从中小企业集群化发展看融资困难的解决思路

中小企业是市场中最具活力和发展潜力的群体,但由于自身规模和信用保障能力有限,中小企业在发展过程中的融资瓶颈难以打破。本文对中小企业集群融资服务、网络融资平台和中小企业集合票据这三类融资模式进行比较分析,归纳了三者的异同点和适用范围,在此基础上,通过对广州地区皮革、服装、布匹和化妆品四个典型中小企业集群的分析,将中小企业集群分为"发展-多元型"、"发展-传统型"、"追随-多元型"、"追随-传统型"四类,并将其与前面分析的三类融资模式相匹配,提出了不同类型中小企业集群所适合的融资模式。     

Financing China’s unprecedented infrastructure boom: the evolution of capital structure from 1978 to 2015

ABSTRACT

The authors examine the sources of the funds that have financed China’s infrastructure development since 1978. They define the five periods in which this development has taken place in terms of predominant financing: fiscal funds, build-operate-transfer (BOT), treasury bonds, the land financing, and local bonds. The system is characterized by a heavy reliance on debt financing and one-off revenues. These approaches have raised widespread concerns about fiscal sustainability in China. The authors explain why a shift towards the more conventional approach of fiscal funds is necessary.     

债务融资行为对亏损上市公司财务价值的驱动研究

文章研究了债务融资行为的三种特征(债务融资期限、债务融资方式和债务融资规模)对亏损上市公司财务价值的驱动路径和驱动机理。实证结果表明,债务融资期限结构对亏损上市公司的财务价值同时存在侵害和治理两种效应,并且随着流动负债比例的增加,亏损上市公司的财务价值表现出先升后降的趋势;从债务融资方式来看,银行借款的债务融资方式对亏损上市公司的财务价值也同时存在侵害效应和治理效应,但利用商业信用和临时性占用款进行债务融资的方式对亏损上市公司财务价值产生明显的反向驱动效应;债务融资规模对亏损上市公司的财务价值也同时存在正向和反向两种驱动效应,同样,随着负债比率的增加,亏损上市公司的财务价值也表现出先升后降的趋势。     

民营控制、政治关系与企业融资约束——基于中国民营上市公司的经验证据

融资难是制约民营企业发展的关键因素,而这种金融困境从根本上讲是一种信用困境。本文构建的理论模型论证了民营企业的政治关系对其融资中的作用,并以中国民营上市公司2002～2005年的经验数据为样本,实证检验了民营企业的政治关系对减轻融资约束的作用。研究发现,相对于没有参与政治的民营企业来说,有政治关系的民营企业其外部融资时所受的融资约束更少;同时,越在金融发展水平低的地区,民营企业的政治关系对其融资的帮助越明显。     

产权、所有权安排与融资偏好

成熟市场的企业,由于技术和信息不对称方面的原因,更偏好于债权融资,而不是股权融资.在中国资本市场存在严重信息不对称的情况下,我国企业仍十分偏好于股权融资.这种选择基本上是经营者基于保持控制权的自利性考虑.其根源在于国有产权主体的抽象化、由此导致的失控的所有权安排、股权投资主体控制权的丧失以及债权投资主体拥有的状态依存控制权的威慑.     

THE ESTIMATED IMPACT OF RESIDUAL MARKET ASSESSMENTS ON FLORIDA PROPERTY INSURERS

Abstract: The authors examine the risk financing approach of the Florida state-sponsored property insurance programs. The programs rely heavily on post-disaster assessments on insurers to meet expected obligations. The authors evaluate the impact of the assessments and discuss whether this approach represents a realistic solution to the "cat problem."     

The financing decisions of innovative firms

The paper examines the relation between forms of financing and the level of expenditure on research and development (R&D). The paper shows that the probability of issuing new equity rises monotonically with the level of expenditure on R&D, whilst the use of debt finance follows an inverted U curve, rising and then falling as R&D expenditure rises. The analysis confirms ‘control rights’ theories of financing, in which firms follow an established hierarchy of preferences for modes of financing, with debt preferred to equity since it involves less loss of control rights. The mode of financing is linked to characteristic types of innovation, with debt financing associated with incremental innovation and equity funding with R&D intensive innovation, as in pharmaceuticals. The paper concludes by suggesting a linkage between modes of financing, types of innovation and business systems, with the UK's innovation pattern linked to market financing contrasting with the relationship financing of bank oriented systems such as Germany.     

Long-term care financing: options for the future

The aging of the baby boomers will have an enormous impact on the future of long-term care costs. This article projects the magnitude of that impact, discusses sources of financing, and considers the cost and feasibility of three options for financing future long-term care services. The authors investigate the alternatives of increasing personal savings, raising payroll taxes and expanding employer-sponsored private long-term care insurance coverage, respectively.     

Dynamic Models of Investment Distortions

This paper studies the interaction between corporate financing decisions and investment decisions in a dynamic framework. When the production decision involves an expansion option, the firm trades off tax benefits of debt against two costs of debt financing, namely the investment distortion related to exercise of the expansion option and the loss of a valuable expansion opportunity if the firm defaults. The optimal capital structure is all equity for firms with more value in growth options (or intangible assets) and tends to involve debt financing for firms with more value in tangible assets. JEL Classification: D81, G13, G31, G32     

Information asymmetry,the cost of debt,and credit events: Evidence from quasi-random analyst disappearances

We hypothesize that greater information asymmetry causes greater losses to debtholders. To test this, we identify exogenous increases in information asymmetry using the loss of an analyst that results from broker closures and broker mergers. We find that the loss of an analyst causes the cost of debt to increase by 25 basis points for treatment firms compared to control firms, and the rate of credit events (e.g., defaults) is roughly 100–150% higher. These results are driven by firms that are more sensitive to changes in information (e.g., less analyst coverage). The evidence is broadly consistent with both financing and monitoring channels, although only a financing channel explains the impact of the loss of an analyst on firms' cost of debt.     

Private Equity: Boom and Bust?

The private equity or leveraged buyout (LBO) market in Europe and the U.S. has grown enormously over the last two decades, from $7.5 billion in 1991 to $500 billion in 2006. Much of the financing of recent transactions has come in the form of syndicated debt, which is dispersed after origination to many non‐bank financial institutions. This financing practice has two important possible consequences: First, bankers' incentives to engage in effective ex‐ante screening and ex‐post monitoring of deals have been weakened, which may have led to excessive lending while encouraging buyers to overpay. Consistent with this possibility, the authors provide new evidence that some recent transactions have occurred at very low EBITDA‐to‐capital ratios, financed with high levels of debt that recall those of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Second, there is a scarcity of information about the identity of the ultimate holders of the LBO debt; and as a consequence of the resulting uncertainty, a few defaults of major LBO deals could cause a drying up of new funding for financial institutions. The end result could be that the veil covering the repackaging of LBO debt converts a small shock to the LBO sector into a liquidity crisis for its financiers. Such liquidity problems could in turn affect not the financing and re‐financing of just LBO deals, but other as set classes as well, including lending by banks to public firms. The authors offer a number of suggestions for increasing the transparency of this market.     

Informational Black Holes in Financial Markets

We show that information aggregation in primary financial markets fails precisely when investors hold socially useful information for screening projects. Being wary of the Winner's Curse, less optimistic investors refrain from making financing offers, since their offers would be accepted only when a project is unviable. Their information is therefore lost. The Winner's Curse and associated information loss grow with the number of informed market participants, so that larger markets can lead to worse financing decisions and higher cost of capital for firms seeking financing. Precommitment to ration fundraising allocations, collusive club bidding, and shorting markets can mitigate the inefficiency.     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: The Evidence Revisited

Since the formulation of the M&M propositions almost 50 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that maximizes shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are largely "irrelevant" in the sense that they have no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of greater debt against the costs of financial distress. Yet another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but simply follow a financial "pecking order" in which retained earnings are preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required.
In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy (and other "contracting") costs, and information costs all appear to play an important role in corporate financing decisions. While much of the evidence is consistent with the argument that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that firms are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (the levels of debt and equity in relation to the target) and flows (or which security to issue at a particular time).     

The Wealth Effects of Bank Financing Announcements in Highly Leveraged Transactions

We analyze the effect of financing announcements of highly leveraged transactions (HLTs) on the stock prices of the banks that lead HLT-lending syndicates. For our sample of 41 HLTs, we document that the first HLT and bank financing announcements result in positive wealth effects for the lending banks. We also find that these wealth effects are lower in 1985, for smaller HLTs, and for banks with a high loan loss reserve to total asset ratio. Finally, we report that Leveraged Buyout (LBO) targets gain about 2 percent, whereas leveraged recap targets lose about 2 percent, when the first bank financing agreement is announced.     

Strategic Financial Management: Lessons from Seasoned Equity Offerings

Each of today's three dominant academic theories of capital structure has trouble explaining the financing behavior of companies that have seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). In conflict with the tradeoff theory, the authors’ recent studies of some 7,000 SEOs by U.S. industrial companies over the period 1970‐2017 notes that the vast majority of them—on the order of 80%—had the effect of moving the companies away from, rather than toward, their target leverage ratios. Inconsistent with the pecking‐order theory, SEO issuers have tended to be financially healthy companies with low leverage and considerable unused debt capacity. And at odds with the market‐timing theory, SEOs appear to be driven more by the capital requirements associated with large investment projects than by favorable market conditions. The authors’ findings also show that, in the years following their stock offerings, the SEO companies tend to issue one or more debt offerings, which have the effect of raising their leverage back toward their targets. Whereas each of the three theories assumes some degree of shortsightedness among financial managers, the authors’ findings suggest that long‐run‐value‐maximizing CFOs manage their capital structures strategically as opposed to opportunistically. They consider the company's current leverage in relation to its longer‐run target, its investment opportunities and long‐term capital requirements, and the costs and benefits of alternative sequences of financing transactions. This framework, which the authors call strategic financial management, aims to provide if not a unifying, then a more integrated, explanation—one that draws on each of the three main theories to provide a more convincing account of the financing and leverage decisions of SEO issuers.     

An Entrepreneur's Guide to Understanding the Cost of Venture Capital

Entrepreneurs who deal with a venture capital firm (VC) for the first time often find themselves unprepared for the experience. The deal structure language used to describe financing terms, and the methods used to value the investment, are unique to the VC world. The authors have two objectives in preparing this entrepreneur's guide to venture capital finance: First, they explain why VCs require rates of return that are considerably higher—even after adjusting for difference in risk—than the returns required by the shareholders of established companies. Their explanation focuses on differences of opinion between overly optimistic entrepreneurs and less sanguine VCs. Second, the authors discuss the difficulty faced by entrepreneurs when trying to understand the actual cost of VC financing (including the dilution of value that occurs when entrepreneurs fail to meet targets or milestones). The problem can be traced to deal structure terms that typically call for the VC to receive preferential treatment in the event the entrepreneur's scenario does not turn out to be accurate. More specifically, entrepreneurs often grant VCs control rights as well as liquidation rights that, when things go wrong, dramatically increase the effective cost to entrepreneurs of venture financing.     

Institutional quality,economic freedom and stock market volatility in the MENA region

How can a government help secure low-cost equity financing? This study offers an answer that a government can secure sustainable economic progress when policies of economic freedom are well institutionalized in a way that results in low equity volatility, thus low-cost equity financing. This study examines the quantitative and empirical associations between elements of Economic Freedom Index (being treated in this study as a proxy for institutional quality) and stock market volatility. The authors classify the institutional quality into three levels: high, medium and low. The data cover the years 1996–2014 for the MENA countries. The statistical tests include fixed and random effects, linearity versus non-linearity. The results show that stock market volatility can be mitigated and reduced when economic freedom is associated with an effective enforcement of law and efficient regulations. Nevertheless, the high freedom from corruption results in active equity trading which is associated with high volatility that leads in turn to high cost of equity financing. The study contributes to the literature in terms of offering practical insights on the pillars of economic freedom that policymakers must improve in order to mitigate or reduce equity volatility, therefore cost of equity financing.     

The Capital Structure Puzzle: Another Look at the Evidence

Since the formulation of the Miller and Modigliani propositions over 60 years ago, financial economists have been debating whether there is such a thing as an optimal capital structure—a proportion of debt to equity that can be expected to maximize long‐run shareholder value. Some finance scholars have followed M&M in arguing that both capital structure and dividend policy are irrelevant in the sense of having no significant, predictable effects on corporate market values. Another school of thought holds that corporate financing choices reflect an attempt by corporate managers to balance the tax shields and disciplinary benefits of more debt against the costs of financial distress. Still another theory says that companies do not have capital structure targets, but instead follow a financial pecking order in which retained earnings are generally preferred to outside financing, and debt is preferred to equity when outside funding is required. In reviewing the evidence that has accumulated since M&M, the authors argue that taxes, bankruptcy and other contracting costs, and information costs all appear to play important roles in corporate financing decisions. While much, if not most, of the evidence is consistent with the idea that companies set target leverage ratios, there is also considerable support for the pecking order theory's contention that managements are willing to deviate widely from their targets for long periods of time. According to the authors, the key to reconciling the different theories—and thus to solving the capital structure puzzle—lies in achieving a better understanding of the relation between corporate financing stocks (that is, total amounts of debt and equity) and flows (which security to issue at a particular time). Even when companies have leverage targets, it can make sense to deviate from those targets depending on the costs associated with moving back toward the target. And as the authors argue in closing, a complete theory of capital structure must take account of these adjustment costs and how they affect expected deviations from the targets.     

Are Banks Still Special? New Evidence on Their Role in the Corporate Capital‐Raising Process

Bankers appear to play a special role in providing commitment-based financing to corporations. This type of lending is important not only for small firms that lack access to public debt markets but for large and medium-size companies as well. For such companies, commitment-based financing provides access to debt capital that becomes valuable when the firm has an immediate need for funding but interest rates in public debt markets are prohibitively high, or the firm is undervalued by the market. A good example of this was provided by the Asian crisis in the last quarter of 1998, when $10 billion of commercial paper was retired and $20 billion of net new commercial loans were booked. The authors also suggest that the fact that commitment-based financing is used by larger companies when they believe themselves to be undervalued in the market is probably the best explanation of why announcements of these types of loans elicit a positive stock price reaction.     

小额贷款公司持续发展面临的制度约束及破解

本文通过对SH小额贷款公司的分析,认为其发展面临困境的根源在于制度和资金来源约束,使其失去比较优势。出路在于适度提高其杠杆比例,使其更好服务于小微企业和个体工商户。