金融业高管人员需要具备的基本素质

在市场经济条件下,国有专业银行向商业银行机制转化,其中最关键的环节是逐步培养和造就一支高素质、高水平、懂经营、会管理的金融家队伍。这支队伍的成员不是一般意义上的银行管理者,他们必须是按照世界商业银行操作的要求和意识,在众多的金融机构竞争中脱颖而出的佼佼者,是更高层次的企业经营者。这就要求每一个优秀的商业银行经营管理者都必须具备良好、稳定的基本素质。     

Supervision of higher executives in commercial banks ——From the view of game theory

After reviewing the bad news and corruptions of the higher executives in commercial banks recent years, the article first analyzes the characteristics of all these things, and use game theory to analyzes the actions between the higher executives and administrative sections and further construes with cost and benefit utility model, and finally put up some countermeasures.     

Executive shareholding,compensation, and analyst forecast of Chinese firms

We examine the impact of executive and leadership shareholding and cash compensation on analyst forecast error and dispersion as proxies for information asymmetry. We find that firms pay higher compensation (or excess compensation) to executives and directors are associated with higher information asymmetry. The positive association is stronger where executives’ and directors’ shareholdings are higher. Shareholding appears to facilitate managerial entrenchment and gives highly paid executives/leadership stronger structural power which adversely affects information disclosure leading to larger forecast error and dispersion. These results are robust to different measures of compensation and alternative models controlling for the predictability of firm-level earnings. Our findings indicate that executive/director shareholding and compensation do not provide sufficient incentives for information disclosure by Chinese firms.     

高管人力资本、高管报酬和公司绩效关系的实证研究——以中部地区上市公司为例

高管人力资本、高管报酬和公司绩效三者之间体现何种关系特征,是企业配置高管人员有效实施高管报酬激励的重要依据,是提升公司绩效的有效保证。本文的研究结果表明,高管的任期与公司绩效存在正相关关系,与高管报酬存在负相关关系;高管年龄与公司绩效存在负相关关系,与高管报酬存在正相关关系;高管的教育背景与公司绩效存在负相关关系,与高管报酬存在正相关关系。公司治理因素尤其是股权因素对高管人力资本特征与公司绩效、高管报酬的相关性有很大的影响。     

Incentive-compatible compensation and regulation

This article uses contingent claims analysis and regulatory constraints to show how a bank can create incentive-compatible compensation for the senior management aligned with the interests of the other stakeholders. For this purpose, the remuneration package takes the form of a ‘call spread’ on the bank’s equity. Unlike regular stock option programmes, a call spread limits the upside potential for the senior management. This prevents unlimited risk taking. Additionally, a maximum regulatory default probability also constrains risk-taking behaviour. We show under which parameterizations the remuneration package and the regulatory constraint offer equal incentives for the senior management.     

Executive compensation among Australian mining and non-mining firms: Risk taking,long and short-term incentives

How firms determine the pay of their executive employees is a vital research area. In the Australian context, mining firms form a large portion of listed companies. These miners tend to have more volatile earnings, operate with less certainty and higher risk in relation to capital investment. We look at a sample of ASX listed miners and non-miners from 2005 to 2013. We note that miners pay their CEOs less (AUD 1 m vs AUD 1.5 m for non-miners) overall. However, we also note that miners tend to use enhanced contingent long-term remuneration arrangements to significantly boost the pay-performance relationship compared to non-miners particularly during the pre-GFC period. Curiously, non-miners tend to have more generous short-term contingent arrangements linking executive pay and performance. The GFC, as an event, has adversely impacted these arrangements, lessening the generosity of pay-performance among miners, while enhancing these arrangements among non-miners. Overall, the results of the study provide support for optimal contracting theory and do not generally support the managerial power approach for both mining and non-mining firms.     

高管报酬隐性激励的实证研究

文章运用虚拟变量改变业绩评价指标斜率的方法,考察了成长性不同的两类上市公司的高管年度报酬与会计收益和市场股价这两个业绩指标的关系。研究后发现,年度报酬包含着隐性长期激励的报酬形式。与稳定成长公司相比,高成长公司会在市场股价指标上赋予较大权重,在会计收益指标上赋予较小权重;同时,高成长公司会给予高管较大的保底报酬。     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

Asset quality,non-interest income,and bank profitability: Evidence from Indian banks

This paper investigates whether a shift toward non-interest income activities improves the profitability of Indian banks and, if so, how it varies across ownership groups and banks with different asset qualities. Our findings show that higher share of non-interest income yields higher profits and risk-adjusted profits; in particular when banks are involved in more trading activities. The results indicate that private foreign banks earn more risk-adjusted profits compared to public sector and private domestic banks. Furthermore, we also find that income diversification benefits more to the banks that have lower asset quality compared to the banks that have higher asset quality. The findings are insensitive to dynamic panel data estimations and alternative sample specification. The results of this paper provide valuable insights for policymakers, and conclude that ensuring diversification activities enhances bank profitability, in particular for the banks that have lower asset quality.     

高管薪酬利益驱动下的企业并购——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

并购是企业最为重要的一项资源配置战略,而实施这项战略计划的决策权一般掌控在公司高管手中,因此,研究并购中高管人员的行为动机具有重要意义。文章以2002~2004年发生并购的中国上市公司为样本,研究了并购中企业高管人员的自身利益变化。经验证据表明,企业高管人员有很强的动机通过企业并购这种方式增加自己的薪酬和控制权收益,研究后还发现,当企业高管人员处于临近退休时,这种动机会更加强烈。同时发现,由于制度刚性的存在,企业高管人员会借助并购,并通过并购后公司资产规模的扩大、雇佣员工人数的增加等因素增加自己的薪酬,而且薪酬变化呈现出明显的地区性差异。这项研究结果对公司治理中企业高管人员的薪酬契约设计亦有一定的借鉴意义。     

Turnover in top management and de-escalation of commitment

We explore how de-escalation of commitment is linked to top management turnover and economic changes at the firm. Escalation of commitment occurs when managers continue investment in a project after receiving negative information. A major determinant of escalation is the personal responsibility effect in that managers are more likely to escalate commitment to a failing project if they were responsible for the original investments. Prior studies suggest that a change in top management facilitates de-escalation of commitment as incoming managers who do not have such commitment are able to stop investments that are discovered to be failing. Our empirical analysis based on a sample of over 3,300 firms for the period from 1992 to 2016 demonstrates the link between specific top management turnover types and economic changes at the firm consistent with the de-escalation of commitment.     

Pre-recession efficiencies and input allocation decisions of agricultural and critically insolvent banks

The late 2000s’ economic recession is considered the longest economic downturn since the 1930s Great Depression. Declining real estate values ignited an increase in loan defaults and mortgage foreclosures that led to a surge of bank failures at a rate not experienced by the U.S. banking industry since the 1980s. A total of 509 bank failures were recorded by the FDIC from January 2007–December 2014, with nearly 60% of these failures occurring in 2009 and 2010. In contrast, there were only 24 bank failures in the U.S. during the 7-year period prior to 2007. This study analyzed certain components of operating decisions made by banks that either survived or became critically insolvent during the late 2000s financial crisis using an Input Distance Stochastic Frontier function to estimate the technical efficiency (TE) and allocative efficiency (AE) between agricultural banks and non-agricultural banks. This efficiency analysis was applied to a 7-year pre-recession period and is designed to final out any early warning signals that decrease the efficiency level of banks. Results suggest that survival banks were more technically efficient than critically insolvent banks, and banks’ tendency to utilize cheaper inputs were more likely to stand the economic crisis.     

我国商业银行信用卡业务发展对策研究

随着经济全球化,我国市场经济与世界接轨,我国的市场经济发展不断加速,金融体制的改革也逐渐深入。为使商业银行能够更好地辅助我国经济发展以及促进商行自身的进步,商业银行开始战略转型。我国商业银行中间业务开始逐渐显现自己的优势,甚至有超越传统业务的趋势,而信用卡业务作为商业银行重要的中间业务,成为商业银行盈利的重要业务。信用卡业务较传统业务有高风险、高收益的特点,同时信用卡业务发展过程中也不断出现新的问题,应受到高度重视。     

Customer ignorance, price-cap regulation, and rent-seeking in mobile roaming

Mobile phone usage when traveling abroad is expensive. Although the network connection switches frequently between available networks, the choice of network is largely independent of wholesale prices. As a consequence, we show that wholesale prices are strategic substitutes. The recent European price-cap regulation forces firms to reduce wholesale and retail roaming prices, but does not solve the underlying problem. There may thus be a permanent need for regulation analogous to what we have for domestic call termination. Furthermore, we show that there is a risk that wholesale price-cap regulation stimulates wasteful rent-seeking activity.     

Firm performance,corporate governance and executive compensation in Pakistan

This study examines the effects of firm performance and corporate governance on chief executive officer (CEO) compensation in an emerging market, Pakistan. Using a more robust Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation approach for a sample of non-financial firms listed at Karachi Stock Exchange over the period 2005–2012, we find that both current- and previous-year accounting performances has positive influence on CEO compensation. However, stock market performance does not appear to have a positive impact on executive compensation. We further find that ownership concentration is positively related with CEO compensation, indicating some kind of collusion between management and largest shareholder to get personal benefits. Inconsistent with agency theory, CEO duality appears to have a negative influence, while board size and board independence have no convincing relationship with CEO compensation, indicating board ineffectiveness in reducing CEO entrenchment. The results of dynamic GMM model suggest that CEO pay is highly persistent and takes time to adjust to long-run equilibrium.     

Bank reforms and efficiency in Vietnamese banks: evidence based on SFA and DEA

This study examines the cost efficiency of Vietnamese banks from 2000 to 2014 in the first stage, and the selection and dynamic effects of two governance reforms, foreign partial acquisition and listing on the stock exchange, on the efficiency in the second stage. Empirical results from the two-stage Stochastic Frontier Analysis (SFA) are highly consistent with those from the two-stage Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) . Specifically, the first-stage efficiency estimation indicates that the cost efficiency shows a slightly upward trend over the period 2000–2014, with the cost efficiency score being 0.93 and state-owned banks outperforming joint-stock banks (JSBs). The mixed process seemingly unrelated regression estimator which controls the potential endogeneity of public listing and foreign acquisition in the second stage shows that selection effects occur in the Vietnamese banking system: banks selected by the strategic foreign investors for partial acquisition and banks selected for public listing are more cost-efficient than those not selected. The short-term and long-term dynamic effects of foreign partial acquisition are documented: the cost efficiency of the Vietnamese banks post-partial acquisition is lower than prior-partial acquisition, and it experiences a decreasing trend since partial acquisition. However, the short-term and long-term dynamic effects of public listing are not evidenced: the cost efficiency of the banks after public listing is not statistically different from that before public listing, and it also reveals an unclear trend since public listing.     

北美大型建筑企业及工程承包市场--中国大型建筑企业家经济合作考察团考察报告摘要

今年2-3月,以中国对外承包商会副会长、建筑分会会长符曜伟为团长,由中国建筑工程总公司副总经理郭爱华、中国铁道建筑总公司副总经理何能金、北京建工集团董事长孙维林、中国核工业建设集团公司常务副总经理王寿君、中国机械工业建设总公司总裁王治安、湖南省建筑工程集团总公司总经理陈国平组成的中国建筑企业家经济合作考察团访问了加拿大和美国,对在全球排名前列的加拿大和美国四家大型跨国建筑企业及北美建筑市场的相关情况进行了实地考察。代表团成员企业与加拿大、美国大型跨国建筑公司就初步建立战略伙伴关系达成共识,为在中国市场和国际工程承包市场上进行全面合作奠定了基础。本刊特将此次考察报告的核心内容予以发表,希26望对读者进一步了解北美大型建筑企业及工程承包市场有所助益。     

Board monitoring,firm risk,and external regulation

We examine the relationship between board monitoring and firm characteristics using a broad sample of firms over the 8 year period from 1996 to 2003. We find that board independence and monitoring is negatively related to firm risk in the absence of external regulation. In addition, we find that external regulatory and political pressures affect the level of board monitoring, especially after the increased focus on board composition by the stock exchanges beginning in 1999 and the passage of the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley Act. We find that the sensitivity of the negative relationship between board monitoring and firm risk decreases in the post 1999 period suggesting that firms have increased board monitoring in response to external regulations. We also find that these external regulations have had an asymmetrical impact on high-risk firm. In our empirical analysis we also control for other factors that affect board monitoring and find that firms in which the CEO has longer tenure and greater equity ownership have less board monitoring activity and that there is a negative relationship between the level of board monitoring and the level of shareholder rights.      

上市公司高管薪酬与盈余管理实证分析

采用操纵性应计作为盈余管理的代理变量,对中国上市公司高管年薪与盈余管理之间的关系进行了实证分析。研究发现：操纵性应计对上市公司高管年薪存在显著影响,但影响程度小于经营活动现金流与非操纵性应计;非经常性损益对高管年薪的影响并不显著;高管操纵盈余的动机随着年薪与报告利润相关性的增加而增加。     

Basel III and perceived resilience of banks in the BRICS economies

This study investigates how the additional capital and liquidity requirements of Basel III would increase the resilience of banks. In particular, using panel data from 2007 to 2014, we examine the resilience of banks in the BRICS economies. Our results suggest that a 10% increase in capital adequacy ratio (CAR), Tier 1 capital ratio (TRA), and leverage ratio (LEV), the resilience (as measured by Z-Score of banks) increases by about 2.18, 0.89 and 1.31%, respectively. Similarly, for a 100% increase in liquidity coverage ratio (LCR), the resilience of banks increases by 0.51%, 1.10% and 1.19%, respectively, in the models associated with CAR, TRA, and LEV. Hence, our findings suggest that the CAR is robust to increase the resilience of banks. Our study also reveals that the LCR and LEV are the most effective to increase the resilience of banks if implemented simultaneously. We also find that the stage of economic development does not matter in formulating policies for the BRICS economies, and finally, we provide empirical evidence that economy-wide risk, such as a financial crisis, does not affect the resilience of banks and it influences the resilience of banks in the BRICS economies in the same way before and after the crisis.