Privatization when the public firm is as efficient as private firms

The literature on mixed oligopoly shows that when production costs are quadratic the public firm is privatized if the competition in the product market is high enough. Similarly, when the public firm is less efficient than private firms and the marginal costs of production are constant, the government privatizes the public firm if its efficiency is low enough. In this paper we analyze this issue assuming that the public firm maximizes the weighted sum of consumer surplus, private profit and the profit of the public firm. If all firms have the same marginal cost of production we obtain that for some value of parameters the government does not privatize the public firm regardless of how many private firms are competing in the product market. We also obtain that the consumer surplus can be lower in the mixed oligopoly than in the private oligopoly.     

Leadership and Privatisation in a Mixed Multi‐product Oligopoly: An Endogenous Timing Model

This paper examines both leadership choice and welfare consequences of privatisation in an endogenous timing mixed multi‐product oligopoly. It shows that a multi‐product firm undermines the welfare‐maximising efforts of a public firm by cross‐subsidising. The paper demonstrates that a unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium emerges in a multi‐product market, in contrast to the multiple equilibria of a single‐product market. This unique equilibrium indicates that profit‐maximising private firms retain leadership while a welfare‐maximising public firm acts as a follower. Even on the off‐equilibrium path where the public firm acts as a leader, it rarely generates maximum social welfare. However, privatising the public firm usually harms social welfare and results in a different timing structure in equilibrium.     

INSUFFICIENT ENTRY OF EMPLOYEE‐CONTROLLED FIRMS IN A FREE‐ENTRY OLIGOPOLY

This study is a theoretical examination of whether employee‐controlled firms (ECFs) enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market excessively or insufficiently, from the viewpoint of welfare maximization. The excess entry theorem is well known in oligopoly theory. According to this theorem, a greater number of profit‐maximizing firms enter a free‐entry oligopolistic market than is optimal for welfare maximization. We demonstrate the possibility that insufficient entry arises when ECFs compete in a free‐entry market. In particular, we show that if both the demand and cost functions are convex, insufficient ECF entry necessarily occurs. Our results suggest that competition among firms seeking purposes other than profit might lead to insufficient entry because differences in competing firms’ objectives affect the intensity of market competition.     

R&D Strategy in International Mixed Duopoly with Research Spillovers

This paper examines the international mixed duopoly behaviour with research spillovers. Using a two‐stage game with Research and Development (R&D) and output, we investigate the effects of imperfectly appropriable R&D on optimal R&D strategies of a domestic public firm and a foreign private firm across different market interactions: (i) international R&D competition, (ii) only the foreign firm conducts R&D, (iii) only the domestic public firm conducts R&D, (iv) no firm conducts R&D, and (v) research joint venture. The results show that firms' research performances are determined by the degree of spillovers and the optimal R&D strategies involve R&D competition. Spillovers are shown to be socially beneficial and their absence can prove to be a strategic deterrent, with the public firm monopolising the market. Some of these findings contrast with the traditional models of oligopoly (with or without R&D) and mixed oligopoly (without R&D).     

PROTECTION,INVOLUNTARY SELF‐EMPLOYMENT AND WELFARE

A small open economy operates with a unionized import‐competing sector and an informal “self‐employed” sector. Productivity varies across people in the informal sector. The full‐employment structure accommodates “underemployment or involuntary self‐employment” in the flexible‐wage informal sector. Protection increases the cost of capital and may increase the set of people who are involuntarily employed in the informal sector. Even if one ignores the consumption distortion effect of a tariff, the tariff may fail to be second‐best because it may raise underemployment. Our results on tariff‐reform are consistent with some recent empirical evidence.     

Anti-competitive conduct, in-house R&D, and growth

Incumbent firms have two basic possibilities to improve their competitive position in the product market: Investment in R&D and the creation of entry barriers to the disadvantage of potential rivals, e.g. through lobbying activities, campaign contributions, bribes or the adoption of incompatible technologies. This paper proposes a simple oligopoly model which raises the possibility that such anti-competitive conduct and R&D investment are complementary activities for incumbents. Consequently, an institutional framework or technological possibilities which encourage anti-competitive conduct, although impeding entry of potential rivals and accentuating standard oligopoly distortions, may foster R&D-based growth and welfare. However, this outcome is less likely if entrants exert technological spillover effects, e.g. through foreign direct investment. Stronger protection of intellectual property rights, although triggering anti-competitive conduct and thereby impeding market entry as well, is more likely to foster economic growth.     

Foreign penetration and undesirable competition

This paper examines how the order of the firms' moves affects the social efficiency with foreign ownership and free entry in a mixed oligopoly market. We firstly show that when the foreign shareholding ratio is low, the entry of private followers will lead to a lower consumer welfare and higher social welfare, while the profit of the incumbent nationalized firm is higher under entry than under no entry. Further, we find that there always exists the problem of excessive entry under public leadership regardless of the degree of foreign ownership. Such result is generated by the complementary role played by the leading public firm and the strength of business-stealing effect. Our results thus have important implications for industrial and market-opening policies.     

Mixed oligopoly and spatial agglomeration: a comment

Abstract.  This paper extends Matsushima and Matsumura (2003) by incorporating a large production cost difference between public and private firms in a quantity setting spatial mixed oligopoly. The public and private firms first choose their locations in a linear market and then compete in quantities. It is shown that for a significant inefficiency of the public firm, all firms (including both public and private firms) agglomerate at the market centre.     

Privatization, strategic foreign direct investment and host-country welfare

Recent evidence shows that developing countries and transition economies are increasingly privatizing their public firms and at the same time experiencing rapid growth of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). We show that there is a two-way causality between privatization and greenfield FDI. Privatization increases the incentive for FDI, which, in turn, increases the incentive for privatization compared to the situation of no FDI. The optimal degree of privatization depends on the cost difference of the firms, and on the foreign firm's mode of entry.     

分权的“悖论”：“省管县”改革对居民医疗服务满意度的影响

财政分权是否有助于提高与本地居民偏好更加匹配的公共服务水平未有定论。借助“省管县”改革这一准自然实验,文章旨在从微观需求角度考察地方分权对公共服务改善的效果。采用2005年的县级宏观数据和 CG S S2005居民调查数据,本文对“省管县”改革与公共医疗服务满意度的关系进行了实证分析。 Logit模型结果表明,“省管县”财政体制的实施未能使当地政府提供让居民更加合意的医疗服务,反而恶化了居民对公共医疗服务的满意度。在排除了“改革错觉”、“预期效应”以及“滞后效应”的干扰后,这一结论依旧稳健。文章认为,财权扩大加剧了地方政府间竞争,使得县级政府有更大的激励将财政资金投入到基建领域而非民生领域,这将导致医疗服务供给相对不足,进而引起满意度的下降。中介分析证实了这一推理。文章研究有助于从微观视角评析分权改革的公共福利效应。     

QUALITY AND WELFARE IN MIXED DUOPOLY: EFFECTS OF CAPACITY REDUCTION*

Under rationing of a public service due to its lower price and higher quality, the “privatization” could be regarded as a reduction in the capacity of the public service. We develop a model of mixed duopoly in which the service is vertically differentiated, a public firm is in a Stackelberg leader position, rationing happens, and the market is not covered. In one of two possible cases, it is shown that any reduction in the capacity of a public service will lower total surplus unless the price of the public service is too low and its quality is too high.     

A unified framework for analysing price interdependence,innovative activity and exchange rate pass-through

This paper develops an international oligopoly model in which domestic and foreign firms simultaneously choose their price and innovation strategies under the assumption of non-zero conjectural variations in relation to their competitors’ price changes. The model captures the links between the exchange rate, foreign and domestic firms’ prices and investment in process innovation and provides a unified framework for analysing exchange rate pass-through.     

US Trade Policy in the Trump Administration

President Donald Trump has emphasized three recurring themes regarding trade policy: the importance of trade balances, including bilateral trade balances, currency manipulation to gain unfair advantage in trade, and “disastrous” trade agreements. Asia figures prominently in these concerns. Trump withdrew the United States from the Trans‐Pacific Partnership, is increasing contingent or process protection, demanding the renegotiation under duress of the North American Free Trade Agreement and the Korea‐United States Free Trade Agreement. These policies are modeled quantitatively and results generated for sectoral output and employment at the state and metropolitan area level.     

Using the Tools of Industrial Organisation to Illuminate the Credit Rating Industry

Until slightly more than a decade ago, the credit rating industry was largely a little‐recognised and little‐understood part of the financial system “plumbing”. This obscurity changed with the financial crisis of 2008 and its aftermath. After a few years of intensive attention, however, the CRAs have retreated back to semi‐obscurity and attract little media or political attention. The tools of industrial organisation can help us understand this industry: its structure; its behaviour; and its outcomes; and the public policies that are likely to improve its functioning.     

Mixed duopoly,privatization, and subsidization with excess burden of taxation

We investigate optimal tax‐subsidy policies in mixed and private oligopolies with excess burden of taxation. We compare the optimal subsidies and the resulting welfare levels among four regimes: mixed and private Cournot duopolies and Stackelberg competition with public and private leaderships. We show that, in contrast to the existing works on the privatization neutrality theorem, privatization affects resulting welfare.     

COMPETITION,REGULATION AND WELFARE IN THE PRESENCE OF NETWORK EXTERNALITIES*

In this paper we consider a simple model of an industry with network externalities, where a benefit to each consumer from network services depends on the size of the network. We first consider a single network and cover the cases with and without fixed cost of entry. We then turn to the two‐network industry, where the incumbent network and a new entrant network compete for the market and may differ both in their marginal costs and demand structures. In addition, we identify several situations where public policy may play a crucial role in sustaining socially advantageous network service provision.     

Competition and Privatisation Policies in a Differentiated Mixed Oligopoly: The Pay‐off‐interdependence Approach

I revisit the relationship between competition and privatisation policies in a mixed oligopoly with differentiated goods, following the pay‐off‐interdependence approach in the fashion of Matsumura and Okamura. We find that although the intensity of market competition increases with the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance, the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease in a differentiated goods mixed oligopoly in both the increasing marginal costs case and the constant marginal costs case. Further, given the degree of importance of each firm's relative performance and the number of private firms, we find that the optimal degree of privatisation can decrease as the degree of product differentiation declines. Finally, by considering an alternative‐pay‐off model in both cases, we compare the optimal degree of privatisation of the public firm.     

Oligopoly in international trade: Rise,fall and resurgence

Large firms played a central role in the “new trade” models that became a major focus of trade economists in the early 1980s. Subsequent literature for the most part kept imperfect competition but jettisoned oligopoly. Instead, as the heterogeneous firms literature burgeoned in the 2000s, monopolistic competition quickly became established as the workhorse model. The use of oligopoly in trade models has been criticized for reasons that we argue are unpersuasive. Renewed incorporation of oligopolistic firms in international trade is warranted. Quantitative investigations of welfare effects of trade policy should again address the impact of such policies on the allocation of profits across countries.     

Welfare effects of competitive lobbying efforts in international oligopoly markets

Conventionally, rent-seeking activities have been considered to deteriorate social welfare and to distort resource allocation. This paper examines whether rent-seeking behavior can improve social welfare by focusing on the welfare effects of firms’ competitive lobbying efforts when governments can impose market entry regulation against foreign firms. We demonstrate that competitive lobbying efforts can improve social welfare when such lobbying efforts are directed to reduce market entry barriers. In addition, social welfare can be maximized when the government shows the maximum sensitivity to the foreign firm's political contributions while maintaining competitive market structure. Moreover, it is shown that the dominant strategy for a domestic firm is to allocate more resources to R&D sectors while it is optimal for foreign firms is to exert more efforts in lobbying to reduce the market entry barriers when a government makes political economic approach in market entry regulations.     

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES OF A PUBLIC ENTERPRISE IN OLIGOPOLY REVISITED: AN EXTENSION TO STACKELBERG COMPETITION

This paper revisits De Fraja and Delbono (1989), which is the seminal paper on mixed oligopoly, in order to pay more attention to Stackelberg competition. First, we show that, even in Cournot competition, if the number of private firms is sufficiently small, privatization necessarily reduces social welfare. Second, we demonstrate that when a public firm is a Stackelberg leader before and after privatization, privatization necessarily reduces welfare irrespective of the number of private firms. Moreover, we show that even when a public firm remains a follower, privatization reduces welfare if the number of private firms is relatively small.