创业者与风险投资者之间的合约设计

本文根据风险资本的性质和不完全合约理论,针对高技术企业融资过程中创业者和风险投资者之间的合约在融资期限、融资轮次、联合投资、监控力度、证券设计等方面的特征进行了论证和分析.     

订单农业契约风险的防范机制研究——以三鹿婴幼儿奶粉事件为例

订单农业的契约风险形成既有事前的逆向选择原因,也有事中的逆向选择和非合作博弈取向原因.从已经发生的契约风险案例来看,契约主体在履约中的逆向选择行为给企业和农户及第三方(消费者)带来伤害往往更大更深.因此,有必要创新订单农业运行机制,建立契约风险"第三者责任险"制度和完善法律保障机制等来增强订单农业契约的稳定性,降低契约风险,促进订单农业良性发展.     

现阶段我国农业生产是否具有企业合约特征分析

我国现阶段的农业生产合约同样具有市场中的企业合约特征,合约中也包含对人力资本的利用,但两者的区别在于合约内具有不同的人力资本循环激励约束结构,企业合约的激励约束结构是“……企业所有者→人力资本所有者→企业所有者……”,而农业生产合约的激励约束结构为“……农户人力资本→土地产权强度→农户人力资本……”,在上述分析框架基础之上,利用相关统计资料进行了实证检验。     

"公司+农户"契约设计及价格形成机制

由于信息不对称、组织分散、资金技术劣势和政府干预偏向等原因,农户在与公司的谈判中处于弱势地位,其利益受到严重损害。这直接导致了"公司 农户"契约关系的不稳定性。决定合同价格的最主要因素是农户参与项目的机会成本及其组织化程度。因此,建议一方面应不断促进市场的发育和完善,形成龙头公司之间的良性竞争机制,改变"龙头"垄断的局面;另一方面应积极建立各类农业经济合作组织,提高农户谈判能力,改变农户"一家一户"面对公司的状况,真正提高农户进入市场的组织化程度。     

风险态度、农户信贷与信贷配给——基于张家港市问卷调查的分析

笔者利用张家港市农户的调查数据,运用Probit和Logit模型实证风险态度与信贷配给之间的关系。研究表明,农户风险态度与信贷配给呈显著的正向关系,农户的风险规避意识越强产生的需求型信贷配给越强烈。农户的风险态度决定了风险成本与风险溢金,进而影响了信贷行为及其信贷配给程度。缓解农户信贷配给应从政府、金融机构和农户三方面着手。     

农业经济组织形式的选择和政府政策

农产品进入市场的途径有两条:一是单个农户或农民进入市场;二是农户以组织的形式进入市场.单个农户进入市场受到诸多因素的限制,要承担较大的市场风险.农业生产组织分为两类:一类为他组织形式;另一类为自组织形式.后者是农户自身为治理的主体、"利益共享、风险共担"的生产组织.自组织形式将是我国农业经济组织今后发展的主导方向.这是因为,自组织在诸多方面都存在着明显的优势.当然,组织本身也存在不可忽视与小农经营方式有关的缺陷,这要求农户+农户的自组织模式的发展需要政府作为外部的支持力量存在,这有别于此前农业经济组织的政府干预模式.     

农地经营权主体差异与农地抵押方式选择——基于市场与组织合约的分类视角

本文立足市场与组织合约的分类视角,通过选取以农户为抵押主体的同心与平罗、以规模经营主体为抵押主体的明溪与枣庄这两对典型案例的对比,探讨农地经营权主体与农地抵押合约方式选择之间的联系,结果表明:在农地抵押中存在直接与间接定价的合约方式差异,且农户和规模经营主体这两类主体倾向于选择不同的抵押合约;当农户作为抵押主体时,采用组织合约的间接方式优于选择市场合约的直接方式;而当规模经营主体作为抵押主体时,以市场合约的直接抵押方式要优于采用组织合约的间接抵押方式。就此,提出考虑抵押主体差异、鼓励具有信息收集与定价功能的主体参与抵押进程、推进"三权分置"改革和活化农地经营权等政策建议。     

推进农业产业化全流程风险管控研究

通过保险对农业产业化龙头企业在农产品生产、加工、储存、流通、贸易等全过程可能发生的风险,提供全方位、全过程、全封闭的风险保险保障,带动银行融资,激活金融支持链条,提高涉农企业和农户的抗风险能力和盈利能力,做大做强农业产业化龙头企业,逐步实现农业经营模式由分散型的个体农户向规模型的产业化经营转变。     

农业产业化风险形成机理分析——从利益相关者角度

农业产业化组织中的利益主体根据自身利益最大化原则做出最优决策,使本身就面临自然风险和市场风险的组织更增加了契约风险和道德风险.文章以三鹿事件为例,从企业与农户、消费者以及政府相关部门的相互行为关系上分析了农业产业化风险形成的机理,并提出要从制度、职能归位等方面来规避风险的建议.     

农户采用有风险技术的意愿及影响因素研究

利用四川省509个农户的调查数据,运用多元Logit模型对农户采用有风险技术的意愿及其影响因素进行实证分析。研究表明:农户采用有风险技术的意愿受多种因素影响:农户的受教育程度、人均家庭纯收入、农产品商品率与农户采用有风险技术呈正相关关系;从事农业生产的年限与农户采用有风险技术呈负相关关系;农业技术培训随具体情况的不同与农户采用有风险技术呈双向相关关系。     

农产品营销合作中影响农户合同形式选择的因素分析——基于江西省486户农户的实证

本文以江西省486农户为例,分析了农产品营销合作中农户合同形式选择的影响因素,实证结果表明,农户家庭类型、户主文化程度、户主风险态度、农产品生产集中度、专用设施投入、经营规模、农产品价格波动、销售难度、距离市场远近、政府支持及农产品类型等多种因素对农户合同形式选择有不同程度和不同方向的影响。在本研究基础上,本文提出了相关政策建议。     

Extended Games Played by Managerial Firms

The issue of timing is addressed in a game between managerial firms. The choice over timing can be taken either by managers or by entrepreneurs. It is shown that (i) delegation drastically modifies the owners' preferences concerning the distribution of roles, as compared with the setting where firms act as pure profit-maximizers; and (ii) the ability of moving first in the market game entails that, at least observationally, the owner of the leading firm prefers not to delegate. I show that the choice of the timing by managers entails the same profit that owners would achieve by specifying the timing in the delegation contract.
JEL Classification Numbers: D43, L13.     

最优农业契约与中国农业产业化模式

本文在一个统一的关系契约分析框架下,比较了单期和多期条件下"农户+市场"、"龙头企业+农户"和"龙头企业+农场"三种主要的农业产业化模式及其衍生模式的生产效率,并分析了产权、声誉、抵押和风险态度对最优农业契约的影响。我们的分析表明,在单期条件下,由于契约不完全和敲竹杠效应,所有模式都无法实现最优效率;在多期条件下,如果贴现率足够低,"龙头企业+农户"和"龙头企业+农场"这两种模式都可以实现最优效率;如果市场价格波动比较大,则"龙头企业+农场"模式优于"龙头企业+农户"模式。我们还分析了农户的转售成本对契约效率的影响,并提供了支持本文结论的典型案例。     

Household internal and external electricity contract switching in EU countries

Using a representative sample of more than 13,000 households from eight countries in the European Union (EU), this article empirically studies the factors related to household electricity contract switching by distinguishing between internal switchers (households that switched contracts but stayed with the same supplier) from external switchers (households that switched to a new supplier). The econometric analysis includes individual preferences, household structural factors and socio-demographic characteristics, as well as electricity market characteristics. The study explicitly explores the role of risk and time preferences on switching behaviours, with risk and time preferences elicited through incentivized experiments as well as self-assessment scales. The main results suggest that internal and external switching are not related to the same factors, that risk and time preferences affect switching behaviours, and that renters are less likely to switch than homeowners; further, electricity market characteristics are found to affect household electricity contract switching.     

A Model of Creative Destruction with Undiversifiable Risk and Optimising Households

This paper studies optimal household behaviour in a model of creative destruction. The saving technology is characterised by stochastic returns that follow a Poisson process. It is shown that equilibrium conditions with optimising households differ substantially from equilibrium conditions where investment in R&D is determined by firms. Three out of four market failures disappear and a new market failure resulting from a complementarity in financing R&D is identified. Studying the social optimum shows that it contains as the special case of risk neutrality the social optimum derived in the literature.     

Financial Development, Financing Choice and Economic Growth

In an overlapping generations economy, households (lenders) fund risky investment projects of firms (borrowers) by drawing up loan contracts on the basis of asymmetric information. An optimal contract entails either the issue of only debt or the issue of both debt and equity according to whether a household faces a single or double enforcement problem as a result of its own decision about whether or not to undertake costly information acquisition. The equilibrium choice of contract depends on the state of the economy which, in turn, depends on the contracting regime. Based on this analysis, the paper provides a theory of the joint determination of real and financial development, with the ability to explain both the endogenous emergence of stock markets and the complementarity between debt finance and equity finance.     

Alcohol consumption in the UK, 1955–85: a system-wide analysis

As a consequence of economic reforms in China, firms have ben affected by three essential changes. First, instead of surrendering all profits to the Government, firms now pay tax on their profits according to a contract between them and the Government and retain the balance as their own controllable surplus. Second, the central economic plan determines only part of firms' production. After fulfilling the command plan, firms are allowed to adjust their production scale by the availability of inputs and the profitability of production. Third, most consumer and investment goods have two prices, a plan price and a market price. As most of the plan prices are always lower than the market prices, the latter play a basic role in determining firms' profits. After a decade of economic reforms, the important question is: can Chinese state enterprises perform like market entities? The analysis shows that Chinese firms in transition domimic the production behaviour of market-based, efficiency-oriented firms.     

Inventories and Risk in African Manufacturing

Using a panel data set for Zimbabwe which includes firm-specific measures of contractual risk, we show that contractual risk has a major effect on the holding input stocks and, to a lesser extent, the constitution of cash reserves. This is consistent with inventories being a hedge against stockout risk. By contrast, firms facing more inter-annual market risk hold less inventories. This suggests that African manufacturers prefer adapting to long-term market fluctuations as they materialise rather than building up inventories. This interpretation is consistent with the finding that high market risk firms also have a low capacity utilisation rate.     

关系型契约特殊类别:超市场契约

从契约理论的角度看,企业网络或企业与市场间中间状态,可以由“超市场契约”来描述,它是关系型契约的一个特殊类别,是拥有关键性资源的企业以管理输出和行使指挥权方式与其他相关企业的交易。私人可履约资本、合作的潜在丰厚收益和违约的机会成本,以及威廉姆森式的安全保证条款是促使企业间超市场契约可自我实施的条件。     

On contract duration of royalty licensing contracts

This paper explores how the choice of royalties and contract duration can be a device to mitigate opportunistic behavior in the presence of asymmetric information. It presents a model where an upstream patent holder with no production capabilities licenses a product innovation, by means of royalty-only contracts, to several downstream firms that produce and market the new product. In a two-period signaling model, the profitability of short-term and long-term contracts is compared, given that the licensees’ costs may be inferred by observation of their output levels. For a sufficiently large difference in production costs, the patentee introduces a series of short-term contracts, rather than a long-term contract for the entire expected lifetime of the innovation. In such a sequence of contracts, both high- and low-cost firms pay the same royalty rate (which is not higher than that of long-term contracts) and reveal their costs in the first licensing period. Thereafter, royalties are smaller (than in the first period) for high-cost firms but larger for low-cost producers so as to increase expected total output and licensing income. Overall, royalties are not time-decreasing, in expected terms, as information evolves from incomplete to complete. This strategy is typically welfare-improving.