Environmental participation in the U.S. sulfur allowance auctions

The 1990 Clean Air Act established a sulfur emissions-trading program among utilities. This was the first large scale adoption of this type of emissions-trading program and the program’s success has attracted international attention. An interesting aspect of this program is that in addition to trades among the polluting firms and brokers or investors, individuals and groups have been participants, buying allowances to retire them and reduce sulfur emissions. This provides a relatively unique way to examine the “willingness to pay” for further reductions of sulfur emissions. I examine environmental participation in the sulfur allowances market, focusing on the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) allowance auctions which have been conducted annually since 1993. The existence of groups purchasing these allowances in order to retire them suggests that the overall cap on sulfur emissions may be higher than the optimal emissions level. The marginal benefits from the first ton of emissions reduction appear to be significantly larger than marginal abatement costs. Total spending to retire sulfur emissions allowances, while small in relation to the total market, is sizeable in terms of the alternate purchases these groups and individuals could have made.      

Does energy‐related aid affect emissions? Evidence from a global dataset

Donor countries have been using international aid in the field of energy for at least three decades. The stated objective of this policy is to reduce emissions and promote sustainable development in the global South. In spite of the widespread use of this policy tool, very little is known about its effect on emissions. In this paper we perform an empirical audit of the effectiveness of energy‐related aid in tackling CO₂ and SO₂ emissions. Using a global panel dataset covering 128 countries over the period 1971–2011 and estimating a parsimonious model using the Anderson and Hsiao estimator, we do not find any evidence of a systematic effect of energy‐related aid on emissions. We also find that the non‐effect is not conditional on institutional quality or level of income. Countries located in Europe and Central Asia do better than others in utilizing this aid to reduce CO₂ emissions. Our results are robust after controlling for the environmental Kuznets curve, country fixed effects, country‐specific trends, and time‐varying common shocks.     

The regulatory choice of noncompliance in emissions trading programs

This paper addresses the following question: To achieve a fixed aggregate emissions target cost-effectively, should emissions trading programs be designed and implemented to achieve full compliance, or does allowing a certain amount of noncompliance reduce the costs of reaching the emissions target? The total costs of achieving the target consist of aggregate abatement costs, monitoring costs, and the expected costs of collecting penalties from noncompliant firms. Under common assumptions, I show that allowing noncompliance is cost-effective only if violations are enforced with an increasing marginal penalty. However, one can design a policy that induces full compliance with a constant marginal penalty that meets the aggregate emissions target with lower expected costs. This last result does not depend on setting an arbitrarily high constant marginal penalty. In fact, the marginal penalty need not be higher than the equilibrium marginal penalty under the policy with the increasing marginal penalty, and can actually be lower. Finally, tying the marginal penalty directly to the permit price allows the policy objective to be achieved without any knowledge of firms’ abatement costs.     

External balance,dynamic efficiency,and the welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral permit policies in interdependent economies

This paper investigates domestic and foreign welfare effects of unilateral and multilateral permit policies in a two-country overlapping generations model with producer carbon emissions. We show that the welfare effects of a more stringent cap on emissions depend on the external balance of the policy implementing country, the dynamic (in)efficiency of the world economy, and the preference for environmental quality. Under dynamic efficiency, the global welfare loss of policy implementation in a net foreign creditor country is lower than of a policy in the net foreign debtor country. Moreover, although the country which has unilaterally implemented a permit policy would gain from a multilateral policy, the associated welfare loss for the other country is larger than that of a unilateral policy abroad.     

Public Sector Pricing,Capital Mobility and National Income: A Two‐Sector General‐Equilibrium Analysis

Abstract This paper examines the resource allocation and income effects of public‐sector pricing. During the short run, raising public‐sector prices leads to a worsening in public‐sector efficiency, causing a decline in GNP. In the intermediate run, the policy begins to improve public‐sector efficiency and, hence, increases GNP. At the outset of the transition to a steady state, the pricing policy continues to improve efficiency. Nevertheless, efficiency and GNP remain invariant across steady states in the long‐run equilibrium. The implications of the pricing policy are also discussed.     

Do technology externalities justify restrictions on emission permit trading?

International emission trading is an important flexibility mechanism, but its use has been often restricted on the ground that access to international carbon credits can undermine the domestic abatement effort reducing the incentive to innovate and, eventually, lowering the pace of climate policy-induced technological change. This paper examines the economics that is behind these concerns by studying how a cap to the trade of carbon offsets influences innovation, technological change, and welfare. By using a standard game of abatement and R&D, we investigate the main mechanisms that shape these relationships. We also use a numerical integrated assessment model that features environmental and technology externalities to quantify how limits to the volume, the timing, and the regional allocation of carbon offsets affect climate policy costs and the incentive to invest in innovation and low-carbon technologies.Results indicate that, for moderate caps on the amount tradable emissions permits and sufficiently high technology spillovers, global innovation and technical change would increase and that this additional innovative effort could lead to economic efficiency gains. The numerical analysis confirms that when constraints are close to 15% of domestic abatement, efficiency losses are small because they are partly compensated by more technological spillovers and lower energy prices. Under a broad range of parameters, restrictions are costly for the constrained countries, but always beneficial for unconstrained ones.     

The taxation of capital returns in overlapping generations models

This paper shows that in the Diamond (1965) overlapping generations economy with production and capital savings, there is a period-by-period balanced fiscal policy supporting a steady state allocation that Pareto-improves upon the laissez-faire competitive equilibrium steady state (whether dynamically inefficient or efficient) without resorting to intergenerational transfers. The policy consists of taxing linearly (or subsidizing, in the dynamically efficient case) the returns to capital, while balancing the budget period by period through a lump-sum transfer (or tax, respectively) in second period. This intervention grants every generation the highest steady state utility attainable through markets (i.e. remunerating factors by their marginal productivities and without transfers) which under laissez-faire is not a competitive equilibrium outcome. A transition from the competitive equilibrium steady state to this other steady state is also Pareto-improving when the former is dynamically inefficient. The result disentangles from redistributive considerations the impact of the taxation of capital returns on steady state welfare, and thus provides a rationale for the taxation of capital returns that is based on efficiency considerations and not on redistributive goals.     

Policy implications of potential conflicts between short-term and long-term efficiency in CO2 emissions abatement

This paper shows that, under certain conditions (including path dependence and lock-in), policies and measures leading to a cost-effective GHG emissions mitigation in the short term may not allow reaching long-term emissions targets at the lowest possible cost, that is, they might not be cost-effective in the long term. The reason is that, in a situation where currently expensive technologies have a large potential for cost reductions through learning effects and R&D investments, the implementation of incentive-based mitigation policies such as taxes or tradable permits will encourage the adoption and diffusion of currently low-cost abatement technologies, but might not be enough to make attractive the diffusion of expensive ones, which is a necessary condition for these technologies to realise their cost-reduction potential through the aforementioned effects. A simple model and a numerical simulation are provided to show this possible conflict between static and dynamic efficiency, which points out to the need to combine different instruments, some aiming at short-term cost-efficiency (such as incentive-based environmental policy) and others at encouraging dynamic cost reductions (such as technology/innovation policy).     

Macroeconomic implications of modeling the Internal Revenue Code in a heterogeneous-agent framework

Tax policy analysis in heterogeneous-agent models typically involves the use of smooth tax functions to approximate complex present tax law and proposed reforms. In this paper, we explore the extent to which the tax detail omitted under this conventional approach has macroeconomic implications relevant for policy analysis. To do this, we develop an alternative approach by embedding an internal tax calculator into a large-scale overlapping generations model that, while conditioning on idiosyncratic household characteristics, explicitly models key provisions in the Internal Revenue Code applied to labor income. We find that for a debt-constant steady state analysis of a given tax policy change, both approaches generate similar policy-induced patterns of macroeconomic activity despite variation in the underlying patterns of household tax-preferred consumption and labor supply behavior. However, this variation in underlying behavior is associated with significant quantitative and qualitative differences in macroeconomic aggregates along a debt-financed transition path immediately following a policy change. Consequentially, although the use of unconditional smooth tax functions may be a reasonable modeling simplification for steady state analysis of tax policy, caution should be taken for their use in transition path analysis within heterogeneous-agent models.     

Strategic partitioning of emission allowances under the EU Emission Trading Scheme

The EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS) is breaking new ground in the experience with emission trading regimes across multiple jurisdictions. Since the EU ETS covers only some industries, it implies a hybrid emission control scheme where EU member states must apply complementary domestic emissions regulation for the non-trading sectors of their economies in order to comply with their national emission reduction targets. The EU ETS thus opens up for strategic partitioning of national emissions budgets by the member states between trading and non-trading sectors. In this paper we examine the potential effects of such strategic behavior on compliance cost and emissions prices. We show that concerns on efficiency losses from strategic partitioning are misplaced. In turn, our analysis implicitly indicates significant political economy forces behind EU climate policy, as both cost-effective and strategically motivated partitioning of national emission budgets are far off from the actual break-down between trading and non-trading sectors.     

“More is less”: the tax effects of ignoring flow externalities

Using a model of non-linear, non-monotone decay of the stock pollutant, and starting from the same initial conditions, the paper shows that an optimal tax that corrects for both stock and flow externalities may result in a lower tax, fewer cumulative emissions (less decay in emissions) and higher output at the steady state than a corrective tax that ignores the flow externality. This “more is less” result emphasizes that setting a corrective tax that ignores the flow externality, or imposing a corrective tax at too low a level where there exists only a stock externality, may affect both transitory and steady-state output, tax payments and cumulative emissions. The result has important policy implications for decision makers setting optimal corrective taxes and targeted emission limits whenever stock externalities exist.     

Managing Permit Markets to Stabilize Prices

The political economy of environmental policy favors the use of quantity-based instruments over price-based instruments (e.g., tradable permits over green taxes), at least in the United States. With cost uncertainty, however, there are clear efficiency advantages to prices in cases where the marginal damages of emissions are relatively flat, such as with greenhouse gases. The question arises, therefore, of whether one can design flexible quantity policies that mimic the behavior of price policies, namely stable permit prices and abatement costs. We explore a number of “quantity-plus” policies that replicate the behavior of a price policy through rules that adjust the effective permit cap for unexpectedly low or high costs. They do so without necessitating any monetary exchanges between the government and the regulated firms, which can be a significant political barrier to the use of price instruments.     

政策性负担、道德风险与预算软约束

本文在一个动态博弈的框架下 ,考察了政策性负担与转轨经济中企业的预算软约束问题。在信息不对称情况下 ,政策性负担将导致国有企业经理的道德风险 ,从而导致国有企业的低效率 ;当市场竞争达到一定程度时 ,政策性负担必然带来国有企业的预算软约束。而且 ,预算软约束同企业的公有制性质无关 ,在同样承担政策性负担的条件下 ,私有企业比国有企业更容易产生预算软约束 ,并且要求政府提供更多的补贴。当国有企业承担政策性负担时 ,政府剥夺企业的生产自主权往往是一种次优的制度安排     

人工智能技术对碳排放的影响

随着新一轮科技革命和产业变革的深入推进,人工智能技术在应对气候变化方面扮演重要角色,并赋能“碳达峰、碳中和”目标的实现。利用2006—2019年中国内地省级面板数据,考察人工智能技术对碳排放的影响。研究发现：人工智能技术与碳排放之间呈倒U型关系,即当人工智能技术达到一定阈值后,其碳减排效应逐渐凸显;人工智能技术主要通过提高能源利用效率实现碳减排;在东部和西部地区,人工智能技术与碳排放之间存在显著倒U型关系,而在中部地区,人工智能技术对碳排放发挥持续促进作用。因此,在推进“双碳”目标过程中,需要以绿色低碳发展为目标开发人工智能技术,正确引导人工智能在碳减排领域的研发应用,针对不同区域实际制定差异化发展政策。     

Carbon leakage revisited: unilateral climate policy with directed technical change

Using a stylized theoretical model, we argue that current economic analyses of climate policy tend to over-estimate the degree of carbon leakage, as they abstract from the effects of induced technological change. We analyse carbon leakage in a two-country model with directed technical change, where only one of the countries enforces an exogenous cap on emissions. Climate policy induces changes in relative prices, that cause carbon leakage through a terms-of-trade effect. However, these changes in relative prices also affect the incentives to innovate in different sectors. This leads to a counterbalancing induced-technology effect, which always reduces carbon leakage. We therefore conclude that the leakage rates reported in the literature may be too high, as these estimates neglect the effect of price changes on the incentives to innovate.      

Precautionary Principle and Robustness for a Stock Pollutant with Multiplicative Risk

The interest shown by policy makers and economists in the precautionary principle indicates the importance of model uncertainty in global warming policy. I show that through robust control, policy makers can implement the precautionary principle to regulate a stock pollutant, and I analyze its effect on expected steady state pollution taxes, stocks and welfare. The paper is broadly comprised of a theoretical part and an application to global warming policy. I find that: (1) an increase in either uncertainty about the model or risk about abatement cost increases expected steady state pollution taxes; (2) a robust policy is preferred for any level of model uncertainty and this preference increases for either higher model uncertainty or higher multiplicative risk and (3) the effect on expected steady state pollution taxes and stock of introducing model uncertainty is relatively small for high levels of model uncertainty. These results advocate using robust policies for a stock pollutant in the presence of model uncertainty.      

Sustainable management of renewable resources: an experimental investigation in continuous time

This study addresses one of the most basic questions in renewable resource management: the ability of economic agents to exploit a renewable resource in an efficient and sustainable manner. In a laboratory experiment, subjects are presented with renewable resource extraction problems, where optimal management will lead to a stable steady state. A test of sustainability of the extraction practices shows that extraction behaviour results in steady states only 56% of the time. The mode of the steady state distribution coincides with the optimal steady state extraction. The trade-off between accruing a higher payoff in the present and sustaining the resource for future exploitation leads to suboptimal behaviours such as initial overextraction of the resource compared to the optimal extraction policy, costly downward adjustment of the extraction later in time, and settling down for lower long-run resource and extraction. The suboptimal behaviours lead to 17% loss in efficiency on average in terms of the accumulated payoff. We further look at extraction behaviour in terms of the degree of impatience it projects and find, based on their extraction decisions, that most of our subjects seem more impatient in managing their resource than is justified by the decision-making problem presented to them.     

Endogenous business cycles and systematic stabilization policy*

We study the effects of fiscal policy rules on the determinacy of rational expectations equilibrium in a perfectly competitive monetary model with constant returns. Government spending implies a distortion of the monetary steady state due to the implied taxation. We show that policy rules that let the GNP share of government spending depend sufficiently negatively on increases in GNP stabilize the economy with respect to endogenous fluctuations for arbitrarily little distortion of the steady state at which stabilization occurs. The rules do not involve lump‐sum taxation, negative income taxation, or exact knowledge of the economy's laissez‐faire steady state.     

排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的传导机制研究

从企业的目标函数和生产函数两个角度出发,分析了排污权交易政策对企业环保行为的影响机理,并讨论了排污权交易政策下企业的环保行为选择。研究发现：排污权交易政策通过影响企业的资本要素分配,从而影响企业环境资源的使用成本,进而影响企业的生产和环保行为决策;在排污权交易政策的作用下,企业主要采取不同的污染治理投资策略来满足该政策的规制。基于此,政府应制定配套政策和措施,引导企业沿着“政策遵从—环保投资策略—新环保技术采纳”的行为选择路径进行行为决策,以实现排污权交易政策的目标。     

碳交易政策下区域减排潜力研究——产业结构调整与技术创新双重视角

加快产业结构调整和技术创新对于充分激发碳交易政策的区域碳减排潜力具有重要推动作用。基于2005-2017年中国内地30个省域面板数据,采用DID和PSM-DID方法评估碳交易政策对碳排放和碳排放强度的影响,在SFA模型测算技术创新效率的基础上,从产业结构高级化、合理化和技术创新效率两个方面探讨碳交易政策的作用机制,同时运用固定效应模型进行分区域验证。结果表明：碳交易政策能推动试点和非试点地区协同减排;不同经济发展水平地区,从东部、中部到西部,碳交易政策的碳减排效应逐渐减弱;产业结构调整中,产业结构高级化更多受益于碳交易政策,产业结构合理化作用较弱,技术创新效率提升效果也较为明显。基于此,从完善碳市场建设、制定差异化政策、注重产业结构调整和技术创新协同减排等方面提出相应政策建议,旨在促进区域绿色高质量发展。