Conditions for equivalence between sequentiality and subgame perfection

We characterize the class of finite extensive forms for which the sets of Subgame Perfect and Sequential equilibrium strategy profiles coincide for any possible payoff function. In addition, we identify the class of finite extensive forms for which the outcomes induced by these two solution concepts coincide. We thank Luis Corchón, Francesco De Sinopoli, Herbert Gintis, Sjaak Hurkens, Francisco Marhuenda, Eric Maskin and four anonymous referees for helpful comments. Carlos thanks the financial support of the Spanish MEC through its FPI Grant BES-2003-0822. Cristian thanks the grant Plan de Formación de Personal Investigador de la Comunidad de Madrid and the financial support from project No. SEJ2004-00968/ECON from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Games of strategic complementarities: an application to Bayesian games

This paper provides an introduction to the theory of games of strategic complementarities, considers Bayesian games, and provides an application to global games. This paper is based on the Spanish Economic Review lecture given at the Simposio de Análisis Económico, Alicante, December 2001. Support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (project SEJ2005-08263) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Procedurally fair and stable matching

Summary. We motivate procedural fairness for matching mechanisms and study two procedurally fair and stable mechanisms: employment by lotto (Aldershof et al. , 1999) and the random order mechanism (Roth and Vande Vate, 1990, Ma, 1996). For both mechanisms we give various examples of probability distributions on the set of stable matchings and discuss properties that differentiate employment by lotto and the random order mechanism. Finally, we consider an adjustment of the random order mechanism, the equitable random order mechanism, that combines aspects of procedural and endstate fairness.Received: 9 September 2003, Revised: 12 December 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: C78, D63. Correspondence to: Flip KlijnWe thank two referees and a co-editor for helpful comments and suggestions. B. Klauss and F. Klijns research has been supported by Ramón y Cajal contracts of the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología. The work of the authors has also been partially supported by Research Grant BEC2002-02130 from the Spanish Ministerio de Ciencia y Tecnología and by the Barcelona Economics Program of CREA. This paper is part of the Polarization and Conflict Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. This article reflects only the authors views and the Community is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.     

The structure of information networks

We develop a strategic model of information acquisition in networks where agents pay for all the pieces of information they acquire, including those through indirect links. The cost of information depends on the distance it traverses in the network. We consider two possibilities in this context: (1) costs increasing with distance, and (2) costs decreasing with distance. The paper also examines situations where it is more expensive to acquire information of higher value. We show that there is almost no divergence between the efficient and Nash equilibrium information architectures. We then study the effect of decay in networks where information through longer paths is cheaper. Finally, we also examine a model with costly link formation that combines both types of cost related assumptionsWe are grateful to Hans Haller, Rob Gilles, Susanne Maria Schmidt, Sumit Joshi, Georg Erber, Beth Allen, Mark Machina, Bob Martin, Johanna Francis, Cheryl Long, Raja Kali, Kaz Miyagiwa, Micheal Kosfeld, Bibhudutta Panda and two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions. The paper has further benefited from the comments of participants at Game Theory and Applications Mumbai 2003, Royal Economic Society Meetings 2003, SED 2004 and GAMES 2004. Sudipta Sarangi acknowledges the hospitality of DIW Berlin where a part of this research was carried out. Rajgopal Kannan acknowledges the support of NSF grants IIS-0329738 and IIS-0312632     

A monetary mechanism for sharing capital: Diamond and Dybvig meet Kiyotaki and Wright

Summary. A model is presented in which banks update public records, accept deposits of fiat money and intermediate capital. I show that inside money is more liquid than outside money, increasing the turnover rates of idle capital. The model offers a simple explanation for the dual role of financial institutions: Banks are monitored and can issue nominal assets upon request, which helps them to transfer capital in sufficiently high rates and to also become intermediaries. The model shares some features with those of Diamond and Dybvig [5], and Kiyotaki and Wright [7].Received: 18 February 2003, Revised: 16 February 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: E51, G21, G24.Ricardo de O. Cavalcanti: I thank two anonymous referees, Susumu Imai, B. Ravikumar and Neil Wallace, as well as participants at the Economic Theory symposium Recents Developments in Money and Finance, and seminar participants at the Richmond Fed, Queens University, and Sabanci University for comments on an early draft. The hospitality and financial support of the Cleveland Fed Central Bank Institute and CNPq are greatfully appreciated. The authors opinions are not necessarily those of the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland or the Federal Reserve System.     

Stock market cycles and stock market development in Spain

In this paper we use Spanish stock market data to identify the bull and bear phases of the market and to analyze its characteristics during the period 1941-2002. We compare these characteristics with those of the US and of two other European countries (Germany and the UK). Our sample is divided in two subperiods in order to account for differences induced by the process of development undergone by Spanish capital markets in the late 1980s and early 1990s. We find that the Spanish stock market has become increasingly more similar to those of the more developed countries, although some differences still persist. Additionally, we show that concordance of the Spanish stock market with other developed markets has increased quite significantly.JEL Classification: C22, G15An earlier version of the paper circulated under the title Bulls and bears: lessons from some European countries. Comments from seminar participants at the Universidad de Navarra, at the IX Meeting of the Spanish Finance Association (Pamplona 2001) and at the Royal Econonomic Society Conference (Warwick 2002) are gratefully acknowledged. We are very grateful to J.M. Campa, G. Llorente and two anonymous referees for helpful comments and suggestions. We also thank D. Garcia and the Research Department of the Madrid Stock Exchange for generously providing the data of the Spanish case. Financial assistance from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology (SEC2002-01839) is gratefully acknowledged. The usual disclaimer applies.     

An appreciation of our referees

Editorial

An appreciation of our referees     

Acknowledgement to referees

Acknowledgement to referees

Acknowledgement to referees     

Policy consequences of limited cognitive ability

This paper analyses the welfare effects of price restrictions on private contracting in a world where agents have a limited cognitive ability. We deal with that by assuming that people compute the costs and benefits of entering a transaction with an error. We first discuss an example of an auction that will attract the least efficient buyers, because these are those who have made the largest mistake. We then study the case for government intervention when the government knows the distribution of true costs and benefits as well as that of errors. By imposing constraints on transaction prices, the government eliminates some that are on average inefficient - because the price signals that one of the parties has typically grossly overestimated its benefit from participation. This policy may increase aggregate welfare even though some of the transactions being blocked are actually efficient.JEL Classification: D81, J38, K31Gilles Saint-Paul: This paper is based on my Spanish Economic Review lecture at the Spanish Economic Association meeting, Salamanca, December 2002. I am grateful to the organizers for inviting me, and to participants and especially Juan Dolado for their useful comments.     

When inefficiency begets efficiency

Summary. Collective consumption decisions taken by the members of a household may prove inefficient. The impact on market performance depends on whether household inefficiencies are caused by inefficient net trades with the market or by inefficient distribution of resources within households. Inefficient internal distribution always results in inefficient equilibrium allocations. This leads us to consider competitive forces as disciplinary device for households. Competition of households for both resources and members can eliminate or reduce inefficient internal distribution.Received: 5 February 2003, Revised: 12 January 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D10, D51, D62.This paper is an abbreviated and revised version of Gersbach and Haller (2003). It addresses issues raised during seminar presentations at the University of Texas, Austin, and the Center for Economic Studies (CES), Munich. The hospitality and financial support of CES, the Institute for Advanced Studies (IHS), Vienna, and the Institute of Economics, University of Copenhagen, is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Clive Bell for helpful comments and two referees for thoughtful suggestions.     

Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association (NOeG)

Call for Papers

Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association (NOeG)     

Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association (NOeG)

Call for Papers

Annual Meeting of the Austrian Economic Association (NOeG)     

Growth in India’s Service Sector: Implications of Structural Breaks

The paper is an attempt to identify the multiple structural breaks in India’s GDP, as well as its main growth enhancing sector i.e., services and its components and subsequently calculate the growth rate in different regimes. The paper uses the Bai-Perron (Econom 66(1), 1998, J Appl Econom 18(1), 2003) methodology of estimating multiple endogenous structural breaks (both pure and partial) in India’s service sector and its components and GDP during 1950–2010. Further, the paper uses the Boyce (Oxf Bull Econ Stat 48:385–391, 1986) methodology of estimating kinked exponential model of the growth rate, and further uses the Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock (J Business Econ Stat 10:271–287, 1992) test and the Lumsdaine and Pappel (Rev Econ Stat 79:212–218, 1997) test to check for the stationarity in the presence of structural breaks. The data used in this paper are the components of subsectors of services GDP and GDP at factor cost (with 2004–2005 as base). It is found that there is very little difference between the estimation of pure and partial structural break dates in India’s services GDP and its subsectors and four such breaks have been identified with help of Bai-Perron (Econom 66(1), 1998, J Appl Econom 18(1), 2003) methodology. The Boyce methodology of estimation of growth rates finds that mainly in the third and fourth regimes, the growth rates are highest in the subsectoral as well as at the aggregate levels of services GDP. The Banerjee, Lumsdaine and Stock test (J Business Econ Stat 10:271–287, 1992) and the extended Lumsdaine and Pappel test (Rev Econ Stat 79:212–218, 1997) cannot negate the presence of unit root in the data, irrespective of the presence of multiple structural breaks. The paper concludes with the identification of four broad regimes of growth of India’s services GDP and in the subsectors with possible explanations thereof.

     

Existence of Sparsely Supported Correlated Equilibria

We show that every N-player K ₁ × ... × K _N game possesses a correlated equilibrium with at least zero entries. In particular, the largest N-player K × ... × K games with unique fully supported correlated equilibrium are two-player games. We thank an anonymous referee for most useful comments. The first author acknowledges financial support from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant SEJ2004-03619, and in form of a Ramón y Cajal fellowship. The second author acknowledges support by the PASCAL Network of Excellence under EC grant no.506778, as well as from Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology and FEDER, grant BMF2003-03324. Both authors also acknowledge financial support from BBVA grant “Aprender a jugar.”     

The measurement and interpretation of structural budget balances

Zusammenfassung Strukturelle Budgetsalden bilden ein wichtiges Diagnoseinstrument für wirtschaftspolitische Entscheidunge. Die Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Bereinigung von Budgetausgaben und-einnahmen um zyklischen Schwankungen in der wirtschaftlichen Aktivität und der Aussagekraft von strukturellen Budgetsalden für fiskalpolitische Fragestellungen.

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I thank Johann Brunner, Klaus Neusser, four anonymous referees, and especially Alfrerl for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this paper. All remaining shortcomings are my own. A version of the paper titled Evaluating Budget Consolidation Efforts was presented at the Austrian Economic Association Meeting 1990 in Linz.     

Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design

Summary. We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects, namely, an English and a Japanese auction, and derive a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the Japanese auction by exploiting its strategic equivalence with the survival auction, which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Thus an equilibrium of a continuous time game is derived by means of backward induction in finitely many steps. We then show that all equilibria of the Japanese auction induce equilibria of the English auction, but that many collusive or signaling equilibria of the English auction do not have a counterpart in the Japanese auction.Received: 2 September 2004, Revised: 20 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D44.Fabrizio Germano: Correspondence toWe are indebted to Philippe Jehiel for useful discussions and to Nicolas Vieille for suggestions in the proof of Proposition 2; we also thank seminar audiences in Athens, Basel, Beer-Sheva, Berlin, Brussels, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Exeter, Lausanne, Lisbon, London, Louvain-la-Neuve, Namur and Tel Aviv. Germano acknowledges financial support from Euopean Commission, TMR Network Grant ERBFMRXCT0055, “Cooperation and Information” as well from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, Grants SEC2001-0792, SEJ2004-06319, and in form of a Ramon y Cajal Fellowship. Lovo is member of GREGHEC, unité CNRS, FRE-2810. The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is also gratefully acknowledged. The work was part of the programme of the ESRC Research for Economic Learning and Social Evolution.     

The key party in the Catalan government

This paper analyzes the different compositions of the Catalan governing coalitions during the current democratic period, and offers some predictions about the coalitions that can be expected in the future. During this period, in Catalan politics, there have been two main political issues over which the different parties have taken positions: rightist versus leftist with respect to economic policy, and sovereign versus centralist with respect to the power distribution within the state. I find that for any allocation of parliament seats there is a key party: a party that has a clear advantage in terms of being able to decide the composition of the governing coalition. I show the features that allow a party to become the key party and those that affect the size of the advantage of the key party. Thanks are due to Andreu Ferré, Marta Guspí, Larry Kranich, Angel Solano and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. The author acknowledges financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, grant number SEC2003-01961 and CREA-Barcelona Economics. This paper is part of the Polarization and Conflict Project CIT-2-CT-2004-506084 funded by the European Commission-DG Research Sixth Framework Programme. This article reflects only the author’s views and the Community is not liable for any use that may be made of the information contained therein.     

Fiscal policy and private consumption behaviour: The Spanish case

In this article we analyse whether the Ricardian equivalence hypothesis is a valid approximation for Spains economic reality or whether there exist deviations from that situation which would be more in line with the conventional Keynesian perspective of the effects of debt on private consumption-savings decisions.Our aim is to contribute to the rather sparse empirical literature on the subject for the Spanish case. The analysis is based on annual aggregate data for Spain covering the years 1955 to 2000, and uses both the structural and the Euler equation approaches to test the neutrality proposition, and is thus to be considered as a generalization of foregoing work on the Spanish economy.The findings indicate that support for Ricardian equivalence is mixed, while we also find very little support for the Keynesian specification of consumption and fiscal policy.First revision received: March 2003 / Final version received: October 2003The authors wish to thank M. Ferré, J.M. González-Páramo, A. Marchante, P. Meguire, F. Pedraja, J.L. Raymond, J. Salinas and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions on this paper. We also thank the participants in the V Encuentro de Economía Aplicada (Oviedo, Spain, June 2002) and the XVII Simposio de Análisis Económico (Salamanca, Spain, December 2002) for their comments. Any remaining defects are our responsibility. We also are grateful to the Institute for Fiscal Studies of Spain (Ministerio de Hacienda, Secretaría de Estado de Hacienda) for its financial support.     

Financial price fluctuations in a stock market model with many interacting agents

Summary. We consider a financial market model with a large number of interacting agents. Investors are heterogeneous in their expectations about the future evolution of an asset price process. Their current expectation is based on the previous states of their neighbors and on a random signal about the mood of the market. We analyze the asymptotics of both aggregate behavior and asset prices. We give sufficient conditions for the distribution of equilibrium prices to converge to a unique equilibrium, and provide a microeconomic foundation for the use of diffusion models in the analysis of financial price fluctuations.Received: 16 April 2003, Revised: 1 March 2004, JEL Classification Numbers: D40, D84, G10.I thank Peter Bank, Dirk Becherer, Hans Föllmer, Peter Leukert, José Scheinkman, Alexander Schied, Ching-Tang Wu, and seminar participants at various institutions for many suggestions and discussions. Thanks are due to two anonymous referees and the editor, C.D. Aliprantis, for valuable comments which helped to improve the presentation of the results. Financial support of Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft via SFB 373, Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes, Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin, and DFG Research Center Mathematics for Key Technologies (FZT 86) is gratefully acknowledged.     

Social structure and consumption: on the diffusion of consumer good innovation

This paper presents a simple evolutionary model to study the diffusion patterns of product innovations for consumer goods. Following a Veblenian theme, we interpret consumption as a social activity constrained by social norms and class structure. Societies that allow for more behavioral variety will experience faster adoption of new consumer goods. We also find that the speed of diffusion as well as the saturation levels reached depend greatly on the structure of a society. Combining these two effects, we conclude that a social structure displaying behavioral variety and an even class structure fares better than any other social set-up in terms of the speed of adoption of product innovations and product variety. JEL Classification: D11, O31 This paper has benefited from comments by Robin Cowan and seminar participants at the University of Economics in Vienna, the Maastricht Economic Research Institute on Innovation and Technology (MERIT), University of Maastricht, participants of the EMAEE 2003 Conference in Augsburg, Germany as well as the Schumpeter Conference 2004 in Milan, Italy. We also would like to thank two anonymous referees for their constructive criticism and suggestions. The usual disclaimers apply. Correspondence to: A. Reinstaller