The Macroeconomic Consequences of Reciprocity in Labor Relations*

We develop and analyze a structural model of efficiency wages founded on reciprocity. Workers are assumed to face an explicit trade‐off between the disutility of providing effort and the psychological benefit of reciprocating the gift of a wage offer above some reference level. The model provides a rationale for rent sharing—a feature that is very much present in the data but absent from previous formulations of the efficiency wage hypothesis. This firm‐internal perspective on efficiency wages has potentially important macroeconomic consequences: rent‐sharing considerations promote wage rigidity, internal amplification and differential responses to technology and demand shocks.     

Social comparison and performance: Experimental evidence on the fair wage–effort hypothesis

We investigate the impact of wage comparisons for worker productivity. We present three studies which all use three-person gift-exchange experiments. Consistent with Akerlof and Yellen's (1990) fair wage–effort hypothesis we find that disadvantageous wage discrimination leads to lower efforts while advantageous wage discrimination does not increase efforts on average. Two studies allow us to measure wage comparison effects at the individual level. We observe strongly heterogeneous wage comparison effects. We also find that reactions to wage discrimination can be attributed to the underlying intentions of discrimination rather than to payoff consequences.     

Games of status and discriminatory contracts

Following recent empirical evidence which indicates the importance of rank for the determination of workers' wellbeing, this paper introduces status seeking preferences in the form of rank-dependent utility functions into a moral-hazard framework with one firm and multiple workers, but no correlation in production. We show that workers' concern for the rank of their wage in the firm's wage distribution induces the firm to offer discriminatory wage contracts when its aim is to induce all workers to expend effort.     

REFERENCE NORMS,STAGGERED WAGES,AND WAGE LEADERSHIP: THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE*

This article presents an extension of the Taylor model with staggered wages in which wage setting is also influenced by reference norms. We show that reference norms can considerably increase the persistence of inflation but that the size of this effect depends on the exact definition (e.g., external vs. internal, symmetric vs. asymmetric norms). Using data on collectively bargained wages in Austria from 1980 to 2006 we show that wage setting is strongly influenced by reference norms, that external norms seem to matter more than internal norms, and that there is a clear indication for the existence of wage leadership (asymmetric norms).     

Monetary regimes and money supply endogeneity

Quasi-longitudinal Canadian microdata was used to compare the movement of individuals between employers with job changes taking place within firms. Internal mobility is found to be much less common than job changing between firms. Workers changing jobs within a firm are more likely to be older and have higher wages and longer tenures in the jobs they leave than individuals employers. This provides some support for the job-matching hypothesis underlying recent research on the causes of individual mobility, although it is also clear that workers in large or unionized firms are more likely to have the opportunity for internal promotion. While wage gains obtained through internal mobility are smaller than those achieved through external mobility, wage levels are higher for individuals moving within the firm. It is argued that this observation is consistent with a dual labour markets interpretation of mobility patterns.     

Do internal references lead to wage rigidity?

This paper analyzes three prominent models of internal references and their impact on wage rigidity (Danthine and Kurmann in Scand J Econ 109(4):857–881, 2007; J Monet Econ 57(7):837–850, 2010; Koskela and Schöb in J Econ 96:79–86, 2009). With one exception, these studies find that internal references, nested in reciprocal worker preferences, unambiguously increase wage rigidity. In contrast to that literature, the present study provides analytical proofs, calibration results as well as impulse response functions which show that the effect of internal references on wage rigidity is in fact ambiguous. Several model extensions are discussed and robustness checks conducted. The intuition for this result is similar in all models: as internal and external references are modeled as weighted average, an increase in the weight on the internal reference implies a simultaneous decrease in the weight on the outside option. Therefore, the effect of the internal reference relative to the external reference determines whether wage rigidity increases or decreases.     

Wage determination and the gender pay gap: A feminist political economy analysis and decomposition

Abstract

This paper develops a heterodox analytical framework of wage determination and a new method of decomposition of the gender pay gap drawing on Marxian and feminist theories. The proposed framework utilizes two wage equations for the analysis of the gender gap: the first equation refers to average occupational wages and the second to individual wages as deviations from occupational wages. Using a data set for wages from industries in Greece, this paper demonstrates and explains differences in results between this proposed decomposition of the gender pay gap and that of Oaxaca-Blinder, and discusses the merits of this new technique compared to the Brown-Moon-Zoloth method. The authors argue that the main advantage of this proposed method of decomposition over the other two methods is that the proposed method allows for separate estimates of the impact of social and individual gender wage discrimination on the gender pay gap.     

Towards a More Complete Efficiency Wage Theory

The efficiency wage is an important topic in the theory of employment. In a traditional efficiency wage model, only the representative firm is optimizing against an assumed S‐shaped effort supply function. This S‐shaped supply curve is critical for the model and the absence of a derivation of the curve in the literature means that it is an incomplete theory. In the present paper, we extend the model by specifying a worker's representative utility function so that the corresponding argmax function will be the S‐shaped effort supply curve. This will make the worker's decision process endogenous and will produce a more complete model. The importance of this extension is clear. The characterization of the utility function will make explicit the necessary conditions and crucial assumptions of the traditional model. More importantly, the extension will allow researchers to introduce employment compensation factors into the worker's utility function for analysis. This has important bearings on future development in employment theory. For example, a worker's satisfaction from shirking (net of dismissal risks), or his or her willingness to search for jobs (net of search cost), can now be included in his or her utility function to form an optimal work or search strategy. Incorporating the worker's optimization behaviour into the model will also enable researchers to study policy directed not just towards firms but also towards the worker's decision process. Furthermore, this approach provides a framework for researchers to generate comparative statics. These comparative statics can lead to interesting topics for econometric models or to further research within this field.     

Wage Bargaining Versus Efficiency Wages: A Synthesis

We construct a model integrating the efficiency wage model of Shapiro–Stiglitz (1984) (SS), with an individual wage bargaining model in the Diamond–Mortensen–Pissarides (DMP) tradition where firms and workers form pairwise matches. We show that when workers may threaten to shirk on the job and there is individual wage bargaining, the wage is always higher and employment lower than in either the SS model, or the (appropriately modified) DMP model. When firms determine workers' efforts unilaterally, efforts are set inefficiently low in the SS model. In the bargaining model, effort is higher, and is first best when the worker non–shirking constraint does not bind. The overall equilibrium allocation may then be more or less efficient than in the SS model, but is always less efficient than in a pure bargaining model with no moral hazard.     

Profit Sharing and Outsourcing under Labor Market Imperfection

When the wage rate is set by the labor union, profit sharing and outsourcing is combined in this paper to analyze how the implementation of profit sharing affects individual effort and wage and thus outsourcing. The findings show that profit sharing and wage have an individual effort‐augmenting effect and therefore increase productivity. It is also found that the wage effect of profit sharing in general is ambiguous. There is a wage decreasing substitution effect, but in contrast, there is a wage increasing effect via labor demand elasticity and effort so that outsourcing and employment effects are also ambiguous. Furthermore, it is shown under which condition a firm will implement a profit sharing scheme.     

Wages in and voluntary quits from an establishment internal labour market

This paper analyses wage rates in and quit rates from two production departments in an establishment based structured internal labour market in which labour allocation between grades and the wage rate of these grades are managerially determined. First, it is assumed that management makes effective use of the ‘private’ information about individual employees collected through time, proxied by tenure, to allocate them to the most appropriate tasks. However, in an OLS regression the elasticity of the wage rate with respect to tenure, although statistically significant, is not economically important. Further, it is assumed that this labour allocation process together with the wage structure will facilitate labour retention. However, in a probit model analysing the quit probability, the probability of quitting increases with the wage rate. Both results are compatible with an internal labour market labour allocation process and wage structure that is not competitive with wage rates prevailing in the external labour market.     

TRAINING, JOB SECURITY AND INCENTIVE WAGES

This paper considers the optimal level of firm‐specific training by taking into account the positive effect of training on the expected duration of workers' current employment. In the framework of an efficiency wage model, a short expected job tenure represents a disamenity that reduces the penalty from shirking. As this disamenity increases, workers have an incentive to continue providing a positive level of effort only if they are compensated by a higher wage. We endogenize the employment separation rate by introducing firm‐specific training. Firm‐specific training creates a rent that is lost if the worker is separated from the firm. As a result, the firm will be more reluctant to fire its trained workforce in a recession. This implies that firm‐specific training can decrease current wages because it represents a commitment to lower future labour turnover.     

Union coverage and sectoral wages: Evidence from the Netherlands

This paper investigates the impact of union coverage on sectoral wages in the Netherlands. The semi-elasticity of the wage rate with respect to union coverage appears to be around 0.05; it is higher in the industrial than in the other sectors. The impact of union coverage on wages appears to be lower in the Netherlands than in the US and the UK. Union coverage increases the weight of internal (sector-specific) factors in wage determination and decreases the weight of external (labour market) factors. Apparently, unions increase the role of rent sharing in wage formation and stabilize employment.     

The role of unemployment in wage determination: further evidence on the wage curve from Turkey

This paper presents an empirical estimation of the correlation between wages and regional unemployment rates in Turkey, more specifically it explores the role of regional unemployment rates in wage determination. The analysis builds upon a series of recent empirical studies on the wage-unemployment relationship, now commonly known as ‘the wage curve’, a downward sloping curve in wage-unemployment space. The existing studies are for most part in advanced market economies, while this paper presents one of the few attempts at a wage curve analysis within the context of a developing market economy. A cross-sectional estimation of micro level individual wage data for the Turkish labour market in 1994, suggest a statistically significant negative correlation between wages and regional unemployment rates. Separate regressions for men and women, however, show a wage curve to exist only in the male labour market. The study also presents the results on other variables of wage determination such as returns to schooling, returns to age, job tenure, gender, industrial and occupational affiliation of the worker, economic sector and union status.     

Testing for uniform wage trends in West-Germany: A cohort analysis using quantile regressions for censored data

The rise of unemployment in West Germany is often attributed to an inflexibility of the wage structure in the face of a skill bias in labor demand trends. In addition, there is concern in Germany that during the 70s and 80s unions were pursuing a too egalitarian wage policy. In a cohort analysis, we estimate quantile regressions of wages taking account of the censoring in the data. We present a new framework to describe trends in the entire wage distribution across education and age groups in a parsimonious way. We explore whether wage trends are uniform across cohorts, thus defining a macroeconomic wage trend. Our findings are that wages of workers with intermediate education levels, among them especially those of young workers, deteriorated slightly relative to both high and low education levels. Wage inequality within age-education groups stayed fairly constant. Nevertheless, the German wage structure was fairly stable, especially in international comparison. The results appear consistent with a skill bias in labor demand trends, recognizing that union wages are only likely to be binding floors for low-wage earners.     

Incentives,pay, and performance: a study of Australian employees

The paper analyses the determinants of self-reported work effort using a 1988 survery of Australian employees. While controlling for the endogeneity of the firm's choice of incentives and pay, it is found that direct incentive schemes have predicted effects, and the efficiency wage hypothesis is supported: pay and work effort are positively correlated. Two efficiency wage models are tested: Akerlof's gift exchange model, and work discipline arguments regarding monitoring difficulties and threats of dismissal. The latter argument is broadly consistent with the data.     

Monetary Reference Points of Managers – Empirical Evidence of Status Quo Preferences and Social Comparisons

We explore whether monetary reference points affect managers′ job satisfaction. These reference points include a manager′s own status quo and the incomes of comparable managers within the same firm and also at the market level. Making use of a unique panel data set of managers in the German chemical sector, we find that social comparisons of compensation do affect reported job satisfaction. Both the relative income position within a manager's own firm and a manager's wage rank on the market have positive relations with job satisfaction. There is no evidence of the relevance of status quo considerations once we control for firm‐related pay variables.     

Income and well-being: an empirical analysis of the comparison income effect

This paper presents an empirical analysis of the importance of ‘comparison income’ for individual well-being or happiness. In other words, the influence of the income of a reference group on individual well-being is examined. The main novelty is that various hypotheses are tested: the importance of the own income, the relevance of the income of the reference group and of the distance between the own income and the income of the reference group, and most importantly the asymmetry of comparisons, i.e. the comparison income effect differing between rich and poor individuals. The analysis uses a self-reported measure of satisfaction with life as a measure of individual well-being. The data come from a large German panel known as GSOEP. The study concludes that the income of the reference group is about as important as the own income for individual happiness, that individuals are happier the larger their income is in comparison with the income of the reference group, and that for West Germany this comparison effect is asymmetric. This final result supports Dusenberry's idea that comparisons are mostly upwards.     

Fairness Considerations in Labor Union Wage Setting – A Theoretical Analysis

We consider a theoretical model in which unions not only take the outside option into account, but also care about the performance of the firm and base their wage‐setting decisions on a firm internal reference, called the fairness reference. Two references, which measure the earnings situation of the firm, are considered – productivity and profits per worker. Wage and employment outcomes as well as the degree of wage rigidity depend on the size of the fairness reference relative to the outside option. A high fairness reference leads to wage pressure and real wage rigidity, whereas a low fairness reference leads to wage moderation and real wage flexibility. An increase in the weight on the fairness reference amplifies these deviations from the standard model.     

Inflation and Openness with Non‐Atomistic Wage Setters

This paper analyses the impact of trade openness on inflation in a strategic framework characterised by monopolistic production in the domestic sector and unionised labour markets. By stressing the interplay between internal and external sources of economic distortion, we show that the economy's inflationary bias reduces up to a critical level of trade openness. Beyond this threshold, wage setters may be induced to behave more aggressively in open economies, leading to higher equilibrium inflation. Based on a regression analysis that investigates the combined effect of labour market institutions and openness on inflation across nineteen OECD economies, we show that inflation is negatively related to openness when wage bargaining is decentralised, while there is virtually no link between openness and inflation at higher levels of wage centralisation.