Stackelberg equilibrium with multiple firms and setup costs

I provide conditions that guarantee that a Stackelberg game with a setup cost and an integer number of identical leaders and followers has an equilibrium in pure strategies. The main feature of the game is that when the marginal follower leaves the market the price jumps up, so that a leader’s payoff is neither continuous nor quasiconcave. To show existence I check that a leader’s value function satisfies the following single crossing condition: When the other leaders produce more the leader never accommodates entry of more followers. If demand is strictly logconcave, and if marginal costs are both non decreasing and not flatter than average costs, then a Stackelberg equilibrium exists. Besides showing existence I characterize the equilibrium set and provide a number of results that contribute to the applied literature. As the number of leaders increases, leaders produce more and eventually they deter entry. Leaders produce more than the Cournot best reply, but they may underinvest in entry deterrence. As the number of followers increases, leaders become more aggressive. When this number is large, if leaders can produce the limit quantity and at the same time have market power, then they deter entry.     

不同质产品市场Stackelberg博弈模型

一个不同质产品市场中，两企业只能选择产量或价格中的一个为决策变量进行Stackelberg竞争，没有生产能力限制。均衡结果为产品可替代（互补）时，领头企业和尾随企业都将选择产量（价格）为决策变量，存在“先动优势”。     

Stackelberg problems with followers in the grand coalition of a Tu-game

In this article, a case of partial cooperation in a game theory framework is studied. The interest is on a bi-level Stackelberg problem where one of the players is the leader and the rest are the followers, involved in a TU-game. The continuity, with respect to the leader’s choice, of the Shapley value function and the core correspondence of the TU-game is investigated.     

Social pressure,uncertainty, and cooperation

We analyse the role of uncertainty in a sequential game where players have to decide whether to contribute to a public project or not. A player's payoff may depend on his belief about the other player's action which allows us to model social pressure. Using the theory of psychological games, we show that the players' propensity to choose an individually costly action such as cooperation in a public project may increase if there is some uncertainty about who has cooperated before. A central agency, e.g. the government, can induce incomplete information by using a randomization policy, thus crowding in private contributions. Received: November 16, 1998 / Accepted: May 31, 1999     

基于遗传算法的逆向供应链Stackelberg主从定价策略分析

定价策略是逆向供应链中的一个重要环节。本文基于一个制造商是领导者而一个零售商为跟随者的主从定价策略,建立了求解Stackelberg主从对策的利润优化模型。并运用遗传算法求解该模型。     

Second‐Mover Advantages with Asymmetric Costs and Information Updates: A Product Life Cycle Perspective

Two firms with asymmetric costs engage in a Stackelberg game under multiple levels of uncertainty with information updating. A product life cycle perspective is employed to reveal when and why a second‐mover may have an advantage. At early stages in the product life cycle, when uncertainty is the dominating factor, the impact of uncertainty may be either positive or negative. As a result, the Stackelberg leader faces the possibility of either overshooting or losing its market leadership position to the second‐mover. In later market stages, when cost is more important, a process‐innovating second‐mover may accrue higher profits. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Altruism, redistribution and social insurance

The paper examines the influence of altruism on voluntary transfers and government redistribution in a simple model: two jobs of different productivity are assigned by chance to two individuals. Ex ante the individuals are identical, ex post they have different incomes. The first part of the paper examines voluntary transfers determined ex post or agreed upon ex ante in the absence of altruism. In the second part, the influence of altruism is examined. Altruism is modelled as a pure public good: the minimum consumption (or income, since there is only one consumption good). Both individuals can contribute to its provision, one person by earning wage income, the other by voluntary transfers. The ex ante solutions generally lead to higher expected welfare but create several incentive problems. Only lump-sum transfers are considered. Received: 28 February 1997 / Accepted: 31 January 2000     

Corporate social responsibility in long-term supply chain management

Long-term corporate social responsibility (CSR) projects are affected by the time span and the decay of CSR level. Different government tax policies and different status of supply chain members also have an impact on CSR performance. Considering these issues, multi-period dynamic game processes with the supplier and the manufacturer as the Stackelberg leader, respectively, are established. By solving the Hamiltonian function and differential game model, it shows that supplier-led supply chains have better CSR performance. Leaders and followers invest differently in CSR projects in different periods. Single tax return improves the CSR level more than system tax return.     

The Desirability of In‐kind Transfers in the Presence of Distortionary Taxes

A standard argument in welfare economics maintains that private goods should not be publicly provided, because cash transfers are always superior to in‐kind transfers. However, this conclusion does not hold in second best economies. A strong case for the desirability of in‐kind transfer in the presence of distortionary taxes has been made in various recent contributions. Here, we survey the arguments provided in these papers, using a common theoretical framework which enables us to present more clearly the similarities and the differences among the various papers. The use of a common formal model helps us to show how the rationale for public provision of private goods is sensitive to the form of the tax system. It also helps us to provide an explanation why mandatory and non‐mandatory in‐kind transfer schemes have the same effects on social welfare. Finally, we offer some considerations on the relevance of the theory of in‐kind transfers for policy action. JEL Classification Number: H42     

基于部分收益共享契约的双渠道供应链协调

构建了由一个制造商和一个零售商组成的双渠道供应链模型,其中制造商和零售商均拥有网络销售渠道,零售商为Stackelberg对策博弈的主方。分析、比较了集中式和分散式决策下双渠道供应链的最优均衡解,并从制造商与零售商合作的角度,对传统收益共享契约进行了改进,并论证了这种契约能够实现双渠道供应链的协调。最后通过算例分析,进一步验证了所改进的收益共享契约的有效性。     

Tax Competition between Unitary and Federal Countries

We analyse taxation of capital in a two-country model, where one country is unitary while the other one is federal, consisting of two identical regions. Both national and regional governments levy a tax on capital. The countries play a noncooperative game between them, with the government of the federal country acting as a Stackelberg leader with respect to its regional governments. We show under what circumstances, at equilibrium, the federal country sets its tax rate inefficiently low, while the unitary country sets it inefficiently high.We are deeply grateful to three anonymous referees for their comments, and especially to one of them for extremely helpful suggestions. We also wish to thank participants at ESEM 2004 for fruitful discussions     

Non-cooperative pollution control in an inter-jurisdictional setting

This paper examines various circumstances under which decentralized pollution policies can be efficient both in federal settings and in multi-region settings with labor mobility. We consider a model in which pollution control policies are set by regional governments non-cooperatively and pollution damages are borne by the residents of all regions. We characterize the efficiency of pollution policies, and of population allocation among regions, in a variety of scenarios, including when pollution policies are enacted before interregional transfers are determined by the federal government and before migration occurs; when migration decisions are taken before policy decisions; in the absence of a central government if regional governments can make voluntary interregional transfers; when decisions over pollution control policies are followed by voluntary contributions by regions to a national public good; when regions can commit to matching the abatement efforts of each other; and when regions can commit to specific levels of abatement contingent on the emissions of other regions not exceeding some maximum level.     

Rational Nonprofit Entrepreneurship

This paper derives the decision to found a nonprofit firm as the equilibrium outcome of a multistage game among individuals who would like a public good to be provided. The model predicts that if individuals will voluntarily contribute towards provision of the public good, then it is in the self-interest of the entrepreneur to impose a nondistribution constraint on herself by founding a nonprofit firm.     

Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game

This paper analyses the formation and stability of coalitions to form international environmental agreements. We present and apply the Stability of coalitions model to assess the internal and external stability of all possible coalition structures in a cartel formation game; first under the assumption that no transfers take place and second for a transfer scheme. One important novelty of this paper is the analysis of the incentive structure of twelve regions for all possible combinations of (cartel) coalitions in an empirical setting with asymmetric regions. We show that stable coalitions can emerge only if benefits from global abatement are sufficiently high or if an appropriate transfer scheme is introduced.The authors acknowledge the support of Juan-Carlos Altamirano-Cabrera, Eligius Hendrix, Niels Olieman, Pepijn van Oort, Arjan Ruijs and Hans-Peter Weikard in the analysis. Furthermore, the comments by two anonymous referees are gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

博弈论在逆向供应链系统定价中的应用

基于单一制造商和单一零售商构成的逆向供应链系统,应用博弈理论对废旧产品回收的定价策略进行研究。分别得出了非合作博弈的均衡解(Stackelberg均衡)和合作博弈的均衡解(联合定价),并进一步对各种定价策略的效率进行了分析。另外,给出了便于实际操作的协调方法。     

基于渠道竞争的双渠道供应链低碳协调策略

针对由一个制造商和一个零售商构成的双渠道供应链,将渠道竞争和产品的低碳性能引入消费者的非线性需求中,通过构建制造商为主导者的Stackelberg博弈模型,对比分析了分散决策和集中决策下的最优定价、碳排放水平和成员利润,并采用价格折扣-成本分摊契约实现了供应链的协调。研究结果表明:在分散决策和集中决策两种情况下,渠道竞争程度的增加均会造成碳排放水平、供应链利润和消费者效用的降低;集中决策下的直销价格大于分散决策下的直销价格,集中决策下的零售价格小于分散决策下的零售价格。最后通过算例验证了以上结论和协调机制的有效性。     

Transferring HR practices within multinational corporations

There is extensive evidence that planned transfers of management practices by the headquarters of multinational corporations (MNCs) to foreign subsidiaries are not always successful. In this article, we outline a model of factors influencing the transfer of HR practices to MNC units abroad. The article has two main contributions. First, we develop a more holistic understanding of the outcome of HR practice transfer as encompassing three dimensions: implementation, internalisation and integration. Second, we expand current explanations of transfers of practices to foreign units. We argue that transfer of HR practices is a social process where the governance mechanisms used by the MNC, characteristics of the subsidiary HR systems, the social relationship between the subsidiary and MNC headquarters, and the transfer approach taken by headquarters management will influence the outcome of the process.     

基于交易定价的再制造供应链回收处理服务决策

研究单一制造商与单一第三方回收处理商（简称回收商）组成的再制造供应链,回收商为制造商提供回收拆卸以及增值服务。通过建立Stackelberg博弈模型首先研究回收商回收拆卸服务,分析了回收定价、回收努力程度、拆卸处理转化率等决策,在此基础上研究了增值服务对供应链带来的影响。结果表明：制造商提高回购价格,将激励回收商的回收处理行为;可拆卸处理程度较高的产品制造商更加乐于接受回收商的增值服务,制造商较高的基本支付是激励回收商回收服务行为的必要条件,否则,回收商将缺乏动力产生懈怠。     

Optimal joint trade-in rebate strategies in a retailer-led supply chain

This study investigates the joint trade-in rebate strategies in a supply chain with independent manufacturers selling substitutable products via a dominant retailer. We model their interplay as a Stackelberg game and analyze their joint trade-in rebate decisions. We find that the differentiated trade-in rebate scheme is better for the retailer, and the manufacturers cooperating in making their trade-in rebate decisions can achieve win-win results in most cases. However, replacement consumers could benefit from the retailer's uniform trade-in rebate scheme and the manufacturers not cooperating in their trade-in decisions. The latter is always more beneficial to the environment.