Intangible capital and the investment-q relation

The neoclassical theory of investment has mainly been tested with physical investment, but we show that it also helps explain intangible investment. At the firm level, Tobin’s q explains physical and intangible investment roughly equally well, and it explains total investment even better. Compared with physical capital, intangible capital adjusts more slowly to changes in investment opportunities. The classic q theory performs better in firms and years with more intangible capital: Total and even physical investment are better explained by Tobin’s q and are less sensitive to cash flow. At the macro level, Tobin’s q explains intangible investment many times better than physical investment. We propose a simple, new Tobin’s q proxy that accounts for intangible capital, and we show that it is a superior proxy for both physical and intangible investment opportunities.     

International capital flows and the boom-bust cycle in Spain

We study the joint dynamics of foreign capital flows and real activity during the recent boom-bust cycle of the Spanish economy, using a three-country New Keynesian model with credit-constrained households and firms, a construction sector and a government. We estimate the model using 1995Q1-2013Q2 data for Spain, the rest of the Euro Area (REA) and the rest of the world. We show that falling risk premia on Spanish housing and non-residential capital, a loosening of collateral constraints for Spanish households and firms, as well as a fall in the interest rate spread between Spain and the REA fuelled the Spanish output boom and the persistent rise in foreign capital flows to Spain, before the global financial crisis. During and after the global financial crisis, falling house prices, and a tightening of collateral constraints for Spanish borrowers contributed to a sharp reduction in capital inflows, and to the persistent slump in Spanish real activity. The credit crunch was especially pronounced for Spanish households; firm credit constraints tightened later and more gradually, and contributed much less to the slump.     

Optimal capital controls and real exchange rate policies: A pecuniary externality perspective

A new literature studies the use of capital controls to prevent financial crises. Within this new framework, we show that when exchange rate policy is costless, there is no need for capital controls. However, if exchange rate policy entails efficiency costs, capital controls become part of the optimal policy mix. When exchange rate policy is costly, the optimal mix combines prudential capital controls in tranquil times with policies that limit exchange rate depreciation in crisis times. The optimal mix yields more borrowing, fewer and less severe financial crises, and much higher welfare than with capital controls alone.     

Multinational capital structure and financial flexibility

We address multinational capital structure decisions when firms have varying degrees of financial flexibility for shifting income and/or tax shields between subsidiaries. We find: (1) firms can use leverage to dramatically reduce negative valuation effects from operating in a high-tax country; (2) financial flexibility is a key determinant of optimal capital structure, acting as both a substitute and a complement for leverage; (3) multinational firms derive a synergistic effect from financial flexibility, which can enhance their value beyond that for a single-country firm from a low-tax jurisdiction; and (4) optimal capital structure typically differs substantially across subsidiaries, with each having positions in multiple currencies.     

Bank capital and economic activity

Banks argue that holding higher capital will have adverse implications on their lending activities and thereby on economic growth. Yet, the effect of a stronger capital base on economic growth remains largely unsettled. We argue that better capitalized banks improve financial stability conditions and, in dire times, they are able to sustain credit to the economy thereby containing adverse macroeconomic implications. Using various methods, we test for the presence and strength of a financial stability channel and a bank lending channel by drawing evidence from 47 advanced and developing countries over close to two decades. We find that higher capital ratios improve financial stability and help sustain bank lending, ultimately exerting a positive influence on economic activity. These effects on real GDP growth are economically significant, reaching up to 1¼ percentage points for each percentage point acceleration in capital. Our main results are robust to various sensitivity checks, supporting the conclusion that safer banking systems do not bridle economic activity.     

Ethics,capital and talent competition in banking

We model optimal ethical standards, capital requirements and talent allocation in banking. Banks with varying safety-net protections, including depositories and shadow banks, innovate products and compete for talent. Managers dislike unethical behavior, but banks heed it only because detection imposes costs. We find: (i) higher capital induces higher ethical standards, but socially optimal capital requirements may tolerate some unethical behavior; (ii) managerial ethics fails to raise banks’ ethical standards; (iii) banks with lower ethical standards attract better talent and innovate more; and (iv) it is socially optimal to allocate better talent to shadow banks instead of depositories, and this allocation results in higher capital requirements and ethical standards for depositories. Consequently, with capital capacity constraints, the shadow banking sector is larger than the depository sector; talent competition induces a race to the bottom in ethical standards, and the regulator responds by setting capital requirements to magnify this size difference.     

Credit frictions and the comovement between durable and non-durable consumption

Frictions in lending between households have been proposed as a solution to the difficulties new-Keynesian models have in predicting a decline in both durable and non-durable consumption following a monetary tightening. By revisiting a standard new-Keynesian framework with collateral constraints, it is shown that the presence of such credit frictions in fact makes it more difficult to generate the joint decline. The intuitive reasons behind this result are provided, which should be helpful in developing models that are more successful in generating a positive comovement between durables and non-durables.     

An analysis of euro area sovereign CDS and their relation with government bonds

We compare the market pricing of euro area government bonds and the corresponding Credit Default Swaps (CDSs). In particular, we analyse the “basis” defined as the difference between the premium on the CDS and the credit spread on the underlying bond. Our sample of weekly data covers the period from January 2007 to December 2012 and contains several episodes of sovereign market distress. Overall, we observe a complex relationship between the derivatives market and the underlying cash market characterised by sizable deviations from the no-arbitrage relationship (i.e. basis equal to zero). We show that short-selling frictions explain the persistence of positive basis deviations while funding frictions explain the persistence of negative basis deviations which are observed for countries with weak public finances. Moreover, we show that the “flight-to-quality/liquidity” phenomenon in bond markets is a key driver of the large positive basis of better rated countries.     

Bank interconnectedness and financial stability: The role of bank capital

This paper builds a network model to study the relation between financial stability and interconnectedness among banks. In the model, banks adopt a Value-at-Risk rule to determine capital ratios. It is shown that interconnectedness may hurt financial stability by amplifying the banks’ mistakes of underestimating risk, and that interconnectedness increases systemic risk. The results in the paper suggest that financial integration may hurt financial stability, and that bank interconnectedness is more harmful when the economy turns abruptly from boom to recession. In addition, banks should be given incentives to reduce interconnectedness if systemic risk is a serious concern for regulators.     

A portfolio based theory of excessive foreign borrowing and capital control in a small open economy

We develop a simple model of portfolio choice in a mean variance framework to address the issue of international borrowing and financial crisis. Instead of adverse selection or moral hazard of lending and borrowing activities we emphasise the role of exchange rate movement. Syndicated borrowing by way of internalising the aggregate effect tends to restrict excessive borrowing from external source. However, this may undermine the welfare consequences by further aggravating the extent of risk undertaken in the process. There is a built-in externality in the model that leads to over exposure to foreign currency debt and readily calls for intervention by the government. Government intervention by way of a tax on foreign borrowing may help restrain the amount of external debt and implement the first best.     

Social capital and capital allocation efficiency

Based on the social norms and structural theories of social capital, this study examines the relationship between community social capital and the firms’ capital allocation efficiency. We hypothesize and find that the community social capital of a firm's headquarter area has a negative and statistically significant impact on its capital allocation inefficiency, which is robust to alternative proxies for community social capital and capital allocation inefficiency, propensity score matching and instrumental variable regressions. In addition, we find that the effect of community social capital is more pronounced for firms with poor internal ethical culture and weak network connections to outside executives and directors, implying that community social capital becomes important in these situations. This finding links prior social norms and networks literature to capital allocation studies in that the norms and networks components of community social capital discipline self-interested managers’ behavior and reduce information asymmetry-two channels of capital allocation efficiency. Overall, community social capital works as a compensatory monitoring and information transfer mechanism and improves the firms’ capital allocation efficiency.     

Asymmetric timely loss recognition,adverse shocks to external capital,and underinvestment: Evidence from the collapse of the junk bond market

Using the collapse of the junk bond market in the early 1990s as an exogenous shock to external capital, I document, in both difference-in-differences and triple difference designs, that speculative-grade firms that recognize economic losses in a timely manner experience a smaller reduction in investment following the collapse. The effect is more pronounced for speculative-grade firms with a low level of asset liquidation value. Using the excess bond premium as a proxy for fluctuations in the supply of capital, I also extend the generalizability of my findings to a broader sample of 84,421 firm-years over the 1972–2011 period.     

Financial contracting with strategic investors: Evidence from corporate venture capital backed IPOs

We analyze financial contracting in start-ups backed by corporate venture capitalists (CVCs). CVCs' strategic goals can economically hurt or benefit the start-ups, depending on product market relationships between start-ups and CVC parents. Empirically, start-ups receive funding from both complementary and competitive CVC parents. However, start-up insiders commonly limit the influence of competitive CVCs, awarding them lower board power, while retaining higher board representation for themselves. Second, lead CVCs receive lower board representation, indicating heightened concerns about their greater influence in start-ups' early stages. Finally, start-ups extract higher valuations from competitive CVCs, reflecting greater moral hazard problems. Overall, CVC strategic objectives affect their early inclusion in VC syndicates, their control rights and share pricing.     

培育和发展金融资本促进我国金融业改革

作为世界贸易组织成员国，在经济全球化、全球金融市场一体化和金融自由化的大环境中培育和发展金融资本，是我国金融业的发展趋势，也是更为适合的改革途径。本文试图从金融资本理论出发，探讨这一改革途径的必要性、可能性和发展思路。     

Full adoption of IFRSs in Brazil: Earnings quality and the cost of equity capital

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of IFRS adoption on the earnings quality and the cost of equity capital of Brazilian companies. It is assumed that an increase in information contributes to a reduction in asymmetric information. A conjecture is that more efficient allocation of resources will result in a reduction in the cost of capital. The results show that the hypothesis of an increase in earnings quality after IFRS adoption holds true. The models used to analyze the equity cost of capital suggest a reduction in the cost of capital of around 7 basis points.     

Credit market imperfections,labor markets,and leverage dynamics in emerging economies

Emerging economies (EMEs) have different credit and labor market structures relative to advanced economies. We document that economies with larger self-employment shares tend to exhibit less countercyclical leverage dynamics. We build a model where formal credit markets, input credit relationships, and the structure of labor markets interact that (1) captures a comprehensive set of EME business cycle regularities and (2) rationalizes our new fact. The interaction between firms’ net worth, interfirm input credit, and self-employment underlying our framework is critical for explaining our fact and is supported by the data.     

Arbitrage crashes and the speed of capital

The imminent failure of prime brokers during the 2008 financial crisis caused a sudden decrease in the leverage afforded hedge funds. This decrease resulted from the asymmetrical payoff to rehypothecation lenders—the ultimate financiers, through prime brokers, to hedge funds. Seemingly long-term debt capital became short-term capital creating a duration mismatch between left-hand side arbitrage opportunities and right-hand side liabilities. Consequently, arbitrageurs became unable to maintain similar prices of similar assets. Mispricing magnitudes, and the time required to correct them, reflect the role of arbitrageurs in maintaining accurate prices during normal times and offer an estimate of discounts at which assets transact during crises.     

Unbounded liabilities,capital reserve requirements and the taxpayer put option

When firms access unbounded liability exposures and are granted limited liability, then an all equity firm holds a call option, whereby it receives a free option to put losses back to the taxpayers. We call this option the taxpayer put, where the strike is the negative of the level of reserve capital at stake in the firm. We contribute by (i) valuing this taxpayer put, and (ii) determining the level for reserve capital without a reference to ratings. Reserve capital levels are designed to mitigate the adverse incentives for unnecessary risk introduced by the taxpayer put at the firm level. In our approach, the level of reserve capital is set to make the aggregate risk of the firm externally acceptable, where the specific form of acceptability employed is positive expectation under a concave distortion of the cash flow distribution. It is observed that, in the presence of the taxpayer put, debt holders may not be relied upon to monitor risk as their interests are partially aligned with equity holders by participating in the taxpayer put. Furthermore, the taxpayer put leads to an equity pricing model associated with a market discipline that punishes perceived cash shortfalls.     

Fiscal policy with banks and financial frictions

We assess the role of banks to the transmission of optimal and exogenous changes in fiscal policy to the economy. We built-up a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with patient and impatient agents, banks and a government to find that banks and their associated capital-adequacy constraint mitigate the negative spill-over effects to the economy from higher taxes. Specifically, we confirm that labour income tax is the most distortionary fiscal instrument. The optimal choice of a housing tax is the most favorable funding source to a temporary increase in public spending. The combination of housing and labour taxes is the most preferred tax bundle to be optimally chosen under negative output shocks. Moreover, a permanent increase in housing tax is beneficial if it is welfare enhancing and the existence of banks benefits mainly impatient households under permanently higher consumption taxes. Finally, these results remain robust to various robustness checks.     

Delegated asset management,investment mandates,and capital immobility

This paper develops a model to explain the widely used investment mandates in the institutional asset management industry based on two insights: first, giving a manager more investment flexibility weakens the link between fund performance and his effort in the designated market, and thus increases agency cost. Second, the presence of outside assets with negatively skewed returns can further increase the agency cost if the manager is incentivized to pursue outside opportunities. These effects motivate narrow mandates and tight tracking error constraints to most fund managers except those with exceptional talents. Our model sheds light on capital immobility and market segmentation that are widely observed in financial markets, and highlights important effects of negatively skewed risk on institutional incentive structures.