paper are that (1) agents increase their contributions as the project moves forward; (2) as additional agents join the group, existing agents increase their contributions in the initial stages of the project while reducing them in the stages close to completion; (3) groups that are formed by more patient agents and that undertake larger projects tend to be larger; and (4) groups that rely on voluntary contributions tend to be too small compared to the social optimum. The empirical evidence on contributions to open‐source software projects provides partial support for these findings.     

Efficient Equilibria in the Voluntary Contributions Mechanism with Private Information

We characterize generally the Bayesian Nash equilibria of a voluntary contributions public goods game for two consumers with private information.The two consumers simultaneously make voluntary contributions to the public good, and the contributions are refunded if the total falls short of the cost of the public good. Several families of equilibria (step‐function, regular and semi‐regular) are studied. Necessary and sufficient conditions for regular and semi‐regular equilibrium allocations to be interim incentive efficient are derived. In the uniform distribution case we prove (i) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient regular equilibria when the cost of production is large enough and (ii) the existence of an open set of incentive efficient semi‐regular equilibria when the cost of production is low enough. Step‐function equilibra are proved to be interim incentive inefficient.     

Voluntary Contributions with Risky and Uncertain Marginal Returns: The Importance of the Parameter Values

Previous research indicates that risky and uncertain marginal returns from a public good lower contributions significantly. This paper presents experimental results showing that this effect depends on the employed parameterization.     

电子商务牵动物流业转型

电子商务代表着未来贸易发展的方向，它在本质上是传统商业活动的电子化、网络化，是以传统商务活动为基础上，随着互联网的应用日益普及，电子商务作为一种全新的、便捷的贸易形式，亦逐步为各国企业了解与采用，成为现代贸易活动中不可缺少的重要手段。据预测到2003年，因特网的用户将从1998年的520亿美元增加到13000亿美元。     

Japanese Contributions to the Theory of International Trade

This paper outlines a number of significant Japanese contributions to the theory of international trade in the postwar period, and identifies some of their characteristic topics and methods. It then seeks to explain these characteristics, with reference to Japan's intellectual and cultural heritage, its pressing national priorities, and the situation of the Japanese economist within Japanese society and the economics profession internationally. It is argued that despite these common characteristics we cannot speak meaningfully of a Japanese school of trade theory, although there is a characteristically Japanese approach to trade policy. Finally, some reasons for the neglect of Japanese contributions are explored.
JEL Classification Numbers: B20, F19.     

On the Contributions of Barbara Bergmann to Economics

Abstract

This paper examines the major economic contributions of Barbara R. Bergmann. After presenting her personal background information, it gives an overview of her theoretical framework. This is followed by her critique of economic methodology and an examination of her major contributions in micro-simulation, feminist analysis of labor markets and the family, and policy-oriented work focused on improving the lives of women and children. The essay concludes with a brief discussion of Bergmann's unique qualities as an activist economist in the pursuit of social change.     

Accounting for Fertility Decline During the Transition to Growth

In every developed country, the economic transition from pre-industrial stagnation to modern growth was accompanied by a demographic transition from high to low fertility. Even though the overall pattern is repeated, there are large cross-country variations in the timing and speed of the demographic transition. What accounts for falling fertility during the transition to growth? To answer this question, this paper develops a unified growth model that delivers a transition from stagnation to growth, accompanied by declining fertility. The model is used to determine whether government policies that affect the opportunity cost of education can account for cross-country variations in fertility decline. Among the policies considered, education subsidies are found to have only minor effects, while accounting for child labor regulation is crucial. Apart from influencing fertility, the policies also determine the evolution of the income distribution in the course of development.     

中国基础设施超常规发展的土地支持研究

过去20多年,中国基础设施获得超常规发展,现有文献主要强调政治激励影响。而本文发现,土地制度结构变迁是一个重要线索,中国基础设施超常规发展是土地制度结构变迁的一个可以解释的结果。本文在理论上证明,在一个政治集权经济分权以及土地公有制的经济体,除政治经济激励外,地方官员通过调控土地出让价格所形成的自我融资机制是影响一个地区基础设施最优供给量的主要因素,而该机制能否形成取决于一国的土地制度结构,这有助于从理论上解释中国与其他发展中国家存在的基础设施差别。在实证上,我们采用省级面板数据发现,土地支持假说成立。本文的工作意味着,中国基础设施的"以地谋发展"模式确实为其超常规发展贡献了主要力量,但由于该模式自身的一些缺陷,目前正面临着重要转型,出路是土地制度改革和新型城镇化建设。此外,在"一带一路"战略下,中国基础设施建设的经验具有复制推广以及帮助发展中国家消除基础设施瓶颈的更广泛意义。     

Contributions Feminist Economics Can Make to the Quality of Life Movement

This article articulates how and why feminist economists can move the quality of life literature forward and help it become a solid part of the social sciences rather than a subject whose perceived value fluctuates with political winds. Readers are challenged to consider and critique a proposed set of expectations to clearly define the field and set standards of excellence. Examples of this approach are provided from the experiences of an economic research firm striving to build on these guidelines in its work with nonprofit and for-profit organizations that design, fund, evaluate, and/or deliver programs that impact quality of life.     

Potential Contributions of Political Science to Environmental Economics

While political science has much to offer, at least some of its contributions might be difficult to incorporate into economic models. Nevertheless, we argue that environmental economics might benefit from supplementing, combining, or sometimes even replacing the rational choice approach with other approaches commonly used in political science. We develop our argument by examining three core components of political science analysis: ideas, power, and institutions. For each component we review political science approaches and propositions with a view to determining “what’s in it” for environmental economics.