An Economic Analysis of Audit and Nonaudit Services: The Trade‐off between Competition Crossovers and Knowledge Spillovers*

In this paper, I present a model in which both markets for audit services and nonaudit services (NAS) are oligopolistic. Accounting firms providing both audit services and NAS will employ oligopolistic competition in each of these markets. In addition to auditors' gaining “knowledge spillovers” from auditing to consulting or vice versa, oligopolistic competition in one market will influence the counterpart in the other market ‐ what I call “competition crossovers”. Although scope economies due to knowledge spillovers (for example, cost savings) are always beneficial to auditors, such benefits can entice accounting firms to adopt strategies (for example, price reductions) to compete aggressively in the audit market so that some, or all, firms become worse off. A trade‐off arises between these two economic forces in the two oligopolistic markets. Given the trade‐off between competition crossovers and knowledge spillovers, accounting firms may not reduce their audit prices, even though supplying NAS enables firms to decrease auditing costs — a nontrivial impact of oligopolistic competition in two markets on audit pricing. The empirical implication of my results is that because of competition‐crossover effects between the auditing and consulting service markets, finding empirical evidence for knowledge‐spillover benefits is likely to be difficult. Control variables for “audit‐market concentration” concerned with competition‐crossover effects and “auditor expertise” concerned with knowledge‐spillover benefits should be included in audit‐fee regressions to increase the power of empirical tests. With regard to policy implications, my analyses help explain the impact of the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act on “market segmentation” and, hence, the profitability of accounting firms.     

The Consistency of Merger Decisions at the South African Competition Commission

The South African Competition Commission's merger decisions for fiscal year (FY) 2002 through FY2009 are analysed to empirically identify the factors historically influencing prohibition, conditional approval and unconditional approval, as well as the factors historically influencing whether merger applications are deemed non‐complex, complex or very complex. The focus of the analysis is on whether or not the historical process has remained consistent through time, and whether or not that process can be obviously linked to the provisions of the 1998 Competition Act. Initial results point to behaviour that is not consistent over the time period considered; however, those inconsistencies are removed, once additional measures of market contestibility, associated with the 1998 Competition Act are included in the analysis. The final results suggest that the commission is less likely to approve mergers that they link to markets that are less contestable. In addition to protecting competition, the commission is simultaneously protecting other public interests. Therefore, our research supports the hypothesis that the commission consistently applies its legislative remit.     

Profitable Mergers in a Cournot Model of Spatial Competition

This paper investigates the profitability and locational effects of mergers when Cournot firms compete in spatially differentiated markets. A two-firm merger is generally profitable because the merged partners can coordinate their location decisions. The merged firm locates its plants outside the market quartiles with distance from the market center being an increasing function of the number of nonmerged firms remaining at the market center. Profitable two-firm mergers reduce competitive pressure, leading to higher prices and reduced consumer surplus. The merger increases total surplus by increased locational efficiency and the increased profits of the merged and nonmerged firms.     

Determinants of cross-border merger premia

Firms have a broad range of rationales for engaging in cross-border mergers and other forms of foreign direct investment (FDI); while some companies are in search of the cost advantages provided by foreign resources, other firms are primarily interested in gaining access to new markets. Although a significant amount of research has explored the patterns of FDI, little work has been done to assess what influences the value of cross-border mergers and, in particular, what determines why some cross-border mergers are expected to result in higher synergies when compared to others. This paper explores what characteristics of a merger are expected to increase the synergies that a firm will accrue from a cross-border merger by testing how a variety of factors impact the premia paid to effectuate a cross-border merger. We find that firms are willing to pay a higher premium to obtain greater control over foreign firms, and that this control is even more important in mergers involving firms in emerging markets. We also find that the factors affecting deal premia in cross-border mergers differ based on whether the acquirer has a high or low intangible asset intensity level.     

Abnormal Accruals and Managerial Intent: Evidence from the Timing of Merger Announcements and Completions

We examine acquiring managers' opportunistic reporting behavior around stock‐for‐stock acquisitions. Using the timing of merger announcements and completions to infer managerial intent, we show that acquirers with the most inflated earnings tend to announce mergers on Fridays, and that they manage earnings several quarters before the merger announcement date. Friday announcers exhibit a stronger negative association between pre‐merger announcement abnormal accruals and post‐merger announcement market performance than non‐Friday announcers. This effect is driven mainly by mergers that are completed relatively quickly after they are announced. Overall, the evidence supports the notion that some acquiring managers inflate earnings prior to announcing the mergers, and time the merger announcements to exploit investor inattention.     

The effect of mergers on employment and wages: Evidence from Japan

This study investigates the impact of mergers on employment and employees’ wages in Japan, based on 111 mergers between listed firms observed between 1990 and 2003. Typically, the number of employees decreases by 4.45% three years after a merger, even after changes in sales and other variables are controlled. Firms that experience related mergers, and rescue mergers are more likely to decrease the number of workers. At the same time, wages increase by 5.46% per employee. These results suggest that the main motivation behind mergers is not to divest employees of their wealth.     

Ex-post Analysis of Mobile Telecom Mergers: The Case of Austria and The Netherlands

Recently there has been an increased attention towards the ex-post evaluation of competition policy enforcement decisions and in particular merger decisions. In this paper we study the effects of two mobile telecommunication mergers on prices. We apply a standard difference-in-differences approach which is widely used in the literature on ex-post evaluation of mergers. For the Austrian T-Mobile/tele.ring merger, we conclude that after the acquisition (for which remedies were imposed) prices in Austria did not increase relative to the considered control countries. For the Dutch T-Mobile/Orange merger, we observe an increase in the mobile tariff prices in the Netherlands in the analysed period, relative to the control countries. We cannot firmly establish whether this price increase was exclusively caused by the T-Mobile/Orange merger or in part by possible price effects brought about by the KPN/Telfort merger consummated two years earlier in the Netherlands. However, we believe that such price increase could be linked to the structural changes brought by both KPN/Telfort and T-Mobile/Orange mergers together.     

加拿大并购反垄断审查中的效率因素分析——以Hillsdown Holdings并购案为例

加拿大反垄断当局对并购进行反垄断控制的法律依据是《竞争法》和《并购实施指南》,其并购反垄断控制政策要求并购可能带来的效率在加拿大境内实现的部分能够补偿该项并购给加拿大生产者和消费者带来的福利净损失,并对能够纳入反垄断当局评估分析的效率因素进行详细界定。由于效率难以观察和证实,在早期的司法实践中,效率因素对于竞争管理局的并购评估审查判定影响有限。20世纪90年代以后,加拿大反垄断当局对于效率的态度逐步趋于友好,效率因素对于反垄断当局最终判定的影响越来越大。     

THE GLOBAL BANK MERGER WAVE: IMPLICATIONS FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

This paper reconsiders causes and implications of the global bank merger wave, especially for developing economies. Previous studies of the global bank mergers—that is, mergers between banks from different nations—had assumed that these combinations are efficiency‐driven, and that the U.S. case defines the paradigm for all other nations' banking systems. This paper argues that the U.S. experience is unique, not paradigmatic, and that bank mergers are not efficiency‐driven; instead, this merger wave has arisen because of macrostructural circumstances and because of shifts over time in banks' strategic motives. This paper argues that large, offshore banks often engage in cross‐border mergers because they want to provide financial services to households and firms that have reached minimal threshold wealth levels. For developing economies, this suggests that cross‐border acquisitions of local banks by offshore banks will have mixed effects; and it cannot be assumed that the net social impact is positive.     

上市公司兼并的方式及其利益流动研究

随着我国资本市场的兴起和发展,作为资本市场重要组成部分的兼并行为越来越活跃,呈现出来的方式也多种多样。兼并过程通常伴随着相关各方之间的利益流动,但是,这种利益流动并不平衡,流通股股东和债权人的利益不能得到保护,兼并机制存在诸多问题。本文试图在对兼并收益进行深入分析的基础之上,对兼并的方式进行分类,并通过案例揭示各种兼并方式的特点,并阐释我国目前兼并过程中的利益流动的问题。然后针对兼并中存在的问题,试图提出一些有益的措施。     

Downstream Research Joint Venture with Upstream Market Power

In a vertically related industry, we examine the downstream firms' incentives to invest in cost‐reducing Research and Development (R&D), and to form a Research Joint Venture (RJV), under two alternative structures of input supply: exclusive vertical relations and a single supplier. In contrast to the “hold‐up” argument, in which downstream firms invest non‐cooperatively and spillovers are low, R&D investments are higher under a single supplier than under competing vertical chains. Downstream firms' incentives to form a RJV are also stronger in the former case than they are in the latter. We identify conditions under which an RJV is beneficial for society. Integrated innovation and competition policies are also discussed.     

Simulating the Effects of Railroad Mergers

The purpose of this paper is to add to the empirical literature regarding merger simulation analysis by examining the effect of railroad mergers on railroad market power. This is done by measuring railroad profits and revenue/variable cost ratios corresponding to different degrees of intrarailroad competition for movements of Kansas export wheat to Houston, Texas. Two models are developed to achieve the objectives of the study. A network model of the wheat logistics system is used to identify the least cost transportation routes from the Kansas study area to the market at Houston. A profit improvement algorithm, which identifies Nash equilibrium prices, is developed to measure the amount by which railroads can profitably raise their prices above variable cost. The results of the study have implications for U.S. railroad merger policy. The paper indicates that railroad mergers do not necessarily increase railroad market power or make railroad shippers worse off. Instead, the study demonstrates that the impact of railroad mergers on shippers and railroads depends on factors that vary geographically, such as the degree of intrarailroad and intermodal competition in the area.     

Let’s Not Stick Together: Anticipation of Cartel and Merger Control in The Netherlands

Does enforcement action by the Netherlands Competition Authority (NMa) in the case of cartels and mergers produce an anticipatory effect? We use surveys among firms and their advisers to test whether merger plans that may fail to gain clearance from the NMa are not notified and whether the possibility of detection helps to reduce the number of cartels. Our results indicate that enforcement action by the NMa has a preventive effect. Surveys among companies show that 5 % of the notified mergers were modified before notification to forestall possible objections from the NMa. Moreover, for every 100 notifications of mergers there are 13 proposed mergers that are later on abandoned due to merger control. Companies also take account of the Competition Act when drafting contracts, conducting negotiations and holding meetings. Our survey among lawyers and other advisers shows that for every sanction decision taken by the NMa there are almost 5 cases in which, unbeknown to the NMa, a prohibited act has been terminated or modified in response to advice on competition law.     

浅谈汽车制造业并购财务风险及防范

成功的汽车制造业并购能使并购企业迅速壮大企业规模,提高市场占有率和竞争力。但在并购过程中,不可避免地要面临各种财务风险,主要表现在并购目标企业的价值评估风险、融资风险、资金使用风险和财务整合风险。要保证并购的成功和并购完成后达到预期的经营效果,必须对这些财务风险进行有效的规避和防范,主要措施包括充分获取并购方信息制订合理并购价值、选择合理的融资方式、谨慎利用资金防范资金使用风险以及加强资金使用效率降低整合风险等方面。上汽并购双龙汽车的案例体现了并购财务风险的成因,而对于如何规避也给出了有益的启示。     

Did the 1998 Merger of Price Waterhouse and Coopers & Lybrand Increase Audit Quality?

We examine the effects of the 1998 merger of Price Waterhouse (PW) and Coopers & Lybrand (CL) on the audit quality of the merged firm PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) at both the firm and office levels, where audit quality is surrogated by the auditor's propensity to issue a going‐concern opinion, clients’ likelihood of meeting or beating analysts’ earnings forecasts, and clients’ accrual quality. At the firm level, we find that the merger increased audit quality for PwC relative to the audit quality of the other Big N firms. At the office level, our findings, albeit mixed, collectively suggest that the improvement in firm‐level audit quality was likely driven by the improvement in audit quality at PwC's overlapping offices, that is, offices in cities where both PW and CL had separate offices prior to the merger. Further, our findings suggest that although the PW/CL merger increased auditor concentration in local audit markets with PwC overlapping offices, the merger improved (rather than hurt) audit quality in those markets. Overall, our study contributes to the extant sparse literature on the effect of Big N mergers on audit quality, and is of potential interest to regulators.     

跨国公司在华并购与隐性垄断

在当前全球化浪潮中,跨国并购已成为跨国投资的主要方式,更是我国今后引资的重要趋势。然而这种不同性质的多种资本主体并存于中国市场的特质将直接决定彼此的生存空间和获利机会,并最终决定投资的绩效和宏观经济稳定性。分析跨国公司进入中国市场的方式和在中国市场上进行竞争的手段,并从品牌、技术和币场占有率三个方面考察跨国并购对我国市场结构的影响,可以得出已经形成隐性垄断的结论,相应地从企业和政府两个层面提出对跨国并购实施竞争规制的应对策略。     

中国企业跨国并购的困境及策略研究

随着经济的飞速发展,越来越多的企业走出国门,通过跨国并购扩大生产规模,开拓国际市场。但近年来,我国企业跨国并购屡屡受挫。究其原因,我国企业产权制度不明晰、缺乏核心竞争力和跨国并购战略、我国尚未制定相关法律法规、国外政治因素的干预是主要的因素。     

外生单向溢出效应下纵向差异化产品Cournot和Bertrand竞争均衡的比较研究

研究价格(Bertrand)和数量(Cournot)竞争模式下,单向溢出对企业质量选择、利润的影响。以纵向差异化市场结构为例,建立了基于单向质量溢出的不对称寡头竞争模型,运用赋值计算对模型的均衡解进行了比较分析,结论是:1给定溢出因子和学习效应的合理取值范围,领先和跟随企业的质量与利润在价格竞争下都小于数量竞争;2质量间的单向溢出效应、跟随者的学习努力都会导致领先者初始质量的下降,但在价格竞争时,这种"逆向选择"效应的程度较低;3跟随者的学习激励随着溢出效应的提高而降低,并不受竞争策略变化的影响。这些发现可以解释中国轿车产业竞争模式对合资和自主创新企业关系变化的影响。     

Leading and Merging: Convex Costs,Stackelberg, and the Merger Paradox

This paper examines the consequences of a Stackelberg leader merging with followers when costs are convex. Such mergers are always profitable for the participants, and the followers often do better merging than remaining excluded rivals. This resolution of the merger paradox cannot be generated either by Stackelberg leadership without convex costs or by convex costs without leadership. In addition, with convex costs, a merger with the leader can actually harm excluded rivals (suggesting why they might object to the merger) and increase social welfare.     

我国汽车企业国际并购中的风险关注

我国汽车企业在国际竞争中实施了国际并购战略,以实现技术资源、人才资源和市场资源的有效整合和快速利用。在国际并购中,我国汽车企业面临着法律制度、企业伦理、管理文化、市场区域等多方面的并购风险。为此,对汽车企业国际并购中的并购动因和种类、并购风险的成因和种类进行了分析,提出了我国汽车企业的国际并购中针对风险应对的建议和措施。