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1.
A recent study by Fitza argued that the prior estimates of the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) effect are conflated with events outside the CEO's control, are largely the result of random chance, and that the true CEO effect is smaller than has been previously estimated. We suggest that the empirical methodology employed by Fitza to support these claims substantially overstates the “random chance” element of the CEO effect. We replicate Fitza's findings, highlight methodological issues, offer alternative conclusions, and using multilevel modeling (MLM), suggest that his analyses mischaracterize the CEO effect. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
2.
Markus A. Fitza 《战略管理杂志》2014,35(12):1839-1852
Variance decomposition analysis is often used to examine the degree to which CEOs influence their companies' performance (the so‐called CEO effect). Such studies play an important role in a body of literature that investigates the effect of leadership on organizations. In this paper, I argue that these previous studies have an important underlying flaw. Empirically, these studies wrongly attribute the performance effect of randomness—of chance—to the CEO. I demonstrate how randomness can affect the measured effects in a variance decomposition analysis, and I show that this is especially problematic for the measurement of CEO effects. I demonstrate how this results in a greatly inflated CEO effect and develop an approach to correct for it. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
3.
Markus A. Fitza 《战略管理杂志》2017,38(3):802-811
How much of the variance in firm performance can be attributed to CEOs? This question has been the focus of a long debate in management research. In a recent study, I showed that a large portion of the performance differences that are often attributed to CEOs might in fact be due to chance. In a recent article, Quigley and Graffin argue that my conclusions can be avoided if more advanced methodological approaches are applied. Here I show that this is not the case, in fact if more realistic assumptions of how chance can affect firm performance are made, the effect of CEO leadership is almost indistinguishable from the effect of chance, independent of the estimation methodology. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
4.
This study investigates how the relationship between bank performance and executive compensation is affected by the degree of an executive’s managerial discretion. Managerial discretion is captured by two industry-specific attributes: a bank’s strategic domain, and its regulatory environment. Executive compensation is found to be more related to bank performance in a context of high managerial discretion than in a context of low managerial discretion. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
5.
Do CEOs matter more in some countries than in others? Based on a theoretical consideration of three fundamental national‐level institutions—national values, prevailing firm ownership structures, and board governance arrangements—we argue that CEOs in different countries face systematically different degrees of constraint on their latitudes of action, and hence they differ in how much effect they have on firm performance. To test these ideas, we apply a variance components analysis methodology to 15‐year matched samples of 100 U.S. firms, 100 German firms, and 100 Japanese firms. Results provide strong, robust evidence that the effect of CEOs on firm performance—for good and for ill—is substantially greater in U.S. firms than in German and Japanese firms. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
6.
Research summary : Despite a number of studies highlighting the important impact Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) have on firms, several theoretical and methodological questions cloud existing findings. This study takes an alternative approach by examining how shareholders' perceptions of CEO significance have changed over time. Using an event study methodology and a sample of 240 sudden and unexpected CEO deaths, we show that absolute (unsigned) market reactions to these events in U.S. public firms have increased markedly between 1950 and 2009. Our results indicate that shareholders act in ways consistent with the belief that CEOs have become increasingly more influential in recent decades. Managerial summary : With Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) facing increased scrutiny and receiving ever‐increasing pay packages, substantial debate exists about their overall contribution to firm outcomes. While prior research has sought to calculate the proportion of firm outcomes attributable to the CEO, this study takes an alternative approach by using the “wisdom of the crowds” to assess how shareholders think about the importance of CEOs. Our study finds that shareholders, perhaps the most financially motivated stakeholder, view CEOs as increasingly important drivers of firm outcomes, good and bad, versus their peers from decades earlier. Notably, market reaction to the unexpected death of a CEO has increased steadily over the last six decades, highlighting the importance of succession planning and supporting, at least partially, the increased compensation given today's top executives. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
7.
Timothy J. Quigley Donald C. Hambrick Vilmos F. Misangyi G. Alessandra Rizzi 《战略管理杂志》2019,40(9):1453-1470
8.
The concept of managerial discretion provides a theoretical fulcrum for resolving the debate about whether chief executive officers (CEOs) have much influence over company outcomes. In this paper, we operationalize and further develop the construct of managerial discretion at the national level. In an empirical examination of 15 countries, we find that certain informal and formal national institutions—individualism, tolerance of uncertainty, cultural looseness, dispersed firm ownership, a common‐law legal origin, and employer flexibility—are associated with the degree of managerial discretion available to CEOs of public firms in a country. In turn, we show that country‐level managerial discretion is associated with how much impact CEOs have on the performance of their firms. We also find that discretion mediates the relationship between national institutions and CEO effects on firm performance. Finally, we discuss two inductively derived institutional themes: autonomy orientation and risk orientation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
9.
This paper builds and tests the thesis that CEO influence evolves differently for founders and agents. We theorize that at the beginning of their tenures, founder CEOs can pursue market expansion more aggressively than agent CEOs, because they take office with the combination of motivation, power, and requisite knowledge that agent CEOs build over time. Subsequently, however, founder CEOs have less access to the administrative infrastructure necessary to sustain a growing firm, making them less able than agent CEOs to continue market expansion mid‐tenure and more severely constrained by market complexity. A longitudinal study of cable television operators confirms that the firm's market expansion follows an inverted U‐shape for agents and a downward slope for founders, while market complexity reduces market expansion, especially for founders. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
10.
This study develops and tests predictions regarding factors that influence early‐stage CEO evaluation. We suggest that contextual elements of the CEO succession process will influence the heuristics that directors employ to aid in their early evaluation of a CEO because traditional performance metrics, such as firm performance, are less diagnostic of CEO quality in the first years of their tenure. Broad empirical support for our theoretical arguments is shown in a sample of Fortune 1000 firms. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
11.
Research on how managers influence firm outcomes has generated promising explanations of differences in organizational strategies and performance within a given industry, but has largely ignored the role of emotions in shaping managers' strategic choices. This article analyzes the influence of the affective traits of CEOs—their long‐term tendency to experience positive or negative moods or emotions—on strategy and performance conformity in a sample of Spanish banks and savings banks. Our results show that managers' negative affective traits are related to more conformist strategies and more typical performance, whereas positive affective traits seem to promote outcomes that deviate from the central tendencies of the industry. Results also show that strategic conformity mediates the relationship between CEO negative affective traits and typical performance. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
12.
Alison Mackey 《战略管理杂志》2008,29(12):1357-1367
The extent to which CEOs influence firm performance is fundamental to scholarly understanding of how organizations work; yet, this linkage is poorly understood. Previous empirical efforts to examine the link between CEOs and firm performance using variance decomposition, while provocative, nevertheless suffer from methodological problems that systematically understate the relative impact of CEOs on firm performance compared to industry and firm effects. This study addresses these methodological problems and reexamines the percentage of the variance in firm performance explained by heterogeneity in CEOs. The results of this study suggest that in certain settings the ‘CEO effect’ on corporate‐parent performance is substantially more important than that of industry and firm effects, but only moderately more important than industry and firm effects on business‐segment performance. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
13.
Despite the growing recognition in the corporate governance literature that the relationship between ownership concentration and profitability is context dependent, this issue has not yet been subjected to direct empirical investigation using a single cross-national sample. This study empirically examines the ownership concentration–performance relationship across the nations of Canada, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Essentially, we argue that the correlation (if any) between ownership concentration and firm profitability differs across countries in a systematic way determined by the national system of corporate governance. Results indicate that important and statistically significant differences do in fact exist across the countries studied. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
14.
A limited number of studies have addressed the idea of ‘strategic’ reward systems—the matching of compensation systems to a firm's strategy. Prior research on this topic has been confined to U.S. firms, however, and a number of key questions remain unanswered. Using a sample of 917 employees from two large Swiss financial institutions, we found that pay systems are linked with divisional strategic orientation, but in a different form than prior studies. Additionally, we identify hierarchical position as an important variable in the tailoring of reward systems. Hierarchy has a significant main effect on pay plan design, and an interactive effect with strategic orientation. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
15.
《战略管理杂志》2018,39(5):1473-1495
Research Summary: Firm performance and corporate governance have been shown to influence CEO selection, but our understanding of the role of social capital is more limited. In this study, we seek to provide further insight into the role of social capital by examining the influence of both “bonding” and “bridging” forms of social capital on CEO appointments. We find that candidates who have relational social capital, in terms of overlap with the CEO in organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed as CEO. We also find that candidates who have external linkages to the CEO in the form of geographic, prestigious university, and prior employment affiliations are more likely to be appointed CEO. Managerial Summary: The appointment of a new CEO has significant and widespread implications for the firm’s future strategic direction and performance, the relationship between the board and CEO, and perceptions by investors, employees, and other key stakeholders. Our study finds that candidates who have shared connections and experiences with the CEO in terms of geographic, prestigious university, or prior employment affiliations as well as overlap in terms of organizational tenure, board tenure, and CEO tenure are more likely to be appointed CEO. Given the enormous impact that executive appointments have on the strategic direction and performance of the company, it is important to recognize that social factors such as shared experiences and connections influence how candidates are perceived, and thus, may affect appointment decisions. 相似文献
16.
The notion that managers encounter differing levels of discretion across industries and organizations is becoming central to discussions of strategy formulation and implementation. However, discretion can be exercised or created only to the extent it is perceived, and theories of cognition and decision making suggest that managers’ perceptions of discretion may vary significantly. Despite the importance of perceptions to Hambrick and Finkelstein’s (1987) theoretical model of managerial discretion, no empirical tests examining perceived discretion have been published to date. Drawing on theories of issue interpretation and impression management, we find that managers differ systematically in the amount of discretion they perceive. Specifically, we find support for the predicted relationship between locus of control, a stable personality difference, and perceptions of managerial discretion. We also find that perceived discretion predicts managerial power, but only in situations in which the manager actually has little discretion. The dynamic model presented and tested here suggests that managers, in part through impression management activities and their ability to attend to critical contingencies, may both increase their power and enlarge their latitude for action. Implications for strategy formulation and implementation are discussed. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
17.
We develop and test a novel theory about strategic noise with regard to CEO appointments. Strategic noise is an anticipatory and preemptive form of impression management. At the time it announces a new CEO, a board of directors seeks to manage stakeholder impressions by simultaneously releasing confounding information about other significant events. Several CEO and firm characteristics affect the likelihood that this will happen. Strategic noise is most likely when long‐term CEOs have a wide pay gap between other top managers at high stock price performance firms, and when a new CEO does not have previous CEO experience or comes from a less well‐regarded firm. Results showing that CEO succession announcements are noisier than they would be by chance have some interesting implications for impression management theory, traditional event study methodology, and managerial and public policy. Interviews with public firm directors on CEO succession provide additional validity for the strategic noise construct and help us to articulate key elements of the theory. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
18.
Nandini Rajagopalan 《战略管理杂志》1997,18(10):761-785
This study examines the performance implications of the fit between strategic orientations and incentive plan characteristics. Research hypotheses are based on a framework that draws upon managerial discretion and agency theories to identify the links between firm strategy, managerial motivation and control, managerial risk-bearing, and incentive plan characteristics. A pooled cross-sectional, time series research design is used to test hypotheses in a sample of 50 electric utility firms. Consistent with theory, results indicate that annual bonus plans that use cash incentives and accounting measures of performance lead to better performance among firms with Defender strategic orientations. In contrast, firms with Prospector strategic orientations realize performance benefits when they adopt stock-based incentive plans and use market measures to evaluate managerial performance. © 1997 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
19.
We offer a new explanation for the relationship between CEO duality and firm performance that accounts for managerial capabilities and succession planning. Our reinterpretation of findings by Worrell, Nemec and Davidson (1997) is consistent with the new explanation. We also make suggestions for future research. © 1998 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献
20.
This paper investigates the effects of regulatory constraints and their relaxation on managerial discretion and internal fit in the context of the U.S. airline industry. Our results suggest that when managers' discretion is limited in one realm of choice, they compensate by using their greater level of discretion in some other arena to achieve internal fit. We show that the pursuit of fit matters, in the sense of having measurable efficiency consequences, and that fit trumps ‘best practice,’ at least in this context. In this respect, our findings provide a validation of the contingency perspective on internal fit. The ability to achieve fit under changing conditions may express a dynamic managerial capability necessary for adaptive organizational change. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 相似文献