Monetary policy and corporate default

When a corporation issues debt with a fixed nominal coupon, the real value of future payments decreases with the price level. Forward-looking corporate default decisions therefore depend on monetary policy through its impact on expected inflation. We build a general equilibrium economy with deadweight bankruptcy costs that demonstrates how nominal rigidities in corporate debt create an important role for monetary policy even in the absence of standard nominal frictions such as staggered price setting in the output market. Under a passive nominal interest rate peg, the direct effects of a negative productivity shock combine with deflation to produce strong incentives for corporate default. A debt-deflationary spiral results when there are real costs of financial distress. Inflation targeting eliminates this amplification mechanism but full inflation targeting requires permitting the nominal interest rate to depend explicitly on credit market conditions.     

The systematic risk of corporate bonds: default risk,term risk,and index choice

In this paper, we empirically examine the systematic risk of corporate bonds in the Euro area. Based on a unique sample of 784 bonds from 1999 to 2010, we show that the systematic risk of constructed bond portfolios and individual bonds—measured against three different market indices—depends on credit quality, term risk, and index choice. A significant increase in systematic risk for lower-rated bonds is observed following the start of the financial crisis. In multi-factor models, bond portfolios load significantly on default and term risk, which are included as additional factors. Conducting Fama and MacBeth cross-sectional tests, we find that default and term risk are priced with economically relevant premiums that range from 0.35 to 0.62 % per month. Our results are robust to the inclusion of characteristics such as rating and time to maturity.     

Credit default swaps and corporate bond trading

Using regulatory data on CDS holdings and corporate bond transactions, I provide evidence for a liquidity spillover effect from CDS to bond markets. Bond trading volumes are 70% larger for investors with CDS positions written on the debt issuer. Moreover, higher CDS trading activity substantially improves the liquidity of the underlying bonds, particularly around rating downgrades. Additional analyses reveal that the spillover effect is partly driven by naked CDS positions, highlighting one of the adverse consequences of naked CDS bans for bond markets. The results suggest that the presence of an accessible CDS market enhances the liquidity of the underlying bond market.     

The syndicate structure of securitized corporate loans

Securitized loans have lower lead bank shares, but larger shares held by non-CLO (collateralized loan obligation) institutional investors than nonsecuritized loans. The result can largely be explained by their degree of information asymmetry and credit risk. We find that lead banks increase their holdings after a nonsecuritized loan becomes securitized, but they do not reduce financial exposure to securitized facilities during the boom of the CLO market. Furthermore, we find that securitized loans do not perform differently from similar nonsecuritized loans. We conclude that differences in syndicate structure are likely shaped by participants’ investment preference rather than a manifestation of adverse selection.     

Improvements in loss given default forecasts for bank loans

An accurate forecast of the parameter loss given default (LGD) of loans plays a crucial role for risk-based decision making by banks. We theoretically analyze problems arising when forecasting LGDs of bank loans that lead to inconsistent estimates and a low predictive power. We present several improvements for LGD estimates, considering length-biased sampling, different loan characteristics depending on the type of default end, and different information sets according to the default status. We empirically demonstrate the capability of our proposals based on a data set of 69,985 defaulted bank loans. Our results are not only important for banks, but also for regulators, because neglecting these issues leads to a significant underestimation of capital requirements.     

Institutional demand pressure and the cost of corporate loans

Between 2001 and 2007, annual institutional funding in highly leveraged loans went up from $32 billion to $426 billion, accounting for nearly 70% of the jump in total syndicated loan issuance over the same period. Did the inflow of institutional funding in the syndicated loan market lead to mispricing of credit? To understand this relation, we look at the institutional demand pressure defined as the number of days a loan remains in syndication. Using market-level and cross-sectional variation in time-on-the-market, we find that a shorter syndication period is associated with a lower final interest rate. The relation is robust to the use of institutional fund flow as an instrument. Furthermore, we find significant price differences between institutional investors’ tranches and banks’ tranches of the same loans, even though they share the same underlying fundamentals. Increasing demand pressure causes the interest rate on institutional tranches to fall below the interest rate on bank tranches. Overall, a one-standard-deviation reduction in average time-on-the-market decreases the interest rate for institutional loans by over 30 basis points per annum. While this effect is significantly larger for loan tranches bought by collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), it is not fully explained by their role.     

Product market advertising and corporate bonds

Research shows that by enhancing visibility, advertising improves stock liquidity and returns. Unlike stock holders, bond holders may view advertising skeptically. Without proven effectiveness in improving revenues, large pre-interest advertising expenditures can be seen as eroding a firm's ability to meet its debt service obligations. We find that although greater advertising by a firm improves liquidity of its bonds in the market, it does not lower the firm's cost of debt. However, firms with ineffective advertising experience reduced bond market liquidity and a higher cost of debt. Without a real positive economic impact, advertising has little or no value for bond investors.     

The effects of credit default swaps on corporate investment

ABSTRACT

This paper examines how credit default swaps (CDS) affect the corporate investment of the referenced entities. We document a significant reduction in corporate investment after CDS trading, a result that is robust to alternative model specifications and a set of endogeneity tests. Our findings of the increased firm risk and cost of capital support the costly external capital channel. The cross-sectional variations in CDS effects demonstrate that both reduced monitoring and the empty creditor problem might be the underlying forces driving the costly external capital channel. Our additional analysis implies that CDS trading is associated with an enhancement in investment efficiency for firms that are prone to overinvestment.     

Orderbook demand for corporate bonds

We examine the determinants of investor demand for corporate bond offerings using novel data on the primary market orderbook size. We find that credit risk and bond market presence are significant in explaining investor demand. These effects are more pronounced during the crisis periods including the global financial crisis and eurozone crisis as well as during the postcrisis periods. Our results also highlight the size of the bond investor order depends on information asymmetry costs and the benefit of diversifications, as investor demand is lower for new issuers as well as very frequent issuers. The levels of investor demand have important economic consequences for bond issuers as high investor demand shortens the time to subsequent bond issues and potentially reduces the firm's cost of capital at issuance.     

Multi-period corporate default prediction with stochastic covariates

We provide maximum likelihood estimators of term structures of conditional probabilities of corporate default, incorporating the dynamics of firm-specific and macroeconomic covariates. For US Industrial firms, based on over 390,000 firm-months of data spanning 1980 to 2004, the term structure of conditional future default probabilities depends on a firm's distance to default (a volatility-adjusted measure of leverage), on the firm's trailing stock return, on trailing S&P 500 returns, and on US interest rates. The out-of-sample predictive performance of the model is an improvement over that of other available models.     

Liquidity,default, taxes,and yields on municipal bonds

We examine the effects of liquidity, default and personal taxes on the relative yields of Treasuries and municipals using a generalized model with liquidity risk. The municipal yield model includes liquidity as a state factor. Using a unique transaction dataset, we estimate the liquidity risk of municipals and its effect on bond yields. Empirical evidence shows that municipal bond yields are strongly affected by all three factors. The effects of default and liquidity risk on municipal yields increase with maturity and credit risk. Liquidity premium accounts for about 9–13% of municipal yields for AAA bonds, 9–15% for AA/A bonds and 8–19% for BBB bonds. A substantial portion of the maturity spread between long- and short-maturity municipal bonds is attributed to the liquidity premium. Ignoring the liquidity risk effect thus results in a severe underestimation of municipal bond yields. Conditional on the effects of default and liquidity risk, we obtain implicit tax rates very close to the statutory tax rates of high-income individuals and institutional investors. Furthermore, these implicit income tax rates are quite stable across bonds of different maturities. Results show that including liquidity risk in the municipal bond pricing model helps explain the muni puzzle.     

Pricing credit card loans with default risks: a discrete-time approach

The main purpose of this paper is to modify the Jarrow and van Deventer model by using Das and Sundaram (Manag Sci 46:46–62, 2000) model to extend the Heath–Jarrow–Morton (J Finan Quant Anal 25:419–440, 1990) term-structure model to facilitate the consideration of default risks for pricing credit card loans. Furthermore, we derive closed-form solutions within a continuous-time framework. In addition, we also provide a numerical method for the evaluation of credit card loans within a discrete-time framework. Using the market segmentation argument to describe the characteristics of the credit card industry, our simulation results show that the shapes of the forward rate and forward spread (default risk premium) term structures play extremely important roles in determining the value of credit card loans.     

Default- and call-adjusted duration for corporate bonds

Call and default can potentially alter the timing and amounts of promised cashflows for callable, corporate bonds. While prior research has indicated the theoretical importance of adjusting Macaulay duration for the impacts of default and call, the question of their relative impact remains a matter of debate [The High Yield Debt Market, Dow Jones Irwin, New York, 1990, p. 18; J. Finan. 53 (1998) 2225]. We develop a theoretical analysis incorporating both default and call effects on duration and test its implications employing a previously unexplored data base of Canadian, investment grade, corporate bond indices containing an unusual provision making it possible to identify callable and noncallable indices.     

The market for borrowing corporate bonds

This paper describes the market for borrowing corporate bonds using a comprehensive data set from a major lender. The cost of borrowing corporate bonds is comparable to the cost of borrowing stock, between 10 and 20 basis points, and both have fallen over time. Factors that influence borrowing costs are loan size, percentage of inventory lent, rating, and borrower identity. There is no evidence that bond short sellers have private information. Bonds with Credit Default Swaps (CDS) contracts are more actively lent than those without. Finally, the 2007 Credit Crunch does not affect average borrowing costs or loan volume, but does increase borrowing cost variance.     

Machine learning loss given default for corporate debt

We apply multiple machine learning (ML) methods to model loss given default (LGD) for corporate debt using a common dataset that is cross-sectional but collected over different time periods and shows much variation over time. We investigate the efficacy of three cross-validation (CV) schemes for hyper-parameter tuning and bootstrap aggregation (Bagging) in preventing out-of-time model performance deterioration. The three CV methods are shuffled K-fold, unshuffled K-fold and sequential blocked, which completely destroys, keeps some and completely retains the chronological order in the data, respectively. We find that it is important to keep the chronological order in the data when creating the training and testing samples, and the more the chronological order that can be retained, the more stable the out-of-time ML LGD model performance. By contrast, although bagging improves out-of-time fit in some cases, its effectiveness is rather marginal relative to that from the unshuffled K-fold and sequential blocked CV methods. Substantial uncertainty in relative out-of-time performance remains, however, thus ongoing model performance monitoring and benchmarking are still essential for sound model risk management for corporate LGD and other ML models.     

The impact of corporate social responsibility on the cost of bank loans

This study examines the link between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and bank debt. Our focus on banks exploits their specialized role as delegated monitors of the firm. Using a sample of 3996 loans to US firms, we find that firms with social responsibility concerns pay between 7 and 18 basis points more than firms that are more responsible. Lenders are more sensitive to CSR concerns in the absence of security. We document a mixed reaction to discretionary CSR investments. Low-quality borrowers that engage in discretionary CSR spending face higher loan spreads and shorter maturities, but lenders are indifferent to CSR investments by high-quality borrowers.     

Owner liability and financial reporting information as predictors of firm default in bank loans

We examine the effects of owner liability and non-accounting and financial accounting information on the probability of default as defined in Basel II in bank loan contracted by non listed firms. We model default as a function of owner liability and accounting and non-accounting information of non-listed firms, drawing on 43,117 annual accounts of 16,029 firms over a 7-year period. Our estimations based on mixed logistic regressions with random parameters show that the predicted default probability of full-liability firms is 0.72 times that of limited liability firms. The likelihood ratio test for omitted variables confirms the additional predictive ability of liability status over and above other non-accounting and financial accounting information. A Heckman self-selection model does not indicate sampling bias. The particular definition of default used in the study enables the findings to be generalizable across other institutional contexts.     

Why government bonds are sold by auction and corporate bonds by posted-price selling

When information is costly, a seller may wish to prevent prospective buyers from acquiring information, for the cost of information acquisition ultimately is borne by the seller. A seller can achieve the desired prevention through posted-price selling, by offering prospective buyers a discount. No such prevention is possible in the case of an auction. We establish the result that the seller prefers posted-price selling when the cost of information acquisition is high and auctions when it is low. We view corporate bonds as an instance of the former case, and government bonds as an instance of the latter.     

Momentum spillover from stocks to corporate bonds

We investigate and improve momentum spillover from stocks to corporate bonds, i.e. the phenomenon that past winners in the equity market are future winners in the corporate bond market. We find that a momentum spillover strategy exhibits strong structural and time-varying default risk exposures that cause a drag on the profitability of the strategy and lead to large drawdowns if the market cycle turns from a bear to a bull market. By ranking companies on their firm-specific equity return, instead of their total equity return, the default risk exposures halve, the Sharpe ratio doubles and the drawdowns are substantially reduced.