Technology Choice and Coalition Formation in Standards Wars

We study the efficiency of the standard-setting process when standards result from competition between groups of firms sponsoring different technologies. We show that ex ante agreements may decrease welfare in the case of standards wars: Even though industry profits are larger with ex ante agreements, welfare is not necessarily larger, because the interests of firms and society may not be aligned. This result contrasts with the findings of previous works studying de jure monopoly standards. Including adopters in the standard-setting process may restore the efficiency of ex ante agreements.     

R&D competition versus R&D cooperation in oligopolistic markets with evolving structure

This paper considers investment behavior of duopolistic firms subject to technological progress. It is assumed that initially both firms offer a homogeneous product, but after a stochastic waiting time they are able to implement a product innovation. Production capacities of both firms are product specific. It is shown that firms anticipate a future product innovation by under-investing (if the new product is a substitute to the established product) and higher profits, and over-investing (in case of complements) and lower profits, compared to the corresponding standard capital accumulation game. This anticipation effect is stronger in the case of R&D cooperation. Furthermore, since due to R&D cooperation firms introduce the new product at the same time, this leads to intensified competition and lower firm profits right after the new product has been introduced. In addition, we show that under R&D competition the firm that innovates first, overshoots in new-product capacity buildup in order to exploit its temporary monopoly position. Taking into account all these effects, the result is that, if the new product is neither a close substitute nor a strong complement of the established product, positive synergy effects in R&D cooperation are necessary to make it more profitable for firms than R&D competition.     

Patent Protection and R&D with Endogenous Market Structure

In a model with endogenous number of innovating firms, we show that whether patent protection increases R&D investment is ambiguous, and depends on the market demand function and the cost of R&D. If the market size increases with number of firms, patent protection reduces R&D investment if the cost of R&D is sufficiently high, and higher product differentiation increases the possibility of lower R&D investment under patent protection. If the market size does not increase with number of firms, patent protection never reduces R&D investment. We find that welfare is lower under patent protection than under no patent protection.     

Cooperative R&D and vertical product differentiation

A partial equilibrium model with vertical product differentiation, Coumot competition and quality determined by R&D expenses is analysed. Cooperative agreements on R&D entail higher levels of R&D, quality, output and welfare than at the non-cooperative equilibrium, under well denned conditions on spillover rates. This confirms, in a new setting, a well-known outcome of models with cost reducing R&D. Further, cooperation in R&D allows a larger number of firms to operate in the industry than in the non-cooperative case. Via a reduction in prices, a new source of social gains from cooperative research is identified.     

Information Gathering Externalities for a Multi‐Attribute Good

Most goods and services vary in numerous dimensions. Customers choose to acquire information to assess some characteristics and not others. Their choices affect firms' incentives to invest in quality and so lead to indirect externalities in consumers' choices. We characterize a model in which a monopolist invests in the quality of a product with two characteristics, and consumers are heterogeneous ex‐ante. Consumers do not internalize their influence on the firm's investment incentives when choosing which information to acquire. Cheaper information affects consumers' information gathering and thereby firm investment. This can paradoxically reduce consumer surplus, profits, and welfare.     

Effect of agglomeration on firms’ research and development investment: a U-shaped relationship

Extant research on how agglomeration affects firms’ R&D investment reveals conflicting views. Some studies suggest that, owing to free riding arising from knowledge spillovers, agglomeration reduces firms’ R&D investment, whereas others find that it creates additional incentives for innovation through intensifying local competition, thereby increasing firms’ R&D investment. Thus, this study attempts to reconcile these two conflicting views. We propose a U-shaped relationship between agglomeration and firms’ R&D investment; that is, when the extent of agglomeration is low, knowledge spillover effects are important, while local competition is negligible. The free riding effects dominate local competition effects. Therefore, firms’ R&D investment decreases with the extent of agglomeration at a decreasing rate. By contrast, when the extent of agglomeration is high, local competition becomes the dominant force. Consequently, firms’ R&D investment increases with the extent of agglomeration at an increasing rate. Using data from 299,256 manufacturing firms in China, we find that firms’ R&D investment first decreases with the extent of agglomeration to reach a minimum, then increases as the extent of agglomeration continues to rise. These results indicate that there is a robust U-shaped relationship between agglomeration and firms’ R&D investment.     

PARALLEL TRADE,INTERNATIONAL EXHAUSTION AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: A WELFARE ANALYSIS*

This paper analyses the issue of parallel trade (arbitrage) for products protected by intellectual property rights. We discuss a basic trade‐off that arises between the ex post better allocation that typically occurs under parallel trade when demand dispersion is not too high, and the ex ante reduced product quality because of lower investment. We show that the size of the welfare effects is significantly affected by the presence of a ‘generic’ product, which represents a form of competition for the monopolist. The monopolist will introduce a ‘fighting brand’ to compete with the generic, which dilutes but does not eliminate the result on the adverse effects of parallel trade on investments.     

COLLUSION AND RESEARCH JOINT VENTURES*

I examine the question whether cooperation in R&D among firms producing similar products leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated‐game framework. Innovation under non‐cooperative R&D leads to an inter‐firm asymmetry, destabilizing collusion in pre‐discovery and post‐discovery periods. Innovation sharing under cooperative R&D preserves the symmetry and also increases total profit, thereby facilitating collusion. However, welfare may increase with cooperative R&D. I also examine the condition for collusion under licensing and compare the results.     

Strategic control systems and relative r&d investment in large multiproduct firms

This paper hypothesizes that tight financial controls associated with large diversified M-form firms lead to a short-term, low-risk orientation and thereby lower relative investment in R&D. Further, it is hypothesized that increasing levels of diversification require different control systems which have significant implications for investing in R&D. Results of the study of 124 major U.S. firms suggest that less diversified U-form firms invest more heavily in R&D than more diversified M-form firms after controlling for size and industry effects. Additionally, dominant business firms invested more in R&D than either related or unrelated business firms. Finally, the relationship between R&D intensity and market performance was negative for related and unrelated firms. The findings suggest that the market evaluates R&D investment more positively for firms that are organized to seek synergy than for those that are organized to pursue a hedging (or diversification) strategy.     

Cooperative R&D with product market competition

A simple model RJV is presented to examine the private and social incentives for cooperative R&D in the presence of product market competition. The key assumption to our analysis was that the spillover rate increases with cooperation in R&D and total industry profit decreases as the spillover rate increases due to intensified post-innovation competition. This leads to a negative impact of cooperative R&D, introducing a trade-off in the model. It is shown that private firms prefer a cooperative R&D to non-cooperative R&D competition when spillover rates are high and that the private incentive for cooperative R&D is less than the social incentive.     

DESIGNING A MARKET STRUCTURE WHEN FIRMS COMPETE FOR THE RIGHT TO SERVE THE MARKET*

In many industries, a regulator designs an auction to select ex‐ante the firms that compete ex‐post on the product market. This paper considers the optimal market structure when firms incur sunk costs before entering the market and when the government is not able to regulate firms in the market. We prove that a free entry equilibrium results in an excessive entry when the entry costs are private information. Then, we consider an auction mechanism selecting the firms allowed to serve the market and show that the optimal number of licences results in the socially optimal market structure. When all the potential candidates are actual bidders, the optimal number of firms in the market increases with the number of candidates and decreases with the social cost of public funds. When the market size is small, as the net profit in the market decreases with the number of selected firms, entry is endogenous. As increasing competition in the market reduces competition for the market, the optimal structure is more concentrated than in the previous case.     

R&D-induced industry polarization and shake-outs

We consider the standard two-stage game of R&D and Cournot competition with ex ante identical firms but depart from the literature in assuming that R&D is characterized by mildly, instead of strongly, decreasing returns to scale. We establish that only extreme R&D levels are possible at equilibrium, and that for a broad range of parameters, equilibria are asymmetric in R&D levels, possibly leading one firm to endogenously exit. This provides a simple link between returns to scale in R&D and industry polarization, including shake-outs. A novelty is that exit may be triggered by positive opportunities in a strategic setting. Given the original nature of our R&D equilibrium, a complete welfare analysis is conducted, including a possible role for R&D subsidies.     

Innovation and competition: The role of the product market

We study how competition impacts innovation (and welfare) when firms compete both in the product market and in innovation development. This relationship is complex and may lead to scenarios in which a lessening of competition increases R&D and consumer welfare in the long run. We provide conditions for when competition increases or decreases industry innovation and welfare. These conditions are based on properties of the product market payoffs. Implications for applied work and policy are discussed.     

Direct and interaction effects of top management team and board compositions on R&D investment strategy

This paper examines why firms differ in levels of R&D investment intensity by developing and testing a theory of direct and interaction effects of top management team and board outsider composition on R&D intensity. The theory is tested in a longitudinal sample of technology‐intensive firms that completed an initial public offering. The results indicate that both top management team composition and board composition have direct and additive effects on R&D investment intensity. Also, monitoring by outsider directors does not constitute a universally effective governance mechanism with regard to a firm's R&D investment strategy. Firms opt for lower levels of R&D investment intensity when their outsider‐rich board interacts with a team of managers who have high levels of (1) firm tenure, (2) shared team‐specific experience, or (3) functional heterogeneity. When a firm's competitiveness relies on sustained R&D investments, it is important to note these interaction effects and make adjustments to promote a healthy dialogue between managers and the board. Adjustments could be made to the management team composition (e.g., initiating management turnover to reduce firm tenure) or to the bundle of governance mechanisms (e.g., partially substituting board monitoring with other mechanisms). Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Patent Hold‐Up and Antitrust: How A Well‐Intentioned Rule Could Retard Innovation

Licensing technology essential to a standard can present a hold‐up problem. After designing new products incorporating a standard, a manufacturer could be confronted by an innovator asserting patent rights to essential technology. This hold‐up problem can be solved with a damages remedy provided by antitrust or some other body of law, but a damages remedy can reduce the innovator's licensing revenue and thereby retard innovation. The availability of an ex post damages remedy also alters the licensing terms in ex ante bargaining with the result that fewer socially beneficial R&D projects are undertaken.     

Partner technological heterogeneity and innovation performance of R&D alliances

This study investigates the impacts of partner technology heterogeneity on innovation performance of alliance firms both in terms of R&D output and the enhancement of partners’ innovation capability. We apply a generalized semi-parametric model on a questionnaire survey result of 413 High and New Technology Enterprises in China. In order to ensure the robustness and practicability of our result, PCA is applied to extract comprehensive information and SiZer analysis is employed to test the linearity and significance of the nonparametric functions in the model. Our results indicate that collaborations between partners with different industry technologies exert inversed U-shaped R&D output pattern and affect very little the innovation ability of focal firms. The impact of industry domain divergence is no longer significant when partner technology heterogeneity is added in the model of analysis. Partner technology heterogeneity leads to an ascending S-shaped R&D output pattern and contributes positively to innovation capabilities. One of the implications of our findings is that when choosing R&D alliance partners, firms are better off avoiding candidates from a different industry domain but opt for potential collaborators who are in the same industry but in the different technical domain, which may facilitate more effective organizational learning. Further, we argue that the reasons behind the S-shaped R&D output pattern led by technology heterogeneity being the co-existence of competition and cooperation between partners where firms collaborate in value-creation by combining diverse resources and compete for acquiring partner’s distinct technology and resources. Therefore, we suggest that, for the sustainability of collaborative innovation outcome, both cooperation and competition amongst alliance partners should be encouraged and well balanced at different stages of joint R&D projects.     

Declared essential patents and average total R&D expenditures per patent family

The sharp increase in SEP declarations and declaring firms emphasizes the necessity for understanding firms’ innovation investment behavior in standardization. This paper empirically investigates whether declared standard-essential patents (SEPs) and the declaring firm’s business model (operationalized as a firm’s location in the value chain) are associated with a firm’s innovation investment behavior. To this end, we measure firms’ innovation investment behavior through average total research and development (R&D) expenditures per filed patent family for publicly listed firms from 1999 to 2018. Our sample mainly includes major SEP family declarants. We rely on a binary business model taxonomy differentiating upstream and downstream firms. Within that setting, total R&D expenditures rise with increasing fragmentation of declared SEP families, suggesting that firms adjust their R&D investments to declaration developments in standard-setting organizations (SSOs). We also show that upstream firms have significantly lower total R&D expenditures than downstream firms, which could indicate structural differences in their intellectual property (IP) and R&D management processes. Our results can help SSOs and regulators better understand firms’ innovation investment behavior.     

R&D in markets with network externalities

This paper studies the consequences of network externalities on R&D rivalry between an incumbent firm and a potential entrant. In the model, all differences between the R&D projects chosen in market equilibrium and the socially best projects are solely due to network externalities. From a welfare perspective, the incumbent chooses a too risky and the entrant a too certain R&D project. Rothschild and Stiglitz's mean preserving spread criterion is used as a measure of risk. Adoption of a new standard is more likely in equilibrium than in the social optimum.     

Knowing when to leap: Transitioning between exploitative and explorative R&D

A common perspective is that consistent R&D investment facilitates innovation, while volatile spending implies myopic decision making. However, the benefits to exploiting extant competencies eventually erode, so firms must disrupt their R&D function and explore for new competitive advantage. We suggest that high‐performing firms recognize when extant competencies decline and increase exploratory R&D to develop new competencies at the appropriate time. We find that changes in R&D expenditure away from the firm's historic trend, in either direction, are indicative of transitions between exploitative and exploratory R&D and are associated with increased firm performance. Increases in R&D expenditure above the trend are associated with an increased likelihood of highly cited patents, suggesting that firms are making the leap between R&D‐based exploitation and exploration. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vertical Exclusion with Downstream Risk Aversion or Limited Liability

An upstream firm with full commitment bilaterally contracts with two ex ante identical downstream firms. Each observes its own cost shock, and faces uncertainty from its competitor’s shock. When they are risk neutral and can absorb losses, the upstream firm contracts symmetric outputs for production efficiency. However, when they are risk averse, competition requires the payment of a risk premium due to revenue uncertainty. Moreover, when they enjoy limited liability, competition requires the upstream firm to share additional surplus. To resolve these trade‐offs, the upstream firm offers exclusive contracts in many cases.