Pampered Bureaucracy,Political Stability and Trade Integration

This paper examines the effect of trade integration and comparative advantage on one of a country's institutions, which in turn influences its economic efficiency. The environment we explore is one in which a country's lower classes may revolt and appropriate wealth owned by a ruling elite. The elite can avert revolution by incentivizing a potentially productive middle class to sink their human capital into a relatively unproductive bureaucracy. Thus the bureaucracy serves as an institution through which the elite can credibly commit to make transfers to the rest of society, but in the process this reduces economic efficiency. Trade integration alters the relative value of the elite's wealth. This alters the lower classes’ incentive to revolt on the one hand and the elite's incentive to subsidize participation in the inefficient bureaucracy on the other. Therefore, the interaction between a country's comparative advantage and an inefficient economic institution determines whether trade integration increases or reduces economic efficiency. The econometric findings support the model's main prediction.     

Informal sector: The credit market channel

We build a model of firms' choice between formality and informality. Complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods, enforcement of property rights and contracts, that make the participation in the formal credit market possible. In a moral hazard framework with credit rationing, their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality, and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements. The model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality.     

Informal sector: The credit market channel

We build a model of firms' choice between formality and informality. Complying with costly registration procedures allows the firms to benefit from key public goods, enforcement of property rights and contracts, that make the participation in the formal credit market possible. In a moral hazard framework with credit rationing, their decision is shaped by the interaction between the cost of entry into formality, and the relative efficiency of formal versus informal credit mechanisms and their related institutional arrangements. The model is consistent with existing stylized facts on the determinants of informality.     

A theory of participatory democracy based on the real case of Porto Alegre

Participatory democracy is a process of collective decision making that combines elements from both direct and representative democracy: Citizens have the power to decide on policy proposals and politicians assume the role of policy implementation. The aim of this paper is to understand how participatory democracy operates, and to study its implications over the behavior of citizens and politicians and over the final policy outcomes. To this end, we explore a formal model inspired by the experience of Participatory Budgeting implemented in the Brazilian city of Porto Alegre, that builds on the model of meetings with costly participation by Osborne et al. [2000. Meetings with costly participation. American Economic Review 90, 927-943].     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

Costly Technology Adoption and Capital Accumulation

We develop a model of costly technology adoption where the cost is irrecoverable and fixed. Households must decide when to switch from an existing technology to a new, more productive technology. Using a recursive approach, we show that there is a unique threshold level of wealth above which households will adopt the new technology and below which they will not. This threshold is independent of preference parameters and depends only on technology parameters. Prior to adoption, households invest at increasing rates, but consumption growth is constant.     

Political Participation of Mobile Citizens and the Size of the Welfare State

This paper deals with the implications of personal mobilityfor political participation of citizens and for the resultingsize of the welfare state. We show that mobility of citizensmay influence the individual decision to participate in thepolitical process and thereby may change policy outcomes. Ifcitizens who prefer a larger public sector are relatively immobile,the size of the welfare state may increase with mobility. (JELD72, J61)     

ENDOGENOUS CONSUMER PARTICIPATION AND THE RECYCLING PROBLEM*

We endogenise the extent of consumer participation in the recycling process, and analyse its effect on the ‘recycling problem’. When recycling requires consumers to undertake costly sorting activities to separate scrap from household waste, they will participate only if the net reward from sorting is positive. Consumers' sorting cost is subject to a network effect arising due to social norms. With heterogeneous consumers differing in terms of their sorting cost, the entire output of the recyclable product may not be subsequently available as scrap to the recycling firms. This increases the virgin producer's monopoly power, and may also lead to multiple equilibria if the network effect of sorting is sufficiently large. The latter result suggests a role for the government in influencing equilibrium selection to improve social welfare. Depending on the fraction of consumers that participate in recycling, increased societal pressure on consumers to recycle may decrease consumer participation and increase the virgin producer's market power.     

On the timing of political regime changes in resource-dependent economies

We consider a resource-dependent economy initially ruled by the elite. The transition from the autocratic to a more democratic regime takes place only if the citizens decide to revolt against the elite. The occurrence of a revolution primarily depends on the autocratic regime vulnerability and the level of inequalities, both being driven by the elite׳s redistribution and repression policies. First, we show that when a political transition is inevitable, the elite choose the maximum rate of redistribution to lengthen their period in office. Second, we find that the duration of the autocratic regime is linked to resource abundance, and how it relates to the elite׳s policies. More resources lead to a shorter reign of a redistributive regime, which may not be the case of a repressive regime. Finally, we interpret the Arab spring sequence in light of our findings.     

Representation of constitutions under incomplete information

We model constitutions by effectivity functions. We assume that the constitution is common knowledge among the members of the society. However, the preferences of the citizens are private information. We investigate whether there exist decision schemes (i.e., functions that map profiles of (dichotomous) preferences on the set of outcomes to lotteries on the set of social states), with the following properties: (i) The distribution of power induced by the decision scheme is identical to the effectivity function under consideration; and (ii) the (incomplete information) game associated with the decision scheme has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. If the effectivity function is monotonic and superadditive, then we find a class of decision schemes with the foregoing properties.     

Rawlsian pricing of access to public facilities: A unidimensional illustration

We consider a setting where citizens using a public facility face an idiosyncratic private access cost and must also contribute to the costs of facility. We show that if the population is uniformly spread over the real line, the cost of a facility is independent of location and access costs are linear in distance, the Rawlsian access pricing is the unique cost sharing solution that satisfies the “core property” of secession-proofness. The latter amounts to the voluntary participation principle under which no group of citizens should be charged more than the cost incurred if it had acted on its own.     

Faculty participation in university governance and the effects on university performance

This paper examines the relationship between faculty participation in university decision-making and university performance. Using an aggregated measure of faculty participation, McCormick and Meiners [The Journal of Law and Economics 31 (1989) 423] find that increased faculty control in decision-making is associated with lower levels of institutional performance. Building on the existing university governance literature, this paper argues that the optimal level of faculty participation varies by decision type. Disaggregating the data by faculty participation into different decision types produces results that are consistent with this hypothesis. Increased faculty participation may be good or bad; the effects vary by the type of decisions in which faculty participate.     

迎接第三次工业革命的关键 在于发展模式的革命 ——我国光伏产业和机器人产业的案例研究与反思

按照演化经济学家佩蕾丝有关经济追赶的两种机会窗口理论，“第一种机会窗口”不可能存在追赶机会。但是，由于产品内分工和全球价值链的发展，“第一种机会窗口”在战略性新兴产业中也大量地出现了，那么，这是否有追赶成功的可能呢？本文通过对我国光伏产业和机器人产业的案例研究，认为我国光伏产业和机器人产业的发展模式无法承担起迎接第三次工业革命的历史重任，其根本原因就在于我国在战略性新兴产业上仍然试图通过“第一种机会窗口”即继续沿袭劳动力成本低廉的比较优势应对新工业革命。为了抓住第三次工业革命的“第二种机会窗口”，我国战略性新兴产业的发展模式亟须重大变革。     

The behavioral response to voluntary provision of an environmental public good: Evidence from residential electricity demand

This paper develops a theory of voluntary provision of a public good in which a household's decision to engage in a form of environmentally friendly behavior is based on the desire to offset another behavior that is environmentally harmful. The model generates predictions about (1) participation in a green-electricity program at the extensive and intensive margins, and (2) changes in electricity consumption in response to participation. We test the theory using billing data for participants and nonparticipants in a green-electricity program in Memphis, Tennessee. High-consumption households are more likely to participate, and they participate at higher levels. In terms of a behavioral response, households participating above the minimum threshold level do not change electricity consumption, but those participating at the minimum threshold increase electricity consumption 2.5 percent after enrolling in the program. The result is based on identification strategies that exploit before–after differences between participants and nonparticipants, and differences in the timing of enrollment among participants only. Despite the increase in electricity demand upon the purchase of green electricity for the households with a “buy-in” mentality, the net effect for the buy-in households is a reduction in pollution emissions, as the behavioral response is not large enough to offset the environmental benefit of the green-electricity purchase.     

Consumer search markets with costly revisits

This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes in consumer search markets taking the cost of going back to stores already searched explicitly into account. We show that the optimal sequential search rule under costly revisits is very different from the traditional reservation price rule in that it is non-stationary and not independent of previously sampled prices. We explore the implications of costly revisits on market equilibrium in two celebrated search models. In the Wolinsky model, some consumers search beyond the first firm. In this class of models, costly revisits do make a substantive difference and their impact can be of the same order of magnitude as the initial search cost. In the Stahl oligopoly search model where consumers do not search beyond the first firm, there remains a unique symmetric equilibrium that has firms use pricing strategies that are identical to the perfect recall case.     

The role of personality traits in pension decisions: findings and policy recommendations

Many countries need to stimulate pension participation and contribution to ensure their citizens are prepared adequately for retirement. Identifying at-risk groups with tendencies of not joining pension plans will help governments target strategies to improve pension awareness and participation. This study investigates the role of personality traits in pension decision making using data from the UK Household Longitudinal Study. Our results demonstrate that Extraversion significantly correlates with non-participation in private pensions, including both employer run and personal pensions. Individuals who are high in Conscientiousness are more likely to participate and pay more into personal pensions. Openness to experience is negatively correlated with saving via personal pensions. Agreeableness and Extraversion correlate inversely with the amount contributed to personal plans. This paper discusses our findings in detail and offers policy implications which may help promote pension participation and ease the problem of old age poverty.     

大学对政府生态决策的参与

大学参与政府生态决策具有平台优势和理念优势;可以通过提供政策建议、学术思想、宣传动员、效果评估、人才输送等途径参与政府的生态决策;对社会的进步和高校自身建设都有推动作用。伴随着发展方式的转型。政府决策的内容也将发生重要的变化,决策主体不仅仅单纯考虑本群体利益,而将延伸到自然与人类的共同利益。     

Repeated Experimentation to Learn About a Flow-Pollutant Threshold

We examine in discrete time the management of a flow pollutant that causes damage when it crosses a fixed but unknown threshold. The manager sequentially chooses a pollution level that allows learning about the threshold, thereby improving future decisions. If crossed, damage can be reversed at some cost. We analyze the conditions under which experimentation is optimal, and explore how experimentation depends on restoration costs, information about the threshold, and the discount rate. Our results suggest that the level of experimentation, defined as the difference between the optimal activity with and without learning, is non-monotonic in costs and decreasing in the discount rate. We identify two stopping boundaries for the experiment, depending on cost levels compared to the lower bound of the threshold’s interval. We show that when costs are high the stopping boundary under an infinite number of decisions is the same as when there are only two decision moments. A computational extension to more than two decisions suggests that an optimal sequence of experiments can cross the same threshold several times before experimentation ceases. These results shed light on a large class of environmental decision problems that has not been examined in the literature.     

Weak and Strong Signals

Akerlof, Spence and Stiglitz showed that competitive markets can perform very poorly in the presence of informational asymmetry. In this paper I show that if there is a signaling technology which is sufficiently strong (i.e., the marginal cost of signaling declines sufficiently rapidly with quality) the cost of sorting is low and a Nash equilibrium exists. Empirically testable necessary and sufficient conditions for existence are derived. I further show that if Akerlovian participation constraints are added to a signaling model there is a minimum signaling threshold. Finally I argue that these conclusions hold regardless of whether it is the uninformed or informed agents who move first.
JEL classification : D 8     

Economics and the treatment of AIDS: a preliminary assessment

This paper applied cost-effectiveness analysis to the use of drug therapy in the treatment of AIDS. The empirical approach adopted overcame the facts that the samples of patients had varying clinical prognoses, had variable entry dates into the samples and, because AIDS is a terminal disease, had variable exit dates. Holding these variables constant, administration of the drug AZT proved to be a less costly alternative than other existing palliatives for AIDS. The sub-sample of patients treated with AZT had lower hospitalization costs, lower caring costs and sufferers had an increased ability to continue to participate for longer as economically active members of society.