Adverse Selection and Pigou Taxes

It id assumed that firms have different technologies, and that an environment protection agency knows which technologies exist, but not which is used by which firms. Neither the emissions of individual firms nor their total emissions are observable. The output of each individual firm, however, can be monitored without cost. Based on this information tax schemes are constructed which induce firms to produce the socially efficient output quantities. Conditions about cost functions are derived which ensure the existence of tax schemes which yield first best solutions.     

Environmental Taxes and First-Mover Advantages

This paper studies whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in environmental policies. To analyze this question I assume transboundary pollution and two countries that have to decide whether to set environmental taxes sequentially or simultaneously. When taxes are set sequentially an effect, denoted as the sequential setting effect, arises that raises the equilibrium taxes. I show that whether governments prefer to be leaders or followers in taxes depends on the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners. When this overspill is low enough, taxes are strategic complements and both the leader and the follower obtain greater welfare than under a simultaneous tax setting. However, the leader country obtains greater welfare than the follower. In this case, governments set taxes sequentially. When the degree to which environmental pollution spills over to trading partners is high enough, taxes are strategic substitutes and governments set taxes simultaneously. In this case, each government wants to avoid becoming the follower in taxes.     

The Political Economy of Environmental Taxes with an Aging Population

This paper develops a two-period overlapping-generations model with environmental externalities and uncertain lifetimes, and studies how two sources of population aging, greater longevity and a lower rate of population growth, affect the politically determined environmental tax and the quality of the environment. It is shown that greater longevity and a lower rate of population growth have entirely different effects on these factors; greater longevity has no effect on the environmental tax and has a non-positive effect on the environmental quality, whereas a lower rate of population growth has a negative effect on the tax and has a positive effect on the quality. In addition, the political decision-making on the tax leads to an inefficient allocation of capital and environmental quality.JEL classifications: D72, D78, D91, H41, O40, Q20, Q28     

环境税收的国际借鉴及对中国的启示

环境税收政策在国外发达国家已付诸实施并取得了一定效果。借鉴国外在环境税收方面的成功经验,中国在研究实施环境税制中应循序渐进地推进税制改革,同时利用新增税收增加就业、提高能源消费弹性,以实现经济的可持续发展。     

Voluntary Environmental Agreements vs. Emission Taxes in Strategic Trade Models

The purpose of the paper is to narrow the gap between the widespread use of voluntary agreements and research on the rationale of such approaches. A topical example are voluntary agreements of many industries to reduce carbon dioxide emissions because of global warming. If the industry anticipates that taxes and fees will be introduced in the coming years, it seems rational to act in advance in order to mitigate the tax levels.The conventional approach in strategic trade and tax models was to look at a two-stage game where governments set taxes first and then firms react. In such a policy regime the government is concerned about the international competitiveness of its firms and sets taxes below marginal damages. In this paper, we consider a policy regime with a reversed timing. Firms commit themselves in the face of emission taxes to abatement efforts and to lower levels of the environmentally intensive output. Then the government introduces the tax. Under this timing of strategies the tax is equal to marginal damage. Firms waive profit and reduce output in order to use less of the polluting input. The reward for this behavior will be a less strict use of policy instruments and hence lower abatement costs in the near future.     

Competitiveness and Exemptions From Environmental Taxes in Europe

A number of European countries have introduced a variety of environmental taxes. A common characteristic of their implementation is the inclusion of exemptions and tax relief, in particular for (some sectors of) manufacturing industry. This paper analyses the pattern and motivation of exemptions as they have developed in Western European countries, making clear the difference between the nominal and effective tax rates once the exemptions have been taken into account. The principal motivation for exemptions relates to concern about competitiveness. While particular environmentally-intensive sectors may have some grounds for concern, even these might be able to achieve cost-effective environmental improvements, such that their competitive position is not over-disadvantaged, while for an economy structured like the UK's, an environmental tax plus rebate scheme, sometimes called an ecological tax reform, would be likely to yield benefits in terms of competitiveness. The exemptions usually run counter to the environmental economic logic of using environmental taxes to internalise social costs and give economic signals that are based on the full costs of production, and they are likely to increase the costs of achieving a given level of emission reduction. With little justification for them also on the grounds of competitiveness, it would therefore be undesirable on both economic and environmental grounds for them to remain a feature of the implementation of environmental taxes in the future.     

Optimal Environmental Charges/Taxes: Easy to Estimate and Surplus-yielding

The estimation of the optimal charges/taxes on environmental disruption and the financing of the spending on the abatement of environmental disruption are important practical problems. This paper shows that, for most cases where some abatement is desirable, both the estimation and the financing problems may be easily solved. It is desirable to charge disruption (at least) at the marginal cost of abatement (which is easier to estimate than the marginal damage of disruption) and such a charge will normally yield total revenue in excess of the amount of abatement spending.     

How to Turn an Industry Green: Taxes versus Subsidies

Environmental policies frequently target the ratio of dirty to green output within the same industry. To achieve such targets, the green sector may be subsidized or the dirty sector be taxed. We show that in a monopolistic competition setting, the two policy approaches have different welfare effects, depending on the design of the instrument (ad valorem versus unit instrument) and the initial situation (size of the dirty sector). For a strong green policy (a severe reduction of the dirty sector) a tax is the dominant instrument. If initially the dirty sector is important, then for moderate policy targets a subsidy may be the superior tool. These findings have implications for policies such as the Californian Zero Emission Bill.This paper benefited from the comments of Wilhelm Althammer, Michael Kohlhaas, Michael Pflüger, Thomas Ziesemer, participants at the EEA Annual Congress 2003, Stockholm, at the WEAI Annual Conference 2004, Vancouver, and two anonymous referees. The authors are responsible for any remaining errors.     

有限信息与假冒伪劣商品的识别

基本竞争模型完全信息的假设与现实相悖:由于信息的真伪难辨;信息收集需要成本;消费者能够记忆并回想的信息有限;消费者对信息的加工能力有限以及信息市场不完善等原因,致使消费者所掌握的信息非常有限.信息有限的结果是市场稀薄和假冒伪劣商品盛行.消费者可以借助担保、信誉、专家、标准以及价格制度等方法去识别假冒伪劣商品.     

Strategic Environmental Policy Under Incomplete Information

This paper introduces incomplete information into recent analyses of strategic environmental policy. It is shown how asymmetric information between planners and producers affects national incentives to impose strategic environmental standards on domestic industries in international oligopolistic competition. Relative to the full-information case, incomplete information is likely to mitigate allocative distortions originating from strategic behaviour. A countervailing effect, tending to raise distortion, is however revealed from the analysis. This effect is absent when governments intervene in free trade through direct production subsidies. The results suggest that incentives to capture foreign rents are less reduced due to private information, when environmental standards, rather than direct production subsidies, are the strategic instrument.     

Ambient Taxes Under m-Dimensional Choice Sets, Heterogeneous Expectations, and Risk-Aversion

We consider the design of ambient taxes forrisk-neutral and risk-averse polluters whenpolluters and the regulatory agency haveasymmetric information about environmentalrelationships and probabilities associatedwith random events. Unlike prior work, we showthat under these conditions, optimal ambienttaxes must be firm-specific, and accompaniedby additional incentives to influencepolluters' choices of abatement techniques.     

The Effects of Pollution Taxes on Urban Areas with an Endogenous Plant Location

This paper has integrated space into the effect of a direct pollution control on the pollution damage of heavily populated areas like CBD. This integration gives us some new insights into the effectiveness of a pollution tax as a pollution control device when the plant location of the firm is endogenized. It is shown that when the plant location is endogenous, as pollution taxes become higher, the firm moves its plant towards the CBD, causing higher pollution damage to the CBD residents, if the production function exhibits decreasing returns to scale.     

A New Approach for Regulating Information Markets

Information markets are markets for contracts that yield payments based on the outcome of an uncertain future event, such as a presidential election. They have the potential to improve decision making and policies throughout the economy. At the same time, there are regulatory hurdles to establish such markets, largely arising from state prohibitions on Internet gambling. This paper reviews the current regulatory structure for information markets in the United States and offers recommendations for reform. We argue that the authority for regulating many information markets should be shifted from the states to the federal government. In addition, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission should administer an “economic purpose test”. That test would only allow information market contracts that are likely to provide significant financial hedging opportunities or valuable information for improving economic decisions.     

Environmental Quality,Medical Care Demand and Environmental Tax Interactions

Assuming that improvements in environmental quality lead to lower demand for medical care, it has been shown that general-equilibrium interactions with the tax-distorted labor market reduce the benefits from such improvements, and thus lower the second-best optimal environmental tax. This paper provides some insights on how the link between environmental quality, individual’s health capital, and the demand for medical care affects the analysis of pollution taxes. The paper develops structural conditions under which improvements in environmental quality decrease/increase the demand for medical care and discusses their implications for environmental tax interactions.      

Trading Taxes vs. Paying Taxes to Value and Finance Public Environmental Goods

The potential sensitivity of environmentalresource valuation to payment vehicles is ofinterest to researchers and decision-makersinvolved in estimating and applying thesenumbers. A conceptual model is developed whichprovides insight into how the different paymentvehicles of a special tax and a taxreallocation affects the willingness to pay(WTP) for environmental goods. Hypothesistesting using contingent valuation datasuggests WTP with a tax reallocation is higherthan WTP with a special tax for ground waterquality protection in Georgia and Maine, USA.Technical measurement and welfare analysisimplications and limitations of valuing andfinancing public environmental goods using taxrealloactions are discussed.     

Optimal Tax Policy under Environmental Quality Competition

This paper studies the socially optimal emission and commodity tax policy when consumers are willing to pay a price-premium for environmentally friendlier variants of a commodity vertically differentiated in environmental quality. The first-best levels of quality can be obtained by a combination of a uniform ad valorem tax and an emission tax (or a subsidy for buying green products). The first-best emission tax is higher than the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. Regardless of environmentally conscious consumers, if only one instrument is available, the second-best emission tax is equal to the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality. A uniform ad valorem tax increases welfare only if the social valuation of the positive externality associated with average environmental quality is low enough.     

生态环境、环境税与可持续经济增长

如何实现经济和生态环境的和谐发展,已经成为全球关注的焦点。文章把生态环境纳入生产函数和效用函数,构建一个考虑环境税的内生增长模型,运用最优控制方法求解模型的最优均衡解。并在此基础上,进一步探讨了生态环境与可持续经济增长的关系以及环境税对最优增长路径的影响。发现环境税的开征降低了最优增长路径上的经济增长率,却提高了人们的最优消费水平。而人们环境意识的提高可以帮助减小因环境税给经济增长率带来的冲击。     

Nonseparable Utility and the Double Dividend Debate: Reconsidering the Tax-Interaction Effect

The literature on the use of environmental taxes inthe presence of distortionary (labor) taxes warns thata partial-equilibrium Pigouvian tax analysis is notappropriate because increasing the price of dirtygoods can futher aggravate the prexisting distortions. This argument is most frequently made assuming thatlabor is taxed to meet a fixed revenue requirement.When a dirty good is also taxed, others argue thatthis lowers workers' real wages, causing people toreduce their labor supply below its already suboptimallevel, aggravating labor market distortions. However,most papers ignore the effect that a cleanerenvironment can have on labor supply. That is, mostpast work has assumed that the quality of theenvironment is weakly separable in the utilityfunction. We argue that a cleaner environment canincrease labor supply, at least partially offsettingany incentive for workers to decrease their laborsupply. Further, we show explicitly how relaxing theseparability assumption affects the standardresults.     

环境审计、环境信息披露与企业环境绩效

环境审计作为国家环境管理的重要手段,在关注环境治理与生态环境效益时也必定会对企业环境绩效产生一定影响。论文基于我国沪市A股工业企业2014—2017年的面板数据,实证检验了环境审计、环境信息披露与企业环境绩效之间的关系。结果表明:(1)环境审计与企业环境绩效显著正相关,且在不同的产权性质和法制环境下表现出一定的差异。(2)环境信息披露在环境审计对企业环境绩效的影响中呈正向调节作用。研究成果验证了环境审计对企业环境绩效的促进作用,一方面拓展了工业企业环境绩效的影响因素研究,另一方面为促进生态文明建设和企业绿色发展提供了重要的启示。     

Regulating a Polluting Firm Under Asymmetric Information

This paper reinterprets the Laffont-Tirole model of regulation under asymmetric information to cover the case of pollution control. The asymmetry of information concerns the firm's cost of lowering its pollution. The regulator has three objectives: Ensuring an efficient abatement level, generating 'green taxes' and securing the survival of the firm. We show that when optimal abatement is important relative to tax generation, the regulator cannot use the policy of offering the firm a set of linear tax schemes from which to choose. By contrast, this policy is optimal in the Laffont-Tirole model under certain not very restrictive assumptions. We proceed to establish a simple rule for when to shut-down inefficient types. In an example with specific functional forms, we derive the optimal tax function both analytically and graphically. We show the effect on the optimal tax system of a change in a technological parameter.