关于累犯适用假释的理论探讨——兼论社区矫正的引入

累犯在我国刑法中不适用假释,这种立法在实践中不仅有时难以体现刑罚的公平,同时与相关的刑罚理论相互冲突.从域外的刑事法治来看,很多国家并没有采取简单的累犯不能假释的"一刀切"做法,而是采取了灵活的可以假释的宽容态度.从刑罚公平角度来看,通过社区矫正来完善对累犯的保护无疑可以作为一种可以探索的路径.     

关于累犯适用假释的理论探讨——兼论社区矫正的引入

累犯在我国刑法中不适用假释，这种立法在实践中不仅有时难以体现刑贸的公平，同时与相关的刑罚理论相互冲突。从域外的刑事法治来看，很多国家并没有采取简单的累犯不能假释的。一刀切”做法，而是采取了灵活的可以假释的宽容态度。从刑罚公平角度来看，通过社区矫正来完善对累犯的保护无疑可以作为一种可以探索的路径。     

论未成年人不应构成特殊累犯

为了体现宽严相济的刑事司法政策,刑法修正案(八)对累犯制度进行了修改,彰显了立法的文明和进步,其中关于未成年人能否构成特殊累犯留下了讨论空间。立足于青少年的生理、心理发育特点,分别从体系解释和比较解释、报应和功利的角度,提出特殊累犯犯前罪时应年满十八周岁。     

单位犯罪之补丁：单位累犯的创制

我国现行刑法中没有规定单位累犯，在现行刑法中创制单位累犯是十分必要的。文章在分析和研究前人研究成果的基础上阐述了单位累犯的概念及其构成条件几个问题。     

单位犯罪之补丁:单位累犯的创制

我国现行刑法中没有规定单位累犯,在现行刑法中创制单位累犯是十分必要的.文章在分析和研究前人研究成果的基础上阐述了单位累犯的概念及其构成条件几个问题.     

论环境刑事责任实现方式的发展趋势

环境刑事责任实现方式一般划分为刑罚方式与非刑罚方式。环境刑事责任的实现方式主要体现了两个发展趋势：在刑罚措施上财产刑将取代自由刑扩大适用,相应的资格刑也将不断引入适用,这是其一;其二,以刑罚措施为基础,非刑罚实现方式将在环境犯罪中越来越多地得到适用。而非刑罚化的发展趋势更是现代刑法转制的新方向。     

我国环境刑罚轻缓化探析

毋庸置疑,在整个国际社会对环境犯罪处以轻缓刑罚的背景下,我国亦应该对环境刑罚采用轻缓化的原则。诚然,我国的环境刑罚制度与其他国家相比还有许多亟待完善的地方,但这并不妨碍我们在借鉴其他国家先进的立法经验的基础上构建适合我国具体国情的环境刑罚制度。在环境刑罚中要突出自由刑的适用,扩大并完善财产刑的适用,明确财产刑中过于模糊的规定,逐步改善环境犯罪的刑事处罚措施过于单一的缺点和功能上的不足,同时提高对辅助刑罚措施的关注。在环境犯罪方面,在适用传统刑罚措施惩治的基础上配合适用辅助刑罚措施,使我国环境刑罚轻缓化实践不至于成为一纸空谈。     

终身监禁刑罚措施的再斟酌——以《刑法修正案(九)》为契点

作为死刑替代措施而被提出的终身监禁刑罚措施并非法定的刑种,但确属事实上的独立刑种;这一刑罚措施缺乏刑罚根据,违反报应刑、目的刑以及刑罚人道主义.其产生是刑罚民粹主义兴起、情绪化立法以及失衡的刑事政策和重刑主义导向的刑罚结构改革所致.鉴于此,在立法层面上应早日废除终身监禁,在司法层面上则应停止适用.     

现行减刑制度的缺陷及完善

减刑体现了刑罚个别化原则、刑罚效益原则以及中国宽严相济的刑事政策,是追求刑罚报应基础上的功利主义。但是,现行减刑制度在实际适用中存在缺陷,应当设立减刑专门处理机构减刑委员会、引入听证程序和规定减刑撤销制度对现行减刑制度进行完善。     

论我国罚金刑的不足与完善

随着刑罚的轻缓化,罚金刑在刑罚体系中的地位日益提高。我国在修订刑法时虽适时扩大了罚金刑的适用,但仍存在一些不足,造成司法实践中出现了问题,应加以完善。     

A fault confessed is half redressed—Confessions and punishment

Confessions after failures are socially desirable. However, confessions also bear the risk of punishment. In a laboratory experiment I examine how confessions work. I analyze whether the willingness to punish harmful failures depends on how the harmed party has learned about the outcome. The harmed party can learn about the outcome via random detection or self-report by the performer. There are two major findings: first, confessions are a powerful instrument: punishment for confessed failures is less likely than for randomly detected failures. Second, confessions are much more likely to occur if there is no punishment.     

Cooperation under alternative punishment institutions: An experiment

While peer punishment has been shown to increase group cooperation, there is open debate on how cooperative norms can emerge and on what motives drive individuals to punish. In a public good experiment we compared alternative punishment institutions and found (1) higher cooperation levels under a consensual punishment institution than under autonomous individual punishment; (2) similar cooperation levels under sequential and simultaneous punishment institutions.     

Peer punishment in teams: expressive or instrumental choice?

A key question about human societies is how social norms of cooperation are enforced. Subjects who violate norms are often targeted by their peers for punishment. In an experiment with small teams we examine whether subjects treat punishment itself as a second-order public good. Results do not support this view and rather suggest a hard-wired taste for punishment; subjects are engaged in a cooperative task but ignore the public good characteristics of punishment.     

New insights into conditional cooperation and punishment from a strategy method experiment

This paper introduces new experimental designs to examine how conditional cooperation and punishment behaviours respond to the full range of variation in the contributions of others. It is shown that contributions become significantly more selfish-biased as others contribute more unequally, while punishment increases both with decreasing contributions by the target player and increasing contributions by a third player. Low contributors who punish antisocially do not direct their punishment specifically toward high contributors, while their beliefs indicate that they expect to themselves be punished.     

Conflict technology in cooperation: The group size paradox revisited

This paper studies the implications of punishment‐induced conflict in a public goods game. It shows, under plausible assumptions, how larger group size sometimes enhances punishing behavior in social dilemmas and hence supports higher levels of cooperation. Unlike existing approaches that focus on uncoordinated punishment, I consider punishment as a coordinated activity that may be resisted by those being punished and study the implications of punishment‐induced conflict situations. Developing a conflict model of punishment and combining it with a standard public good game, I show that coordinated punishment can yield the concentration effect of punishment, leading to a larger group advantage; that is, the larger the group, the easier it becomes to organize cooperation. The key idea is that when punishers coordinate their punishment, punishers as a coalition successfully divide defectors and punish each defector one by one. Surprisingly, even when coordination among punishers decays as group size increases, as long as the rate of decaying remains relatively slow the larger group advantage still obtains.     

The evolution of private governance: Neither anarchism nor Statism

I read E. P. Stringham’s book on private governance against the background of Morris Hoffman’s account of the evolution of legal punishment. This allows us to see how the evolution of private governance moves through three levels of punishment: the first-party punishment of conscience and guilt, the second-party punishment of retaliation and revenge, and the third-party punishment of retribution. This suggests that neither pure anarchism nor pure statism is possible, because every social order shows some form of governance, and no authoritarian state can ever hold an absolute monopoly on governance to the exclusion of private governance. One can also see that liberal states leave lots of room for private governance, which allows for adaptive flexibility in solving public problems in ways that promote peace and prosperity.     

On the Design of Peer Punishment Experiments

Some peer punishment technologies may bias experimental results in unwanted ways. A critical parameter to consider in the design is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which measures the income reduction for the targeted subject relative to the cost for the subject who requested the punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it could confound the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.JEL Classification: C91, C92     

On the acceptance of apologies

An apology is a strong and cheap device to restore social or economic relationships that have been disturbed. In a laboratory experiment in which apologies emerge endogenously, we find that harmdoers use apologies in particular if they fear punishment and if their intentions cannot be easily inferred. After offenses with ambiguous intention punishment for apologizers is lower than for non-apologizers. Victims expect an apology and punish if they do not receive one. An apology does not help at all after clearly intentionally committed offenses. On the contrary, after such offenses an apology strongly increases punishment compared to remaining silent.     

效用最大化模型与中国个人所得税的治理

随着个人所得税收入的快速增长，如何通过强化对个人所得税的管理以减少税收收入的流失，已经成为政府亟待解决的重要课题。针对中国个人所得税的税制不健全、处罚措施力度薄弱、公民“纳税”意识淡薄等问题，我们可以通过改革税制、加大惩罚力度、改革税收征管模式等措施加以改善和解决。     

Juvenile crime and punishment: evidence from Japan

Over the last decade, juvenile crime has become a serious social problem in Japan. The Juvenile Law was revised in 2001 to impose harsher punishment on juvenile offenders. This revision makes it possible to impose criminal punishment on 14- and 15-year-old criminal offenders, while those offenders aged 16–19 have always faced criminal punishment, both before and after the revision. Using this revision as a natural experiment, this study conducts a difference-in-differences estimation to examine the effect of punishment on juvenile crime. The analysis provides evidence that punishment can deter juvenile crime. In addition, this research examines the criminal behaviour of 13-year-olds, who face no change in punishment, but who soon will in the near future. The results suggest that the revision also had a negative impact on the criminal behaviour of these younger offenders.