The Political Economy of Environmental Taxes with an Aging Population

This paper develops a two-period overlapping-generations model with environmental externalities and uncertain lifetimes, and studies how two sources of population aging, greater longevity and a lower rate of population growth, affect the politically determined environmental tax and the quality of the environment. It is shown that greater longevity and a lower rate of population growth have entirely different effects on these factors; greater longevity has no effect on the environmental tax and has a non-positive effect on the environmental quality, whereas a lower rate of population growth has a negative effect on the tax and has a positive effect on the quality. In addition, the political decision-making on the tax leads to an inefficient allocation of capital and environmental quality.JEL classifications: D72, D78, D91, H41, O40, Q20, Q28     

The Final Incidence of Australian Indirect Taxes

The Australian Bureau of Statistics provides a breakdown by industry of the revenue collected from each of the major indirect taxes in Australia. This information does not show who bears the ultimate burden of indirect tax as each industry may pass on its initial burden to others. Thus, the burden of the tax may be passed on round by round to indirect business purchases and final demand until the total burden of the tax is passed onto the final consumer. Using a method to derive final indirect tax incidence developed from earlier studies, the final incidence of a selection of indirect taxes in Australia is presented. The major innovation is to include the use of margin industries in the initial flows of the input-output matrix ensuring that taxes on inputs to margin services are fully passed forward onto the good or service that the consumer purchases. It is found that many goods and services that are initially exempt from the main indirect taxes, such as the wholesale sales tax, have significant effective tax rates once taxes on inputs to industry are taken into account.     

Taxes or Fees? The Political Economy of Providing Excludable Public Goods

This paper provides a positive analysis of public provision of excludable public goods financed by uniform taxes or fees. Individuals differing in preferences decide, using majority rule, the provision level and financing instrument. The decisive voter has median preferences in a tax regime, but generally has above median preferences in a fee regime. Numerical solutions indicate that populations with uniform or left‐skewed distributions of preferences choose taxes, while a majority coalition of high‐ and low‐preference individuals prefer fees when preferences are sufficiently right skewed. Public good provision and welfare under fees exceeds that under taxes in the latter case.     

The Political Economy of the IRS

This paper tests a multiple principal–agent model of the Internal Revenue Service. Using data for 33 IRS districts over six tax years, 1992–1997, we report evidence that the fraction of individual income tax returns audited is significantly lower in districts that are important to the president electorally and that have representation on key congressional committees. These findings suggest that the IRS is not a rogue government agency, but rather is an effective bureaucratic agent of its political sponsors. Reforming the IRS by subjecting it to an independent oversight board appointed by the president would therefore seem to be redundant.     

The Political Economy of the Global Environment

Issues of the ‘global commons’ have secured a prominent place in environmental discourse. The temperature-regulating functions of the global atmosphere and radiation control functions of stratospheric ozone offer clear examples of true public goods. Other environmental assets, such as biodiversity and forests, are treated as if they are public goods, but in reality are complex mixtures of private goods, local public goods and global public goods. The approach to the provision and protection of these goods has tended to focus on the development of international agreements, such as those at the Rio de Janeiro ‘Earth Summit’ in 1992. But do these agreements contain the relevant incentives to conserve the global commons? Much depends on one's view of human nature. The Scottish economic tradition suggests that unless incentives focus on ‘self love’, as postulated by Hume and Smith, improvements will, at best, be marginal. A richer array of policy measures is obtained by analysing the potential for ‘global bargains’, trades that improve the environment whilst making each party better off. The souls of Hume and Smith surely approve recent developments in practical global bargains.     

The (International) Political Economy of Falling Wage Shares: Situating Working-Class Agency

This paper relates the financial and monetary dimensions of the contemporary economic crisis to working-class agency via a central concern of classical political economy: the distribution of surplus between the chief factors of production. The fall in the wage share of value added is now accepted as a stylised fact in the empirical economic literature. This paper argues that the punctuated pattern of the development validates the regulation theoretical narrative of an epochal shift from Fordism to finance-led accumulation. Furthermore, synthesising econometric studies supports a class-centred explanation. In the last instance, the falling wage share is due to successful transnational class rule in the form of a neoliberal hegemonic paradigm. Crucially, such class rule restructured the environment of trade unions, rendering increasingly ineffective its relational power resources. The paper concludes by considering the contradictory implications for organised labour of the current financial crisis. On the one hand, the financial crisis offers an opportunity to link its particular interests to the general interest of macroeconomic management since low wage share inhibits growth rates. But how might trade unions assert a higher wage share in the face of the structural power of (financial) capital?     

The Political Economy of the Kuznets Curve

The paper provides a political economy theory of the Kuznets curve. When development leads to increasing inequality, this can induce political instability and force democratization on political elites. Democratization leads to institutional changes which encourage redistribution and reduce inequality. Nevertheless, development does not necessarily induce a Kuznets curve, and it is shown that development may be associated with two types of nondemocratic paths: an "autocratic disaster," with high inequality and low output, and an "East Asian Miracle," with low inequality and high output. These arise either because inequality does not increase with development, or because the degree of political mobilization is low.     

The New Comparative Political Economy

With the collapse of communism in the late 1980s the field of comparative political economy has undergone major revision. Socialism is no longer considered the viable alternative to capitalism it once was. We now recognize that the choice is between alternative institutional arrangements of capitalism. Progress in the field of comparative political economy is achieved by examining how different legal, political and social institutions shape economic behavior and impact economic performance. In this paper we survey the new learning in comparative political economy and suggest how this learning should redirect our attention in economic development.JEL classification: B53, O10, O20, P0     

宏观税负约束下的间接税比重与城乡收入差距

本文在宏观税负约束的条件下,分析了间接税在总税收中比重的变化会对城乡收入差距产生何种影响。通过构建动态一般均衡模型和相应数值模拟分析,本文发现:随着间接税比重的提高,城乡收入差距扩大;在间接税比重不变的情况下,提升工业品商品税在间接税中的比重能够缩小城乡收入差距;当城乡之间的生产率差距、居民工资差距、人均财政支出差距变小时,间接税比重对城乡收入差距的边际作用变小,也即随着城乡二元经济结构特征的弱化,间接税扩大城乡收入差距的作用也在减弱。随后,本文进一步使用中国省级面板数据和多种计量模型对上述结论进行了验证。基于此,进一步降低间接税在总税收中的比重,尤其是在城乡二元经济结构特征明显的地区,将十分有利于缩小城乡收入差距。     

The Political Economy of Argentina's Debacle

In this paper I argue that political economy considerations and, in particular, the identity of the reformers, are central to understanding the Argentine crisis that culminated in sovereign default in January 2002. During the 1990s, the main political parties remained attached to populism, and no strong party emerged at the center of the political spectrum. This had two effects in the reform process. First, it severely deteriorated it (efficiency, corruption), reducing the support of the population. Second, when a series of shocks hit the economy the anti‐reform camp tried to undo most reforms, and thus convey a message to the population about the “right” model of the world.     

The Political Economy of Fiscal Consolidations

In the context of recent research in political economy, this paper addresses the policy problem of fiscal consolidation in terms of three types of issues: i) the macroeconomic effects of alternative strategies to consolidate; ii) the institutional setups conducive to a consolidation; and iii) the best strategy for implementing a consolidation in order to maximize its political feasibility. One methodological feature of this survey is an emphasis on policy feasibility. One methodological feature of this survey is an emphasis on policy issues in order to bridge the gap between the level of abstraction of politico-economic models of fiscal policy and the issues faced by a policymaker when attempting a fiscal consolidation.     

The Political Economy of Social Security

We consider a two-period overlapping generations model in which individual voters differ by age and by productivity. In such a setting, a redistributive pay-as-you-go system is politically sustainable, even when the interest rate is higher than the rate of population growth. The workers with medium wages (not those with the lowest wages) and the retirees form a majority which votes for a positive level of social security. This level depends on the difference between the rates of population growth and interest as well as on the redistributiveness of the benefit rule.     

论政治经济学、西方经济学的位置和功能

准确定位政治经济学、西方经济学的位置和功能,需要把握好以下问题:要正确看待西方经济学,分清西方经济学和当年马克思批判的资产阶级庸俗经济学的关系,鼓励对西方经济学进行创新性研究,有分析地加以利用;正确看待马克思主义在教学和研究中的指导作用,理解好马克思主义的基本内涵,采取与时俱进的态度来创新和发展政治经济学的资本主义部分,针对社会主义国家建设过程中出现的社会各阶层之间利益关系的矛盾,来创建社会主义政治经济学;深刻认识政治经济学和西方经济学的互补性。