How do risk attitudes of clearing firms matter for managing default exposure in futures markets?

This article proposes a theoretical framework that is built upon extreme value theory to study three instruments (i.e. margin, capital requirement and price limits) for managing default risk in futures markets. Specifically, the exceedances over a price threshold are modeled using a generalized Pareto distribution, and the models are static (one-period). We incorporate the risk attitudes of clearing firms into the framework to investigate the efficacy of these instruments under several risk measures, including value-at-risk measures, expected-shortfall measures and spectral risk measures. An empirical study on the VIX futures (or VX) data shows that the effectiveness of these market instruments rests not only on clearing firms' risk attitudes, but also on the tail fatness of the futures price distribution. Moreover, the shift in the risk attitudes of clearing firms may cause interactions among these instruments, which casts new light on the economic rationale of price limits.     

Optimal clearing arrangements for financial trades

Clearinghouses support financial trades by keeping records of transactions and by providing liquidity through short-term credit that participants clear periodically. We study efficient clearing arrangements for exchanges, where traders must clear with a clearinghouse, and for over-the-counter (OTC) markets, where traders can clear bilaterally. When clearing is costly, it can be efficient to subsidize OTC clearing by charging a higher clearing price for transactions conducted on exchanges. The clearinghouse then operates across both markets. Since clearinghouses offer credit, intertemporal incentives are needed to ensure settlement. When liquidity costs increase, concerns about default lead to a tightening of liquidity provision.     

Default Risk in Futures Markets: The Customer-Broker Relationship

The traditional view of the futures clearinghouse as an insurer that eliminates the need for customers to evaluate default risk is inaccurate. A clearinghouse member default in 1985 confirms that the clearinghouse only guarantees payment from member to member, not from customer to customer or member to customer. Thus, non-defaulting customers are subject to losses as a result of the action of individuals with whom thay have no contractual obligations. This study models the behavior of customers choosing a futures commission merchant (FCM) given the current legal position of the clearinghouse. In a single-period model with symmetric information, customers can eliminate their exposure to defaults of other customers or of their FCM only by choosing to trade through “boutique” (undiversified) FCMs. In practice, monitoring and rebalancing costs may impede the attainment of zero default risk. However, FCM diversification remains an important factor in customer choice of an FCM. When setting capital requirements, clearinghouses and government regulators need to consider the implications of diversification for both customer and market protection.     

Margins and Price Limits in Taiwan's Stock Index Futures Market

This study extends the framework of Brennan (1986) to find the cost-minimizing combination of spot limits, futures limits, and margins for stock and index futures in the Taiwan market. Our empirical results show that the cost-minimization combination of margins, spot price limits, and futures price limits is 7 percent, 6 percent, and 6 percent, respectively, when the index level is less than 7,000. When the index level ranges from 7,000 to 9,000, the efficient futures contract calls for a combination of 6.5 percent, 5 percent, and 6 percent. The optimal margin, reneging probability, and corresponding contract cost are less than those without price limits. Price limits may partially substitute for margin requirements in ensuring contract performance, with a default risk lower than the 0.3 percent rate that is accepted by the Taiwan Futures Exchange. On the other hand, though imposing equal price limits of 7 percent on both the spot and futures markets does not coincide with the efficient contract design, it does have a lower contract cost and margin requirement (7.75 percent) than that without imposing price limits (8.25 percent).     

Derivatives Clearing,Default Risk,and Insurance

Using daily data on margins and variation margins for all clearing members of the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, we analyze the clearing house exposure to the risk of default by clearing members. We find that the major source of default risk for a clearing member is proprietary trading rather than trading by customers. Additionally, we show that extreme losses suffered by important clearing firms tend to cluster, which raises systemic risk concerns. Finally, we discuss how private insurance could be used to cover the loss from defaults by clearing members.     

Setting the futures margin with price limits: the case for single-stock futures

Price limits are artificial boundaries established by regulators to establish the maximum price movement permitted in a single day. We propose using a new censoring method that incorporates the effect of price limits on the futures price distribution and investigates how to set an appropriate daily margin level using single-stock futures in Taiwan. We compare our estimations with those obtained using the method in Longin (J Bus 69:383–408, 1999). The results show that (1) the margin levels derived from the Longin method, which ignore price limits in the estimation, are lower than those in our censoring method; and (2) the legal margin for single-stock futures set at 13.5 % by the Taiwan Futures Exchange to avoid default risk appears to be too high.     

Risk aversion and price limits in futures markets

Assuming that a representative trader is risk-neutral, Brennan [1986. Journal of Financial Economics 16, 213–233] shows that price limits, in conjunction with margins, may help reduce the default risk, lower the margin requirement, and decrease the total contract cost. We show that Brennan's result is true only when the trader's degree of risk aversion is low and the precision of additional information about the equilibrium futures price is also low. When the trader either is more risk-averse or can receive precise information, price limits become ineffective in either reducing the default probability, cutting down the margin requirement, or lowering the contract cost.     

The impact of central clearing on counterparty risk,liquidity, and trading: Evidence from the credit default swap market

This paper examines the impact of central clearing on the credit default swap (CDS) market using a sample of voluntarily cleared single-name contracts. Consistent with central clearing reducing counterparty risk, CDS spreads increase around the commencement of central clearing and are lower than settlement spreads published by the central clearinghouse. Furthermore, the relation between CDS spreads and dealer credit risk weakens after central clearing begins, suggesting a lowering of systemic risk. These findings are robust to controls for frictions in both CDS and bond markets. Finally, matched sample analysis reveals that the increased post-trade transparency following central clearing is associated with an improvement in liquidity and trading activity.     

The Capital Structure of Firms Subject to Price Regulation: Evidence from the Insurance Industry

Automobile and workers' compensation insurance are relatively homogeneous products sold under varying regulatory systems among the states. This paper investigates how price regulation affects the capital structure decisions of profit-maximizing insurers who sell insurance in both competitive and/or regulated markets. Specifically, we test the hypothesis that insurers subject to price regulation will choose to hold less capital. In addition, we hypothesize insurers subject to more stringent regulatory pricing constraints will choose even higher degrees of leverage because the benefits of holding additional amounts of capital are suppressed. We conduct empirical tests using cross-sectional data on insurers and find evidence consistent with both hypotheses. These findings have important implications for insurance price and solvency regulation. Stricter price regulation increases the default risk (i.e., reduces the financial quality) of insurance contracts purchased by individuals and firms.     

Does OTC derivatives reform incentivize central clearing?

Regulatory changes in the over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market seek to reduce systemic risk. The reforms require that standardized derivatives be cleared through central counterparties (CCPs), and they set higher capital and margin requirements for non-centrally cleared derivatives. We investigate whether these requirements create a cost incentive in favor of central clearing, as intended. We compare the total capital and collateral costs when banks transact fully bilaterally and when they clear all contracts through CCPs. We calibrate our model using data on the OTC market collected by the Federal Reserve. We find that the cost incentive may not favor central clearing. The main factors driving the cost comparison are netting benefits, the margin period of risk, and CCP guarantee fund requirements. Lower guarantee fund requirements lower the cost of clearing but make CCPs less resilient.     

SUSTAINABLE GROWTH AND STOCK RETURNS

We examine relations between sustainable growth and stock returns over 1964–2007. Findings indicate that high sustainable growth firms tend to have low default risk, low book‐to‐market ratios, and low subsequent returns. Of the four sustainable growth components, we find that the net profit margin is the major determinant of subsequent returns. Results persist after controlling for asset growth and capital expenditure growth. Additional tests indicate that the sustainable growth effect is attributable to risk and not to mispricing.     

Do Credit Spreads Reflect Stationary Leverage Ratios?

Most structural models of default preclude the firm from altering its capital structure. In practice, firms adjust outstanding debt levels in response to changes in firm value, thus generating mean-reverting leverage ratios. We propose a structural model of default with stochastic interest rates that captures this mean reversion. Our model generates credit spreads that are larger for low-leverage firms, and less sensitive to changes in firm value, both of which are more consistent with empirical findings than predictions of extant models. Further, the term structure of credit spreads can be upward sloping for speculative-grade debt, consistent with recent empirical findings.     

Estimating the frequency of price re-optimization in Calvo-style models

This paper assesses the empirical performance Calvo style models of price re-optimization. We first show that versions of these models in which firms update non-re-optimized prices to lagged inflation account well for the statistical behavior of post-war U.S. inflation rates. We then investigate whether these models imply plausible degrees of inertia in price setting behavior by firms. They do, but only if we depart from two standard auxiliary assumptions: monopolistically competitive firms face a constant elasticity of demand, and capital is homogeneous and can be instantaneously reallocated after a shock. We develop a version of the model in which these assumptions are relaxed and show that it is consistent with the view that firms re-optimize prices, on average, once every two quarters.     

Frailty Correlated Default

The probability of extreme default losses on portfolios of U.S. corporate debt is much greater than would be estimated under the standard assumption that default correlation arises only from exposure to observable risk factors. At the high confidence levels at which bank loan portfolio and collateralized debt obligation (CDO) default losses are typically measured for economic capital and rating purposes, conventionally based loss estimates are downward biased by a full order of magnitude on test portfolios. Our estimates are based on U.S. public nonfinancial firms between 1979 and 2004. We find strong evidence for the presence of common latent factors, even when controlling for observable factors that provide the most accurate available model of firm-by-firm default probabilities.     

Superreplication under model uncertainty in discrete time

We study the superreplication of contingent claims under model uncertainty in discrete time. We show that optimal superreplicating strategies exist in a general measure-theoretic setting; moreover, we characterize the minimal superreplication price as the supremum over all continuous linear pricing functionals on a suitable Banach space. The main ingredient is a closedness result for the set of claims which can be superreplicated from zero capital; its proof relies on medial limits.     

自由现金流量创造力与违约风险——来自A股公司的经验证据

本文基于我国A股上市公司数据,研究了企业自由现金流量创造力与违约风险之间的关系。研究发现：(1)企业自由现金流量创造力越强,其违约风险越低。经过一系列稳健性检验后,该结论依旧成立。(2)自由现金流量创造力越强的企业往往有更低的债务规模、更高的资产收益率和更低的股票波动,因而其违约风险更低。(3)自由现金流量创造力与违约风险的负相关关系,主要存在于货币政策紧缩时期以及外部信息环境较差的企业。本文发现意味着,监管部门和投资者应重视上市公司自由现金流量创造力不足所带来的潜在债务违约风险,通过不断提高公司自由现金流量创造力,助力我国宏观经济与微观企业高质量发展。     

Energy Price Shocks and the Macroeconomy: The Role of Consumer Durables

We create a model with a distinction between investment in consumer durables and capital goods, as well as energy use by households and firms, to evaluate the importance of energy price shocks for output fluctuations. Simulation results indicate that this economy has a smaller proportion of output fluctuations attributable to energy price shocks than one without durable goods and household energy use. We show that an energy price hike is absorbed by reducing investment in durables more than in fixed capital. This rebalancing effect cushions the hit to future production. Thus, productivity shocks remain the prime driver for output fluctuations.     

On the role of arbitrageurs in rational markets

We investigate the role of “arbitrageurs,” who exploit price discrepancies between redundant securities. Arbitrage opportunities arise endogenously in an economy populated by rational, heterogeneous investors facing investment restrictions. We show that an arbitrageur alleviates these restrictions and improves the transfer of risk amongst investors. When the arbitrageur behaves noncompetitively, taking into account the price impact of his trades, he optimally limits the size of his positions due to his decreasing marginal profits. When the arbitrageur is subject to margin requirements and is endowed with capital from outside investors, the size of his trades and capital are endogenously determined in equilibrium.     

Stock price and systematic risk effects of discontinuation of corporate R&D programs

We extend the evidence on whether investors impound efficiently into stock prices new disclosures about corporate R&D programs. We find that firms that disclose the discontinuation of some of their R&D programs experience a significant negative announcement-period stock price response which is worse for growth stocks, for small-size firms, and for firms with low operating cash flow. We find no evidence that R&D discontinuing firms experience an event-induced change in their systematic risk. We find evidence of a one-year-long price reversal; however, it is not robust to controlling for possible risk dimensions for firms with R&D capital that the three-factor model does not capture. Evidently, investors' initial response at disclosures of discontinuation of corporate R&D programs is efficient.     

Innovation and Price Informativeness

We study whether the innovation decisions of a firm are improved as a result of information reflected in the firm's stock price. We show that firms with more informative stock prices, as measured by price nonsynchronicity, have better innovation outcomes, as measured by the number of patents and patent citations. Our results are not driven by managerial private information and are robust to various alternative specifications. We also find that price informativeness is more important to innovation when managers are less experienced or face greater uncertainty about the optimal innovation strategy, and that these effects are primarily observed in small‐ and mid‐sized firms where additional information may be of greater value. Our results are consistent with the notion that capital markets can have real effects on the economy.