The transfer of workers within multinationals and ownership of foreign affiliates

We study the variation in ownership shares across affiliates of the same multinational firm. Using the micro-level data on foreign affiliates of South Korean multinationals, we construct a proxy for the headquarter intangible asset using transferred Korean workers from the parent to the affiliate. Our results show a strong relationship with the parent ownership share even after controlling for the parent fixed effect. Our empirical evidence thus extends support for the theory on multinational firm boundaries at the micro-level.     

Cuba—Is the “Special Period” Really Over?

Since 1989, Cuba has struggled to recover from the loss of Soviet trade and subsidies. The Cuban government dubbed the period between 1990 and 1994 A Special Period in Peacetime in recognition of the 35% decline in GDP. Instead of restructuring its economy, the Cuban government used a bandaid approach that permitted self-employment, raised prices, legalized the dollar, and decreased government subsidies of state enterprises. Although growth resumed in 1994, the Cuban economy never fully recovered to pre-1989 levels of GDP. This paper discusses the investment, trade, and production problems that continue to plague the Cuban economy.     

On selective indirect tax reform in developing countries

The current consensus on indirect tax reform in developing countries favors a reduction in trade taxes with an increase in VAT to raise revenue. The theoretical results on selective reform that underlie this consensus are, however, derived from partial models that ignore the existence of an informal economy. Once the incomplete coverage of VAT due to an informal economy is acknowledged, we show that, contrary to the current consensus, the standard revenue-neutral selective reform of trade taxes and VAT reduces welfare under plausible conditions. Moreover, a VAT base broadening with a revenue-neutral reduction in trade taxes may also reduce welfare. The results raise serious doubts about the wisdom of the indirect tax reform policies pursued by a large number of developing countries.     

Evaluating the Relative Efficacy of the Marketing Function in the Construction Complex of Ukraine

The break up of the USSR pushed 15 constituent states into a transition phase from a regulated economy to a free market style one. Partially, this involved the wholesale importation of a variety of theories, strategies, and operational plans. This paper seeks to examine the efficiency of the use of the marketing communications mix in medium and large firms in the Ukraine’s construction complex during the transition period to a market oriented economy. In order to do so, a survey of the most significant, privately owned firms in the industry was conducted. A variety of quantitative measures were employed, including econometric estimates and certain elasticity coefficients that allowed us to asses existing tendencies in the industry, identify problems, and to make tentative recommendations.     

Credit constraints,inequality and the growth gains from trade

This paper tests the hypothesis that, in the presence of credit constraints, higher wealth inequality affects negatively the growth gains from trade liberalisation. Variations in the growth rate of value added–decomposed in the growth rate of the number of establishments and the growth rate in average size–of manufacturing industries in 34 developing countries before and after trade liberalisation are used to study the effects of inequality on the difference in growth under liberalised and nonliberalised regimes. The results show that the number of firms in industries with high dependence on external finance in countries with higher inequality grow significantly slower, in both statistical and economic terms, than in industries with low dependence on external finance in countries with lower inequality following a trade liberalisation relative to the closed-economy period.     

Persistent gaps and default traps

We show how vicious circles in countries' credit histories arise in a model where output persistence is coupled with asymmetric information about output shocks. In such an environment, default signals the borrower's vulnerability to adverse shocks and creates a pessimistic growth outlook. This translates into higher interest spreads and debt servicing costs relative to income, raising the cost of future repayments, thereby creating “default traps”. We build a long and broad cross-country dataset to show the existence of a history-dependent “default premium” and of significant effects of output persistence on sovereign creditworthiness, consistent with the model's predictions.     

How do transport costs affect firms’ exports? Evidence from a vanishing bridge

In this paper we provide estimates of the effects of international transport costs on firms’ exports and disentangle the channels of these effects. In so doing, we use a unique dataset consisting of highly disaggregated transaction-level trade and transport cost data and, in order to account for endogeneity, we exploit the exogenous variation in these costs associated with the non-trade related closure of the main bridge connecting two countries.     

Social capital and political institutions: Evidence that democracy fosters trust

This paper finds evidence that more democratic political institutions increase trust. Second generation immigrants with ancestries from 115 countries are studied within 30 European countries. Comparing individuals born and residing in the same country, those whose father was born in a more democratic country express higher trust than those whose father was born in a less democratic country. The results are robust to individual, parental, and ancestral country controls.     

A political economy theory of the soft budget constraint

Why do soft budget constraints exist and persist? In this paper we argue that the prevalence of soft budget constraints can be best explained by the political desirability of softness. We develop an infinite horizon political economy model where neither democratic nor autocratic politicians can commit to policies that are not ex post optimal. We show that because of the dynamic commitment problem inherent in the soft budget constraint, politicians can in essence commit to make transfers to entrepreneurs which otherwise they would not be able to do. This encourages such entrepreneurs to support them politically. Though the soft budget constraint may induce economic inefficiency, it may be politically rational because it influences the probability of political survival. In consequence, even when information is complete, politicians may fund bad projects which they anticipate they will have to bail out in the future. We show that, maybe somewhat surprisingly, dictators who are less likely to lose power, are more likely to use the soft budget constraint as a strategy to gain political support.     

Home and regional biases and border effects in Armington type models

We discuss biases in preferences and their trade effects in terms of impacts on non-neutral trade flows motivated by recent literature on both home bias and the border effect. These terms take on multiple definitions in the literature and are often used interchangeably even though they differ. The border effect refers to a higher proclivity to trade behind rather than across national borders and is usually defined by the coefficients of regional dummies from an estimated gravity model. It can be present both in data and in counterfactual model solutions. Sometimes the reduced form of the gravity model used is asserted to reflect an Armington type model. For the border effect to occur as a model outcome, a structural model with at least 2 home regions and 1 country abroad is needed. In contrast to current literature, we offer a characterization of various forms of preference bias in trade models and measures of their associated trade effects based on a concept we term trade neutrality. These effects go beyond conventional border effects, and can be both across and within borders. Home bias is typically specified as an Armington preference for domestic over comparable foreign products in a trade model where goods are heterogeneous across countries. It is reflected in both model structure and parameterization, but defined in several different ways in the literature. We assess the contribution of each form of bias to the set of possible trade effects using a calibrated model with 3 Canadian regions, the U.S., and the rest of the world using 2001 data. We also evaluate how much of the conventional border effect is accounted for when model biases are modified in various ways.     

Charities and the political support for estate taxation

We explain why wealthy people often favor estate taxation, while wealthless people oppose it. Wealthy people devote part of their estate to charities. Estate taxation with tax breaks for charities increases contributions to an otherwise underprovided public good.