International Provision of Trade Services, Trade, and Fragmentation

This paper examines the special role that trade liberalization in service industries can play in stimulating not only trade in services but also in goods. International trade in goods requires inputs from several services industries (trade services, such as transportation, insurance, and finance) in order to complete and facilitate international transactions. Restriction on the ability of national service providers to provide these services across borders and within foreign countries creates additional costs and barriers to international trade above those that would arise in otherwise comparable intranational exchange. As a result, trade liberalization in services can yield benefits, by facilitating trade in goods, that are larger than one might expect from analysis of the services trade alone. This paper explores this idea using simple theoretical models to specify the relationships between services trade and goods trade. The paper also notes the role of services trade in a model of international industrial fragmentation, where production processes can be separated across locations but at some cost in terms of additional service inputs. The incentives for such fragmentation can be larger across countries than within countries, owing to the greater differences in factor prices and technologies available. However, the service costs of international fragmentation can also be larger, especially if regulations and restrictions impede the international provision of services. As a result, trade liberalization in services can also stimulate fragmentation of production of both goods and services, thus increasing international trade and the gains from trade even further.     

The Division and Size of Gains from Liberalization in Service Networks*

If two disjoint country service networks involving a small and large country are connected as part of international liberalization in the presence of network externalities, the per capita gain for the small country from access to a large network will be large, and the per capita gain for the large country will be small. In contrast to goods, the benefits of liberalization in network‐related services are more likely to be approximately equally divided between large and small countries than is true of trade in goods, where benefits accrue disproportionately to the small country. We also argue that non‐cooperation in network‐related services trade may involve more extreme retaliation than suggested for trade in goods by the optimal tariff literature, so that relative to a non‐cooperative outcome, gains from liberalization in network‐related services become larger than from liberalization in goods. We develop simple models which we use for numerical examples showing these points, along with an empirical implementation for global telecoms liberalization for the US, Europe, Canada, and the rest of the world using the framework developed in the paper. This shows similar proportional gains to regions, consistent with the theme of the paper that goods and services liberalization differ.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization in a Vertical Structure

Despite the importance of international trade on intermediate goods, the literature did not pay much attention to this aspect in determining the effects of trade liberalization in the presence of a labor union. We take up this issue here and show the effects of trade liberalization on the final goods and/or the intermediate goods, where the domestic firm pays unionized wage and imports intermediate goods. We show that trade liberalization on the intermediate goods (final goods) increases (decreases) the unionized wage, labor union's utility and domestic profit. Trade liberalization on both the final goods and intermediate goods may either increase or decrease the domestic unionized wage, labor union's utility and domestic profit depending on the input coefficients and the initial tariff levels. Our qualitative results are robust with respect to the intermediate goods market structure, the pricing strategy of the intermediate goods producers and the union's objective function.     

Trade liberalization in environmental goods

Trade negotiations have started to pay attention to liberalization in environmental goods (EGs), whose production may require dirty intermediate goods. We construct a two-country trade model to explore the effects of trade liberalization in EGs on the local pollution, the global environment and welfare in the presence of such an environmental conundrum. We find that countries do not necessarily benefit from trade liberalization in EGs in the absence of an environmental policy. With the assistance of an upstream pollution tax, trade liberalization in EGs improves each country's welfare. This result holds independent of whether the upstream market is competitive or not, or whether we have upstream trade across countries. For asymmetric countries, trade liberalization in EGs improves the world welfare and the welfare for the country if it has a smaller demand for EGs; or experiences less damage from the production of dirty inputs; or values environment improvement more.     

Trade Liberalization and Environmental Regulation on International Transportation

Incorporating pollution emissions from international transportation into a model of strategic trade and environmental policies, we investigate the effect of trade liberalization and environmental regulation on national welfare and the environment. Our model includes imperfectly competitive markets for international transportation and final products. We find that trade liberalization may reduce each country's welfare unless some level of environmental regulation on international transportation is in place. When international trade is liberalized initially, a mutual increase in the common emission tax rates may improve each country's welfare. However, when international trade is highly protected initially, imposing an emission tax may reduce welfare.     

服务贸易的货物贸易条件效应研究——基于伯格斯模型的分析与扩展

文章基于伯格斯模型,分析检验了服务贸易的净进口与我国货物价格贸易条件恶化之间的关系,初步证明了该模型在我国的适用性。进一步地,文章对2004-2008年我国价格贸易条件恶化有所趋缓这一特征进行了分析。结果表明,不同服务部门的净进口对我国货物贸易条件的影响不尽相同。文章得出的政策启示在于:当考察我国服务业开放和服务贸易自由化的收益时,要同时注意到货物价格贸易条件恶化可能带来的福利损失;我国在制定服务业对外开放与服务贸易自由化发展战略时,采取逐步开放和参与的战略尤为重要;另外,可以优先加强对通信、建筑、计算机和信息服务、咨询以及电影音像五大类服务部门的扶持以促进其出口。     

Trade in Environmental Goods: Evidences from an Analysis Using Elasticities of Trade Costs

Negotiations on the liberalization of environmental goods (EGs) and services within the WTO Doha Round (mandated in November 2001) are facing specific challenges. Conflicting interests and differing perceptions of the benefits of increased trade in EGs were reflected in different approaches proposed for determining EGs. Using import data of 34 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) member countries and from a sample of 167 countries, from 1995 to 2012, we discuss the trade effect of reducing barriers on EGs. We analyze the lists of EGs proposed by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and OECD using a Translog gravity model. We found that removing tariff barriers for EGs will have a modest impact because for the biggest importers and exporters, elasticities of trade costs are very low while for most trading relationships they are very high, making it difficult for exporters to maintain their markets. Overall, our results suggest that, because of their substantial effect on international trade, future negotiations on EGs should also address the issues of standards and nontariff barriers.     

Trade,poverty, and social protection in developing countries

How do shifts in trade affect social protections for the poor? Although the fraction of the world's population considered the “extreme” poor has fallen by over one-half over the past quarter century, many of those lifted above the global poverty line remain vulnerable to shocks that could place them back into poverty. These are the groups that require social protection to stabilize their incomes. Among the shocks to which the absolute poor have been exposed are those created by trade liberalization, particularly of the agricultural sector. The resulting risks, uncertainties, and threats to social stability from this type of trade require that the poor be provided with some forms of adjustment assistance. We examine the effects of trade components on several dimensions of social protection in developing countries, including spending, coverage, and adequacy over the past two decades. We find that, contrary to previous studies, disaggregating trade may be a key to determining which international market variables drive expansion of social protection. Disaggregating trade balances in agricultural vs. manufactured goods reveals that net food and agricultural exporters provide better social protection than countries that report agricultural trade deficits. Meanwhile, countries with manufacturing trade surpluses tend to experience reduced social protection coverage. We reason that governments of net agricultural exporters face incentives to invest in social programs that extend eligibility to the rural poor. Manufacturing export-driven economies, on the other hand, are likely participants in global production chains that limit the capacity of the public sector to extend social protection.     

Trade liberalization and Firms’ export performance in China: Theory and evidence

The focus of the literature surrounding trade liberalization has recently shifted from trade liberalization in imported final goods to studying the effects of trade liberalization in imported intermediate inputs. This emphasis fits very well the trade liberalization experience of China following its accession to the WTO in 2001. In this paper, we build a multi-sector heterogenous-firm model with trade in both intermediate goods and final goods, and we ask: How do final-goods producers respond to trade liberalization in imported inputs? Do they respond differently across sectors? How do firms respond differently to trade liberalization in imported-outputs instead? We separate the total effect of trade liberalization into those caused by inter-sectoral resource allocation (IRA) and by within-sector selection of firms according to productivity (which we call Melitz selection effect). It is the IRA effect that gives rise to differential impacts of trade liberalization in different sectors. These impacts include changes in the probability of entry into the export market, the fraction of firms that export and the share of export revenue. To test our hypotheses, we carry out both quantitative analysis and empirical analysis by using Chinese firm-level data. The results are consistent with our theoretical predictions.     

The influence of international trade on labour productivity in services: The case of Brazil in the 1990s

In the developing world, services account for a rising share of domestic employment and international trade. Thus, it is important to know whether trade liberalization contributes to labour productivity in services. We explore this question, examining the 1990–2000 Brazilian trade liberalization. We find that growth of imports and exports strengthened labour productivity in services, but the contribution was smaller in subsectors with more college graduates, and this negative offset was larger in subsectors that received large foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows. Improved access to imported manufactured intermediate inputs raised downstream services' labour productivity and downstream manufacturing firms benefitting from tariff cuts enacted by trade partners generated spillovers that improved the labour productivity of upstream service subsectors. However, FDI inflows and investments in human and physical capital modified these downstream factors. We conclude that the Brazilian trade liberalization strengthened productivity in services, but unequally across subsectors.     

Trade integration and risk sharing

What are the effects of increased trade in goods and services on the trade balance? We study the effects of reducing transport costs in a Ricardian model with complete asset markets and find that this increases the volatility of the trade balance. This result applies regardless of whether supply or demand shocks are the main source of economic fluctuations. Both type of shocks generate fluctuations in the trade balance that are in part moderated by stabilizing movements in the terms of trade. Trade integration dampens these terms of trade movements and, for a given distribution of shocks, amplifies fluctuations in the trade balance. To overturn this result, one must assume that either trade integration is sufficiently biased towards goods with strong comparative advantage and/or risk aversion is sufficiently extreme. We calibrate the model to U.S. data and find that, for reasonable parameter values, increased trade in services could double the volatility of the trade balance.     

A Model of Trade Liberalization in Services*

This paper develops an intra‐industry service trade model taking into account important features of services. We find that service trade liberalization between identical economies is welfare enhancing when the pre‐trade domestic market liberalization is limited. This holds regardless of the degree of trade liberalization and of the mode of supply. However, if the pre‐trade environment is characterized by a free‐entry equilibrium, then service trade liberalization is not necessarily welfare improving. It is welfare enhancing if the trade liberalization is full and the mode of supply is cross‐border. The gain from trade in our model comes from the improvement in service quality—better matching between consumers’ ideal varieties and firms’ product specificity. The implications for the mode of supply in service trade are also explored.     

Trade Liberalization and the Degree of Competition in International Duopoly

This paper analyzes how a reduction in trade costs influences the possibility for firms to engage in international cartels, and hence how trade liberalization affects the degree of competition. We consider a particular intra‐industry trade model amended to allow for firms producing differentiated products. Our main finding is that trade liberalization may have an anti‐competitive effect. We find that there is no unique relation between a reduction in trade costs and the degree of competition. When products are differentiated, a lowering of trade costs is pro‐competitive if trade costs are initially high, but anti‐competitive if trade costs initially are low. Hence, trade policy is not necessarily a substitute for competition policy.     

Intra‐industry Trade Liberalization: Why Skilled Workers are More Likely to Support Free Trade

This paper presents a theoretical model and empirical analysis that connects the prevalence of intra‐industry trade with increased wage inequality from trade liberalization in both skilled and unskilled labor abundant countries. The Stolper–Samuelson effect is incorporated into an intra‐industry trade liberalization (intra‐ITL) hypothesis where skilled labor opposes protectionism in all countries engaged in intra‐industry trade because skilled workers gain at the expense of unskilled workers from multilateral trade liberalization within the skill‐intensive sector. We examine empirical evidence on whether skilled individuals are more supportive of trade liberalization than unskilled individuals across 31 countries with different levels of intra‐industry trade and skill endowments. We find that the extent to which countries engage in intra‐industry trade in high‐tech commodities is strongly linked with the intensity of opposition to protection by skilled labor. Regression results strongly support our hypothesis that skilled workers, almost everywhere, are more likely to support free trade.     

The Effects of Trade Liberalization between Heterogeneous Countries on Endogenous Mergers

This paper examines the effects of trade liberalization on merger behavior. We endogenize merger choice among owners in an oligopolistic industry in asymmetric countries to analyze the consequences of trade cost reductions on competitiveness and welfare. In this context, the non‐cooperative game supports asymmetric market structures. We also find that trade liberalization is not necessarily pro‐competitive in countries with the competitive advantage, even if trade costs are completely abolished. Moreover, the tariff‐jumping explanation of international mergers does not necessarily apply. The welfare analysis shows that merger behavior can significantly alter any gains from liberalization. Countries should consider enforcing competition in regional agreements. Specifically, to avoid a reduction in domestic welfare following trade‐liberalizing reductions in trade costs, a high‐cost country's optimal policy may be to ban international mergers.     

Trade Liberalization with Heterogeneous Firms

This paper examines the various aspects of trade liberalization with heterogeneous firms using the Melitz (2003 ) model. We find a number of novel results and effects including a Stolper–Samuelson‐like result and several results related to the volume of trade, which are empirically testable. We also analyze what might be called an anti‐variety effect as the result of trade liberalization. We show that this effect is most pronounced for small countries. This resonates with the often voiced criticism from antiglobalists that globalization leads the world to become more homogeneous by eliminating local specialties. Nevertheless, we find that trade liberalization always leads to welfare gains in the model.     

DEMOCRACY AND GLOBALIZATION

The relationship between democracy and globalization has been a subject of both scholarly and policy debate. Some argue that the two go hand in hand – that unrestricted international transactions encourage political accountability and transparency and that politically free societies are least likely to restrict the mobility of goods and services. But others argue that democracies, in which special interests that suffer from foreign competition have voice, are more likely to have closed markets, and vice versa. Our analysis differs from its predecessors in three ways. We seek to uncover general patterns by considering as long a period as possible and all countries with the relevant data. We consider multiple dimensions of globalization, analyzing both trade liberalization and capital account liberalization. And we estimate these relationships using an instrumental variables strategy that allows us to confront the issue of simultaneity. Our findings support the existence of positive relationships between democracy and globalization.     

Trade Liberalization and Welfare Inequality: A Demand‐Based Approach*

There is strong evidence suggesting that different income groups consume different bundles of goods. Hence, trade liberalization can affect welfare inequality via changes in the relative prices of goods consumed by different income groups (the price effect). In this paper, I develop a framework that enables us to explore the role of the price effect in determining welfare inequality. I find that trade liberalization does benefit some income classes more than others. In particular, I show that the relative welfare of the rich with respect to that of the poor has a hump shape as a function of trade costs.     

Trade policy in a Ricardian model with a continuum of goods under nonhomothetic preferences

We study the effects of trade liberalization in a Ricardian trade model with a continuum of goods and nonhomothetic preferences. Goods are ordered according to priority, and higher-ranked goods are consumed only by richer households. South (North) has a comparative advantage in the lower- (higher-) ranked goods. South's terms-of-trade unambiguously deteriorate as a result of unilaterally reducing its tariffs. North, by contrast, may experience a terms-of-trade gain when liberalizing its trade. It appears that the redistribution of tariff revenue from rich to poor households within each country increases the burden of trade liberalization for poor households.     

Trade in goods and services: Two sides of the same coin?

This study analyzes the interrelationship between goods and services in production and trade using the most recent input–output tables for all OECD countries. It first describes the role of services in production and trade in goods. Next, it proposes two models for analyzing the impact of services trade liberalization on industrial structure. The first captures the role of trade in tasks when countries have different technology i) in production of services; and ii) in organizing production. The latter has to the author's knowledge not been analyzed in the trade literature before. Countries with superior organizational technology (e.g. Japan) will strengthen their comparative advantage in manufacturing following trade liberalization in services. The second model explores the interrelationship between intermediate goods and services i) when they are substitutes; and ii) when they are complements. In both models the gains from trade liberalization is non-linear in trade costs. Going the last mile of liberalization has a much larger impact than taking the first steps.