BANK PRIVATIZATION AND CONVERGENCE OF PERFORMANCE: INTERNATIONAL EVIDENCE

We trace the extent of performance deviation of privatized banks from established private banks in 30 countries from 1994 to 2005 and investigate the role of bank regulatory and supervisory norms, market competition, ownership structure, deposit insurance scheme, and governance structure affecting the deviation. Evidence shows that privatization does improve the performance of banks in the first year of being privatized, but performance gradually declines, which is consistent with the government restructuring argument before the privatization. Governance, foreign ownership, banking freedom (regulations), and the deposit insurance scheme in respective economies are found to affect performance deviation significantly.     

Privatization and bank performance in developing countries

We examine the postprivatization performance of 81 banks from 22 developing countries. Our results suggest that: (i) On average, banks chosen for privatization have a lower economic efficiency, and a lower solvency than banks kept under government ownership. (ii) In the postprivatization period, profitability increases but, depending on the type of owner, efficiency, risk exposure and capitalization may worsen or improve. However, (iii) Over time, privatization yields significant improvements in economic efficiency and credit risk exposure. (iv) We also find that newly privatized banks that are controlled by local industrial groups become more exposed to credit risk and interest rate risk after privatization.     

The economics of bank privatization

This paper surveys the empirical literature examining bank privatization. We begin by documenting the extent of, theoretical rationale for, and measured performance of state-owned banks around the world, and then assess why many governments have chosen to privatize their often very large state-owned banking sectors. The empirical evidence clearly shows that state-owned banks are less efficient than privately owned banks, and that state domination of banking imposes increasingly severe penalties on those countries with the largest state banking sectors. On the other hand, there is little in the empirical record to suggest that privatization alone transforms the efficiency of divested banks, especially when these are only partially privatized. Privatization generally improves performance, but by far less than is typically observed in studies of non-financial industries. An increasingly common outcome of large-scale bank privatization programs is foreign ownership of many nations’ banking sector, which evidence suggests is usually positive in an economic sense, but problematic politically.     

Does privatization reform alleviate ownership discrimination? Evidence from the Split-share structure reform in China

This paper investigates the institutional origins of ownership discrimination in bank lending through a staggered quasi-natural experiment: China's Split-share Structure Reform. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have an advantage over non-SOEs in securing external financing to protect investment opportunities from cash flow fluctuations. This financing privilege declined significantly after the reform, which mandatorily converted SOEs' non-tradable state-owned shares into tradable shares, sharply increasing the likelihood of further privatization. Consistent evidence also exists in terms of bank lending behaviors. Further, we show both direct and indirect evidence that the effects were more pronounced among SOEs under higher threats of privatization (e.g., firms with larger increases in tradable shares, smaller workforce, and in industries peripheral to national strategy). The evidence suggests that banks proactively prefer SOEs for the perceived safety of loans under implicit government guarantee; when this privilege disappeared after the reform, banks reacted by allocating credits more fairly. This paper provides new evidence on the bright side of share structure reforms in mitigating credit misallocation and enlightens policy makers to practical resolutions to the financing inefficiency in emerging capital markets.     

Privatization matters: Bank efficiency in transition countries

To investigate the impact of bank privatization in transition countries, we take the largest banks in six relatively advanced countries, namely, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Hungary, Poland and Romania. Income and balance sheet characteristics and efficiency measures computed from stochastic frontiers are compared across four bank ownership types. Our empirical results support the hypotheses that foreign-owned banks are most efficient and government-owned banks are least efficient. In addition, the importance of attracting a strategic foreign owner in the privatization process is confirmed. However, counter to the conjecture that foreign banks cherry pick the most profitable opportunities, we find that domestic banks have a local advantage in pursuing fee-for-service business. Finally, we show that both the method and the timing of privatization matter to performance; specifically, voucher privatization does not lead to increased efficiency and early-privatized banks are more efficient than later-privatized banks, even though we find no evidence of a selection effect.     

Bank privatization in developing and developed countries: Cross-sectional evidence on the impact of economic and political factors

We examine how political, institutional, and economic factors are related to a country’s decision to privatize state-owned banks. Using a panel of 101 countries from 1982 to 2000, we find that political factors significantly affect the likelihood of bank privatization only in developing countries. Specifically, in non-OECD countries, bank privatization is more likely the more accountable the government is to its people. In contrast, none of our political variables affects the bank privatization decision in developed countries. Economic factors (such as the quality of the nation’s banking sector) are significant determinants of bank privatization in both OECD and non-OECD nations.     

宏观调控、所有权结构与商业银行信贷扩张行为

本文结合公司金融和商业银行相关理论,厘清了股权结构对商业银行信贷扩张的作用机理,重点分析政府宏观调控政策目标和意图如何通过股权结构作用于信贷行为。选用21家银行2003-2010年间的面板数据,估计得出中央政府控制、民营化程度低、大股东持股比例高的银行具有更强的信贷扩张冲动;并利用2009年宏观经济扩张政策外生冲击形成的"自然实验"环境,通过双重差分(Difference-in-Difference)估计策略发现,宏观调控对中央政府控制、民营化程度低、大股东持股比例高的银行的信贷行为影响更为显著。本文的研究从政府控制和银行内部治理的视角为信贷扩张的微观机制以及商业银行市场化改革之后政府宏观经济调控的传导渠道提供了一个新的解释。     

Why government banks underperform: A political interference view

This study proposes a political interference hypothesis to explain how political considerations depress the performance of government banks. We define political interference as a situation in which government bank executives are replaced within 12 months after the country’s major elections (presidential or parliamentary elections). We classify political and non-political government banks as those that experience or do not experience political interference, respectively. The hypothesis firstly suggests that once government banks undertake political interference, their financial performance deteriorates. That is, political banks display the worst performance, followed by non-political banks and private banks have the best performance. Next, we posit that the impact of political interference is greater in developing countries than in developed countries. Finally, we hypothesize that the underperformance of government banks will be reduced if we remove political interference. By employing bank data from 65 countries from the period of 2003–2007, our hypothesis effectively explains why government banks in developed countries escape relatively unscathed, while those in developing countries suffer significantly.     

Do privatized banks in middle- and low-income countries perform better than rival banks? An intra-industry analysis of bank privatization

This paper presents a comprehensive analysis of the pre- and post-privatization operating performance and stock market performance of privatized banks and their rivals in middle- and low-income countries. First, we find that privatization announcements elicit negative abnormal returns for rival banks. The effects are more pronounced for subsequent tranche sales where the proportion of government ownership in the privatized bank is reduced. Second, we observe that the privatized banks underperformed the benchmark index in the long run. Investors who bought shares of the privatized banks on the first day of trading and held them for 5 years (instead of investing in the market index) lost 24% of their wealth. The underperformance is consistent with the negative long run returns that have been documented for initial public offerings. Third, we document marginal improvements in the post-privatization operating performance of the privatized banks. Though the privatized banks in middle- and low-income countries are better capitalized than rival banks, they carry higher problem loans and are overstaffed relative to other private banks in the post-privatization period. Since most of the sample firms are partially privatized, we submit that perhaps the continued government ownership of the privatized banks might have hindered managers’ ability to restructure the firms.     

Risk taking behavior of privatized banks

We examine the risk taking behavior of privatized banks prior to and after privatization and find that privatized banks experience a significant decrease in risk after privatization; however they continue to exhibit higher risk than their rivals. This finding is consistent with the assertion that following privatization and the removal of government guarantees and subsidies, privatized banks become more prudent. Since rival banks do not experience a significant change in risk taking, we attribute the reduction in risk experienced by the privatized banks to changes in the banks' ownership structure rather than to industry factors. Interestingly, we also find that a higher fraction of the privatized banks' shares sold beyond a certain intermediate level induces higher risk taking, as the privatized bank becomes more accountable to shareholders. The finding that the fraction of shares sold is positively related to risk taking, coupled with the result that the privatized banks had higher risk in the pre-privatization period than in the post-privatization period suggests a nonlinear relationship between government/private ownership of banks and risk taking. Results of further analysis are consistent with a somewhat U-shaped relationship between private ownership and risk taking. The risk taking behavior of newly privatized banks is also influenced by the country's level of development and degree of political risk. Our results are robust to different measures of risk.     

Bank ownership,privatization, and performance: Evidence from a transition country

This paper combines the static effect of ownership and the dynamic effect of privatization on bank performance in China over 1995–2010, reporting a significantly higher performance by private intermediaries – joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks – relative to state-owned commercial banks. However, publicly traded banks, subject to multiple monitoring and vetting in capital markets, perform better regardless of ownership status. The privatization of banks has improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency gains in the short- or long-run (initial public offerings). The positive long-run effect is more relevant and significant for banking institutions with minority foreign ownership. Moreover, this paper innovatively estimates interest income efficiency and non-interest income efficiency at the same time. The results suggest that Chinese banks are much more efficient in generating interest income than raising non-interest revenue, although the latter aspect has improved significantly during the sample period.     

Competitive and value effects of bank privatization in developed countries

A special issue of the Journal of Banking and Finance (2005) devoted to the performance of privatized banks in middle- and low-income countries shows mixed results. In this paper, we present evidence that shows that privatized banks in developed countries have experienced significant improvements in operating performance. The improvement in performance remains significant after controlling for persistence in bank performance. A comparison of the performance of privatized banks in developed and developing countries suggests that privatization has encouraged excessive risk taking among privatized banks in developing countries, with the consequence that those banks carry large non-performing assets than their counterparts in the developed countries. We also observe that consistent with the competitive effects hypothesis, investors view privatization announcements as foreshadowing bad news for rival banks.     

Bank privatization and performance: Empirical evidence from Nigeria

We assess the effect of privatization on performance in a panel of Nigerian banks for the period 1990–2001. We find evidence of performance improvement in nine banks that were privatized, which is remarkable given the inhospitable environment for true financial intermediation. Our results also suggest negative effects of the continuing minority government ownership on the performance of many Nigerian banks. Finally, our results complement aggregate indications of decreasing financial intermediation over the 1990s; banks that focused on investment in government bonds and non-lending activities enjoyed a relatively better performance.     

The effect of TARP on bank risk-taking

One of the largest responses of the US government to the recent financial crisis was the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). TARP was originally intended to stabilize the financial sector through the increased capitalization of banks. However, recipients of TARP funds were then encouraged to make additional loans despite increased borrower risk. In this paper, we consider the effect of the TARP capital injections on bank risk-taking by analyzing the risk ratings of banks’ commercial loan originations during the crisis. The results indicate that, relative to non-TARP banks, the risk of loan originations increased at large TARP banks but decreased at small TARP banks. Loan levels also moved in different directions for large and small banks and, in supporting evidence, these effects are evaluated based on loan size and TARP repayment. For large banks, the increase in risk-taking without an increase in lending is suggestive of moral hazard due to government support. These results may also be due to the conflicting goals of the TARP program for bank recapitalization and bank lending.     

State bank transformation in Brazil – choices and consequences

This paper analyzes the different options – liquidation, federalization, privatization and restructuring – that the Brazilian state governments had for the transformation of their state banks under the PROES in the late 1990s. Specifically, this paper explores (i) the factors behind the states’ choices and (ii) the effects of the transformation process on bank performance and efficiency. We find that states that were more dependent on federal transfers, whose banks were already under federal intervention and that established development agencies, were more likely to relinquish control over their banks and its transformation process. We find that privatized banks increased their performance, while restructured banks did not.     

The influence of government intervention on the trajectory of bank performance during the global financial crisis: A comparative study among Asian economies

The global financial crisis that started from 2007 onwards spread around the world and impacted the performance of banks in major economies. Many governments have used a variety of intervention policies to recover their financial systems. By examining the dynamic changes in bank performance before and after government intervention, this study demonstrates the use of the piecewise latent trajectory model. We used the data collected from Bloomberg for banks of five major Asian economies, Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, over the eleven-quarter period from the 4th quarter of 2007 to the 2nd quarter of 2010 on six financial performance indicators reflecting solvency, credit risk and profitability. The change patterns of bank performance before/after government intervention during the global financial crisis have been compared among the five economies. Our empirical results indicate that, on average, the bank performance in terms of solvency, credit risk, and profitability improves after government intervention. Moreover, the influence of government intervention on bank performance depends on the evaluative financial indicator, the economy, and whether banks are internationalized. South Korea and Hong Kong have been identified to be the economies with stronger bank performance after government intervention. Policies demonstrated useful in South Korea and Hong Kong have been summarized and discussed.     

Bank political connections and performance in China

We examine the effects of bank’s political connection on bank performance and risk in China. We use hand-collected information on CEOs’ professional background to identify their political affiliations, and find that banks whose CEOs have former government experiences have higher return on assets, lower default risk, and lower credit risk. Additionally, politically connected banks have disproportionally higher performance when the CEOs previous worked in the same city where the current bank’s headquarter locates, had past banking experiences, spend more on entertainment and travel costs, and have higher previous administrative rankings (e.g., at the provincial or state level). These results suggest that politically connected banks have better access to lending to politically connected firms, which are high yield assets and more likely to be bailed out when in distress. Our results offer a mechanism of political rent seeking, consistent with the institutional environment of China’s banking and political system.     

China’s financial services industry: The intra-industry effects of privatization of the Bank of China Hong Kong

The purpose of this paper is to discuss and apply some of the key issues and lessons from similar privatization in other parts of the world to the partial privatization of the Bank of China Hong Kong (BOCHK). The empirical results of this paper indicate that some of the banks and non-bank financial institutions reacted negatively to the partial privatization announcements of the BOCHK. The empirical results also show that HSBC, the largest bank in Hong Kong had no significant reaction to the restructuring announcement or the listing announcement of the BOCHK. However, the Hang Seng Bank, the third largest bank in Hong Kong, suffered a loss after the announcement of the BOCHK listing. Compared with the banks and non-bank financial institutions in China, the BOCHK over-performed the rival firms in Mainland China 1 year after its partial privatization.     

Is there a bright side to government banks? Evidence from the global financial crisis

Using a sample of banks from 56 countries, this paper investigates the lending behavior of government banks during the crisis of 2008, and its association with bank performance and the economy. Contrary to the traditional wisdom, we find that government banks can play a beneficial role under certain circumstances. Government banks have higher loan growth rates than private banks during the crisis. In countries with low corruption, the increased lending by government banks is associated with better bank performance and more favorable GDP and employment growth in the crisis period. In contrast, the results for countries with high corruption are more consistent with the political view: the increased lending by government banks is associated with underperformance relative to private banks, and creates no beneficial effects on either GDP growth or employment.     

Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies

We analyze the competitive effects of government bail-out policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that bail-outs lead to higher risk-taking among the protected bank’s competitors, independently of transparency. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, which intensifies competition in the deposit market, depresses other banks’ margins, and thereby increases risk-taking incentives. Contrary to conventional wisdom, protected banks may take lower risks when transparency in the banking sector is low and the deposit supply is sufficiently elastic.