Entry,imperfect competition,and futures market for the input

We analyze firms' entry, production and hedging decisions under imperfect competition. We consider an oligopoly industry producing a homogeneous output in which risk-averse firms face an entry cost upon entering the industry, and then compete in Cournot with one another. Each firm faces uncertainty in the input cost when making production decision, and has access to the futures market to hedge the random cost. We provide two sets of results. First, under general assumptions about risk preferences, demand, and uncertainty, we characterize the unique equilibrium. In contrast to previous results in the literature (without entry), both production and output price depend on uncertainty and risk aversion. Specifically, when entry is endogenized and the futures price is not actuarially fair, access to the futures market does not lead to separation. Second, to study the effect of access to the futures market on entry and production, we restrict attention to constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) preferences, a linear demand, and a normal distribution for the spot price. In general, the effect of access to the futures market on the number of firms and production is ambiguous.     

The effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based governance in strategic alliances under behavioral and environmental uncertainty

Research summary: We examine the interplay of behavioral and environmental uncertainty in shaping the effectiveness of two key governance mechanisms used by strategic alliances: contractual and trust‐based governance. We develop and test hypotheses, using a meta‐analytic dataset encompassing over 15,000 strategic alliances across 82 independent samples. We find that contractual governance works best under low to moderate levels of behavioral uncertainty and moderate to high levels of environmental uncertainty, while it is detrimental to alliance performance when both types of uncertainty are low or high. Trust‐based governance is most effective at high levels of behavioral uncertainty and low levels of environmental uncertainty. It suffers a large loss of usefulness at high behavioral uncertainty as environmental uncertainty increases. Managerial summary: Strategic alliances allow firms to gain greater efficiency and create value. Yet, many such alliances fail because they are not able to deal with the twin challenges posed by behavioral and environmental uncertainty. Findings from our meta‐analysis imply that under conditions of high behavioral uncertainty and low‐to‐moderate levels of environmental uncertainty, the use of trust‐based governance alongside contractual governance might enhance the latter's effectiveness. The combined effectiveness of contractual and trust‐based governance under high levels of both behavioral and environmental uncertainty is not obvious. When both behavioral and environmental uncertainty are high, contractual governance hurts alliance performance while trust‐based governance does not function at its best either. Under these conditions, it might be better for firms to turn to hierarchy or vertical integration. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The Differentiation Triangle

The paper formalizes the observation that submarkets for high-quality and low-quality variants are markedly different from each other. We study a simple model where variants of low quality cannot be horizontally differentiated, whereas customers disagree about the value of variants in the high-quality range. We determine the outcome under price competition in the differentiation triangle with sequential entry when each firm can develop the vertical product line or decide to follow a niche strategy, i.e. to develop only one variant.     

Uncertainty premia in REIT returns

We provide a systematic study of how financial and real estate uncertainty affect the aggregate return performance of the U.S. REIT market from 1994 to 2017. A temporal causality analysis reveals a negative uncertainty impact on REIT returns. The asset pricing analysis confirms the predictive relation and suggests that REITs are statistically significantly exposed to changes in market-wide uncertainty, for which investors require a return compensation. We also identify economic state variables to explain time-varying uncertainty exposures as well as periodic hedging characteristics of REITs. Finally, we find evidence that the source of uncertainty matters for compensating expected REIT returns.     

Hedging House Price Risk in China

The increasing risk associated with China's housing prices is globally recognized. However, hedging this risk is challenging because of a lack of financial derivatives on China's housing assets. We suggest that the short sale of futures contracts for construction raw materials, i.e., iron ore or/and steel, can act as useful tools to hedge the systematic risk of China's new home price. We first present evidence that there is a strong and stable correlation between changes in China's housing prices and global steel/iron ore prices. Using a hedging strategy model, we then show that, during the sample period between 2009 and 2015, 20.6% of the total unpredicted variance in Chinese housing prices can be hedged by shorting rebar and iron ore futures. We further examine this strategy with an event study based on the announcement of the “home‐purchase restriction” policy in April, 2010. The cumulative abnormal returns show that both steel and iron ore prices reacted significantly to this negative shock, and therefore the proposed strategy could substantially help investors offset losses in the housing market. We finally provide some evidences that this strategy can also help investors in specific regional housing markets, or the resale housing markets.     

Interorganizational Imitation and Acquisitions of High‐tech Ventures

Research summary: This article shows that there is a positive association between the changes in the number of prior acquisitions or the changes in the prominence of prior acquirers within the focal venture's subfield and the venture's likelihood to be acquired. Results are in line with the existence of frequency‐ and trait‐based imitation in acquisitions targeting tech ventures. More importantly, these positive associations are more pronounced when (a) exogenous technological uncertainty within the venture's subfield increases and (b) there are significant differences between the focal venture's and acquirer's technological resources. Our findings are in accord with the suggestion that uncertainty in the technology domain is an important boundary condition in moderating the extent of imitation in technology acquisitions. We also discuss alternative explanations and implications. Managerial summary: The findings of this article suggest that when deciding whether or not to acquire a technology venture (i.e., startup company in a high‐tech industry), managers infer information by observing other acquisitions in the venture's subfield to make assessments about the underlying value of the potential targets. We also find that receiving some informational cues from previous acquisitions would be more useful when there is high technological uncertainty in the potential target's subfield about which technologies will be dominant, and when the potential acquirer and the tech venture operate in dissimilar technological areas. This article shows that imitation can be one way to deal with decision‐making under uncertainty when making acquisition decisions in high‐tech environments. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Interlocks and firm performance: The role of uncertainty in the directorate interlock‐performance relationship

We examine how uncertainty influences the performance effects of directorate interlocks. Our study offers a new perspective of directorate interlocks as mechanisms that enable firms to improve performance when confronted with greater uncertainty, suggesting that uncertainty positively moderates the interlock‐performance relationship. This contrasts with the view based on resource dependence theory suggesting networks reduce uncertainty and enhance firm performance, implying that uncertainty mediates the interlock effect upon performance. Using a sample of 3,745 firms across manufacturing industries in the United States during the period 2001–2009, we find support for the moderation argument and less convincing support for mediation, suggesting that firms may not form interlocks necessarily to reduce uncertainty. Instead, firms may create interlocks to enable adaptation and enhance performance when confronted by uncertainty. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The dark side of institutional intermediaries: Junior stock exchanges and entrepreneurship

Research Summary : Our study shows how institutional intermediaries established to foster the creation of new firms might hinder new firm growth instead. We show that intermediaries can reduce new firm growth rates due to institutional conflict. To analyze this idea, we examine the setting of junior stock exchanges, which are commonly formed to facilitate entrepreneurial growth. The introduction of these exchanges focused investment into new technology firms, reduced investment in other sectors, and led to diminishing new firm growth. Our findings demonstrate how institutional conflict causes unintended effects and reveals the complexity of influencing entrepreneurship with institutional intermediaries. Managerial Summary : Investors and entrepreneurs face uncertainty when deciding what firms to start and fund. We show that an intermediation effort to make entry easier for entrepreneurs increases the uncertainty that entrepreneurs and investors face. For investors, the enthusiasm for technology firms engendered by the new exchange can motivate investment in marginal firms to maintain as desired deal flow. However, lower firm growth and less liquidity in the future is likely. For entrepreneurs, our results indicate that it is more challenging to manage technology firm growth as well as there is potential opportunity to investigate other industries. Finally, for policy‐makers and supporters of the new exchanges, our results imply that investment flows are altered as intended, but unless listing standards remain high, the virtuous cycle of investment upon which a healthy entrepreneurial climate rests may be disrupted, muting the intended effects of the new exchange.     

Real options and MNE strategies in Asia Pacific

Asia Pacific offers a lot of promising growth opportunities, but it also presents high levels of uncertainty for multinational enterprises (MNEs). In this paper, we introduce real options theory as a theory of investment under uncertainty, and we discuss its implications for MNEs and their strategies with a focus on the emerging economies in Asia Pacific. We suggest that MNEs must recognize the various sources of uncertainty, as well as the various options embedded in their investments, and real options theory can help them structure and design their investments to benefit from uncertainty. In particular, MNEs need to develop the dynamic capabilities of managing real options in their investments to respond to the evolving economic and institutional environment in the region. This paper also provides several implications for policy makers in Asia Pacific to stimulate investment activities in the region and to help their firms venture successfully in the international market place.

Hedging grain price risk in the SADC: Case studies of Malawi and Zambia

We use simulation methods to examine the results of hedging maize food security imports into Malawi and Zambia on the South African Exchange (SAFEX). Results show that hedging using either futures or options can spread import costs over time, thereby reducing variability, and also possibly generating lower average costs. These benefits are increased if hedging only takes place when local prices are at less than import parity and also if the hedge is levered. However, problems will remain so long as intra-regional transport costs remain high.     

Ecological uncertainty,adaptation, and mitigation in the U.S. ski resort industry: Managing resource dependence and institutional pressures

We draw on resource dependence and institutional theories to study how firms manage uncertainty in nature (ecological uncertainty) in the U.S. ski resort industry. Through resource dependence theory, we develop the concept of ecological uncertainty and explain its effects on firms' access to and management of natural resources. We then predict that firms adapt to ecological uncertainty with natural‐resource‐intensive practices, as well as practices that attempt to mitigate its underlying causes. Using institutional theory, we also predict that environmental expectations moderate these responses. Our results indicate that firms did manage ecological uncertainty by adopting natural‐resource‐intensive practices, but not mitigation practices. They also show that stronger environmental expectations constrained firms from adopting natural‐resource‐intensive practices and promoted their adoption of mitigation practices in response to ecological uncertainty. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Regulatory decision errors,Legal Uncertainty and welfare: A general treatment

We provide a general treatment of the implications for welfare of various sources of legal uncertainty facing agents about the decisions made by a regulatory authority. We distinguish the legal uncertainty from the decision errors made by the authority. While an increase in decision errors will always reduce welfare, for any given level of decision errors, information structures involving more legal uncertainty can improve welfare. This holds always when sanctions are set at their optimal level. This transforms radically one's perception about the “costs” of legal uncertainty. We also provide general proofs for two results, previously established under restrictive assumptions.     

Toward a behavioral theory of real options: Noisy signals,bias, and learning

Research Summary: We develop a behavioral theory of real options that relaxes the informational and behavioral assumptions underlying applications of financial options theory to real assets. To do so, we augment real option theory's focus on uncertain future asset values (prospective uncertainty) with feedback learning theory that considers uncertain current asset values (contemporaneous uncertainty). This enables us to incorporate behavioral bias in the feedback learning process underlying the option execution/termination decision. The resulting computational model suggests that firms that inappropriately account for contemporaneous uncertainty and are subject to learning biases may experience substantial downside risk in undertaking real options. Moreover, contrary to the standard option result, greater uncertainty may decrease option value, making commitment to an investment path more effective than remaining flexible. Managerial Summary: Executives recognize the need to make uncertain investments to grow their business while mitigating downside risk. The analogy between financial options and real corporate investments provides an appealing method to consider the practical challenge of such investment decisions. Unfortunately, the “real options” analogy seems to break down in practice. We identify how a second form of uncertainty confounds real options intuition, leading managers to overestimate the value of uncertain investments. We present a behavioral real options model that accounts for both forms of uncertainty and suggest how uncertainty interacts with behavioral bias in the option execution/termination decision. Our model facilitates assessment of the conditions under which investments in uncertain opportunities are usefully considered as real options, and provides a means to evaluate their attractiveness.     

On the strategic value of risk management

This article examines how firms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where firms that are rendered “risk averse” by financial frictions decide on and commit to their hedging strategies before their product market strategies. We find that commitment to hedging modifies the pricing and production strategies of firms. This strategic effect is channeled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e., the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders' “risk aversion”. It has opposite effects depending on the nature of product market competition: commitment to hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, not committing to the hedging position can never be an equilibrium outcome: committing is always a best response to non-committing. In the Hotelling model, committing is a dominant strategy for all firms.     

Inflation Protection from Homeownership: Long‐Run Evidence, 1814–2008

This article examines the inflation hedging capacity of the private home. We employ unique long‐term data for inflation, house price dynamics and rents for Amsterdam dating back to 1814, allowing us to study total housing returns in different inflation regimes and for varying investment horizons. Our Amsterdam data show that homeownership's protection against actual and expected inflation increases with the investment horizon. This increase is especially strong for horizons up to 10 years. Inflation protection from housing is stronger when inflation is persistent, and the hedging capacities of housing regarding unexpected inflation are weak.     

Capacity reservation under spot market price uncertainty

Capacity reservation contracts and spot markets are two alternative purchasing practices. We focus on the cost-effective management of the combined use of these two procurement sources. Due to the variability of the spot market prices and demand uncertainty, the flexibility of combined sourcing can be advantageous. Spot market purchasing is a benefit in case of low spot market prices or insufficient reserved capacity, and the capacity reservation contract is an operational risk hedging for high spot market price incidents. The structure of the optimal combined purchasing policy is complex. In this paper we consider a simple and easy-to-implement capacity reservation—base stock policy and compare it to single sourcing options. We examine the joint effect of demand and spot market price uncertainty. Our analysis shows that in the case of large spot market price variability the combined sourcing is superior over spot market sourcing even in the case of low average spot price. The combined sourcing is also superior over long-term sourcing even in the case of high average spot price if there is large spot market price variability. Analytical and simulation results are presented to show the effect of the different price, cost, and uncertainty parameters on the optimal capacity reservation—base stock policy and on the expected percentage gain over single sourcing.     

Toward an integrated theory of the firm: The interplay between internal organization and vertical integration

Research summary : Two central issues in strategic management are the determination of a firm's internal delegation and its vertical boundaries. Despite the importance of these issues, there is scant analysis concerning their interaction. Using a comprehensive database of the construction industry, we show that vertical integration positively influences the centralization decision and that the main mechanism driving this relationship is an improvement in the hierarchically coordinated adaptation of firm activities when complexity and uncertainty are high. We also observe that centralization is negatively related to the extent of relational contracts between principals and agents, and positively related to an exogenous increase in the cost of employee layoffs. Our results suggest that managers cannot consider firm boundaries and internal organization to be independent decisions. Managerial summary : We ask whether a firm's decision about vertically integrating or outsourcing its activities affects the choice of centralizing or delegating its internal decision‐making process. Our statistical analysis shows that firms with more vertical integration tend to centralize the decision‐making process and that firms that outsource more tend to decentralize more. Why? Vertical integration enables the use of centralized authority to coordinate activities that interact intensively. Accordingly, we found that the positive influence of vertical integration on centralization is especially significant in more complex and uncertain environments, when the need for coordination is higher. Thus, our results suggest that managers should choose vertical integration considering its effect on internal decision‐making processes, particularly when coordination is important. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When can you trust “trust”? Calculative trust,relational trust,and supplier performance

Our research empirically assesses two distinct bases for trust: calculative trust, based on a structure of rewards and penalties, versus relational trust, a judgment anchored in past behavior and characterized by a shared identity. We find that calculative trust and relational trust positively influence supplier performance, with calculative trust having a stronger association than relational trust. Yet, important boundary conditions exist. If buyers invest in supplier‐specific assets or when supply side market uncertainty is high, relational trust, not calculative trust, is more strongly associated with supplier performance. In contrast, when behavioral uncertainty is high, calculative trust, not relational trust, relates more strongly to supplier performance. These results highlight the value of examining distinct forms of trust. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Money secrets: How does trade secret legal protection affect firm market value? Evidence from the uniform trade secret act

Research summary : We investigate the impact of trade secret legal protection on firm market value in the context of acquisitions. On one hand, market value may increase because trade secret assets become better protected from rivals. On the other hand, market value may decrease because trade secret protection reduces information about the target and its competitors available to potential buyers, increasing uncertainty about its value. Buyers will discount their offers in expectation of being compensated for riskier deals. Using a sample of private equity investments in the United States, we find that trade secret protection has a positive effect in industries with high mobility of knowledge workers, but a negative effect in industries with (1) high resource–value uncertainty and (2) high poor‐investment risk. Managerial summary : We argue that an increase in trade secret legal protection might not unequivocally benefit firm owners when selling their business. A stronger trade secret protection increases the market value of firms in industries with high workers' mobility, but it decreases the market value of firms in industries with uncertain resource value and/or high risk of poor‐acquisition investments. Based on the contingent effect of trade secret protection, companies may want to adjust their strategic decisions, including where to locate or relocate, based in part on whether they will derive benefits or suffer losses when trade secrets are better protected. Finally, our study should help policymakers understand more fully the economic impact of government policies associated with trade secrets. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Vertical Exclusion with Downstream Risk Aversion or Limited Liability

An upstream firm with full commitment bilaterally contracts with two ex ante identical downstream firms. Each observes its own cost shock, and faces uncertainty from its competitor’s shock. When they are risk neutral and can absorb losses, the upstream firm contracts symmetric outputs for production efficiency. However, when they are risk averse, competition requires the payment of a risk premium due to revenue uncertainty. Moreover, when they enjoy limited liability, competition requires the upstream firm to share additional surplus. To resolve these trade‐offs, the upstream firm offers exclusive contracts in many cases.