Stock market listing status and real earnings management

This study analyzes real earnings management among privately held versus publicly listed firms. Our first finding is that public firms engage in more earnings management through operating activities. When a clear incentive to manage earnings in a specific direction is present we continue to find that public firms manage their earnings more than private firms. We reason that capital market pressure and ownership characteristics drive our results. Additional analyses reveal that public firms employ more real earnings management as a proportion of the total earnings management strategy. Furthermore, we find that mitigating factors of real earnings management have stronger impact in public firms. This study contributes to literature on non-accrual earnings management and to the broader understanding about the private vis-à-vis public firm reporting and operating behavior. Finally, we contribute by identifying an important societal cost of stock market listing, which is the increase in potentially value-destroying real earnings management.     

Founding Family Ownership and Earnings Quality

This study investigates the relation between founding family ownership and earnings quality using data from the Standard & Poor's 500 companies. Existing literature has documented that financial reporting is of higher quality when firms have stronger corporate governance mechanisms and when there is greater demand for quality financial reporting. I provide two competing theories of the effect of founding family ownership on the demand and supply of earnings quality: the entrenchment effect and the alignment effect. The empirical results show that, on average, founding family ownership is associated with higher earnings quality. In particular, I find consistent evidence that founding family ownership is associated with lower abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness, and less persistence of transitory loss components in earnings. In addition, the results suggest a nonlinear relation between family ownership and earnings quality.     

Shareholder Rights,Insider Ownership and Earnings Management

This paper examines whether shareholder rights, which enable shareholders to replace managers, can constrain earnings management, and whether this effect is conditional on the level of insider ownership. Using the comprehensive shareholder rights measure constructed by Gompers et al. ( 2003 ), we find that firms with stronger shareholder rights are associated with fewer income‐increasing discretionary accruals, suggesting that stronger shareholder rights deter managers from reporting aggressive earnings. Moreover, if insider ownership introduces managerial entrenchment, managers with higher ownership would be insulated from shareholder discipline. Consistent with this entrenchment theory, we find that the association between shareholder rights and earnings management becomes insignificant in the presence of higher levels of insider ownership. Shareholder rights are negatively associated with earnings management only when insider ownership is low. Our results indicate that the disciplinary effect of shareholder rights can be attenuated by high levels of insider ownership.     

Political embeddedness and firms’ choices of earnings management strategies in China

We examine whether and how political embeddedness influences financial reporting quality in China by investigating how government ownership and political connections affect Chinese listed firms’ choices of earnings management strategies. The results show that state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and in particular, central SOEs, are more likely to substitute accrual-based earnings management strategies with costlier but less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-SOEs. The results also indicate that politically connected enterprises (PCEs) are more likely to employ less detectable real earnings management strategies than non-PCEs, so much so that PCEs’ total earnings management level is higher than that of non-PCEs.     

Individual Large Shareholders,Earnings Management,and Capital‐Market Consequences

Using a large hand‐collected sample of all blockholders (ownership ≥ 5%) of S&P 1500 firms for the years 2002–2009, we first document significant individual blockholder effects on earnings management (accrual‐based earnings management, real earnings management, and restatements). This association is driven primarily by these large shareholders influencing rather than selecting firms’ financial reporting practices. Second, the market's reaction to earnings announcements suggests that investors recognize the heterogeneity in blockholders’ influence on earnings management. The results highlight the highly individualized effects of blockholders and a mechanism through which shareholders impact reported earnings.     

Earnings Management Constraints and Classification Shifting

Prior literature has investigated three forms of earnings management: real earnings management (REM), accruals earnings management (AEM) and classification shifting. Managers make trade‐off decisions among these methods based on the costs, constraints and timing of each strategy. This study investigates whether managers use classification shifting when their ability to use other forms of earnings management is constrained. We find that when REM is constrained by poor financial condition, high levels of institutional ownership and low industry market share, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. Further, we find that when AEM is constrained by low accounting system flexibility and the provision of a cash flow forecast, managers are more likely to use classification shifting. In addition, when we limit our sample to firms that are most likely to have manipulated earnings, we continue to find support for constraints of both REM and AEM leading to higher levels of classification shifting. We also find support for the hypothesis that the timing of each earnings management strategy influences managers’ trade‐off decision. Our results indicate that managers use classification shifting as substitute form of earnings management for both AEM and REM.     

An Investigation of Factors Influencing the Association between Top Management Ownership and Earnings Management

This study conjectures and shows that the level of stock ownership by top management is non-monotonically associated with managers' propensity to manage earnings. Increasing ownership from low levels decreases earnings management while ownership at high levels increases earnings management. Further, this study attempts to discern when the effects of management ownership are more salient for the firm. The results of this exploratory analysis of 15,945 firm observations over a six-year period show that the non-monotonic association between top management ownership and earnings management is significant, and hence more important, for the firm characteristics of low growth opportunities, high operating volatility, small size, frequent losses, high-technology, and low institutional ownership.     

Corporate Ownership Structure and the Informativeness of Earnings

This study extends prior studies by examining how managerial ownership and external unrelated blockholdings affect the informativeness of earnings. The results are in contrast to prior studies. A non–linear relation exists between managerial ownership and earnings informativeness. Earnings informativeness increases with managerial ownership at low levels but not at higher levels of managerial ownership where the entrenchment effect sets in. Consistent with the role of large shareholder monitoring, the evidence shows a strong positive relationship between external unrelated blockholdings and earnings informativeness. These results are supported when income–increasing and absolute discretionary accruals are used to measure the extent of earnings management     

Extractive Industries Reporting: A Review of Accounting Challenges and the Research Literature

While the extractive industries (EI) are of major significance economically, the reporting of their activities has been the subject of contentious debate posing dilemmas for regulators and standard setters over many decades. In order to ensure alignment with the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) research project on EI, we first identify some important economic characteristics of EI and associated accounting challenges together with an overview of how current accounting standards deal with these challenges using International Financial Reporting Standards as the focus. Second, we conduct a review of extant research on EI reporting analyzed around the key areas of: (a) international diversity of accounting practices and the challenges facing information users; (b) standard-setting processes and lobbying behaviour that deals with why the IASB (and other standard setters) have not succeeded in developing rigorous standards for extractive activities; (c) the reporting of oil, gas, and mineral reserves, given that large proportions of the assets of EI firms (the reserves) are off-balance sheet; (d) environmental, social, and governance (ESG) reporting dealing with how EI firms have increased their reporting of ESG information in response to regulatory demands and pressure for voluntary disclosures; and (e) other EI related topics such as earnings management, risk disclosures, and voluntary disclosure behaviour. Finally, we present some conclusions together with suggestions relating to key areas for future research on EI reporting.     

On the association between institutional ownership and aggressive corporate earnings management in Australia

This study examines the association between institutional ownership and Australian firms' aggressive earnings management strategies. In contrast to similar studies, this study does not assume that the two views on how institutional ownership associates with firms' earnings management behaviour are mutually exclusive. The association between institutional ownership and firms' income increasing discretionary accruals is expected to vary as the level of institutional ownership increases. The results support the predicted non-linear association between institutional ownership and income increasing discretionary accruals. In particular, a positive association is found at the lower institutional ownership levels, consistent with the view that transient (short-term oriented) institutional investors create incentives for managers to manage earnings upwards. On the other hand, a negative association is found at the higher institutional ownership levels, consistent with the view that long-term oriented institutional investors' monitoring limits managerial accruals discretion. These findings suggest that institutional investors can act as a complementary corporate governance mechanism in mitigating myopic aggressive earnings management by corporations when they have a sufficiently high ownership level.     

Type of earnings management and the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices: Evidence from Indonesia

The purpose of this study is to investigate whether companies listed on the Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSE) conduct efficient or opportunistic earnings management and to examine the effect of ownership structure, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on it.Using multiple regressions, we find evidence that the type of earnings management selected by JSE listed firms tends toward efficient earnings management. This evidence is inconsistent with the common view that earnings management in Indonesia is opportunistic. Family ownership has a significant influence on the type of earnings management selected. Firms with a high proportion of family ownership and non-business groups are more inclined to choose efficient earnings management than other types of firms. We find inconsistent evidence with regard to the impact of institutional ownership, firm size, and corporate-governance practices on type of earnings management.     

Family control, board independence and earnings management: Evidence based on Hong Kong firms

In this study, we document that independent corporate boards of Hong Kong firms provide effective monitoring of earnings management, which suggests that despite differences in institutional environments, corporate board independence is important to ensure high-quality financial reporting. The findings also show that the monitoring effectiveness of corporate boards is moderated in family-controlled firms, either through ownership concentration or the presence of family members on corporate boards. The results based on firms reporting small earnings increases provide additional support for our finding that the monitoring effectiveness of independent corporate boards is moderated in family-controlled firms.     

Capital market pressure,real earnings management,and institutional ownership stability - Evidence from Poland

This study investigates whether and how institutional ownership stability influences real earnings management. We find that institutional investors holding stable equity stakes play an important monitoring role in reducing real earnings management by managers pressured by capital market forces to “meet or beat” earnings targets. We also document no relationship between institutional ownership stability and real earnings management in companies with entrenched managers protected from capital market pressure by a dual-class ownership structure. Our findings of the negative association between real earnings management and institutional ownership stability also indicate that firms with more stable ownership are engaged in lesser sales manipulation and overproduction. In addition, we reveal that pressureresistant institutions (pension funds and mutual funds) that reduce real earnings management are an essential part of the external governance mechanism in an emerging economy.     

Do more able managers provide better non-GAAP earnings?

This paper investigates whether managerial ability is associated with non-GAAP earnings quality. I find that the quality of non-GAAP earnings is greater for high-ability managers than low-ability managers. I also find that investors consider non-GAAP earnings released by high-ability management to be informative. Additional tests show that the positive association between managerial ability and the quality of non-GAAP earnings is stronger when return volatility or managerial stock ownership is greater. The results are robust to alternative measures of managerial ability and non-GAAP earnings quality and to controlling for endogeneity bias. Overall, this paper provides evidence that managers of high ability use non-GAAP reporting as a signalling tool to reduce information asymmetry.     

Earnings Behaviour of Financially Distressed Firms: The Role of Institutional Ownership

Using a sample of 859 U.S. bankruptcy-filing firms over the period 1986–2004, we examine the earnings behaviour of managers during the distressed period by looking at sources of abnormal accruals prior to the bankruptcy-filing year. Results show that managers of highly distressed firms shift earnings downwards prior to the bankruptcy filing. We test and provide evidence in support of two potential contributing factors. First, top-level management turnover among distressed firms leads new managers to earnings bath choices during the distressed period. Second, qualified audit opinions exert pressure on managers to follow more conservative earnings behaviour during the distressed period. Evidence is also provided that the management of distressed firms with lower (higher) institutional ownership has greater (lesser) tendency to manage earnings downwards. Results also show that higher institutional ownership mitigates the negative abnormal returns of firms with top management turnover. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first study that attempts to examine whether institutional ownership relates to market reaction in conjunction with a top management turnover or a qualified audit opinion during the distressed period. Prior studies focused on the investigation of earnings management or institutional ownership (separately) during the distressed period, but did not examine if the effect of institutional ownership on earnings behaviour also influences subsequent returns. Thus, the results of this study should be of interest to analysts, standard setters and regulatory bodies since our results show that management turnover, qualified audit opinions and firm governance mechanisms affect the quality of earnings and the level of abnormal returns.     

Institutional Ownership Type and Earnings Quality: Evidence from Iran

Institutional ownership is an important factor in corporate governance. Institutional investors play important roles in firms because of their substantial shareholdings and their capability to monitor managers. However, the question is whether they are capable of monitoring the managers. The literature has provided different evidence for the monitoring role of institutional investors. This study attempts to provide insights into the monitoring roles of institutional investors by examining the relationship between institutional ownership and earnings quality on the Tehran Stock Exchange. Institutional investors are classified into two groups, namely active institutional investors and passive institutional investors, based on their monitoring power in Iran. A multidimensional method is used to measure the various aspects of earnings quality, such as earnings response coefficient, predictive value of earnings, discretionary accruals, conservatism, and real earnings management. The results show that institutional ownership has a positive effect on earnings quality. Similar to total institutional ownership, active institutional ownership has positive effects on proxies of earnings quality. Nonetheless, passive institutional ownership does not have any power to affect earnings quality. Moreover, lead-lag tests of the direction of causality suggest that institutional ownership leads to more earnings quality and not the reverse.     

The influence of director stock ownership and board discussion transparency on financial reporting quality

Seventy-two active corporate directors participate in an experiment where management insists on aggressive recognition of revenue, but the chief audit executive proposes a more conservative approach. Results indicate interactive effects of director stock ownership and the transparency of director decisions. Stock-owning directors are more likely to oppose management’s attempts to manage earnings when transparency increases. For non-stock owning directors, however, increasing transparency does not affect the likelihood that directors oppose management’s attempts to manage earnings. The current study challenges suppositions that equate director stock ownership with improved financial reporting and higher corporate governance quality, and it provides evidence that increased transparency is beneficial when director compensation plans threaten director independence.     

Information environment and earnings management of dual class firms around the world

This study examines the information environment and earnings management of dual class firms. Motivated by the pronounced entrenchment phenomenon at dual class firms due to divergence between voting and cash flow rights, we are interested in whether dual class firms adopt corporate disclosure choices that imply greater opacity as well as employ judgment in financing reporting to misguide the outside shareholders about the firm’s true performance. Based on a sample of 12,672 firms from 19 countries during 1994–2010, we find that dual class status is associated with poorer information environment and increased accrual-based earnings management, consistent with the notion that managers of dual class firms exhibit incentives to conceal private control benefits from the outside shareholders. Results further suggest that dual class ownership structure weakens the mitigating impact of investor protection on earnings management. Following unification, firms experience an improvement in information environment and a decrease in earnings manipulation.     

How efficient ownership structure monitors income manipulation? Evidence of real earnings management among Malaysian firms

This study investigates income manipulation through real earnings management, by listed companies in Malaysia, prior to being officially designated as “financially distressed”, by this country’s stock exchange listed rules. The hypotheses relate to whether the degree of upwards real earnings management, conducted during the four-year period prior to financial distress, can be explained by ownership structure (measured with three variables: managerial ownership, institutional ownership and foreign ownership). Using a sample of 1180 firm-year observations of financially distressed companies, over the investigation period 2001–2011, the findings suggest that the degree of real earnings management is not associated with ownership by management or institutional investors. Conversely, the evidence indicates that foreign shareholders are able to constrain upwards real earnings management related to discretionary expenditure but not the operating cycle. This study contributes to the importance of diversity of ownership structures in monitoring income manipulation among firms.     

Institutional investor type,earnings management and benchmark beaters

This paper classifies institutional investors into transient or long-term by their investment horizons to examine the association between institutional investor type and firms’ discretionary earnings management strategies in two mutually exclusive settings – firms that (do not) use accruals to meet/beat earnings targets. The results support the view that long-term institutional investors constrain accruals management among firms that manage earnings to meet/beat earnings benchmarks. This suggests long-term institutional investors can mitigate aggressive earnings management among these firms. Transient institutional ownership is not systematically associated with aggressive earnings management and is evident only among firms that manage earnings to meet/beat their earnings benchmarks. This indicates transient institution-associated managerial myopia may not be as prevalent as posited by critics. This study highlights the importance of explicitly considering the type of institutional investor and the specific setting when investigating the association between institutional ownership and corporate earnings management.