Corporate social responsibility or CEO narcissism? CSR motivations and organizational performance

This study builds on insights from both upper echelons and agency perspectives to examine the effects on corporate social responsibility (CSR) practices of CEO's narcissism. Drawing on prior theory about CEO narcissism, we argue that CSR can be a response to leaders' personal needs for attention and image reinforcement and hypothesize that CEO narcissism has positive effects on levels and profile of organizational CSR; additionally, CEO narcissism will reduce the effect of CSR on performance. We find support for our ideas with a sample of Fortune 500 CEOs, operationalizing CEO narcissism with a novel media‐based measurement technique that uses third‐party ratings of CEO characteristics with validated psychometric scales. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Earthquake or glacier? How CEO charisma manifests in firm strategy over time

Numerous studies have focused on CEO charisma as an antecedent to firm performance, but this literature has largely overlooked the possibility that charisma manifests in more proximal strategic initiatives that (unlike performance) are largely under the CEO's control. In this study, we integrate perspectives from the upper echelons and charismatic leadership literatures to argue that CEO charisma influences year‐over‐year strategic change, the degree to which strategies deviate from industry central tendencies, and the degree of emphasis on corporate social responsibility. We also theorize that, depending on the outcome in question, the effects of charisma can become both amplified and diminished as CEO tenure advances. Employing a novel data collection approach for a sample of 113 S&P 500 CEOs, we find broad support for our theory. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do board chairs matter? The influence of board chairs on firm performance

Research summary : We use a variance decomposition methodology to assess the degree to which board chairs may influence their companies' performance. To isolate the board chair effect, we focus on firms in which the CEO and board chair positions are separated. Using a U.S. sample of 6,290 firm‐year observations representing 1,828 board chairs in 308 different industries, our results indicate that the board chair effect is substantial at about nine percent. Drawing on resource dependency theory, we also theorize and show how this board chair effect is contingent on the task environment in which firms operate. Our results add to the literature examining the role and influence of board chairs and the context in which chairs may have a greater impact on performance. Managerial summary : Following institutional and regulatory changes, more firms are separating the CEO and board chair positions. With an increasing number of individuals separate from the CEO serving as board chairs, a critical question becomes: What influence do these separate board chairs have on firm performance? Prior research suggests that separate board chairs can provide important resources—including advice and counsel, legitimacy, information linkages, and preferential access to external commitments and support—to their CEOs, other top managers, and overall firms. In turn, who the board chair is and the individual's ability (or lack thereof) to provide these resources may have a significant impact on firm performance. Offering support for this perspective, we find that separate board chairs explain nine percent of the variance in firm performance. Copyright © 2016 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The use of variance decomposition in the investigation of CEO effects: How large must the CEO effect be to rule out chance?

Variance decomposition analysis is often used to examine the degree to which CEOs influence their companies' performance (the so‐called CEO effect). Such studies play an important role in a body of literature that investigates the effect of leadership on organizations. In this paper, I argue that these previous studies have an important underlying flaw. Empirically, these studies wrongly attribute the performance effect of randomness—of chance—to the CEO. I demonstrate how randomness can affect the measured effects in a variance decomposition analysis, and I show that this is especially problematic for the measurement of CEO effects. I demonstrate how this results in a greatly inflated CEO effect and develop an approach to correct for it. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Above the glass ceiling: When are women and racial/ethnic minorities promoted to CEO?

Using a dataset of all CEO transitions in Fortune 500 companies over a 15‐year period, we analyze mechanisms that shape the promotion probabilities and leadership tenure of women and racial/ethnic minority CEOs. Consistent with the theory of the glass cliff, we find that occupational minorities—defined as white women and men and women of color—are more likely than white men to be promoted CEO of weakly performing firms. Though we find no significant differences in tenure length between occupational minorities and white men, we find that when firm performance declines during the tenure of occupational minority CEOs, these leaders are likely to be replaced by white men. We term this phenomenon the “savior effect.” © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Reassessing board member allegiance: CEO replacement following financial misconduct

Research summary: We examine how board members' reactions following financial misconduct differ from those following other adverse organizational events, such as poor performance. We hypothesize that inside directors and directors appointed by the CEO may be particularly concerned about their reputation following deceptive financial practices. We demonstrate that directors more closely affiliated with the CEO are more likely to reduce their support for the CEO following financial misconduct, increasing the likelihood of CEO replacement. Enactment of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act similarly alters governance dynamics by creating a greater expectation for sound corporate governance. We demonstrate our findings in U.S. public firms that restated their financial earnings during a 12‐year period before and after the passage of Sarbanes‐Oxley. Managerial summary: Given past concerns about lack of oversight by boards of directors leading to firm financial misconduct, we examine how the relationship between directors and CEOs may be altered in the face of such misconduct. We argue that directors most closely tied to the CEO (inside board members and board members appointed by the CEO), typically the most supportive of the CEO, may become most concerned about their own reputation following financial misconduct. We find that CEOs receive less support from these directors, a finding in contrast to past studies demonstrating that such board members tend to shield CEOs following poor performance. These findings are accentuated following the passage of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act, which places greater responsibility on the CEO for the accuracy of financial reports. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Is there a “Dark Side” to Monitoring? Board and Shareholder Monitoring Effects on M&A Performance Extremeness

Research summary: W e investigate the effects of monitoring by boards of directors and institutional shareholders on merger and acquisition (M&A ) performance extremeness using a sample of M&A deals from 1997 to 2006. Both governance research and legal reforms generally have espoused a “raise all boats” view of monitoring. We instead investigate whether monitoring may serve as a double‐edged sword that limits CEO discretion to undertake both value‐destroying M&A deals and value‐creating ones. Our findings indicate that the relationship between monitoring and M&A performance is more complex than previously believed. Rather than “raising all boats” in a shift towards better M&A outcomes, monitoring instead is associated with lower M&A losses, but also with lower M&A gains . Managerial summary: M ergers and acquisitions (M&A s) are a quintessential corporate activity. There were $3.8 trillion worth of M&A deals in 2015, despite scholars and practitioners reporting that M&A s often perform poorly. We question the widespread belief that more vigilant monitoring by boards of directors and large shareholders will raise M&A performance, overall. Put differently, does monitoring constrain CEO s' discretion to pursue bad deals, while simultaneously encouraging them to pursue good ones? We find that monitoring limits both large M&A losses and large M&A gains. Contrary to widely held beliefs, our results indicate that constraining executives' ability to pursue value‐destroying M&A deals does not simultaneously encourage or enable CEO s to pursue value‐creating deals . Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Home Alone: The Effects of Lone‐Insider Boards on CEO Pay,Financial Misconduct,and Firm Performance

Research summary: Corporate scandals of the previous decade have heightened attention on board independence. Indeed, boards at many large firms are now so independent that the CEO is “home alone” as the lone inside member. We build upon “pro‐insider” research within agency theory to explain how the growing trend toward lone‐insider boards affects key outcomes and how external governance forces constrain their impact. We find evidence among S&P 1500 firms that having a lone‐insider board is associated with (a) excess CEO pay and a larger CEO‐top management team pay gap, (b) increased likelihood of financial misconduct, and (c) decreased firm performance, but that stock analysts and institutional investors reduce these negative effects. The findings raise important questions about the efficacy of leaving the CEO “home alone.” Managerial summary: Following concerns that insider‐dominated boards failed to protect shareholders, there has been a push for greater board independence. This push has been so successful that the CEO is now the only insider on the boards of more than half of S&P 1500 firms. We examine whether lone‐insider boards do in fact offer strong governance or whether they enable CEOs to benefit personally. We find that lone‐insider boards pay CEOs excessively, pay CEOs a disproportionately large amount relative to other top managers, have more instances of financial misconduct, and have lower performance than boards with more than one insider. Thus, it appears that lone‐insider boards do not function as intended and firms should reconsider whether the push towards lone‐insider boards is actually in shareholders' best interests. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

BS in the boardroom: Benevolent sexism and board chair orientations

Research Summary: Though research has focused on the ascent and acceptance of female CEOs, the post‐promotion circumstances female CEOs face remain unclear. In this study, we focus on a critical post‐promotion circumstance: the board chair–CEO relationship. Drawing on the gender stereotype literature, agency theory, and stewardship theory, we posit that firms appointing a female CEO are more likely to adopt a collaboration board chair orientation and less likely to adopt a control orientation. We further predict this effect is attenuated by female board representation. Using a sample of new S&P 1500 CEOs, we find support for our predictions regarding the collaboration orientation but not the control orientation. This research provides some evidence of benevolent sexism in the boardroom, with female directors acting as a countervailing influence. Managerial Summary: Whereas the notion that females encounter a glass ceiling on their path toward CEO is well documented, the conditions female CEOs encounter after promotion are less understood. The relationship between the board chair and the CEO is one important post‐promotion condition. Board chairs can focus on monitoring and/or working together with the CEO. We suggest board chairs are more likely to work in close collaboration with female CEOs than with male CEOs. We attribute this to benevolent sexism, which explains that board chairs are more likely to collaborate with female CEOs because they view females as more conducive to, and in need of, this type of relationship. We also suggest this benevolent sexism is less prevalent when there are more females on the board.     

Stakeholder management as a predictor of CEO compensation: main effects and interactions with financial performance

We test the effects of stakeholder management on CEOs' salaries, bonuses, stock options, and total compensation. We also examine the extent to which the interaction of stakeholder management and financial performance determines compensation. Using a longitudinal database of 406 Fortune 1000 firms, our results suggest that stakeholder management is relevant to boards of directors when setting CEO compensation. Specifically, we found a significant, negative main effect of stakeholder management on CEO salaries. Further, we found that stakeholder management typically reduces the rewards CEOs may get for increasing levels of financial performance. In tandem, these results indicate that CEOs may jeopardize their personal wealth by pursuing stakeholder‐related initiatives. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Why do some outside successions fare better than others? The role of outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity

Research summary: We develop a theory to explain why new outside CEOs can better manage their relationship with the board if they previously served on boards that were more diverse than the focal board. We predict that a new outside CEO's prior experience with more diverse boards not only reduces the likelihood of post‐succession CEO turnover and director turnover, but also improves firm performance. Results from an analysis of 188 outside CEOs in a sample of Fortune 500 companies provide support for our theory. This study contributes to upper echelon theory and research by identifying outside CEOs' prior experience with board diversity as an important aspect of their background that influences a range of major organizational outcomes, including CEO turnover, director turnover, and firm performance. Managerial summary: It is challenging to be a new CEO who comes from outside of the organization. Our study examines why some new outside CEOs fare better than others. We suggest that a positive relationship with the board of directors is a key factor in a new outside CEO's success. A new outside CEO can better manage the relationship with the board if he or she has prior experience working with other demographically diverse boards. In contrast, when the focal board is more diverse than the other boards on which the new CEO previously served, the new CEO tends to struggle in managing his or her relationship with the board, experiencing a higher likelihood of turnover and delivering worse financial performance. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How CEOs protect themselves against dismissal: A social status perspective

In this study, we address the question of why some CEOs stay in office during a performance downturn while others don't. Taking a social status perspective, we argue that an individual's board network embeddedness—as reflected in the number of outside directorships—plays an important role in dismissal decisions. We predict that a high status of the CEO relative to the chairman of the board protects an underperforming CEO against dismissal, while the relative salience of board network outsiders can counter this effect. Using longitudinal data of large German corporations, we find support for our predictions. Ltd. Copyright © 2015 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Board social capital and excess CEO returns

Excess CEO returns refer to CEO financial returns in excess of shareholder returns. How do boards rein in excess CEO returns? Introducing a social capital view of board monitoring, we suggest that boards face two competing normative pressures—corporate elite norms and monitoring norms. How boards conform to such normative pressures for controlling excess CEO returns is affected by their external and internal social capital. Further, we substantiate our arguments by showing that powerful CEOs and institutional investors may facilitate or constrain the normative pressures existing in the social network and alter the effects of board social capital on excess CEO returns. Data from a sample of U.S. corporations listed on the Standard and Poor's 1,500 index from 1999 to 2010 largely support our framework. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How does CEO tenure matter? The mediating role of firm‐employee and firm‐customer relationships

While the direct influence of CEO tenure on firm performance has been examined in the strategy literature, the underlying channels of influence have remained largely unexplored. This article draws upon the career seasons paradigm, learning perspectives, and marketing literature to examine whether firm‐employee and firm‐customer relationships are the pathways through which CEO tenure influences firm performance. Results from the analysis of a large data set reveal that: (1) CEO tenure has a positive and linear association with firm‐employee relationship strength but an inverted U‐shaped association with firm‐customer relationship strength; (2) industry uncertainty intensifies these associations; and (3) firm‐employee and firm‐customer relationship strength mediate the effects of CEO tenure on firm performance. These findings have implications for a more balanced and nuanced view of CEO tenure. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The differential effects of CEO narcissism and hubris on corporate social responsibility

Research Summary: While prior studies have predominantly shown that CEO narcissism and hubris exhibit similar effects on various strategic decisions and outcomes, this study aims to explore the mechanisms underlying how narcissistic versus hubristic CEOs affect their firms differently. Specifically, we investigate how peer influence moderates the CEO narcissism/hubris—corporate social responsibility (CSR). With a sample of S&P 1500 firms for 2003–2010, we find that the positive relationship between CEO narcissism and CSR is strengthened (weakened) when board‐interlocked peer firms invest less (more) intensively in CSR than a CEO's own firm; the negative relationship between CEO hubris and CSR is strengthened when peer firms are engaged in less CSR than a CEO's own firm. Managerial Summary: Some CEOs are more narcissistic while others may be more hubristic, but these two groups of CEOs hold different attitudes toward the extent to which their firms should engage in corporate social responsibility (CSR). Our findings with a large sample of U.S. publically listed firms suggest that narcissistic CEOs care more about CSR, but hubristic CEOs care less. Interestingly, when narcissistic CEOs observe their peer firms engaging in more or less CSR than their own firms, they tend to respond in an opposite manner; in contrast, hubristic CEOs will only engage in even less CSR when their peers also do not emphasize CSR. Our findings point to a fundamental difference between CEO narcissism and hubris in terms of how they affect firms' CSR decisions based on their social comparison with peer firms.     

The impact of earnings expectations on corporate downsizing

Research Summary: We propose that due to financial market pressures, managers are forward‐looking in their search and decision processes and focus on meeting performance targets set by the financial community. Using panel data on S&P 100 companies, we find that pressure felt by management to meet the analyst consensus earnings estimate influences the extent of corporate downsizing. Moreover, our results show that high levels of institutional investor stock ownership and CEO power attenuate managers’ sensitivity to financial market pressures, while high levels of analyst coverage increase their sensitivity. Managerial Summary: In this study we examine how financial market pressures influence managers’ downsizing decisions. We argue that investment analysts’ earnings estimates represent important performance targets to which managers aspire. If firms fail to meet analysts’ expectations, the stock price will suffer. This study shows that managers utilize corporate downsizing to address the potential shortfall between a firm's future performance and the analyst consensus earnings estimate. In addition, we find that managers’ concerns over meeting analysts’ earnings estimates are influenced by various contextual factors such as institutional investor stock ownership, CEO power, and high levels of analyst coverage.     

The role of CEO relative standing in acquisition behavior and CEO pay

In this study, we develop and test a theory of CEO relative pay standing. Specifically, we propose that CEOs with negative relative pay standing status (underpaid relative to comparison CEOs) will engage in acquisition activity, as a self‐interested means of attempting to realign their pay with that of their peers. We further propose that, when CEOs with negative relative pay standing acquire, they will tend to finance those acquisitions more heavily with stock than cash, to mitigate the risk associated with those deals. Finally, we argue that acquisition activity will partially mediate the influence of CEO negative relative pay standing on subsequent CEO compensation increases; however, that pay growth will come primarily in the form of long‐term incentive pay. Our results support our predictions. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Resource orchestration in practice: CEO emphasis on SHRM,commitment‐based HR systems,and firm performance

In order to be effective, managers at all levels of the firm must engage in resource management activities, and these efforts are synchronized and orchestrated by top management. Using a specific type of strategic resource, commitment‐based human resource systems, we examine the effect of CEO resource orchestration in a multi‐industry sample of 190 Korean firms. Our results demonstrate that CEO emphasis on strategic HRM is a significant antecedent to commitment‐based HR systems. Furthermore, our results also suggest that CEO emphasis on strategic HRM has its primary effects on firm performance through commitment‐based HR systems. This finding underscores the importance of middle managers in operationalizing top management's strategic emphasis, lending empirical support to a fundamental tenet of resource orchestration arguments. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Does good governance prevent bad strategy? A study of corporate governance,financial diversification,and value creation by French corporations, 2000–2006

Building on and extending prior research, we propose a comprehensive framework which posits that free cash flow moderates the impact of corporate governance on financial diversification. We argue that because it increases CEO perceived risk, alignment devices increase rather than decrease financial diversification. In a sample of 59 publicly traded French corporations during 2000–2006, we show that financial diversification negatively impacts shareholder return and firm value. We obtain support for several of our hypotheses: at high levels of free cash flow, CEO variable compensation increases financial diversification, whereas chairman/CEO non‐duality reduces it. In contrast, independent directors increase financial diversification at low values of free cash flow (although weakly). We also find that ownership concentration only reduces financial diversification when free cash flow is low.Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Differences in managerial discretion across countries: how nation‐level institutions affect the degree to which ceos matter

The concept of managerial discretion provides a theoretical fulcrum for resolving the debate about whether chief executive officers (CEOs) have much influence over company outcomes. In this paper, we operationalize and further develop the construct of managerial discretion at the national level. In an empirical examination of 15 countries, we find that certain informal and formal national institutions—individualism, tolerance of uncertainty, cultural looseness, dispersed firm ownership, a common‐law legal origin, and employer flexibility—are associated with the degree of managerial discretion available to CEOs of public firms in a country. In turn, we show that country‐level managerial discretion is associated with how much impact CEOs have on the performance of their firms. We also find that discretion mediates the relationship between national institutions and CEO effects on firm performance. Finally, we discuss two inductively derived institutional themes: autonomy orientation and risk orientation. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.