Trade liberalization and markups: Micro evidence from China

This paper presents evidence from highly disaggregated Chinese firm-product data that, given productivity, input tariff reductions induce an incumbent importer/exporter to increase product markups. We further investigate empirically the mechanisms underlying this trade liberalization effect, and find that input tariff reductions decrease marginal costs, and their effects on markup adjustments are more profound among firms with higher import dependence. Moreover, we exploit unique features of Chinese data by comparing results for two trade regimes: ordinary trade (wherein firms pay import tariffs to import) and processing trade (wherein firms are not subject to import tariffs). While the aforementioned trade liberalization effects and mechanisms only apply to ordinary trade, processing trade samples are used in a placebo test. The paper also shows that more productive firms charge higher markups for products. All these findings are robust to alternative markup measures including one estimate using physical-quantity output data, different production function specifications, a subsample consisting only of pure exporters, and estimations based on our theoretical derivations.     

Trade liberalization, antidumping, and safeguards: Evidence from India's tariff reform

This paper is the first to use product-level data to examine empirically whether countries use antidumping and safeguard exceptions to unwind commitments to lower tariffs in the face of domestic political-economic pressure. We focus on the case of India, a country that underwent a major exogenous tariff reform program in the early 1990s and subsequently initiated substantial use of safeguard and antidumping import restrictions. We first estimate structural determinants of India's import protection using the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model and provide evidence from its pre-reform tariff data of 1990 that is consistent with the theory. We then re-estimate the model on the Indian tariff data after the trade liberalization is complete and find that the model no longer fits, a result consistent with theory and evidence provided in other settings that India's 1991-1992 IMF arrangement can be interpreted as resulting in an exogenous shock to India's tariff policy. However, when we re-estimate the model on data from 2000-2002 that more completely reflects India's cross-product variation in import protection by including both its post-reform tariffs and its additional non-tariff barriers of antidumping and safeguard import protection, the significance of the Grossman and Helpman model determinant estimates is restored. We interpret these combined results as evidence that India unwound its commitment to reduce tariffs through use of antidumping and safeguard protection in the face of political-economic pressure. The estimates are also economically important and provide one explanation for separate results in the literature that the magnitude of import reduction associated with India's use of antidumping is similar to the initial import expansion associated with its tariff reform. Finally, we interpret the implications of our results for the burgeoning research literature examining the effects of liberalization on India's micro-level development.     

The effect of the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement on Canadian multilateral trade liberalization

In this paper show that the Canada‐US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA) tariff preferences have triggered a decline in Canadian external tariffs, explaining a two percentage point reduction in the average tariff between 1989 and 1998. Next, we found that industries that generate the least export rent to the US firms experienced deeper tariff cuts in Canada; this result provides evidence of cooperation in trade policies between the US and Canada. Finally, we estimate the effect of the CUSFTA on the intensity of industrial lobbying for trade policy in Canada and find no relationship between preferential trade liberalization and lobbying activity.     

Explaining Managed Trade as Rational Cheating

Postwar “managed-trade” policies feature low baseline tariffs combined with selective nontariff protection. This paper interprets managed trade as a rational strategy to undermine trade-liberalization agreements in the absence of credible external enforcement. Analyzing the Kennedy GATT Round, I explore the calculus that led the United States to undermine across-the-board tariff reductions selectively by introducing nontariff barriers in industries with rapidly rising import demand. I show empirically that nontariff barrier dynamics across 216 industries support a rational-cheating interpretation of managed-trade policy.     

Measuring China’s trade liberalization: A generalized measure of trade restrictiveness index

Neither simple average nor import-weighted average tariff indexes are ideal measures of tariff barriers. In this paper, we propose a generalized trade restrictiveness index (GTRI) that extends Feenstra’s (1995) tariff restrictiveness index (TRI) by relaxing the crucial assumption of a small open economy. We show that the GTRI can be measured using import tariffs, import shares, and the corresponding import and foreign export elasticities. We then apply the GTRI to examine how trade restrictiveness has evolved in China from 1997 to 2008, the period in which China entered the WTO. The GTRI indicates a higher level of protection than simple and import-weighted averages, but lower than the TRI. We further show a negative correlation between tariffs and product export supply elasticity, indicating that strategic trade policy was being pursued prior to China’s WTO accession. Finally, we calculate the welfare loss and terms-of-trade gain due to tariff protection. The overall tariff pass-through increases from around 28% to almost 47% because of the WTO.     

Trade imbalance and the endogenous optimal tariff

Endogenous tariff literatures reveal empirically that trade imbalance is negatively related with import tariff, this article gives a theoretical evidence and explanation to support this finding with the methodology of multi-country numerical general equilibrium modelling and simulation. We explore how optimal tariff changes after trade imbalance is introduced, and find that optimal tariffs decrease substantially, either for surplus or deficit countries, when imbalance is considered. Specifically, when the imbalance is modelled in endogenous monetary and inside-money structures, the optimal tariffs decrease by 26% globally on average. Our results suggest that the deepening trade imbalance is beneficial to the global trade liberalization due to its driving tariffs down.     

Varying Political Economy Weights of Protection: The Case of Colombia

In this paper, we examine trade policy determinants and trade reform in a developing country setting using a political economy model. The government determines tariffs by balancing the political support from producers vs. consumers, while placing a higher political weight on producers’ welfare relative to average citizens. We then expand the model in several directions to guide our subsequent estimations at the three‐digit industry level for Colombia between 1983 and 1998. We account for import substitution motives for protection but describe how the government's move away from these policies leads to unilateral trade liberalization. We innovatively allow the political weights to vary based on key industry variables beyond a common denominator. The sectors with higher employment, labor cost, and preferential trade agreement (PTA) import shares receive a larger political weight compared to otherwise similar sectors. The novelty of our approach is estimating the effect of sectoral characteristics on protection filtered through the political weights. We obtain more realistic estimates for these weights and provide some evidence for a slowing down effect of PTAs on trade liberalization.     

Race‐to‐the‐bottom Tariff Cutting

Unilateral tariff liberalization accounts for the lion's share of trade liberalization since the 1980s and has accompanied the most successful trade‐led development model of the past 50 years, “Factory Asia”. Understanding what drove this liberalization is therefore crucial to our grasp of the process of economic development. This paper provides empirical evidence for seven Asian emerging economies from 1988 to 2006 consistent with a tariff race to the bottom driven by a competition for foreign direct investment (FDI). The identification is two‐pronged. First, it is shown that tariffs on parts and components, intermediates and capital goods, crucial locational determinants for assembly firms, are correlated in competitive space, i.e. across countries at a similar level of development, but not across all countries. Second, it is shown that the tariff correlation in competitive space is significantly higher for inputs than consumer goods.     

Trade Liberalization and the Profitability of Mergers: a Global Analysis*

We analyze the effects of bilateral tariff reductions on the profitability of cost‐reducing horizontal mergers. Given Cournot competition in a two‐country world, for any positive tariff below a certain threshold, marginal trade liberalization is shown to encourage only those domestic mergers with sufficiently large cost‐savings and to discourage the rest. For tariffs close to, but smaller than, the prohibitive tariff, however, marginal trade liberalization necessarily encourages all domestic mergers. Moreover, we show that for a given level of cost‐savings, the impact of marginal trade liberalization may not reliably predict that of nonmarginal liberalization. Although at high tariffs, domestic mergers are shown to be unambiguously more profitable than cross‐border mergers, near free trade, mergers which yield the most cost‐savings become the most profitable. Thus, when comparing domestic and cross‐border mergers, trade liberalization encourages the type which yields the most cost‐savings.     

The incidence of import liberalization with and without a value added tax: an application to bangladesh

This paper examines the impact of import tariffs and tariff-replacing indirect taxes on the welfare of households grouped by the size distribution of income. A computable general equilibrium model for Bangladesh is simulated to examine the removal of quantitative restrictions and tariffs as well as the replacement of trade taxes with a value added tax (VAT). Import liberalization alone expands the manufacturing sector and increases the welfare of lower income households. If a uniform VAT is placed on both imports and all non-agricultural production in order to replace the lost tariff revenue for the government, some of the gains from import liberalization are diminished. If exports are exempted from the VAT, the gains are sustained to a greater degree. With a combination of tariff liberalization, quota markups, and the VAT, the economy goes through a contraction and the welfare of all households is reduced.     

A Partial Equilibrium Analysis of Trade with Decreasing Transport Costs

Decreasing transport costs are incorporated in the standard partial equilibrium analysis of trade by allowing the divergence—introduced by transport costs—between export and import price to decrease with the volume of trade. When the excess demand (supply) curve is steeper than the long run average cost curve for imports (exports), we observe that an import (export) tariff raises (lowers) the domestic price by an amount exceeding the tariff. Further, when the excess demand (Supply) curve is less steep than the long run average cost curve for imports (exports), the possibility exists that an import (export) tariff may lower (raise) the domestic price. These results lead to the important conclusion that tariffs cannot be used as measures of nominal protection across industries. [F10]     

Trade Liberalization and Antidumping: Is There a Substitution Effect?

Many nations have undergone significant trade liberalization even as they have increased their use of contingent protection measures. This raises the question of whether some of the trade liberalization efforts, at times accomplished through painful reforms, have been undone through a substitution from tariffs to non‐tariff barriers. Among the new forms of protection, antidumping is the most relevant. This paper examines whether the use of antidumping is systematically influenced by the reduction of applied sectoral tariffs in a sample of 29 developing and six developed countries from 1991 through 2002. Evidence is found of a substitution effect only for a small set of heavy users of antidumping among developing countries. There is no similar statistically significant result for other developing countries or developed countries. Robust evidence is also found of retaliation and deflection effects as determinant of antidumping filings across all subsamples.     

Trade Liberalization in the Presence of Foreign Direct Investment and Tax Credits: Estimates for Costa Rica

The paper uses a calibrated general-equilibrium model to quantify the welfare impact of trade liberalization—and compute the optimal tariff structure—for Costa Rica when trade-policy-induced foreign direct investment and international capital taxation with credits are present. It shows that complete trade liberalization reduces Costa Rica's welfare, as it leads to an outflow of capital and loss of tax revenue which more than offset the efficiency gains from an enhanced resource allocation. The optimal tariff structure for the Costa Rican economy turns out to be a mixture of relatively small import tariffs and subsidies.     

何去何从:贸易保护还是开放竞争?——来自微观企业创新的证据

文章基于熊彼特效应和逃离竞争效应假说,结合中国转轨时期的经济制度背景,利用2001?2008年制造业关税数据和沪深A股上市公司专利数据,研究了中国加入WTO后,关税削减所导致的进口竞争对企业创新的影响.研究发现,关税削减后,企业的发明专利申请数量显著增加,而专利申请总数和非发明专利申请数量却没有受到显著影响,表明进口竞争激励企业进行了高质量的发明创新.进口竞争的激励效应对于易受竞争影响和全要素生产率高的企业更加显著.文章认为,应以开放的心态迎接贸易自由化和进口竞争,引导企业将进口竞争转化为创新动力,推动企业创新向高质量迈进,形成国际竞争新优势.     

Deep trade agreements and vertical FDI: The devil is in the details

Although pre‐1990s preferential trade agreements focused mostly on tariff liberalization, recent agreements increasingly contain deep provisions in diverse areas, such as intellectual property rights, investment and standards. At the same time, there has been a remarkable increase in the internationalization of production through foreign direct investment and outsourcing. This paper studies how deep trade agreements affect the international organization of production. Using new measures of the depth and content of preferential trade agreements and of vertical foreign direct investment, the analysis finds evidence that the depth of trade agreements is correlated with vertical foreign direct investment. Furthermore, this relationship is driven by the provisions that improve the contractibility of inputs provided by suppliers, such as standards, while provisions that increase the contractibility of headquarter services, such as intellectual property rights and investment protection, are generally negatively correlated with foreign investment. This finding is consistent with the so‐called “property rights” theory of the multinational firm according to which improving the contractibility of an input reduces the importance of giving incentives through ownership.     

LEGISLATED PROTECTION AND THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

Tariff bindings and administered protection are two characteristics of the World Trade Organization (WTO) that are little understood. Tariff bindings place a ceiling on tariffs that is not always reached, whereas administered protection provides all industries with some minimum import protection, effectively creating a floor for protection. How do these policies affect applied most favored nation (MFN) tariff rates that are enacted through the legislature? I model tariffs determined by a dynamic legislative process and show that low applied MFN tariffs are less likely with tariff bindings and more likely with administered protection than under purely legislated protection.     

The “Emulator Effect” of the Uruguay Round on US Regionalism

Using a detailed data set at the tariff line level, we find an emulator effect of multilateralism on subsequent regional trade agreements (RTAs) involving the USA. We exploit the variation in the frequency with which the US grants immediate duty free access (IDA) to its RTA partners across tariff lines. A key finding is that the US grants IDA status especially on goods for which it has cut the multilateral most favored nation (MFN) tariff during the Uruguay Round the most. Our results suggest that the Uruguay Round multilateral “concessions” have elicited subsequent preferential trade liberalization.     

Industrial labour productivities and tariffs in South Africa

The analysis of the effect of tariffs for labour productivity faces the challenge of tariff policy endogeneity. Tariff policy is designed to promote economic development and the industrial sector tariff structure may reflect characteristics of the industries protected. We seek to identify the effect of tariffs by taking advantage of multilateral tariff liberalization using reductions in industrial sector tariffs in other world regions as instruments for sectoral tariff reductions in South Africa. The data cover 28 manufacturing sectors over the period 1988–2003. We find that tariff reductions have stimulated labour productivity when instrumented by multilateral tariffs. The ordinary least‐squares estimates show downward bias and this confirms the endogeneity of tariffs. Investigation of channels of effects shows some support for the importance of competitive pressure and technology spillover from trade liberalization.     

The United States is a Small Country in World Trade*

Despite being the largest country in world trade and thus presumably having high optimal tariffs, the United States has long had low and declining levels of protection. This paradox suggests that the United States is failing to exploit its monopsony power by levying optimal tariffs. Using data on world output and trade flows, we find that the United States is a small country in world trade in that its trade policies have negligible impacts on world prices. In the median manufacturing industry, US tariffs reduce world prices by only 0.12%. United States optimal tariffs are also typically small (3.6% in the median industry) and are lower than existing US tariffs in most industries. It is no puzzle that the United States has been a champion of free trade since the 1930s—the United States, like other small countries, benefits economically from tariff reductions.     

Protection for maturing industries: Evidence from Canadian trade patterns and trade policy, 1870–1913

As industries mature, experience is accumulated, productivity increases, trade performance improves on domestic and international markets and learning potential dissipates. Using theory‐consistent empirical specifications, I find a strong, robust negative relationship linking tariff rates to trade performance for manufactured products that matured during the first decade after Canada prioritized protectionist policy objectives in 1879. This relationship also holds at a more aggregate industry level, where I can use other measures of maturity, control for import penetration, use historically contemporaneous trade elasticity estimates, link trade performance to trade restrictiveness and effective rates of protection and where I can instrument for import penetration and trade performance using a two‐stage IV–GMM estimation approach. The results suggest that after 1890 the Canadian government carefully cut tariffs on products produced by maturing Canadian producers and this retreat from protectionism significantly lowered the static deadweight losses resulting from Canadian trade policy during the post‐1890 period.