中国、德国和美国商业银行效率差异及其比较优势分析

本文基于经济学不完全竞争条件下利润最大化概念修正了利润效率模型,基于成本最小化概念从营业费用的角度修正了成本效率模型,结合财务指标分析了中国、德国和美国商业银行效率的比较优势。研究发现,德国商业银行以资源利用效率见长;美国商业银行结合混业经营和发达的金融市场创新能力强,不仅非利息业务收入水平高,而且资产流动性强、净息差水平高;中国金融市场不发达,商业银行分业经营创新能力不足,盈利能力得益于政策性利差及低风险的中间业务收入增长,大型商业银行资源利用效率低。银行创新类业务在世界金融危机中损失惨重而传统信贷业务和中间业务成为保持盈利水平的主要力量。     

Derivatives usage,securitization, and the crash sensitivity of bank stocks

We show that the information on derivatives usage and securitization activities of U.S. banks as disclosed in their pre-crisis 10-K filings explains extreme equity returns of banks during the financial crisis. Stocks of banks that had previously disclosed a more extensive use of financial derivatives and loan securitization were more likely to experience extreme losses. Our findings are consistent with investors viewing banks that used derivatives for non-hedging purposes as highly vulnerable to the crisis. Moreover, banks which had significant securitization activities and were thus potentially exposed to under-capitalized risks from conduits possess a higher vulnerability of their equity to market downturns.     

Anatomy of a bail-in

To mitigate potential contagion from future banking crises, the European Commission recently proposed a framework which would provide for the bail-in of bank creditors in the event of failure. In this study, we examine this framework retrospectively in the context of failed European banks during the global financial crisis. Empirical findings suggest that equity and subordinated bond holders would have been the main losers from the €535 billion impairment losses realized by failed European banks. Losses attributed to senior debt holders would, on aggregate, have been proportionally small, while no losses would have been imposed on depositors. Cross-country analysis, incorporating stress-tests, reveals a divergence of outcomes with subordinated debt holders wiped out in a number of countries, while senior debt holders of Greek, Austrian and Irish banks would have required bail-in.     

The impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks stocks. Some evidence of shift contagion in Europe

This paper analyzes the influence of the recent European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns for 15 countries. Our data span the period December 14th 2007 - March 8th 2013 that encompasses several episodes of economic and financial turmoil since the collapse of the subprime credit market. Our contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we use an explicit multifactor model of equity returns extended with a sovereign risk factor. Second, we adopt a Smooth Transition Regression (STR) framework that allows for an endogenous definition of crisis periods and captures the changes in parameters associated with shift contagion. We find that the negative impact of the European sovereign debt crisis on banks’ equity returns has been mostly confined to European banks, whereas U.S. banks appear to be unharmed by its direct impact and may even have benefited from it. Besides, we find some evidence of shift contagion across Europe.     

Financial instruments,financial reporting,and financial stability

I review new empirical evidence from the recent financial crisis on the relation between financial reporting and financial stability. I draw the following conclusions: First, there is still no evidence that fair value accounting caused widespread fire sales of asset or contagion. Second, the empirical evidence suggests that accounting and regulation might have contributed to the crisis by allowing several banks to delay actions. Third, even if share prices reacted positively to the relaxation of fair value accounting rules during the crisis, the origin of the problem might be lax rules that allowed banks to run into financial and regulatory problems. Fourth, fair values can be relevant for assets that a bank intends to hold until maturity if that bank strongly relies on short-term financing. Fifth, the recognition of fair values is no substitute for information that allows investors to judge a bank's risk exposure and the validity of reported fair values.     

Crossborder financial contagion to Germany: How important are OTC dealers?

We examine crossborder contagion from a number of financial systems to the German financial system using the information content of CDS prices in a GARCH model. After controlling for common factors which may cause comovement in security prices, we find evidence for contagion from the US and European financial systems. Assessing contagion for dealer and non-dealer banks suggests that contagion from dealer banks is the most prominent source of contagion to the German financial system. While German non-dealer banks are affected both by European and US dealers, only US dealer banks have a contagion effect to German dealer banks.     

The effects of news events on market contagion: Evidence from the 2007–2009 financial crisis

In this paper, we use the quantile regression technique along with coexceedance, a contagion measure, to assess the extent to which news events contribute to contagion in the stock markets during the crisis period between 2007 and 2009. Studies have shown that, not only the subprime crisis leads to a global recession, but the effects on the global stock markets have also been significant. We track the news events, both in the UK and the US, using the global recession timeline. We observe that the news events related to ad hoc bailouts of individual banks from the UK have a contagion effect throughout the period for most of the countries under investigation. This, however, is not found to be the case for the news events originating from the US. Our findings regarding the evidence of contagion effects in the UK reinforce the argument that spreads and contagion—an outcome of the risk perception of financial markets—are solely a result of the behaviour of investors or other financial market participants.     

Securitization without risk transfer

We analyze asset-backed commercial paper conduits, which experienced a shadow-banking run and played a central role in the early phase of the financial crisis of 2007–2009. We document that commercial banks set up conduits to securitize assets worth $1.3 trillion while insuring the newly securitized assets using explicit guarantees. We show that regulatory arbitrage was an important motive behind setting up conduits. In particular, the guarantees were structured so as to reduce regulatory capital requirements, more so by banks with less capital, and while still providing recourse to bank balance sheets for outside investors. Consistent with such recourse, we find that conduits provided little risk transfer during the run, as losses from conduits remained with banks instead of outside investors and banks with more exposure to conduits had lower stock returns.     

The formation of financial networks

Modern banking systems are highly interconnected. Despite various benefits, linkages between banks carry the risk of contagion. In this article, I investigate whether banks can commit ex ante to mutually insure each other, when there is contagion risk in the financial system. I model banks' decisions to share this risk through bilateral agreements. A financial network that allows losses to be shared among various counterparties arises endogenously. I characterize the probability of systemic risk, defined as the event that contagion occurs conditional on one bank failing, in equilibrium interbank networks. I show that there exist equilibria in which contagion does not occur.     

商业银行流动性危机传染机理研究

银行危机传染往往给一个国家或地区的经济带来巨大的损失.不完全的银行间拆借市场中隐含了更大的银行危机传染的可能性;银行间的长期资产越多,银行间拆借的短期利率和银行间存款的长期利率越高,银行间拆借市场就越稳定,在遭受流动性冲击时,这一市场发生银行危机传染的可能性就越小.适量的银行存款对传染效应具有阻碍作用.为防范系统性风险,中国商业银行应逐步建立完备的银行间存款市场,减少政府干预,让市场约束力来强化商业银行的风险管理意识.     

Shadow Banking,Risk Transfer,and Financial Stability

Shadow banking is the process by which banks raise funds from and transfer risks to entities outside the traditional commercial banking system. Many observers blamed the sudden expansion in 2007 of U.S. sub‐prime mortgage market disruptions into a global financial crisis on a “liquidity run” that originated in the shadow banking system and spread to commercial banks. In response, national and international regulators have called for tighter and new regulations on shadow banking products and participants. Preferring the term “market‐based finance” to the term “shadow banking,” the authors explore the primary financial instruments and participants that comprise the shadow banking system. The authors review the 2007–2009 period and explain how runs on shadow banks resulted in a liquidity crisis that spilled over to commercial banks, but also emphasize that the economic purpose of shadow banking is to enable commercial banks to raise funds from and transfer risks to non‐bank institutions. In that sense, the shadow banking system is a shock absorber for risks that arise within the commercial banking system and are transferred to a more diverse pool of non‐bank capital instead of remaining concentrated among commercial banks. The article also reviews post‐crisis regulatory initiatives aimed at shadow banking and concludes that most such regulations could result in a less stable financial system to the extent that higher regulatory costs on shadow banks like insurance companies and asset managers could discourage them from participating in shadow banking. And the net effect of this regulation, by limiting the amount of market‐based capital available for non‐bank risk transfer, may well be to increase the concentrations of risk in the banking and overall financial system.     

A network model of systemic risk: stress testing the banking system1

Although there are many definitions of systemic risk, most agree that it manifests itself by an initial shock that results in the failure of one or more banks and then spreads out to the entire system by a contagion mechanism which can result in the failure of more banks in the system. Assuming that bank failures in the initial shock are randomly dependent on the failure probabilities of the individual banks and that the ensuing contagion process is deterministic, depending on interbank exposures, in this paper we propose a network model to analyse systemic risk in the banking system that, in contrast to other proposed models, seeks to obtain the probability distribution of losses for the financial system resulting from the shock/contagion process. Thus, calculating the probabilities of joint failures by simulation and assuming that the matrix of bilateral interbank exposures is known, we represent systemic risk in the financial system by means of a graph and use discrete modelling techniques to characterize the dynamics of contagion and corresponding losses within the network. The probability distribution of losses, risk profile for the Mexican banking system, is obtained through an efficient, complete enumeration procedure of all possible bank default events in the system. This, in turn, allows the use of the wide variety of well-established risk measures to describe the fragility of the financial system. Additionally, the model allows us to perform stress tests along both the bank default probabilities and the interbank exposures and is used to assess the risk of the Mexican banking system. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

International compliance with new Basel Accord principles for risk governance

We assess international compliance with the Basel Committee's 2010 guidance on governance of banking organisations. Based on an extensive examination of regulatory documents in selected advanced economies, we find that reform is incomplete in jurisdictions most affected by the financial crisis, and with the largest financial centres. In contrast, other countries less affected by the financial crisis have enacted risk governance reforms as protection against potential future contagion. We provide insights for policy‐makers charged with improving governance at banks, and a richer understanding for international regulators as they revise the guidelines and aim for greater compliance at the national level.     

How to explain non-performing loans by many corporate governance variables simultaneously? A corporate governance index is built to US commercial banks

This paper aims to combine the principal component analysis and GMM dynamic panel data methods in order to estimate the effect of corporate governance system on non-performing loans. The first method is meant to construct a corporate governance index for US commercial banks. The second one allows us to study the relation between the built index and non-performing loans. The advantage of the combination of these methods is reducing the number of corporate governance variables into a single one and ensuring the consistency of GMM estimates, given that a high number of variables leads to an increase in the number of GMM instruments, which in turns results in biased estimators. Applying these methods to US commercial banks, for a period including the financial crisis years, we find that small banks are characterized by a sound corporate governance system that reduces their non-performing loans. In opposition, the corporate governance fails to protect medium and large US commercial banks from excessive risk-taking that damages their loans’ quality and even leads to enormous losses especially during the global financial crisis.     

Orange County Bankruptcy: Financial Contagion in the Municipal Bond and Bank Equity Markets

We examine the spillover wealth effects of the Orange County, California bankruptcy announcement in December 1994 on municipal bonds, municipal bond funds, and bank stocks. This bankruptcy is prominent because of unprecedented losses and because it was caused by a highly leveraged derivatives strategy rather than a shortage of tax revenues and excess spending. We find contagion in the bond market with significantly negative abnormal returns for municipal bond funds without direct exposure to Orange County and for non‐Orange County municipal bonds. In addition, our findings suggest the contagion spills over to the common stocks of investment and commercial banks that deal in or use derivatives; however, the equities of banks unexposed to derivatives are not affected.     

浅议商业银行的财务危机及其化解策略

财务危机是指商业银行经营过程中由于费用成本过大,收入减少,或资产出现严重损失,造成财务亏损或资不抵债的一种经济现象。化解商业银行财务危机的紧急有效措施是采取减员增效、压缩节支等手段,而从根本上解除财务危机在于不断提高商业银行的经营质量,做到既好又快地发展。     

Market reactions to policy deliberations on fair value accounting and impairment rules during the financial crisis of 2008–2009

Fair value accounting (FVA) has been blamed for amplifying the financial crisis of 2008–2009. We investigate investor and creditor reactions to policymaker deliberations, recommendations and decisions about FVA and impairment rules in the banking industry. If FVA was a key contributor to the financial crisis as some industry pundits and academic research suggest, we first should observe positive stock market reactions to proposals that relax FVA rules and negative reactions when policymakers support FVA. Second, we investigate cross-sectional stock price reactions to bank-specific factors that potentially contributed to pro-cyclical contagion. Third, we examine whether banks that have fewer alternative sources of information about fair values experience relatively negative reactions to potential relaxation of FVA and impairment rules. Finally, we investigate credit market reactions to these policy deliberations, recommendations and decisions by examining changes in credit default swap spreads for a subset of banks in our sample.     

The US financial crisis,market volatility,credit risk and stock returns in the Americas

We employ the multivariate DCC-GARCH model to identify contagion from the USA to the largest developed and emerging markets in the Americas during the US financial crisis. We analyze the dynamic conditional correlations between stock market returns, changes in the general economy’s credit risk represented by the TED spread, and changes in the US market volatility represented by the CBOE Volatility Index^® (VIX). Our sample includes daily closing prices from January 1, 2002 to December 31, 2015, for the USA and stock markets in Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and Peru. We first identify that increases in VIX have a negative intertemporal and contemporaneous relationship with most of the stock returns, and these relationships increase significantly during the US financial crisis. We then find evidence of significant increases in contemporaneous conditional correlations between changes in the TED spread and stock returns. Increases in conditional correlations during the financial crisis are associated with financial contagion from the USA to the Americas. Our findings have policy implications and are of interest to practitioners since they illustrate that during periods of financial distress, US stock volatility and weakening credit market conditions could promote financial contagion to the Americas.

     

TRADER EXPLOITATION OF ORDER FLOW INFORMATION DURING THE LTCM CRISIS

By using a unique data set of audit trail transactions, I examine the trading behavior of market makers in the Treasury-bond futures market during the Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) crisis in 1998. I find strong evidence that during the crisis market makers in the aggregate engaged in anticipatory trading against customer orders from a particular clearing firm (coded PI7) that closely match various features of LTCM's trades through Bear Stearns. I also show that a significant percentage of market makers made abnormal profits during the crisis. Their aggregate abnormal profits, however, were more than offset by abnormal losses following the recapitalization of LTCM.     

How did a domestic housing slump turn into a global financial crisis?

The global financial crisis clearly started with problems in the U.S. sub-prime sector and spread across the world from there. But was the direct exposure of foreigners to the U.S. financial system a key driver of the crisis, or did other factors account for its rapid contagion across the world? To answer this question, we assessed whether countries that held large amounts of U.S. mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and were highly dependent on dollar funding experienced a greater degree of financial distress during the crisis. We found little evidence of such direct spillovers from the United States to abroad. Although CDS spreads generally rose higher and bank stocks generally fell lower in countries with more exposure to U.S. MBS and greater dollar funding needs, these correlations were not robust, and they fail to explain the lion’s share of the deterioration in asset prices that took place during the crisis. Accordingly, less tangible channels of contagion may have played a more important role in the global spread of the crisis: a generalized run on global financial institutions, given the opacity of their balance sheets; excessive dependence on short-term funding; vicious cycles of mark-to-market losses driving fire sales of MBS; the realization that financial firms around the world were pursuing similar (flawed) business models; and global swings in risk aversion. The U.S. sub-prime crisis, rather than being a fundamental driver of the global crisis, may have been merely a trigger for a global bank run and for disillusionment with a risky business model that already had spread around the world.