Competitive behavior in market games: Evidence and theory

We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1973) [21]. Market games obtain Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some or possibly all markets are closed. We find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic Nash equilibria, but favor more efficient Nash equilibria in which all markets are open. As the number of subjects participating in the market game increases, the Nash equilibrium they achieve approximates the associated competitive equilibrium of the underlying economy. Motivated by these findings, we provide a theoretical argument for why evolutionary forces can lead to competitive outcomes in market games.     

Counter-intuitive results in game theory

General comparative game statics results are derived in order to provide testable hypotheses in game-like situations. These results run counter to ordinary economic intuition. It becomes necessary to initially define whether a situation represents perfect competition or monopoly on the one hand or a game-like situation on the other hand because these different assumptions lead to greatly differing results. Several empirical applications of the theory are suggested.     

On economic applications of evolutionary game theory

Evolutionary games have considerable unrealized potential for modeling substantive economic issues. They promise richer predictions than orthodox game models but often require more extensive specifications. This paper exposits the specification of evolutionary game models and classifies the possible asymptotic behavior for one and two dimensional models.     

A generalization of modern production theory

This paper analyses the relationship between inflation and equity returns in Australia over the period January 1974 to March 1996. Analysis is based on monthly and quarterly data, using value weighted equity indices at both the aggregate market and industry level. Three price indices, the consumer price index (CPI) (quarterly) and the manufactured materials used index (MMU) and the manufacturing articles produced index (MAP) (both monthly and quarterly) are used to measure inflation. Results provide little evidence of the statistically significant negative relationship observed in the US for the full study period. Analysis is also conducted on three subperiods, ‘monetary targeting’ (July 1976–January 1985), ‘checklist approach’ (February 1985–December 1989) and anti-inflation (January 1990–March 1996). At the market level the anti-inflation subperiod does provide some evidence of a negative relationship between inflation and equity returns though statistical significance is not apparent with quarterly time series. The impact of expected inflation on industry returns varies considerably. Consistent with the overall market analysis, the incidence of negative expected inflation betas increases in the latter anti-inflation subperiod. Finally, changes in Government inflation policy appear to have greatest impact on industrial company expected inflation betas.     

A spectrum of equilibration processes in game theory

In game theory, four dynamic processes converging towards an equilibrium are distinguished and ordered by way of agents' decreasing cognitive capacities. In the eductive process, each player has enough information to simulate perfectly the others' behavior and gets immediately to the equilibrium. In epistemic learning, each player updates his beliefs about others' future strategies, with regard to their sequentially observed actions. In behavioral learning, each player modifies his own strategies according to the observed payoffs obtained from his past actions. In the evolutionary process, each agent has a fixed strategy and reproduces in proportion to the utilities obtained through stochastic interactions. All along the spectrum, longer term dynamics makes up for weaker rationality, and physical relations substitute for mental interactions. Convergence, if any, is towards an always stronger equilibrium notion and selection of an equilibrium state becomes more sensitive to context and history. The processes can be mixed if associated to different periods, agents or mechanisms and deepened if obtained by formal reasoning principles.     

Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory

This paper presents a survey of the use of homotopy methods in game theory. Homotopies allow for a robust computation of game-theoretic equilibria and their refinements. Homotopies are also suitable to compute equilibria that are selected by various selection theories. We present the relevant techniques underlying homotopy algorithms. We give detailed expositions of the Lemke–Howson algorithm and the van den Elzen–Talman algorithm to compute Nash equilibria in 2-person games, and the Herings–van den Elzen, Herings–Peeters, and McKelvey–Palfrey algorithms to compute Nash equilibria in general n-person games. We explain how the main ideas can be extended to compute equilibria in extensive form and dynamic games, and how homotopies can be used to compute all Nash equilibria.     

基金羊群行为的博弈分析

本文从博弈角度对信息不完全和声誉报酬型羊群行为的生成机理进行了剖析,最后从博弈均衡解出发,给出了弱化羊群行为的对策.     

博弈论原理在社会有关领域中的应用

文章利用博弈论的原理、理论工具将其应用在社会中的公安战线、经济领域、环境冶理、家庭关系等方面进行了论述,同时指出博弈论应用范围很广,深入掌握和运用它对于提高效益具有十分重要的意义。     

The brief history of game theory and the dissemination in China

After the year of 1944, Von Neumann and Morgenstem published the book ＂Theory of Games and Economic Behavior＂, the game theory had gradually become an emerging discipline. At present, game theory has already penetrated to every industry and widespread application in economy, politics and military and so on. The paper introduces the history and the developed situation of game theory about the foreign and domestic state.     

Rousseau's notion of envy: A comparison with modern economic theory

Abstract

The concept of envy is present both in Rousseau's economic philosophy and in modern economic theory. This paper compares these different uses of the concept and studies the relevance of the definition of envy adopted on each side, taking into account what is at stake when a notion of envy is introduced. It will be shown that Rousseau's envy cannot be expressed by modern conceptions of envy. Nevertheless, it enlightens the debate between the two competing notions of envy present in modern economic theory, revealing that the existence of envy questions the notion of self-interest.     

The role of strategic uncertainty in games: An experimental study of cheap talk and contracts in the Nash demand game

We utilise results from a human-subjects experiment to examine the connection between strategic uncertainty and outcomes in games. Our basic game is a Nash demand game where one player has an outside option available. A “chat” treatment allows bargainers to send cheap-talk messages prior to playing the basic game, and in a “contracts” treatment, they can additionally propose and accept binding contracts. We propose that strategic uncertainty comprises at least two facets: “coordination-type”, which is lower in the chat game than in the basic game, and “rationality-type”, which is lower in the contracts game than in the chat game. We find that both types of strategic uncertainty impact bargaining outcomes: moving from the basic game to the chat game, and thence to contracts, improves several aspects of outcomes, such as higher efficiency, less opting out and less under-demanding. Other results include a treatment effect on the types of agreements that are reached.     

An introduction to the symposium on behavioral game theory

This article introduces the articles contained in the symposium on behavioral game theory. I break economic experiments studying game theory into three broad classes: (1) experiments studying and possibly modifying the assumptions that serve as foundations for game theory; (2) experiments that perform economic engineering, testing existing institutions with the aim of designing better ones; and (3) experiments designed to test theories which apply game theory to fields such as industrial organization.      

Testing static game theory with dynamic experiments: A case study of public goods

Game theory provides predictions of behavior in many one-shot games. On the other hand, most experimenters usually play repeated games with subjects, to provide experience. To avoid subjects rationally employing strategies that are appropriate for the repeated game, experimenters typically employ a “random strangers” design in which subjects are randomly paired with others in the session. There is some chance that subjects will meet in multiple rounds, but it is claimed that this chance is so small that subjects will behave as if they are in a one-shot environment. We present evidence from public goods experiments that this claim is not always true.     

演化理论视角下现代经济增长理论的批判与重建

本文在演化经济学的视角下,建设性地批判现代经济增长理论,试图建立一个新现代经济增长理论的初步基准分析框架,在此基础上比较了新现代增长理论与现代经济增长理论,并提出进一步研究的方向.