Managing for stakeholders,stakeholder utility functions,and competitive advantage

A firm that manages for stakeholders allocates more resources to satisfy the needs and demands of its legitimate stakeholders than would be necessary to simply retain their willful participation in the firm's productive activities. We explain why this sort of behavior unlocks additional potential for value creation, as well as the conditions that either facilitate or disrupt the value‐creation process. Firms that manage for stakeholders develop trusting relationships with them based on principles of distributional, procedural, and interactional justice. Under these conditions, stakeholders are more likely to share nuanced information regarding their utility functions, thereby increasing the ability of the firm to allocate its resources to areas that will best satisfy them (thus increasing demand for business transactions with the firm). In addition, this information can spur innovation, as well as allow the firm to deal better with changes in the environment. Competitive advantages stemming from a managing‐for‐stakeholders approach are argued to be sustainable because they are associated with path dependence and causal ambiguity. These explanations provide a strong rationale for including stakeholder theory in the discussion of firm competitiveness and performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Stakeholders,reciprocity, and firm performance

The assumption that economic actors behave in a boundedly self‐interested manner promises fruitful new insights for strategic management. A growing literature spanning multiple disciplines indicates most actors' selfish utility maximizing behaviors are bounded by norms of fairness. Rather than being purely self‐interested, people behave reciprocally by rewarding others whose actions they deem fair and willingly incurring costs to punish those they deem unfair. Economists show that employers who are perceived as distributionally fair by their employees generate comparatively more value due to the positively reciprocal behavior of those employees. The organizational justice literature distinguishes two additional types of fairness assessed by employees. Drawing from both these bodies of work, we employ stakeholder theory to propose how perceptions of fairness result in reciprocity (1) extending to all stakeholders of the firm and (2) affecting firm performance. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spinning gold: The financial returns to stakeholder engagement

We provide direct empirical evidence in support of instrumental stakeholder theory's argument that increasing stakeholder support enhances the financial valuation of a firm, holding constant the objective valuation of the physical assets under its control. We undertake this analysis using panel data on 26 gold mines owned by 19 publicly traded firms over the period 1993–2008. We code over 50,000 stakeholder events from media reports to develop an index of the degree of stakeholder conflict/cooperation for these mines. By incorporating this index in a market capitalization analysis, we reduce the discount placed by financial markets on the net present value of the physical assets controlled by these firms from 72 percent to between 37 and 13 percent. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Organization–stakeholder fit: A dynamic theory of cooperation,compromise, and conflict between an organization and its stakeholders

Research Summary : We advance the concept of organization–stakeholder fit (O–S fit) to explain cooperative behavior between an organization and its stakeholders. O–S fit describes the compatibility that exists between an organization and a stakeholder when their characteristics are well matched. We highlight two dimensions of O–S fit: value congruence, or the supplementary fit of organizational and stakeholder values, and strategic complementarity, or the complementary fit of strategic needs and resources. For each dimension, we detail the unique relational factors—including core elements of trust, predictability, attraction/exchange, and communication—that motivate cooperation. We then explicate the ways in which value congruence and strategic complementarity dynamically interrelate over time. Finally, we consider how organization‐stakeholder misfit may result in alternative relational behaviors, such as conflict or compromise. Managerial Summary : We develop a new way of thinking about the relationship between organizations and stakeholders. Recognizing that positive relationships require a degree of fit or compatibility, we argue that cooperative behavior between an organization and its stakeholders is maximized when relational partners share both core values and strategic priorities. We explain that high fit along these two dimensions increases trust, relational predictability, attraction/exchange, and communication. We also describe how positive relationships might be formed with fit along only one dimension, and how negative relationships might result in the presence of misfit. Ultimately, we suggest that managers who want to foster positive relationships with stakeholders should concentrate on aligning their values and priorities, rather than simply concentrating on one or the other.     

Firm responses to secondary stakeholder action

In this paper, we explore the conditions under which secondary stakeholder groups are likely to elicit positive firm responses. To this end, we build upon and advance Mitchell, Agle, and Wood's (1997) stakeholder saliency and identification framework by defining saliency in terms of actions, not perceptions, and by proposing that power, legitimacy, and urgency arise out of the nature of stakeholder–request–firm triplets. To test this framework, we build a unique dataset of over 600 secondary stakeholder actions within the United States, all concerning environmental issues over the period 1971–2003. Copyright © 2006 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Incremental value creation and appropriation in a world with multiple stakeholders

There is a renewed interest among strategy scholars in the relationship between stakeholder theory and the dynamics of value creation‐appropriation in firms. Further advancements in this field are arguably impeded by an incomplete conceptualization and measurement of value and by scant characterization of the different patterns of stakeholder value appropriation. We develop a conceptual framework—based on an analytical taxonomy of value creation and appropriation—consistent with a more complete notion of value and wherein the trade‐offs in stakeholder value appropriation can be included. In essence, our analytical taxonomy contributes to enlarge the spectrum of value creation‐appropriation scenarios to be considered by researchers working on the stakeholder view of strategy. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

When more is not better: Complementarities,costs and contingencies in stakeholder management

Instrumental stakeholder theory has largely emphasized the positive effects of investing in stakeholder cooperative relationships in an additive, linear fashion in the sense that the more investments the better. Yet investing in stakeholders can be very costly and the effects of these investments in firm performance are subject to complex internal complementarities and external contingencies. In this article we rely on set‐theoretic methods and a large international dataset of 1,060 multinational companies to explore theoretically and empirically some of the complementarities, costs and contingencies likely to arise in stakeholder management. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

With greater power comes greater responsibility? takeover protection and corporate attention to stakeholders

Using takeover protection as an indicator of corporate governance, this study examines how an exogenous shift in power from shareholders to managers affects corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Two competing hypotheses are entertained. The shareholder view predicts that stronger takeover protection will lead to a decrease in corporate attention to shareholders and non‐shareholding stakeholders alike, as managers divert resources from shareholders to the pursuit of their private interests. The stakeholder view, in contrast, predicts that stronger takeover protection will increase corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders. Because catering to non‐shareholding stakeholders contributes to the long‐term value of the firm, managers will be more likely to attend to those stakeholders when relieved from short‐termism triggered by the threat of hostile takeovers. Using a sample of 878 U.S. firms from 1991 to 2002, the study finds that an exogenous increase in takeover protection leads to higher corporate attention to community and the natural environment, but has no impact on corporate attention to employees, minorities, and customers. Additional analyses show that firms that increase their attention to stakeholders experience an increase in long‐term shareholder value. These findings provide additional evidence that relief from short‐termism is a likely source of the increase in corporate attention to non‐shareholding stakeholders following the increase in takeover protection. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Looking good by doing good: The antecedents and consequences of stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief

Stakeholder theory suggests a relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and corporate financial performance (CFP) because certain stakeholders reward certain types of CSR. This argument assumes that stakeholders attend to firms' CSR activities—an assumption that has yet to be examined. We fill this gap by extending stakeholder theory to the context of stakeholder attention to firm CSR and exploring the antecedents and consequences of stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief CSR. We test the resulting hypotheses on a sample of public companies that engaged in natural disaster relief efforts, finding that stakeholder attention partially mediated the relationship between disaster relief and CFP and that stakeholder attention to corporate disaster relief was driven by the legitimacy, urgency, and enactment of disaster relief CSR initiatives. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Enterprise logic: explaining corporate attention to stakeholders from the ‘inside‐out’

Why are some firms more effective than others at addressing stakeholder concerns? Conventional stakeholder theories focus on variables in the external environment and cannot adequately explain variance across firms operating in the same context. Our matched‐pair study of eight global corporations goes inside the firm and investigates the role of managerial cognition on corporate attention to stakeholders. We find that top management's conceptualization of the firm's relationship with society—which we name enterprise logic—prompts distinct foci of attention and potentially constrains how well a single firm can simultaneously attend to multiple stakeholders. These findings highlight the value of an ‘inside‐out’ perspective, centered on managerial cognition, in explaining why some firms address stakeholder concerns more effectively than their peers. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Signaling valuable human capital: Advocacy group work experience and its effect on employee pay in innovative firms

Research Summary: The ability of innovative firms to create and capture value depends on innovations that are quickly and widely adopted. Yet, stakeholder concerns can establish important barriers to diffusion. We study the human capital aspect of this challenge and investigate whether innovative firms pay salary premiums to new hires with work experience from advocacy groups like Transparency International. We integrate strategic human capital with stakeholder theory and suggest that advocacy group experience creates signals for valuable human capital in terms of stakeholder knowledge and legitimacy transfers to innovative firms. Using matched data for 3,562 employees in Denmark, we find that new hires with advocacy group experience enjoy larger salary premiums at technologically leading firms, in occupations with direct stakeholder interaction, and for advocacy group top management. Managerial Summary: Innovation research is increasingly aware of the non-technological factors behind successful innovations. Users, regulators, or public opinion can be benevolent supporters or stingy opponents of innovations. Employees with an understanding of the needs and sensitivities of societal stakeholders should therefore be valuable to innovative firms. We find this to be the case when innovative firms hire employees from advocacy groups representing such stakeholders (e.g., Transparency International). Such employees receive higher salaries than an otherwise comparable reference group. These findings indicate that recruiting needs of innovative firms reward stakeholder experience, not merely technological expertise. They demonstrate how firms can create value in the pursuit of the public interest. Further, advocacy groups emerge as an important career stage allowing individuals to develop credible signals for stakeholder expertise.     

Through the mud or in the boardroom: Examining activist types and their strategies in targeting firms for social change

Research summary : We examine the variety of activist groups and their tactics in demanding firms' social change. While extant work does not usually distinguish among activist types or their variety of tactics, we show that different activists (e.g., social movement organizations vs. religious groups and activist investors) rely on dissimilar tactics (e.g., boycotts and protests versus lawsuits and proxy votes). Further, we show how protests and boycotts drag companies “through the mud” with media attention, whereas lawsuits and proxy votes receive relatively little media attention yet may foster investor risk perceptions. This research presents a multifaceted view of activists and their tactics and suggests that this approach in examining activists and their tactics can extend what we know about how and why firms are targeted. Managerial summary : The purpose of this study was to examine how different types of activist groups behave differently when targeting firms for social change. We find that traditional activist groups rely on boycotts and protests, whereas religious groups and activist investors rely more on lawsuits and proxy votes. Additionally, we find that protests and boycotts are associated with greater media attention, whereas lawsuits and proxy votes are associated with investor perceptions of risk. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Asymmetric information and joint venture performance: theory and evidence for domestic and international joint ventures

The increased number of perspectives on joint ventures (JVs) raises important issues for theory development on interfirm collaboration. In this paper, we bring together two key theoretical perspectives on joint ventures—the asymmetric information perspective and the indigestibility view. On a theoretical level, we focus on the relationship between these two different explanations of joint ventures. We also present new evidence on the firm valuation effects of JVs in domestic and international investment contexts. The findings lend support to the asymmetric information perspective on resource combination through joint ventures. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.