A Hotelling–Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit

We study a variant of the multi-candidate Hotelling–Downs model that recognizes that politicians, even after declaring candidacy, have the option of withdrawing from the electoral contest before the election date and saving the cost of continuing campaign. We find that this natural variant significantly alters equilibrium predictions. We give conditions for the existence of an equilibrium for an arbitrary finite number of candidates and an arbitrary distribution of single-peaked preferences of voters. We also provide a partial characterization of the equilibrium outcomes that addresses whether policy convergence can be a feature of equilibrium outcomes when more than two candidates enter the electoral contest.     

Entry in a Dynamic Model with Equilibrium Price Dispersion with an Application to the Market for Long-Distance Telephone Services

Models of entry based on the traditional models of oligopoly do not allow for price dispersions on homogenous products. Yet, such price dispersions do exist for homogenous products, and a firm does not lose its entire market share when it fails to charge the lowest price. Existing models of equilibrium price dispersion are not designed to analyze entry in a dynamic framework. A dynamic model is developed that allows an analysis of the effects of entry into a previously monopolized market. Despite asymmetric initial shares, the market shares of equally efficient firms tend to equalize over time. An application is the market for long‐distance telephone services following the divestiture of the bell operating companies from AT&T.     

A Simple Extension of the Dasgupta–Maskin Theorem,with an Application

This paper generalizes the classical existence results for games with discontinuous payoffs, developed by Dasgupta and Maskin in 1986. This new existence result is then applied to a simple duopoly model with quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition.     

Imputing rent in consumption measures,with an application to consumption poverty in Canada, 1997–2009

We consider two econometric problems in the measurement of poverty, both relating to rent imputation. First, we account for quality differences correlated with selection into owner‐occupied versus rental tenure. This correction increases estimated household consumption by 5% over uncorrected estimates and decreases estimated poverty rates quite dramatically. Second, we propose that measurement error induced by the imputation be corrected by imputing a consumption distribution, rather than a consumption level, for each household. This correction increases estimated poverty rates slightly. We use our methods to measure consumption poverty in Canada, and find that the imputation strategy used influences the patterns observed. For example, measured poverty among the elderly barely declines when one uses our methods, in contrast to the almost 6 percentage point reduction we find using traditional methods. In our assessment of the over‐time evolution of consumption poverty, we find that substantial progress has been made on overall poverty and on child poverty, but that poverty among the elderly hardly changed.     

A solution to the Lucas–Uzawa model with increasing returns to scale: Note

Chilarescu [2008, An analytical solutions for a model of endogenous growth, Economic Modelling.] claims that he determines a solution path to the Lucas–Uzawa model with increasing returns to scale. However, the path is not a closed-form since it depends on the initial consumption and the initial time for goods production, that are unknown. Moreover, the production function is nonconcave and then the first order conditions and the transversality conditions are not sufficient for the optimality. This note converts the model to a problem in which the Hamiltonian is available and derives a fully-closed form solution.     

Competition Tests with a Non-Structural Model: the Panzar–Rosse Method Applied to Germany's Savings Banks

Abstract. In this paper we adopt the Panzar–Rosse approach to assess the competitive conditions in the German banking market for the period from 1993 to 2002. We suggest several improvements to the empirical application of the approach and show that frequently used empirical models that apply price rather than revenue functions lead to biased results. Using disaggregated annual data from more than 400 savings banks (Sparkassen) the empirical findings indicate monopolistic competition, the cases of monopoly and perfect competition are strongly rejected. Furthermore, small banks seem to enjoy even more market power than larger institutions.     

A GM(1,1)–Markov chain combined model with an application to predict the number of Chinese international airlines

In this paper, we propose a new dynamic analysis model which combines the first-order one-variable grey differential equation model (abbreviated as GM(1,1) model) from grey system theory and Markov chain model from stochastic process theory. We abbreviate the combined GM(1,1)–Markov chain (MC) model as MCGM(1,1) model. This combined model takes advantage of the high predictable power of GM(1,1) model and at the same time take advantage of the prediction power of Markov chain modelling on the discretized states based on the GM(1,1) modelling residual sequence. For prediction accuracy improvements, Taylor approximation is applied to MCGM(1,1) model. We call the improved version as T-MCGM(1,1) model. As an example, we use the statistical data of the number of Chinese international airlines from 1985 to 2003 for a validation of the effectiveness of the T-MCGM(1,1) model.     

A method for estimating the effect of a subsidy on the receiver's resource constraint: with an application to U.S. local governments 1964–1971

Most studies of the effects of subsidies or recipient behavior accept the nominal legal provisions of a grant as defining the actual effective resource constraint faced by the receiver. This paper argues that to the contrary the true effect of a subsidy on the receiver's resource constraint can not be read from nominal administrative requirements. Therefore, an indirect statistical method is required to discover the shape of the post subsidy budget line. This paper develops such a method, which is then applied to U.S. local government expenditure decisions on education for the period 1964–71.