The Information Content of Method of Payment in Mergers: Evidence from Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs)

We provide evidence on the information content of the method of payment in mergers by examining shareholder returns in a sample of REIT mergers over the period 1994–1998. When the target firm is publicly held, we find that transactions are always stock-financed, and that acquiring firm shareholders sustain small negative returns around the announcement date. When the target is privately held, cash financing, mixed (stock and cash) financing, and placement of blocks of acquirer stock with target owners are more prevalent. Acquirer returns are positive in stock-financed mergers when the target is private, which is consistent with both the information signaling and monitoring by blockholders hypotheses. Further analysis supports the information signaling hypothesis as the dominant explanation. The effects of other explanatory variables are similar whether the target is public or private. Most significantly, acquiring shareholder returns are negatively related to the acquirer's size, but positively related to the acquirer's use of the UPREIT organizational structure. The positive wealth effects of the UPREIT structure are not fully explained as the capitalization of tax benefits.     

The Wealth Effects of Property Acquisitions: Evidence from Japanese and Singaporean REITs

This article examines the wealth effects of 228 property acquisition announcements made by REITs publicly traded in Singapore and Japan, which are the two largest REIT markets in Asia. Adopting an aggressive growth‐by‐acquisition strategy, the newly listed REITs acquired a number of properties within a short time period. Despite their regular activities, we observe the acquisition announcements are associated with a significantly positive abnormal increase in shareholder wealth averaging 0.38% in a 5‐day window around the event date. Controlling for the method of payment, buyer's acquisition strategy and seller's relationship with the acquiring REIT, the regression results show that the likely sources of economic gains associated with acquisitions are economies of scale and better management by acquiring firms. We also find strong evidence that the market reacts less favorably to acquisitions involving a portfolio of properties as opposed to a single property and weaker evidence that it reacts less favorably to mixed‐use acquisitions. These findings suggest the presence of premiums on transparency and corporate focus.     

Time and Risk Diversification in Real Estate Investments: Assessing the Ex Post Economic Value

Welfare gains to long-horizon investors may derive from time diversification that exploits nonzero intertemporal return correlations associated with predictable returns. Real estate may thus become more desirable if its returns are negatively serially correlated. While it could be important for long-horizon investors, time diversification has been mostly investigated in asset menus without real estate and focusing on in-sample experiments. This article evaluates, ex post, the out-of-sample gains from diversification when equity real estate investment trusts (REITs) belong to the investment opportunity set. We find that diversification into REITs increases both the Sharpe ratio and the certainty equivalent of wealth for all investment horizons and for both classical and Bayesian (who account for parameter uncertainty) investors. The increases in Sharpe ratios are often statistically significant. However, the out-of-sample average Sharpe ratio and realized expected utility of long-horizon portfolios are frequently lower than that of a one-period portfolio, which casts doubt on the value of time diversification.     

Value Creation in REIT Property Sell-Offs

We examine major sales of real property by public U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 1992–2002. We find that abnormal shareholder returns are significantly positive, a result that is consistent with findings for conventional firms that sell off real estate. Because REITs do not pay taxes, this finding supports the view that abnormal returns in real estate sell-offs by all types of firms are derived largely from asset allocation efficiencies and do not result exclusively from tax benefits. Shareholder returns are lower in sell-offs motivated by a desire to reduce long-term debt, as is consistent with financial theory regarding the information content of leverage decisions. Returns are inversely related to the firm's operating performance prior to the sell-off announcement, further supporting the case that improved asset efficiencies create value in real estate sell-offs.     

基于大股东控制的并购财富效应研究

本文研究了存在大股东代理问题下的并购财富效应及其形成机理，通过理论分析发现，大股东发起的收购行为通常导致并购方及其关联企业的总利润减少，竞争对手的利润增加，消费者剩余减少。尽管收购活动对并购方而言没有创造价值，但并购事件依然发生。这是因为收购后控制性股东将偏袒他拥有现金流权相对较多的企业。而侵害其他企业小股东利益。本文的研究成果对制定收购监管规则及小股东保护制度有一定的参考意义。     

Illiquidity and Pricing Biases in the Real Estate Market

This article addresses the micro-analytic foundations of illiquidity and price dynamics in the real estate market by integrating modern portfolio theory with models describing the real estate transaction process. Based on the notion that real estate is a heterogeneous good that is traded in decentralized markets and that transactions in these markets are often characterized by costly searches, we argue that the most important aspects defining real estate illiquidity in both residential and commercial markets are the time required for sale and the uncertainty of the marketing period. These aspects provide two sources of bias in the commonly adopted methods of real estate valuation, which are based solely on the prices of sold properties and implicitly assume immediate execution. We demonstrate that estimated returns must be biased upward and risks downward. These biases can be significant, especially when the marketing period is highly uncertain relative to the holding period. We also find that real estate risk is closely related to investors' time horizons, specifically that real estate risk decreases when the holding period increases. These results are consistent with the conventional wisdom that real estate is more favorable to long-term investors than to short-term investors. They also provide a theoretical foundation for the recent econometric literature, which finds evidence of smoothing of real estate returns. Our findings help explain the apparent risk-premium puzzle in real estate—that is, that ex post returns appear too high, given their apparent low volatility—and can lead to the formal derivation of adjustments that can define real estate's proper role in the mixed-asset portfolio.     

Activist‐impelled divestitures and shareholder value

Research Summary : This study analyzes how the divestitures that are impelled by activist investors in their campaigns against public corporations affect shareholder value. Using hand‐collected data on the activist campaigns that were launched against and the divestitures that were undertaken by Fortune 500 companies between 2007 and 2015, we find that activist‐impelled divestitures are more positively associated with immediate and longer‐term measures of shareholder value than comparable manager‐led divestitures. These performance differences persist for nearly two years after the completion of these deals. Our results empirically test the idea that firms with agency problems unlock shareholder value when they divest, and support the notion that activist investors fulfill an important external governance function. Our work also opens new research opportunities and offers practical implications as well. Managerial Summary : This study investigates how divestitures that are undertaken at the behest of activist investors affect shareholder value. We find that divestitures that were undertaken under pressure from activist investors are associated with more positive shareholder returns than comparable divestitures that were undertaken voluntarily by managers. These performance differences persist for nearly two years after the completion of these deals, alleviating concerns about the purported short‐termism of activist investors. Our findings suggest that activist investors may fulfill an important governance function by inducing managers to undertake strategies that they might not otherwise pursue, thereby unlocking shareholder value.     

Factors influencing wealth creation from mergers and acquisitions: A meta-analysis

This study analyzes the empirical literature concerning the influence of various factors on shareholder wealth creation in mergers and acquisitions using a multivariate framework. Overall, results indicate that while the target firm's shareholders gain significantly from mergers and acquisitions, those of the bidding firm do not. Findings also indicate that the use of stock financing has a significant impact on the wealth of both the target and bidding firms' shareholders. The presence of multiple bidders and the type of acquisition influence the bidders' return, while regulatory changes and tender offers influence the targets' returns. The paper also provides a comparison of our findings with that of previous narrative reviews and discusses their implications from the viewpoint of managers and researchers.     

Top management team incentive heterogeneity,strategic investment behavior,and performance: A contingency theory of incentive alignment

Research summary : We develop and test a contingency theory of the influence of top management team (TMT) performance‐contingent incentives on manager–shareholder interest alignment. Our results support our theory by showing that although TMTs engage in significantly higher levels of acquisition investment when their average incentive levels increase, investors' responses to those large investments are generally negative. More importantly, however, we further find that within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity conditions that effect, such that investors evaluate TMTs' large acquisition investments more positively as the variance in those top managers' incentive values increases. Thus, within‐TMT incentive heterogeneity appears to increase manager–shareholder interest alignment, in the context of large acquisition investments. Managerial summary : We find that as the average value of TMTs' incentives increase, relative to their total pay, they invest more in acquisitions and investors' respond negatively to the announcement of those deals. However, we further show that investors respond more positively to acquisitions announced by TMTs whose members' incentive values vary (some TMT members hold higher incentives and others hold lower). Results imply that when TMT members hold differing incentives levels, they approach investments from divergent perspectives, scrutinize those investments more heavily, and make better decisions, relative to TMTs with similar incentives. They also suggest that boards seeking tighter manager–shareholder interest alignment may benefit from introducing variance into TMT members' incentive structures, as doing so appears to create divergent preferences that can improve team decision making. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Relational configurations with information intermediaries: The effect of firm‐investment bank ties on expected acquisition performance

Recognizing information‐related problems in acquisition transactions, we study how the characteristics of acquiring firms' relationships with information brokers or intermediaries like investment banks affect firms' access to acquisition‐related information, thus influencing expected acquisition performance. We propose that relational configurations that enhance the intermediaries' ability and willingness provide the most beneficial and appropriate information to acquiring firms. We find that acquirers' expected acquisition performance increases with the number of prior transactions with investment banks but decreases when relationships with banks become exclusive. Further, the positive effect of number of prior transactions becomes even stronger for less related acquisitions. Our study provides insights on the beneficial performance implications of competition in multiple but nonexclusive relationships with information intermediaries such as investment banks. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Shareholder value,stakeholder management,and social issues: what's the bottom line?

We test the relationship between shareholder value, stakeholder management, and social issue participation. Building better relations with primary stakeholders like employees, customers, suppliers, and communities could lead to increased shareholder wealth by helping firms develop intangible, valuable assets which can be sources of competitive advantage. On the other hand, using corporate resources for social issues not related to primary stakeholders may not create value for shareholders. We test these propositions with data from S&P 500 firms and find evidence that stakeholder management leads to improved shareholder value, while social issue participation is negatively associated with shareholder value. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Institutional common ownership and firm value: Evidence from real estate investment trusts

This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about whether and how institutional common ownership (ICO) affects firm behavior. Using a sample of equity real estate investment trusts (REITs), which provide significant advantages for isolating a monitoring channel, we find a robust and positive relation between ICO and REIT firm value. The positive relation between ICO and firm value is driven mainly by motivated investors and becomes stronger when we construct our ICO measures using blockholdings. Our difference‐in‐differences analysis, using mergers between institutional investors, suggests a causal relation exists between ICO and firm value. After investigating various channels through which ICO could affect firm behavior, we conclude that asset allocation decisions and performance are the most plausible explanations. Our finding that the monitoring associated with ICO aids managers in their portfolio disposition strategies further supports this conclusion. This enhanced monitoring leads to increased property portfolio returns, as well as more geographic diversification.     

Will succession planning increase shareholder wealth? evidence from investor reactions to relay CEO successions

Our study examines investor reactions to a specific form of succession planning—relay succession. Theory predicts that both the initiation and the outcome of a relay CEO succession process will influence shareholder wealth. Our results show that investors generally do not react to the initiation of the process as indicated by heir apparent appointment; but react negatively when the process ends in heir apparent exit from the firm and react positively when the process ends in heir apparent promotion to the CEO position. We also found a strong positive investor reaction to outside CEO promotion and a negative investor reaction to nonheir inside CEO promotion. Further, firm performance exerts an important influence on the wealth effect of heir apparent promotion and exit. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Attributes of a Costly Recall: Evidence from the Automotive Industry

While researchers have extensively documented the equity response to product recalls and subsequent shareholder losses, less attention in the literature has been given to examining the damaging recall attributes. Using 1973–1998 automotive safety recall data, this study identifies the kinds of recalls that cause significant shareholder losses. After constructing an equally-weighted automotive market index to control for industry effects and adjusting the abnormal returns to account for the degree of surprise in the recall announcement, the study estimates both percentage and real dollar abnormal returns. We find that the indirect costs of automotive recalls are likely larger than the direct costs.     

What Does the Stock Market Tell Us About Real Estate Returns?

This paper analyzes the risks and returns of different types of real estate-related firms traded on the New York and American stock exchanges (NYSE and AMEX). We examine the relation between real estate stock portfolio returns and returns on a standard appraisal-based index, and find that lagged values of traded real estate portfolio returns can predict returns on the appraisal-based index after controlling for persistence in the appraisal series. The stock market reflects information about real estate markets that is later imbedded in infrequent property appraisals. Additional analysis suggests that the differences in the return and risk characteristics across different types of traded real estate firms can be explained in part by appealing to real estate market fundamentals relating to the degree of dependence of the real estate firm upon rental cash flows from existing buildings. These findings highlight the heterogeneity of securitized real estate-related firms.     

Small fish,big fish: The performance effects of the relative standing in partners' affiliate portfolios

This study examines whether the value a venture derives from an affiliation depends on its relative standing in the portfolio of all affiliations held by its partner. Relative standing refers to how the venture ranks among other ventures in the partner's portfolio with respect to expected returns. The relative standing of a venture in its partner's portfolio influences the venture's access to the partner's resources and the venture's performance. We also argue that a venture's relative standing becomes more important to performance when the partner has a larger portfolio or higher status. In addition to a field study, we test the effect of a venture's relative standing in a venture capital portfolio on its exit likelihood, controlling for endogeneity. We find support for our hypotheses. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Can antitakeover activity really create wealth? Evidence from Australia

This paper examines management-induced antitakeover activity which occurred in Australia in the late 1980s. The particular event studied is unique in Australia and requires shareholder approval to amend a company's Articles of Association to incorporate an antitakeover clause. The results show that there are strong positive wealth effects surrounding this management-initiated antitakeover activity, and that there is some evidence of a positive relationship between these abnormal returns and institutional holdings.Scott Armstrong is Investment Analyst, Bankers Trust Australia Limited, Sydney, Australia. Helen Lange is Senior Lecturer, Graduate School of Management, Macquarie University, Sydney, Australia. Li-Anne Woo is Lecturer, School of Banking and Finance, University of New South Wales, Sydney, Australia. We gratefully appreciate the comments on earlier drafts from Tim Brailsford, Malcolm Harris, Gary Twite, Greg Clinch, Julianne Wright, Roger Bowden, Robert Czernkowski, participants at the Inaugural International Conference on Financial Management, Suffolk University, Boston (November 1992), and participants at the Third International Conference on Asian-Pacific Financial Markets, Singapore (September 1993). This research benefited from the financial support provided by a Special Research Grant from the Faculty of Commerce and Economics, University of New South Wales.     

房地产宏观调控与地产公司股价波动的相关性——基于A股市场的实证分析

2005—2008年,频繁出台的房地产调控政策成为政策期间房地产上市公司股价波动和投资者财富效应的重要影响因素。本文研究发现,在事件窗内,一系列宏观调控政策对房地产上市公司产生了平均显著为负的累计异常回报率,对房地产上市公司产生总体负的股东财富效应;而在2008年9月之后,宽松的宏观政策对房地产上市公司股价的影响则相反。房地产公司股价波动受货币政策、土地政策、产业政策等不同政策的影响不同,对货币政策最敏感。横截面分析表明,资产规模越大、拥有国有背景房地产企业受政策冲击较小;沿海地区、以住宅开发销售为主的地产上市公司的股价对调控政策更敏感。     

An extension to the classical mean–variance portfolio optimization model

Abstract

The purpose of this study is to find a portfolio that maximizes the risk-adjusted returns subject to constraints frequently faced during portfolio management by extending the classical Markowitz mean–variance portfolio optimization model. We propose a new two-step heuristic approach, GRASP & SOLVER, that evaluates the desirability of an asset by combining several properties about it into a single parameter. Using a real-life data set, we conduct a simulation study to compare our solution to a benchmark (S&P 500 index). We find that our method generates solutions satisfying nearly all of the constraints within reasonable computational time (under an hour), at the expense of a 13% reduction in the annual return of the portfolio, highlighting the effect of introducing these practice-based constraints.