A Note on the Theory of Charitable Fund-raising: The Role of Refunds

Andreoni (1998, Journal of Political Economy 106 , 1186–1213) shows that a small amount of seed money from the government can generate substantial additional private donations toward the provision of a public good, when there is a threshold level of provision below which no benefits are achieved. We argue that Andreoni's solution can be extended to a mechanism where refunds are possible. We then argue that a greater "bang per buck" may be achieved if the seed money is targeted to cover the administrative costs of providing refunds.     

Time vs. money — The supply of voluntary labor and charitable donations across Europe

In spite of its importance for civil society, we know relatively little about the way in which individuals spend their time and money in the charitable provision of goods and services. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive picture of the philanthropic behavior in Europe by analyzing both, the correlates of individuals' charitable cash donations and volunteer labor as well as their interdependence. Using data from the European Social Survey, we document a positive correlation between time and money contributions on the individual as well as on the country level. In addition, we find evidence that individuals substitute time donations by money donations as their time offered to the market increases. Moreover, analyzing philanthropic behavior on the disaggregated level reveals large differences in the determinants and the relationship of time and money donations in Europe – both across different types of voluntary organizations and across different welfare regimes.     

Revisiting the impact of impure public goods on consumers’ prosocial behavior: A lab experiment in Shanghai

In this study, we implemented a dictator game experiment to examine how the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good affects individuals’ prosocial behaviour. A within‐subject design was used in the experiment. The dictator game was repeated six times with an impure public good introduced in four of them. We observe that the increase of the public characteristic in an impure public good partly crowds out individuals’ subsequent donations, which could be explained by a seemingly ‘mental accounting’ mental process. In addition, we also find that the selfish behaviour of individuals in dictator games with impure public goods, to some extent, has an inertia influence on their subsequent donations when the impure public good is removed.     

Choosing Your Object of Benevolence: A Field Experiment on Donation Options*

In a large natural field experiment, we explore the effect of providing donors with the opportunity of choosing the target country for their donations. We find that our treatment manipulation affects neither the average donation size nor the response rate. Only a small fraction of donors (3.5 percent) actually choose their object of benevolence. These donors give more than those who do not specify a recipient. However, based on previous donations, we can only provide indicative evidence that this might be a causal effect rather than a mere selection effect.     

Trust,ability‐to‐pay,and charitable giving

In the literature on privately provided public goods, altruism has been motivated by what contributions can accomplish (public goods philanthropy), by the pleasure of giving (warm‐glow philanthropy), or by the desire to personally make a difference (impact philanthropy). Underlying these motives is the idea that individuals trust that their donations reach their goal. We revisit these models but allow for distrust in the institutional structures involved. An important result we derive is that trust considerations determine whether crowding out is less or more than complete, and we thus open up possibilities in terms of the extent of crowding out not currently available. We also model socially motivated philanthropy when income‐heterogeneous donors take trust and ability‐to‐pay into account. With ability‐to‐pay in social motivation, an important result we obtain is that low‐income donors may contribute more than high‐income donors (in both absolute and percentage‐of‐income terms), giving a potential theoretical foundation to the frequently observed “U‐shaped” pattern of giving.     

Dancing to the Donors' Tune? Policy Choice in Aid‐Dependent Countries

Current aid rhetoric emphasizes the selective allocation of otherwise unconditional funds in support of the recipients' own plans, in contrast to the old donor practice of bundling money and policies. I show that when recipients have private information, policies reflecting their preferences and knowledge might result in such a regime. However, generous transfers can also induce them to conform to the outcome‐oriented expectations of donors at the expense of lower aid impact. Such behaviour is consistent with an abundance of case‐study evidence. Moderate disagreements over what the optimal policy is could actually produce better results. Certain forms of both donor competition and coordination might also eliminate this distortion, while a donor concern for need only removes incentives for aid‐seeking in the least needy countries. In summary, optimal aid policies are highly context‐specific, and donors should thus concentrate their efforts to practise more informed selectivity.     

AN EVALUATION OF FINANCIAL INCENTIVE POLICIES FOR ORGAN DONATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

This paper examines the association between financial incentives and organ donations. Although the National Organ Transplant Act of 1984 prohibits financial compensation for organs for transplant, we focus on the impact of laws that influence the relative cost of deceased and live organ donations on the supply of organs for transplant. First, we hypothesize that states that have relatively stringent funeral regulations, which have been associated with higher whole‐body donations, will have fewer organ donations. Second, we examine the impact of two common state laws that offer financial compensation to live donors: one that allows a tax deduction for costs incurred and the other which entitles government employees up to 30 days of paid leave. We find no evidence to support that these laws affect organ donations. (JEL I11, I18)     

The identifiable victim effect in charitable giving: evidence from a natural field experiment

We design a natural field experiment to enhance our understanding of the role of the identifiable victim effect in charitable giving. Using direct mail solicitations to 25 797 prior donors of a nonprofit charity, we tested the responsiveness of donors to make a contribution to either an identifiable or a statistical victim. Unlike much previous research, which has used only laboratory experiments, we find that the campaign letter focusing on one identifiable victim did not result in significantly larger donations than the campaign letter focusing on the statistical victim. In addition to the role of the identifiable victim, we investigate the degree to which each of our campaign letters affected donors’ payments to other concurrent and future campaigns and whether there is decreasing marginal returns to campaigning in the sense that receiving a letter crowds out donors’ payments to other future and concurrent campaigns. We find some evidence of crowding out, indicating that charitable giving could be a zero-sum game; however, the treatment letters did not have different effects on other payments.     

Women,Muslim Immigrants,and Economic Integration in France

Muslim immigrants to Europe display distinctive attitudes toward women in a wide range of survey data. This study investigates whether this translates into distinctive behavior. Relying on a dictator game in France and an identification strategy that isolates the effect of religion from typical confounds such as race, we compare the donations of matched Christian and Muslim immigrants and rooted French to in‐group and out‐group men vs. women. Our results indicate that Muslim immigrant participants deviate from Christian immigrant and rooted French participants in their behavior toward women: while the latter favor women over men, Muslim immigrants favor men over women.     

Competition, Contractibility, and the Market for Donors to Nonprofits

This article investigates theoretically and empirically theeffects of competition for donors on the behavior of nonprofitorganizations. Theoretically, we consider a situation in whichnonprofit organizations use donations to produce some commodity,but the use of donations is only partially contractible. Themain results of the model indicate that an increase in competition(i) decreases the fraction of donations allocated to perquisiteconsumption and (ii) increases the fraction of donations allocatedto promotional expenditures. Moreover, the effects of competitionare magnified by the ability to contract on the use of donations.These hypotheses are tested with data on the expenditures ofnonprofit organizations in a number of subsectors where competitionis primarily local. We use across–metropolitan statisticalareas' variation to measure differences in competition and proxycontractibility by the importance of tangible assets, whichare more easily observed by donors. The estimated effects ofcompetition and contractibility are consistent with our model.     

A note on enough money in a strategic market game with complete or fewer markets

Upper and lower bounds for the amount of money required to achieve efficient trade in a strategic market game are considered. The possibility of the efficient use of any commodity as a money is examined.     

The unique minimal cash flow competitive equilibrium

In a strategic market game with paper money used for exchange the control of the amount of money or credit issued and the selection of the level of the penalty for default make it possible to select a single competitive equilibrium which is feasible as a non-cooperative equilibrium.     

The Trojan-Horse Principle in Development Assistance: A Reading of Uganda's Experience with Aid

The World Bank recommends “ideas, not money” as a guiding principle to donors for dealing with badly governed countries. This paper challenges that principle on the basis of a study of the evolution in Uganda of pro‐growth policies in the early to mid 1990s and pro‐poor policies in the late 1990s. The analysis of Uganda’s experience with aid is accommodated within the theoretical framework of a principal–agent conditionality game, in which policy objectives of the recipient (the agent) evolve over time. The key finding of the paper is that the apparent conditionality failure of the period 1987–91 has paved the way for later reform. Financial aid given during this period suspended the necessity of reforms and bought donor proximity to recipient policy deliberations, as a result of both of which the policy learning could take place that led to later successful reform measures.     

Are we nice(r) to nice(r) people?—An experimental analysis

We experimentally investigate whether individuals can reliably detect cooperators (the nice(r) people) in an anonymous decision environment involving “connected games.” Participants can condition their choices in an asymmetric prisoners’ dilemma and a trust game on past individual (their partner’s donation share to a self-selected charity) and social (whether their partner belongs to a group with high or low average donations) information. Thus, the two measures of niceness are the individual donation share in the donation task, and the cooperativeness of one’s choice in the two games. We find that high donors achieve a higher-than-average expected payoff by cooperating predominantly with other high donors. Group affiliation proved to be irrelevant. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C91, C72, D3     

Goodwill bazaar: NGO competition and giving to development

This paper builds a model of competition through fundraising between horizontally differentiated NGOs. NGOs allocate their time resource between working on the project and fundraising, which attracts private donations. If the market size is fixed, the fundraising levels increase with the number of NGOs and the free-entry equilibrium number of NGOs can be larger or smaller than the socially optimal number, depending on the efficiency of the fundraising technology. If the market size is endogenous and NGOs cooperate in attracting new donors, fundraising levels decrease with the number of NGOs and the free-entry equilibrium number of NGOs is smaller than the one that maximizes the welfare of donors and beneficiaries. If NGOs can divert funds for private use, multiple equilibria (with high diversion and no diversion of funds) appear.     

Are contributions of time and money substitutes or complements?

This article empirically investigates the relationship between donations of time and money using Canadian tax policy reforms that changed the tax price of charitable donations. The 1988 reform where a charitable tax deduction was converted to a credit and the 2000 reform in provincial income taxes provide tax price variations plausibly exogenous to individuals’ unobserved heterogeneity. Our estimates on cross-price effects imply that individuals make more time donations as the tax price of charitable donations increases and hence money and time donations are substitutes, as some theories would imply. This contrasts with earlier findings using cross-sectional data.     

Leadership in Public Good Provision: A Timing Game Perspective

We address in this paper the issue of leadership when two governments provide public goods to their constituencies with cross‐border externalities as both public goods are valued by consumers in both countries. We study a timing game between two different countries: before providing public goods, the two policymakers non‐cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves. We establish conditions under which a first‐ or second‐mover advantage emerges for each country, highlighting the role of spillovers and the complementarity or substitutability of public goods. As a result, we are able to prove that there is no leader when, for both countries, public goods are substitutable. When public goods are complements for both countries, each of them may emerge as the leader in the game. Hence a coordination issue arises. We use the notion of risk‐dominance to select the leading government. Finally, in the mixed case, the government for whom public goods are substitutable becomes the leader.     

区域经济协调与东北经济振兴

东北经济振兴是一个系统工程,必须走协调发展的道路,这样才能避免重复建设,提高资源配置效率,有利于激活市场.然而,东北区域经济的协调发展受到地区利益、体制、观念等一系列因素的阻碍.所以,实现东北振兴需采取如下协调发展对策:必须注意科学规划,统筹协调;市场机制与计划机制协调;筹资主体与筹资渠道协调;突出重点与区域协调;基础设施与非基础设施建设协调;经济建设与生态保护协调.     

The politics of special purpose trust funds

Over the last decades, bilateral donors of foreign aid have increased their use of special purpose trust funds to provide earmarked aid to multilateral organizations. This paper investigates the incentives and consequences underlying this recent shift toward country‐ or theme‐specific funding and away from bilateral and multilateral aid. We propose a game‐theoretic model with multiple principals and a multilateral agent to study how the interaction between donor preferences, voter concerns in the donor country, the voting rules at the multilateral organization, and the presence of special purpose trust funds influences aid allocation. We show that multilateral organizations with majority rules are more likely to receive discretion and thus voluntary core contributions than those with unanimity requirements and that the possibility of earmarking multilateral aid decreases donors’ contributions to the multilateral's discretionary core budget and the amount of bilateral aid. In contrast to much of the literature dealing with issues of delegation and bi‐ and multilateral aid, our model suggests non‐monotonic effects of preference heterogeneity on the choice of aid channel for some parameter combinations when contributions to special purpose trust funds are an option.     

Passive Industry Interests in a Large Polity

We seek to explain the puzzle of passive industry interests. Taking the formation decision as given, we focus on the ability of a political action committee (PAC) to elicit voluntary donations for campaign giving. We show that, when the number of stakeholders is large and uncertain, PACs behave counteractively. That is, a single PAC that does not oppose the government's prior preference raises resources whenever an opponent poses a credible threat to secure policy favors. By implication money never actually changes hands, prompting the suggestion that counteractive behavior may lie behind the well‐documented, and consistently low, levels of PAC disbursements.