Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

Determinants of analysts’ revenue forecast accuracy

This study investigates financial analysts’ revenue forecasts and identifies determinants of the forecasts’ accuracy. We find that revenue forecast accuracy is determined by forecast and analyst characteristics similar to those of earnings forecast accuracy—namely, forecast horizon, days elapsed since the last forecast, analysts’ forecasting experience, forecast frequency, forecast portfolio, reputation, earnings forecast issuance, forecast boldness, and analysts’ prior performance in forecasting revenues and earnings. We develop a model that predicts the usefulness of revenue forecasts. Thereby, our study helps to ex ante identify more accurate revenue forecasts. Furthermore, we find that analysts concern themselves with their revenue forecasting performance. Analysts with poor revenue forecasting performance are more likely to stop forecasting revenues than analysts with better performance. Their decision is reasonable because revenue forecast accuracy affects analysts’ career prospects in terms of being promoted or terminated. Our study helps investors and academic researchers to understand determinants of revenue forecasts. This understanding is also beneficial for evaluating earnings forecasts because revenue forecasts reveal whether changes in earnings forecasts are due to anticipated changes in revenues or expenses.     

Do Managers Use Meeting Analyst Forecasts to Signal Private Information? Evidence from Patent Citations

This study examines whether firms manage earnings to meet analyst forecasts to signal superior future performance. Prior research finds that firms use earnings management to just meet analyst forecasts and that these firms have a positive association with future performance (Bartov et al., 2002). There are two potential explanations for the positive association – signaling and attaining benefits that allow for better future performance (i.e., the real benefits explanation). Prior studies cannot provide evidence of signaling because they do not control for the real benefits explanation. Our research design enables us to control for the real benefits explanation because we can identify potential signaling firms within the sample of firms that just meet analyst forecasts. We use a unique database from the National Bureau of Economic Research to construct a proxy for the manager's belief about future firm value due to patents. We find that firms with more patent citations are more likely to just meet the analyst forecast and manage earnings to achieve this goal. We also find firms that just meet analyst forecasts with more patent citations have significantly better performance than firms with fewer patent citations, which is consistent with signaling and not the real benefits explanation.     

Qualitative audit materiality and earnings management

This study investigates auditors’ propensity to rely on quantitative materiality thresholds to the exclusion of qualitative materiality thresholds. Specifically, we examine whether auditors are more likely to allow earnings management that is less than typical quantitative materiality thresholds but that nonetheless is qualitatively material. We use changes in tax expense as a proxy for earnings management. Our results indicate that companies with pre-managed earnings that would have missed the consensus analyst forecast are more likely to decrease their tax expense when the magnitude of the decrease is less than quantitative audit materiality thresholds. The results also indicate that firms are more likely to meet or beat the forecast when the amount of earnings management necessary to meet the analyst forecast is less than quantitative materiality. These results are consistent with auditors relying on quantitative materiality thresholds to the exclusion of qualitative materiality thresholds, i.e., the importance of meeting or beating the analyst forecast. Finally, we find that the ability to use tax expense reduction within quantitative materiality to meet or beat analysts’ consensus forecasts was significantly reduced by the SEC’s guidance on materiality in SAB-99 and by the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act.     

Equity and debt issuance by firms violating GAAP

We examine security issuance in restated periods by firms that misreport financial statements and find that only a small per cent of such firms issues securities in the restated period. Investors are misled by mistakes made by firms issuing equity more so than other restating firms at the initial announcement of misreported earnings, but are not misled by mistakes made by debt‐issuing firms. Equity‐issuing firms that manage earnings to beat analyst expectations experience abnormally high returns in the restated period prior to security issuance. Firms that restated more reports and have higher pre‐mistake returns are more likely to issue equity. High leverage, firm size and number of restated periods are positively associated with the likelihood of debt issuance by restating firms.     

Do Publicly Signalled Earnings Management Incentives Affect Analyst Forecast Accuracy?

Using a panel of listed Australian firms for the years 1999–2007, this paper investigates whether analysts' forecast efficiency is improved by the occurrence of a publicly observable event, such as a CEO appointment, which signals a firm's earnings management incentives. Two supporting hypotheses are also tested: first, that CEO appointments are associated with income‐decreasing earnings management; and second, that analyst forecast errors increase with the level of earnings management present in current period financial statements. Consistent with prior literature, we find income‐decreasing earnings management in the year of CEO appointment. Earnings management, as a general phenomenon, is found to be significantly related to analyst forecast errors in the period in which the earnings management occurs. However, we present evidence that analyst forecasts for current year earnings are significantly more accurate with respect to earnings management in cases where a CEO is appointed during the current financial period.     

Corporate social responsibility and classification shifting

This study examines the relation between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firm behavior to misclassify core expenses as special items in the income statement to inflate core earnings (i.e., classification shifting). We find that firms with good CSR performance (high-CSR firms) are less likely to engage in classification shifting than firms with poor CSR performance (low-CSR firms). We also find that high-CSR firms engage in less classification shifting even when they have greater incentives to meet earnings benchmarks. Overall, our results are consistent with the notion that socially responsible firms behave ethically in financial reporting.     

To beat or not to beat? The importance of analysts’ cash flow forecasts

We investigate the implications of firms’ benchmark-beating patterns with respect to analysts’ quarterly cash flow forecasts for firms’ current capital market valuation and their future performance. We hypothesize that nonnegative earnings surprises are more likely to be supported by real operating performance and signal higher earnings quality if they are achieved via higher than expected cash flows or lower than expected accruals. We show that firms beating analyst earnings forecasts have larger positive capital market reactions and larger earnings response coefficients if they beat analyst cash flow forecasts or report lower than expected accruals. We also demonstrate that these firms’ superior future performance may provide an economic justification for their more favorable market response. Our findings suggest that firms’ ability to beat analyst cash flow forecasts is informative regarding the quality of their earnings surprises.     

An empirical analysis of the effects of monitoring intensity on the relation between equity incentives and earnings management

Prior studies suggest that equity incentives inherently have both an interest alignment effect and an opportunistic financial reporting effect. Using three distinct proxies for earnings management we find evidence consistent with the incentive alignment (opportunistic financial reporting) effect of equity incentives increasing as monitoring intensity increases (decreases). Furthermore, using the accrual-based earnings management and meet/beat analyst forecast models we find that the opportunistic financial reporting effect of equity incentives dominates the incentive alignments effect for firms with low monitoring intensity. Using proxies for real earnings management, we find that the incentive alignment effect dominates the opportunistic financial reporting effect for high and moderate monitoring intensity firms. However, for low monitoring intensity firms the opportunistic reporting effect mitigates, but does not completely offset, the benefits of the incentive alignment effect. Overall, these findings are consistent with the level of monitoring affecting the relation between equity incentives and earnings management.     

Stock repurchases as an earnings management device

We investigate whether firms use stock repurchases to meet or beat analysts’ earnings per share (EPS) forecasts. We identify conditions under which repurchases increase EPS and document the frequency of accretive repurchases from 1988 to 2001. We find a disproportionately large number of accretive stock repurchases among firms that would have missed analysts’ forecasts without the repurchase. The repurchase-induced component of earnings surprises appears to be discounted by the market, and this discount is larger when the repurchase seems motivated by EPS management, although using the repurchase to avoid missing analyst forecasts appears to mitigate some of the negative stock price response.     

Corporate Life Cycle and Earnings Benchmarks

We examine whether and how corporate life cycle significantly influences meeting or beating earnings benchmarks (MBE). We find that corporate life cycle plays a significant role in a firm's meeting or beating earnings benchmarks behaviour. Developing strategies that fit into the stage of corporate life cycle is crucial for corporate success. MBE is an important financial goal that requires strategies. In this study, we examine whether and how corporate life cycle significantly influences MBE. Specifically, we focus on the incentives of MBE in growth and mature firms. We find that corporate life cycle significantly influences a firm's tendency to meet or beat zero earnings, prior earnings and analysts’ earnings forecasts. Based on logit regressions for the period from 1988 to 2008, the results indicate that growth firms are more likely to meet or beat all three earnings benchmarks. Overall, the results of this study indicate that a firm's MBE behaviour should be examined in the context of its life cycle stage.     

Effective board monitoring over earnings reports and forecasts: Evidence from CFO outside director appointments

Prior evidence that firms adjust their board structure following accounting restatements suggests that firms expect the board to effectively monitor the firm’s financial accounting system. However, little is known about signals firms use to identify monitoring weaknesses or the types of individuals firms appoint to improve the quality of monitoring. We expand on Ghannam, Bujega, Matolcsy, and Spiropolous (2019)’s evidence that firms appoint directors with accounting experience after financial fraud by investigating whether firms that file restatements or issue highly inaccurate earnings forecasts appoint individuals with CFO experience (i.e., a subset of accounting experts) to their audit committee. We find that firms are more likely to appoint an outside director with CFO experience to the audit committee when they have recently restated earnings and when they have higher prior management forecast error. We also find that the appointment of a CFO outside director to the audit committee is followed by a lower likelihood of restatement and more accurate management forecast. Together, our results suggest that firms respond to accounting failures by appointing outside directors with CFO experience. Thus, we provide insight into the signals firms use to identify weaknesses in the monitoring of the accounting function and the types of expertise firms value in addressing those weaknesses.     

Increased market response to earnings announcements in the 21st century: An Empirical Investigation

We examine the role of concurrent information in the striking increase in investor response to earnings announcements from 2001 to 2016, as measured by return variability and volume following Beaver (1968). We find management guidance, analyst forecasts, and disaggregated financial statement line items are more frequently bundled with earnings announcements, and each of these items explains part of the increase in market response. Furthermore, collectively, these concurrent information releases explain a substantial fraction of the increase in market response to earnings announcements since 2001. This is in contrast to the decline in market response to management guidance issued separately from earnings and the much smaller increase in market response to analyst forecasts issued separately from earnings over this time. The findings indicate that information arrival at earnings announcement dates has increased significantly over the past two decades, and that key components of this are increased disclosures by management of guidance and financial statement line items and forecasts by analysts.     

The Allowance for Uncollectible Accounts,Conservatism, and Earnings Management

We study the interrelation between conservatism and earnings management by examining the allowance for uncollectible accounts and its income statement counterpart, bad debt expense. We find that the allowance is conservative and that it has become more conservative over time. Conservatism may, however, facilitate earnings management. We find that firms manage bad debt expense downward (and even record income‐increasing bad debt expense) to meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts and that conservatism accentuates the extent to which firms manage bad debt expense. Further, we find that firms manage bad debt expense downward by drawing down previously recorded over‐accruals of bad debt expense that have accumulated on the balance sheet. An implication of our study is that tighter limits on the amount by which firms are permitted to understate net assets may reduce their ability to manage earnings.     

Accruals Management to Achieve Earnings Benchmarks: A Comparison of Pre-managed Profit and Loss Firms

Abstract:  This study examines whether firms with profits before accruals management are more likely than firms with losses before accruals management to meet or exceed earnings benchmarks when pre-managed earnings are below those benchmarks. We extend Brown (2001) by documenting that the differential propensity to achieve earnings benchmarks by profitable and nonprofitable firms results from differential accruals management behavior. We find that firms with profits before accruals management are more likely than firms with losses before accruals management to have pre-managed earnings below both analysts' forecasts and prior period earnings and reported earnings above these benchmarks.     

A Temporal Analysis of Earnings Surprises: Profits versus Losses

I show that median earnings surprise has shifted rightward from small negative (miss analyst estimates by a small amount) to zero (meet analyst estimates exactly) to small positive (beat analyst estimates by a small amount) during the 16 years, 1984 to 1999. I show that a rightward temporal shift in median surprise from negative to positive describes earnings, but neither profits nor losses. Median profit surprise shifts within the positive quadrant, from zero to one cent per share. Median loss surprise shifts within the negative quadrant from extreme negative (about -33 cents per share) to zero. I show that the median surprise for profits exceeds that for losses in every year. I document significant positive temporal trends in both meet and beat analyst estimates for both profits and losses, but I find a greater frequency of profits that either meet or beat analyst estimates in every year. I find a significant positive temporal trend in positive profits that are "a little bit of good news," and a significant negative temporal trend in managers who report losses that are an "extreme amount of bad news." My results are robust to the four internal validity threats I consider—namely temporal changes in: (1) analyst forecast accuracy, (2) the mix of earnings of one sign preceded by earnings of another sign four quarters ago, (3) the timeliness of the most recent analyst forecast, and (4) the I/B/E/S definition of actual earnings. I find that managers of growth firms are relatively more likely than managers of value firms to report good news profits. I show that when they do report positive profit surprises, managers of growth firms are more likely to report "a little bit of good news" in every year.     

The role of corporate governance in meeting or beating analysts’ forecast

Meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts is a topic of considerable interest in the academic and business communities. Some studies indicate a favorable market response when firms meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, but others suggest managers opportunistically manage earnings to achieve earnings targets. We investigate the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and meeting or exceeding analysts’ expectations and find that attributes of corporate governance are related to the likelihood of consistently meeting or exceeding consensus forecasts. We extend current literature by showing that some attributes of strong corporate governance mechanisms lower agency costs associated with consistently meeting or beating analysts’ expectations. We also find that compensation committees reward managers for consistently meeting or beating analysts’ forecasts.     

Management earnings forecasts and the quality of analysts’ forecasts: The moderating effect of audit committees

This study investigates whether effective audit committees influence the association between management earnings forecasts and the properties of analysts’ forecasts. We posit that this influence on the part of an audit committee would likely result from increased responsibility for monitoring voluntary disclosure. Using the four attributes that the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and prior research suggest as being indicative of audit committee effectiveness, we find that analysts’ forecasts exhibit higher accuracy and lower dispersion with the issuance of management forecasts for those firms employing audit committees that are composed exclusively of independent directors, include an accounting expert, and act with due diligence. We also find that effective audit committees strengthen the association between management and analyst forecast accuracy. Our evidence, therefore, supports the notion that effective corporate governance influences the reliability of voluntary disclosure, and thereby benefits the users of financial information.     

Beating market expectations and the pricing of firms’ probability of default

This study explores the impact of beating analysts' forecasts on investors' perceptions about firms' default probability. The information contained in analysts’ forecasts, both earnings and revenues, provides additional information to investors in pricing CDSs. While previous research has focused on the impact of beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, this study shows that firms that beat analysts' revenue forecasts also experience, on average, a decrease in the CDS premium around the earnings announcement date. This study also documents that the effect is stronger when firms beat/miss both earnings and revenue forecasts. When firms beat (miss) earnings and miss (beat) revenues, the effect of earnings is the dominant signal. These effects are stronger for firms with high levels of default risk.     

Detailed management earnings forecasts: do analysts listen?

We provide archival evidence on how a particular type of supplementary information affects the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Managers often provide detailed forecasts of specific income statement line items to shed light on how they plan to achieve their bottom-line earnings targets. We assess the effect of this forecast disaggregation on the credibility of management earnings forecasts. Based on a relatively large hand-collected sample of 900 management earnings forecasts, we find that disaggregation increases analysts’ sensitivity to the news in managers’ earnings guidance, suggesting that analysts find the guidance more credible. More importantly, we identify several factors that influence this relation. First, disaggregation plays a more important role when earnings are otherwise more difficult to forecast. Second, disaggregation is more important after Regulation Fair Disclosure prohibited selective disclosure, especially for firms that were more affected because they had previously provided more private guidance. Finally, in contrast to common assertions in the prior literature, we find that, in more recent years, disaggregation matters more for guidance that conveys bad news. Managers as well as researchers should be interested in evidence suggesting that financial analysts find disaggregation especially helpful in contexts where managers’ credibility is particularly important.