International Leadership in Productivity at the Aggregate and Industry Level

Since many policies affect specific parts of economies differently, it is useful to decompose GDP per capita differences across countries into differences across smaller and smaller parts of economies. In this paper, we summarize recent contributions in this area and fit them together into a decomposition procedure for GDP per capita differences. The overall finding is that the U.S. is the productivity leader for the most of the economy. Moreover, international productivity differences at the aggregate level of the economies are in most cases translated into differences in the productivity of industries, at least compared to the productivity leader U.S. The variability of productivity differences at the industry level is, however, substantially higher than any differences at the aggregate or sector level. For the manufacturing sector alone the U.S. and Japan share the leadership on the industry level. In contrast, France, U.K., and Germany exhibit almost no leadership in productivity at the industry level. Hence, nation-specific factors appear to be dominant in the comparison of European countries with the U.S. Finally, mix differences do not play a very large role for big countries. For Germany, however, the mix effect can help to reconcile relative high productivity for the market economy and lower productivity at disaggregated levels.     

货币国际化扩张中的政策行为--基于最优铸币收入的动态分析

货币国际化为其政策主体带来的重要收益之一就是铸币收入。笔者从考察一种抽象的国际货币出发，在建立了相关收益及成本约束的基础上，得出了该货币铸币收入行为的一般性路径规律，即，其基础货币发行速度变化的最优（各期铸币收入现值最大化）动态路径，并对该路径模型作了从单周期到多周期的扩展性描述。     

Should the Central and Eastern European Accession Countries Adopt the EURO Before or After Accession?

I analyse the option of unilateral euroisation for Central and Eastern Europe. The thorny questions of losing seigniorage and losing the lender of last resort are explicitly addressed. It is found that the option of unilateral euroisation might be quite inviting for some countries. This is certainly the case if one takes into account the difficulties thrown up by the Maastricht–criteria. It is argued that unilateral euroisation provides an elegant way out of the catch of the official EMU-accession path. The EU has, however, expressed explicitly its enmity against euroisation. I think this is a policy error. It should be at least a genuine policy option for all countries concerned. At best the EU should stimulate euroisation by embedding it in a broader and more embracing framework that would support integration and ultimately accession to the EU of the whole of Central and Eastern Europe.     

Niche firms,mass markets,and income across countries: Accounting for the impact of entry costs

I develop a model of monopolistic competition in which I distinguish between niche markets and mass markets, in the spirit of Holmes and Stevens, 2014. Firms choose between entering a small niche market with high markups or a large mass market with low markups. Entry costs and other distortions have a much greater impact on output in the niche market as the gains to specialization are high, relative to the mass market where varieties are highly substitutable. Calibrated to match data from U.S. manufacturing, the model generates an elasticity of total factor productivity with respect to entry costs almost twice that in a model that abstracts from heterogeneous markets. I use data on entry costs across countries to show entry costs alone can account for 23 percent of the cross-country variation in income per worker.     

Estimating models of complex FDI: Are there third-country effects?

The recent general equilibrium theory of trade and multinationals emphasizes the importance of third countries and the complex integration strategies of multinationals. Little has been done to test this theory empirically. This paper attempts to rectify this situation by considering not only bilateral determinants, but also spatially weighted third-country determinants of foreign direct investment (FDI). Since the dependency among host markets is particularly related to multinationals’ trade between them, we use trade costs (distances) as spatial weights. Using panel data on U.S. industries and host countries observed over the 1989–1999 period, we estimate a “complex FDI” version of the knowledge-capital model of U.S. outward FDI by various recently developed spatial panel data generalized moments (GM) estimators. We find that third-country effects are significant, lending support to the existence of various modes of complex FDI.     

The daily relationship between U.S. asset prices and stock prices of American countries

The daily transmission of U.S. comprehensive stock indices to foreign stock markets has been studied extensively, but the transmission may just be that the foreign stock prices respond to news underlying the change in the U.S. stock indices. Besides the regularly economic announcements, news relevant for the U.S. economy may include qualitative news and non-economic events. Due the daily nature of the news, there is no appropriate reference as to its impact on the U.S. or foreign economy and the only accessible reference probably is the change in the financial asset prices. But the U.S. stock index is general in nature and cannot be used to offer specific information about the U.S. economy. Some U.S. asset prices other than stock indices may reveal more specific information about the U.S. economy. Looking into the daily relationship between these U.S. asset prices and stock indices of four American countries in two periods with drastically different economic conditions, this study finds that the daily relationship between these U.S. asset prices and foreign stock prices is consistent with the prevailing U.S. economic fundamentals. From the relationship we identify some U.S. economic conditions foreign stock prices respond to. These economic conditions include real economic shocks, monetary policies, and business default risks.     

International linkages between short-term real interest rates

Whereas previous studies have focused on the causal relation between nominal interest rates, this paper examines causal relationships between real rates for the United States and six other countries. Based on evidence from our full sample we find that U.S. and foreign interest rates are not highly informative for one another. This would suggest that even if the United States is regarded as a large player in international financial markets this does not necessarily translate into the transmission of U.S. real interest rates to other countries. However, an examination of various sub-periods of our sample reveals that this conclusion may be sensitive to the U.S. monetary policy regime. We also report results for linkages between European countries which indicate that Germany provides some information on real interest rates in France and the United Kingdom, but not in Italy. An analysis of various sub-periods for the European countries show that the result for France is not robust, with German rates having an impact only in the first period through March 1983. This latter evidence does not provide strong support for the hypothesis that Germany's monetary policy plays a dominant role in the European Monetary System. In general, we would argue that domestic factors play a prominent role in determining real interest rates, quite independently from the influence of interest rates from abroad.     

Do U.S. macroeconomic surprises influence equity returns? An exploratory analysis of developed economies

Given the dominant role the U.S. economy plays in global trade, we explore how U.S. macroeconomic surprises affect stock markets in ten major developed economies as well as in China and India. We do not find strong enough evidence to conclude that U.S. macro shocks materially and consistently influence equity returns and volatilities in the economies studied. Consistent with previous research, it appears that only in few markets are return levels materially influenced by macro surprises generated in the U.S. Also, only a small number of macro shocks seem to be of any consistent significance. For returns levels, inflation, productivity, consumer confidence, and retail sales seem to matter. At the same time, conditional volatilities appear to be influenced by inflation, retail sales, durable goods, industrial production, consumer confidence, gross domestic product, and trade balance surprises. Finally, our exploratory analysis indicates that the degree of bilateral trade connectedness may partially explain the extent to which macroeconomic surprises are transmitted across countries.     

Do natural disasters and geopolitical risks matter for cross-border country exchange-traded fund returns?

This paper examines whether U.S. and home country geopolitical risks (GPRs) and disasters matter for the returns from cross-border trading of country exchange-traded funds (ETFs) by employing a quantile regression approach. Using monthly returns of 125 country-specific ETFs traded in the U.S. from 38 countries over the period 2004–2018, we find that the highest averages of total deaths, total damage values, total affected, and GPRs are all in developing countries. United States disasters have comparatively more significant impacts than home country disasters on ETF returns as does the salient influences of U.S. investor sentiments, supporting the market sentiment hypothesis. Moreover, U.S. and home country GPRs and disasters also have predictive power on returns. The contemptuous effects and predictive powers of GPRs and disasters are asymmetric across quantiles. The influences of home country GPRs are more salient than the GRPS of U.S., implying that ETFs can be a safe haven during U.S. geopolitical risks. Additionally, our results show that the impacts of disasters on returns can be negative and/or positive, implying the possibility of disasters exuding an impetus and/or risk to country ETFs.     

Does going public in the U.S. facilitate corporate innovation of foreign firms?

We examine how going public in the U.S. IPO market influences corporate innovation. Using 185 foreign and 2948 U.S. domestic firms going public in the U.S. over the 1980–2006 period, we find that while exhibiting similar innovativeness in the pre-IPO period, non-U.S. firms tend to generate more innovation than U.S. domestic firms after going public. The findings are robust to adopting subsample tests, various measures of changes in innovation around the year of the IPO, and accounting for truncation problems and potential endogeneity concerns. Further tests show that changes in innovation around the year of the IPO tend to be less prominent for non-U.S. firms that domiciled in countries with more developed equity market and higher level of economic freedom. Our study provides insights into the real effect of going public in the U.S. IPO market on innovative activities.     

International Banking Facilities Revisited

The creation of International Banking Facilities (IBFs) in 1981 was an attempt by U.S. banking regulators to allow U.S.-based banks and their offshore customers to have access to the Euromarket in a U.S. political and legal jurisdiction, operating in a U.S. time zone. The expected benefits were as follows: 1. the cost of capital for U.S.-based banks (both U.S. and foreign-owned) and their offshore customers, particularly multinational firms, would be reduced due to lower political risk, no reserve requirements, and no Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation requirements; 2. Banks could potentially reduce their operating costs to die extent that IBFs replaced offshore shell branches; 3. Additional bank employment would be created in the U.S.; 4. although IBFs would not be subject to U.S. Federal taxes, a geographical shift of bank assets to the U.S. might create a higher Federal tax revenue due to a reduction in foreign tax credit claimed by the banks. In retrospect the performance of IBFs has shown mixed results. With respect to cost of capital, the IBFs must have been cost effective because there has been an impressive growth in IBF assets and loans, coincident with a stagnation in the offshore bank shell branches. However, die largest benefit of this growdi has accrued to foreign-owned IBFs. With respect to lower operating costs, the IBFs have not caused the offshore shell branches to close since they are needed to do business with U.S. residents. With respect to employment, bank employment in the U.S. has gone up marginally, although not nearly as much as originally predicted. The impact of IBFs on Federal tax revenues was not investigated in this study. Public policy impacts of IBF operations have also been less than expected in that IBFs have not eliminated the need for offshore shell-branches in the Caribbean, although they have significantly stifled growth in these financial centers. The entrance of the Japanese Offshore Market in December 1986 and the potential that other countries may enter the competition could well have long term negative impacts on the growth potential of U.S. IBFs.     

Adoption of inflation targeting and tax revenue performance in emerging market economies: An empirical investigation

This paper investigates whether the adoption of inflation targeting (IT), by strengthening central bank independence and maintaining inflation at low levels, has encouraged the governments of emerging economies to improve the collection of domestic tax revenue in order to recoup the loss of seigniorage revenue. Using the propensity score matching methodology, a micro-econometric methodology recently used in macroeconomics, we evaluate the ‘treatment effect’ of IT on fiscal mobilization in emerging countries that have adopted this monetary policy framework. Our empirical analysis, conducted on a sample of 59 countries (19 IT and 40 non-IT countries) for the period from 1980 to 2009, shows that on average IT adoption has had a large and significant positive effect on public revenue collection. Our results are confirmed by extensive robustness tests.     

The impact of deviation from relative purchasing power parity equilibrium on U.S. foreign direct investment

Analyzing inbound and outbound foreign direct investment (FDI) between the U.S. and seven developed countries over the period from 1994 to 2004, this study provides strong evidence for a positive relationship between aggregate FDI flows and a strengthening of a home currency. Further, taking exchange rate disequilibrium into account, we find that an increase in U.S. inbound FDI is related to a strengthening of an undervalued and overvalued U.S. dollar, while an increase in U.S. outbound FDI (foreign inbound FDI) is mainly related to a strengthening of an overvalued foreign currency. Disaggregate FDI flow data show that these findings hold mainly for the manufacturing (food and machinery) and the wholesale industry. We argue that our findings may provide evidence for a co-existence of the wealth-effect hypothesis and a more profit and production oriented hypothesis, once the U.S. dollar is undervalued. Additionally, the results support the argument that the profit and production oriented hypothesis dominates the wealth effect in developed countries, especially in the manufacturing and wholesale industry. Moreover, the results support the view that foreign investors are interested in how overvalued or undervalued a currency is, rather than being interested only in the recent direction of change in the exchange rate. Finally, all findings are robust with respect to several estimation procedures.     

U.S. Futures Exchanges Face"Mission Impossible"

For U.S. futures exchanges, controlling costs while maintaining market performance is an ongoing, difficult challenge. New market realities have made that challenge even more daunting in recent years as costs have escalated, competition has expanded, and the role of information technology has expanded. It is always difficult for regulatory statutes to keep pace with ever-changing markets. Futures markets are no exception. The basic statutory framework represented by the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) was enacted in 1922, over seventy years ago. In order to maintain appropriate regulatory balance, periodic review and reform has been essential over the years. Our current federal regulatory systems were built for different markets with different competitive realities than we face today. Reforming the CEA to take into account those new market realities is vital to the survival of U.S. futures exchanges.     

Explaining the route to owner-occupation: A transatlantic comparison

This paper compares the transition of young adults from renting to first-time homeownership in Britain and the U.S. By adopting a common theoretical and methodological framework, we identify behavioural similarities and differences in transitions in the two countries. We find that the higher ownership rates among British young adults are caused by quicker transitions and our study sheds light on which factors contribute to this difference. We use British and U.S. longitudinal data sets for the analysis and a relative risk Cox hazard model in the empirical work. Although there are behavioural similarities in attaining first-time homeownership with regard to the demographic and housing market variables, there are substantial differences in the two populations’ responses to income and wealth, where we find that young adults’ transitions to homeownership in Britain are more responsive.     

Growth and government: Is there a difference between developed and developing countries?

I examine the role of government in the growth of 64 industrialized and developing countries, considering both expenditure and financing aspects of government. Recognizing that there may be differences between the two country groups, I estimate both standard OLS and dummy variable regressions. The general conclusion is that although most fiscal variables are not significantly related to economic growth, the means of financing matters more than government spending. I find that seigniorage and the budget surplus are important for growth, but the LDCs is the group that drive the results in all regressions.     

Economic Growth and Quality of Life: A Comparative Indicator Analysis Between China (Taiwan), U.S.A. and Other Developed Countries

A bstract . A composite Quality of Life (QOL) indicator model of five major components — Social, Economic, Energy and Environmental, Health and Education , and National Vitality and Security —was developed. Based on cross-national data of 1975, 32 developed countries and China (Taiwan) were ranked according to their component and overall QOL measures. The influence of income and other variables on QOL was analyzed; it was found that the income variable is not as significantly related to the composite QOL indexes as are other variables and China (Taiwan's) QOL rankings far exceed its per capita income ranking in the international comparison. The U.S. surpassed all the countries studied in providing its citizens with basic human needs and the highest material standard of living. The national vitality and security component indicated, however, that the U.S. may have lost, militarily and strategically, some of its influence and perceived power to the U.S.S.R.     

Donating Money to Get Money: The Role of Corporate Philanthropy in Stakeholder Reactions to IPOs

This study examines how stakeholders' investment time horizons interact with information about corporate giving in initial public offering (IPO) firms. Specifically, we build a model that explains how corporate philanthropy affects IPO performance. We find that at the IPO‐preparation stage, corporate giving is negatively related to underwriter prestige, venture capital investment, and IPO financing costs. We also find that at the IPO‐issuance stage, negative media coverage of IPOs moderates the U‐shaped relationship between corporate giving and market premiums. At the IPO‐trading stage, we find that corporate giving only positively influences the market premiums for IPO firms that are the subject of negative media reports. Our findings contribute to the signalling theory by showing how various stakeholders interpret the same signals differently, and they have implications for understanding how the relationship between corporate philanthropy and corporate financial performance materializes in the IPO markets.     

The currency denomination of external European Union imports after European Union expansion

Using a multiple market model I examine the impact of euro expansion on the optimal currency denomination of external EU imports. Results suggest euro invoicing will increase more in the EU-expansion country than in the original EU. Exporting firms from dollar bloc countries (the U.S. or countries with fixed exchange rates with the dollar) are more likely to invoice in the euro if price discrimination is already optimal. Firms from outside the dollar bloc are more likely to use the euro when the original EU market is relatively large or transaction costs of exchanging the euro are relatively small.     

Happiness sentiments and the prediction of cross-border country exchange-traded fund returns

This research examines whether social media (Twitter) happiness sentiment and country-level happiness sentiment indices predict cross-border ETF returns. To account for complicated associations between happiness sentiment and ETF returns, we use a quantile regression approach and find that Twitter and trading market (U.S.) happiness sentiments are strong predictors of future ETF returns, for which both have far greater predictive power than those of their home countries. Home country happiness indices exhibit asymmetric impacts across quantiles, suggesting the importance of trading country (U.S.) and Twitter happiness sentiments. Higher U.S. and home countries’ freedom to make life choices, absence of corruption perception, and confidence in national government precede higher ETF returns, while U.S. GDP, social support, health life expectancy, positive affect, and negative affect precede lower (abnormal) returns. We find that higher return quantile country ETFs provide a safe haven for U.S. investors during a U.S. bear market.