With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders

Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogenous shift in power from shareholders to managers affects corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Two competing hypotheses are entertained. The shareholder view predicts that stronger takeover protection will lead to a decrease in corporate attention to shareholders and non‐shareholding stakeholders alike, as managers divert resources from shareholders to the pursuit of their private interests. The stakeholder view, in contrast, predicts that stronger takeover protection will increase corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Because catering to non‐shareholding stakeholders contributes to the long‐term value of the firm, managers will be more likely to attend to those stakeholders when relieved from short‐termism triggered by the threat of hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 878 U.S. firms from 1991 to 2002, the study finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection leads to higher corporate attention to community and the natural environment, but has no impact on corporate attention to employees, minorities, and customers. Additional analyses show that firms that increase their attention to stakeholders experience an increase in long‐term shareholder value. These findings provide additional evidence that relief from short‐termism is a likely source of the increase in corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders following the increase in takeover protection. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

营销价值观与组织绩效关系的实证研究:兼论企业所有制的影响

本文重点讨论了营销学中作为指导企业营销活动的价值观——市场导向与利益相关者导向的理论架构，并检验了利益相关者导向与组织绩效之间的关系。同时，还针对文献中欠缺的中国企业所有制的影响，进行了分析。研究结果发现，利益相关者导向对中国企业的组织绩效具有积极影响。但中国不同所有制的企业，在利益相关者导向和组织绩效上差异很大。     

Shareholder value,stakeholder management,and social issues: what's the bottom line?

We test the relationship between shareholder value, stakeholder management, and social issue participation. Building better relations with primary stakeholders like employees, customers, suppliers, and communities could lead to increased shareholder wealth by helping firms develop intangible, valuable assets which can be sources of competitive advantage. On the other hand, using corporate resources for social issues not related to primary stakeholders may not create value for shareholders. We test these propositions with data from S&P 500 firms and find evidence that stakeholder management leads to improved shareholder value, while social issue participation is negatively associated with shareholder value. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does a long‐term orientation create value? Evidence from a regression discontinuity

Research summary : In this paper, we theorize and empirically investigate how a long‐term orientation impacts firm value. To study this relationship, we exploit exogenous changes in executives' long‐term incentives. Specifically, we examine shareholder proposals on long‐term executive compensation that pass or fail by a small margin of votes. The passage of such “close call” proposals is akin to a random assignment of long‐term incentives and hence provides a clean causal estimate. We find that the adoption of such proposals leads to (1) an increase in firm value and operating performance—suggesting that a long‐term orientation is beneficial to companies—and (2) an increase in firms' investments in long‐term strategies such as innovation and stakeholder relationships. Overall, our results are consistent with a “time‐based” agency conflict between shareholders and managers. Managerial summary : This paper shows that corporate short‐termism is hampering business success. We show clear, causal evidence that imposing long‐term incentives on executives—in the form of long‐term executive compensation—improves business performance. Long‐term executive compensation includes restricted stocks, restricted stock options, and long‐term incentive plans. Firms that adopted shareholder resolutions on long‐term compensation experienced a significant increase in their stock price. This stock price increase foreshadowed an increase in operating profits that materialized after two years. We unpack the reasons for these improvements in performance, and find that firms that adopted these shareholder resolutions made more investments in R&D and stakeholder engagement, especially pertaining to employees and the natural environment. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

企业慈善捐赠行为影响因素的实证分析——以广东省民营企业为例

以利益相关者理论为基础,从企业内部的资源和能力、外部的政府行为两个角度出发来考察广东省民营企业慈善捐赠行为的影响因素。运用Logistic回归模型,通过对273份有效问卷的实证分析,发现民营企业慈善捐赠行为与企业现金流的多寡没有显著关系,但企业形象、企业慈善决策机制、企业规模大小、企业所处的生命周期阶段对民营企业是否进行慈善捐赠有显著影响。我国民营企业应结合其资源能力和外部环境。开展战略性慈善捐赠,这是关乎其健康持续成长的重要要素。     

Does it pay to be really good? addressing the shape of the relationship between social and financial performance

Building on the theoretical argument that a firm's ability to profit from social responsibility depends upon its stakeholder influence capacity (SIC), we bring together contrasting literatures on the relationship between corporate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) to hypothesize that the CSP‐CFP relationship is U‐shaped. Our results support this hypothesis. We find that firms with low CSP have higher CFP than firms with moderate CSP, but firms with high CSP have the highest CFP. This supports the theoretical argument that SIC underlies the ability to transform social responsibility into profit. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.