REDISTRIBUTIVE POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT DEBT IN A BORROWING‐CONSTRAINED ECONOMY

We develop a two‐period, three‐class of income model where low‐income agents are borrowing constrained because of capital market imperfections, and where redistributive expenditure is financed by tax and government debt. When the degree of capital market imperfection is high, there is an ends‐against‐the‐middle equilibrium where the constrained low‐income and the unconstrained high‐income agents favour low levels of government debt and redistributive expenditure; these agents form a coalition against the middle. In this equilibrium, the levels of government debt and expenditure might be below the efficient levels, and the spread of income distribution results in a lower debt‐to‐GDP ratio.     

Input versus output incentive schemes

Previous analyses have modeled income tax evasion as a ‘portfolio problem’, deriving the optimal consumption of the ‘risky asset’ (unreported income) assuming a fixed probability of detection. We compare an alternative audit policy to the standard random audit policy. We focus on an ‘audit cutoff’ policy, in which an agent triggers an audit if reported income is ‘too low’, and is not audited if reported income is ‘sufficiently high’. We find that random audit rules are weakly dominated by audit cutoff rules. Given lump-sum taxes and fines, audit cutoff rules are the least-cost policies which induce truthful reporting of income.     

Altruism and the Political Economy of Income Taxation

I develop a model in which altruistic agents vote over quadratic income tax schedules. Agents have heterogeneous preferences and productivities, and the model incorporates the incentive effects of taxation. The main result of the paper establishes the existence of a self-confirming majority rule equilibrium in which agents' labor supply decisions are optimal given their tax liabilities and the tax policy is a majority rule equilibrium given the labor supply decisions. In equilibrium the actions by all agents confirm their expectations, but such expectations may be incorrect out of equilibrium. The model generates majority rule voting equilibria that involve progressive taxation.     

Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Habit Formation

It has recently been shown that incorporating “keeping up with the Joneses” preferences into a prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model leads to higher marginal tax rates for both types of agents. In particular, the high‐skill type faces a positive marginal tax rate, rather than zero as in the conventional case. In this paper, agents’ utility functions are postulated to exhibit “habit formation in consumption” such that the prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model becomes a dynamic analytical framework. We show that if the government can commit to its future fiscal policy, the presence of consumption habits does not affect the standard results on optimal marginal tax rates. By contrast, if the government cannot precommit, the high‐skill type will face a negative marginal tax rate, while the low‐skill type’s marginal tax rate remains positive.     

Income distribution and equilibrium multiplicity in a stigma-based model of tax evasion

This paper incorporates continuous income distribution into the stigma-based model of tax compliance. The paper investigates the effect of income distribution on the existence of multiple equilibria, and characterizes the conditions under which multiple equilibria emerge. Precisely, multiple equilibria exist if taxpayer incomes are sufficiently homogeneous, because the ‘social coordination effect’ dominates the ‘individual characteristics effect’. Numerical simulations show that the main proposition is robust to allowing two-step audit policies on the part of the tax agency, under the presumption that the best (or good) equilibrium is selected whenever there are multiple equilibria. As a byproduct, the effect of various forms of tax reforms on the optimal two-step audit policy, the equilibrium compliance, and fiscal revenue is analyzed.     

Under-reporting of Income and Labor Market Performance

To examine the effects on labor market performance of government tax and enforcement policies, this paper develops an equilibrium model featuring tax evasion, matching frictions, and worker–firm wage bargains. In the wage bargains, workers and firms can agree on the amount of remuneration that should not be reported to the tax authorities. We find that increased taxation actually reduces unemployment, whereas more zealous enforcement has the opposite effect.     

Audit Publicity and Tax Compliance: A Natural Experiment

We use confidential data on value-added tax payments at the sector level, in two large Italian cities, to estimate the effect of audit publicity on the tax compliance of local sellers. By employing a difference-in-differences identification strategy, we find that such publicity has a positive effect on fiscal declarations made shortly thereafter. The results suggest that increasing awareness on future audits via the media can be an important instrument in the hands of tax authorities.     

Comparative Statics of Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with a Publicly Provided Input and a Nonlinear Production Technology

Comparative static properties of the solution to an optimal nonlinear income tax problem are provided for a model in which the government both designs a redistributive income tax schedule and provides a public input for a nonlinear production technology. These assumptions imply that wage rates are endogenous. The endogeneity of the wages necessitates taking account of general equilibrium effects of changes in the parameters of the model that are not present when the technology is linear.     

关于收入分配若干问题探析

在经济快速发展的同时,我国居民收入分配格局发生重大变化,收入分配不公的问题日益凸显。特别是新世纪以来,收入分配差距急剧拉大,收入分配不公已成为制约我国社会和谐稳定以及经济持续发展的突出问题。面对我国日趋严峻的收入分配不公现象,有许多问题值得深入分析和思考。收入差据拉大不能简单等同于收入分配不公,导致收入差距不断拉大的原因比差距拉大本身更值得关注;我国的收入分配不公以不同的形式表现在初次分配环节和再分配环节,初次分配环节的严重不公制约了再分配的公平。制约税收调节收入差距不力的因素不仅仅限于税收的立法与执法,而是有更深刻的根源。行政垄断、腐败等原因形成的收入差距税收杠杆是无效或低效的,政府收入不规范导致税收的公平分配力度偏弱。     

Competitive equilibria with limited enforcement

We show how to decentralize constrained efficient allocations that arise from enforcement constraints between sovereign nations. In a pure exchange economy these allocations can be decentralized with private agents acting competitively and taking as given government default decisions on foreign debt. In an economy with capital these allocations can be decentralized if the government can tax capital income as well as default on foreign debt. The tax on capital income is needed to make private agents internalize a subtle externality. The decisions of the government can arise as an equilibrium of a dynamic game between governments.     

Optimal Income Tax Enforcement under Prospect Theory

Prospect theory (PT) has become the most accepted alternative to expected utility theory (EUT) as a theory of decision under uncertainty. This paper extends the existing literature on efficient tax and audit schemes, by answering the question as to just how progressive an efficient tax system can be when assuming that taxpayers behave in line with the tenets of PT. Under reasonable assumptions regarding the reference income and the value function of taxpayers, we show that the efficient tax schedule is regressive while audit probabilities are nonincreasing in the declared income. These results are consistent with the previous literature on EUT.     

Tax Enforcement Problems

We study an income tax enforcement problem using a principal-agent model where the government sets the tax and inspection functions. These are announced to the agents and there is no commitment problem. The penalty function for dishonest taxpayers is given exogenously and satisfies certain social norms. We prove that, for a large family of penalty functions, this policy is such that honesty implies regressiveness. This result does not depend on the fact that agents know the true probability of inspection.     

Income Taxation Rules and Stability of a Small Open Economy

This paper examines the stability of a small open economy under alternative income taxation rules. Using a one-sector real business cycle model with external increasing returns, we show that if the income tax schedule is linear, the small open economy will not generate equilibrium indeterminacy, but it exhibits a diverging behavior under certain conditions. In this case, an appropriate choice of nonlinear tax on the factor income may recover the saddle-point stability. We also reveal that if the taxation on the interest income on financial assets is regressive, then the small open economy may exhibit equilibrium indeterminacy. In this situation, a progressive tax rule on the interest income can contribute to eliminating sunspot-driven fluctuations.     

税收、收入不平等和内生经济增长

企业家(通过金融中介)从家庭借贷来支撑创新。二者在企业家的努力不为外人所见的情形下双方签订信用合同分享创新带来的垄断利润(即蛋糕)。两个有代表性经济人(企业家和家庭)的存在允许人们在内生经济增长模型里研究收入不平等。本文研究发现,企业家分配份额的增加一开始会提升增长速度,但是过了一定值后会拉低增长速度;而该份额的增加一直拉大企业家和工人间的收入差距。所以降低企业家获得的蛋糕的份额的分配改革可缩小收入差距。提高企业家来自创新的收入的税率将降低他们的努力程度,从而降低增长速度,但是该税率的提高有助于降低收入不平等程度。存款收入的税率提高尽管不会改变企业家的努力程度,但是也会降低经济增长速度,而且不会降低收入不平等(如果工人有一定比例的存款)。对于劳动收入(工人工资)的税率增加会加剧工人和企业家间的收入不平等,但对经济增长速度没有影响。     

The Dynamics of Growth and Income Inequality under Progressive Taxation

This paper develops an endogenous growth model having a progressive income tax structure in which heterogeneous agents, who differ in terms of their rates of time preference, supply labor elastically. We analyze the dynamic adjustment to an increase in progressivity and show that the economy will converge to an equilibrium growth path with nondegenerate distributions of both income and wealth. The role of the endogeneity of labor supply is emphasized and shown to have a major impact on the nature of the transitional path, as a result of the impact of the progressive tax on agents’ work incentives. Our theoretical analysis is supplemented with, and supported by, numerical simulations, which generally match the empirical evidence rather closely. We also show that the responses of the different income groups contrast sharply from one another so that focusing on the economy‐wide average provides an incomplete picture.     

Voting under ignorance of job skills of unemployed: the overtaxation bias

Usual models on voting over basic income–flat tax schedules rest on the assumption that voters know the whole distribution of skills even if at equilibrium some individuals do not work. If individuals’ productivity remains unknown until they work, it may be more convincing to assume that voters have only beliefs about the distribution of skills and that a learning process takes place. In this paper, at each period, individuals vote according to their beliefs which are updated when getting new information from the job market. The voting process converges towards some steady-state equilibrium that depends on both the true distribution of skills and the initial beliefs. The equilibrium tax rate is higher than (or equal to) the tax rate achieved in the perfect information framework. An illustration is provided on French data: if voters are over-pessimistic as to the potential productivity of unemployed people, majority voting may lock the economy in an “informational trap” with a high tax rate and a high level of inactivity.     

Tax evasion and Ricardian equivalence

This paper studies whether the Ricardian equivalence holds in a context with tax evasion. In such a context, the degree of uncertainty becomes endogenous since agents control the distribution of their future income through their income report. We find that Ricardian equivalence holds when proportional fines are imposed on evaded taxes, but does not hold when the fines are on the amount of unreported income. We also show that it is possible to explain the empirical negative relation between tax rates and declared income when the path of government spending remains unchanged.     

Tax Evasion and the Time Consistency of the Government's Income Tax Policy

It is shown that it is not necessarily optimal for the government to tax capital income at a high rate even when capital is in fixed supply because the supply of capital for tax purposes may be elastic if capital income tax evasion occurs. An example is given where the wage tax rate is positive and greater than the interest income tax rate even though capital is in fixed supply. Conditions are also derived under which the capital income tax rate is lower in the closed-loop policy game, where capital is fixed, than in the open-loop game, where it is not.
JEL Classification Numbers: E61, H26.     

Homeownership,Mobility, And Local Income Redistribution

Regions are characterized by different homeownership rates. Homeowners and renters differ in their mobility costs, renters having lower mobility costs. This paper analyses how the presence of those different types of households affects income sorting and tax differences between local jurisdictions. To this aim, we analyze a model of local income redistribution with mobile (renter) and immobile (homeowner) households. Linear income taxes finance a lump sum transfer. Policies are determined endogenously through voting. In such a framework, if there are no or only few homeowners, no income‐sorting equilibrium exists. Above a certain threshold for the homeownership rate we find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between tax differences and homeownership rates, such that tax differences between jurisdictions are highest for intermediate homeownership rates.