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1.
    
This article offers a new interpretation of the traditional Cournot complements problem, or anticommons, by using the theory of public goods to gain a perspective on the problem. Specifically, I examine the pricing strategies and regulation of multiple monopolies that produce products which consumers view as perfect complements. I show that collusion by the firms increases total social welfare and that the collusion problem can be reinterpreted as a problem of provision of public goods from the point of view of the firms. I take this insight further and derive the familiar concepts of the Samuelson marginal condition and the ratio equilibrium for the firms. I compare these outcomes to the first best solution and then apply incentive‐compatible mechanisms to strategically implement the Pareto superior ratio‐equilibrium outcome and the optimal marginal‐cost pricing outcome. Finally, I show how this methodology can be applied to the more familiar Cournot model of oligopoly.  相似文献   

2.
    
Social dilemmas characterize decision environments in which individuals' exclusive pursuit of their own material self‐interest can produce inefficient allocations. Social dilemmas are most commonly studied in provision games, such as public goods games and trust games, in which the social dilemma can be manifested in foregone opportunities to create surplus. Appropriation games are sometimes used to study social dilemmas that can be manifested in destruction of surplus, as is typical in common‐pool resource extraction games. A central question is whether social dilemmas are more serious for inhibiting creation of surplus or in promoting its destruction. This question is addressed in this study with an experiment involving three pairs of payoff‐equivalent provision and appropriation games. Some game pairs are symmetric, whereas others involve asymmetric power relationships. We find that play of symmetric provision and appropriation games produces comparable efficiency. In contrast, power asymmetry leads to significantly lower efficiency in an appropriation game than in a payoff‐equivalent provision game. This outcome can be rationalized by reciprocal preference theory but not by models of unconditional social preferences.  相似文献   

3.
    
Studies show that identifying contributors increases contributions to public goods. In practice, viewing identifiable information is costly, which may discourage people from accessing it. We design a public goods experiment in which participants can pay to view information about identities and contributions of group members. We compare this to a treatment in which there is no identifiable information, and a treatment in which all contributors are identified. Our main findings are that: (i) contributions in the treatment with costly information are as high as those in the treatment with free information, (ii) participants rarely choose to view the information, and (iii) being a high contributor is correlated with choosing to view information about others.  相似文献   

4.
    
The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High‐powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest.  相似文献   

5.
    
This article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending. We propose a simple conjecture: If rent‐seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators' demands for rent‐seeking activities are price‐inelastic, a change of legislative rules from simple majority to a supermajority will lead to greater public spending, other things equal. Using data from U.S. state legislatures, 1970 to 2007, we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust, positive impact on various types of tax revenues and government expenditures.  相似文献   

6.
We study the link between individual attitudes toward uncertainty on the one hand, and preferences over, as well as behavior within, various public goods institutions on the other hand. We incentive‐compatibly elicit preferences over voluntary contribution mechanisms with and without reward and punishment options and then randomly assign subjects to play in one of the four institutions. We find that payoffs are significantly greater when punishment is allowed but that only a small minority of participants prefers such an environment. Somewhat surprisingly, preferences over institutions are generally independent of individual characteristics. Conversely, individual characteristics, including institutional preferences, are significantly predictive of behavior in the public goods game. For instance, risk‐averse individuals preemptively punish more often. This suggests that when studying sanctions and rewards, it is important to consider individual attitudes toward risk and uncertainty—although they may not affect the original selection into institutions.  相似文献   

7.
    
This article investigates the determinants of terrorist groups' failure by applying survival analysis in a discrete‐time specification. Our sample consists of a diverse set of 586 terrorist groups, in which just over 63% end operations (demise) during 1970–2007. We use RAND event data and Jones and Libicki terrorist group data. Findings show that the survival of terrorist groups is bolstered by diversifying attacks, having multiple home bases, locating in the Middle East, locating in a democratic country, and limiting reliance on transnational terrorist attacks. Moreover, larger groups have better survival prospects. Religious fundamentalist terrorist groups face better survival prospects than other terrorist groups. Terrorist groups located in a country with larger tropical territory are less likely to end operations; however, groups based in a landlocked country are more likely to fail.  相似文献   

8.
    
We study the impact of social learning on the depth of reasoning in an experimental beauty‐contest game. Naive advice and observation of others' decisions as two forms of social learning trigger faster convergence to the equilibrium. We find that subjects who receive advice outperform uninformed subjects permanently, whereas subjects who observe others' past behavior before making their decision only have a temporary advantage over uninformed subjects. A series of control‐treatments and simulations indicate that the latter result is due to subjects failing to make the most out of observing others.  相似文献   

9.
When a manufacturer advertises, what is the impact on retailer advertising? I analyze a contest model of advertising where total advertising by the manufacturer and by retailers determines market size, and the relative level of advertising by each retailer determines market share. If retailers are symmetric I show that there is a crowding‐in effect so increased manufacturer advertising increases retail advertising. But if one retailer is stronger, then marginal increases in manufacturer advertising have a crowding‐out effect on retailer advertising, while sufficiently large increases have a crowding‐in effect by “jump‐starting” competition between retailers for the larger market. Furthermore, asymmetric abilities in such contests can lead the weaker player to effectively drop out of the contest, thereby undermining the ability of increased prizes to increase effort by intensifying competition.  相似文献   

10.
Across Africa, Latin America, Asia and the transition economies of Eastern Europe, the need to enhance the capability and capacity of sub‐national governments (SNGs) in providing public goods and services has become a main theme of development programmes. Central to this theme is the need to design an intergovernmental fiscal relations (IGFR) system that enhances the effectiveness of sub‐national governments in mobilizing revenues and implementing expenditure programmes. For South Africa, the post‐1994 dispensation has involved significant reforms to the structure and administrative capacity of the three spheres of government. Critical to these reforms is the need to formulate an IGFR framework that takes cognisance of South Africa's past, and serves as an effective policy tool in ensuring that public sector service delivery is well structured and managed. This paper provides an analysis of South Africa's evolving IGFR system. It outlines the historical evolution of the current IGFR system, identifies current challenges, and discusses implications that these challenges have for the functioning of the IGFR system. The general conclusion emerging from this study is that in the South African context, the key elements necessary for an effective IGFR system are in place. Ongoing reforms have improved the capacity of provincial and municipal authorities in carrying out their revenue and expenditure responsibilities. However, the evolving nature of South Africa's IGFR system requires that significant attention be devoted towards enhancing coordination between delivery departments and improving the capacity of many SNGs. These should not only aid the effective functioning of the IGFR system but also ensure that the gains of decentralisation are sustainable.  相似文献   

11.
    
We examine behavior of subjects in simultaneous and sequential multi‐battle contests, where each individual battle is modeled as an all‐pay auction with complete information. In simultaneous best‐of‐three contests, subjects are predicted to make positive bids in all three battles, but we find that subjects often make positive bids in only two battles. In sequential contests, theory predicts sizable bids in the first battle and no bids in the subsequent battles. Contrary to this prediction, subjects significantly underbid in the first battle and overbid in subsequent battles. Consequently, instead of always ending in the second battle, contests often proceed to the third battle. Finally, although the aggregate bid in simultaneous contests is similar to that in sequential contests, in both settings, subjects make higher aggregate bids than predicted. The observed behavior of subjects can be rationalized by a combination of multidimensional iterative reasoning and a nonmonetary utility of winning.  相似文献   

12.
    
Whether in electoral politics or promotions within organizations, players often face the dilemma of whether to enter the contest or to assist other candidates. This article analyzes incentives in a rank‐order tournament when the winner has control over resources that he can distribute to his supporters. Some players may then be encouraged to help others in exchange for paybacks, resulting in factionalism, with leaders and supporters sorted by ability. The number and the size of factions depend on the reward structure of the contest and the distribution of abilities. These implications are corroborated by data on U.S. gubernatorial primary elections.  相似文献   

13.
This paper analyses the impact of income inequality on public good provision in an experimental setting. A sample of secondary school students were recruited to participate in a simple linear public goods game where income heterogeneity was introduced by providing participants with unequal token endowments. The results show that endowment heterogeneity does not have any significant impact on contributions to the public good, and that consistent with models of reciprocity, low and high endowment players contribute the same fraction of their endowment to the public pool. Moreover, individuals appear to adjust their contributions in order to maintain a fair share rule.  相似文献   

14.
    
This article investigates the effect of hierarchy leadership and social distance on prosocial behavior in a field experimental setting of sequential charitable giving conducted in an organization. The treatments vary in whether the leading (first) donor's identity is revealed to the following donors as a hierarchy leader, a peer, or a stranger. The followers' giving in the Leader and Peer treatments responds positively to the leader's giving, but no significant response is found in the Stranger treatment. However, on average, the followers in the Leader treatment give less than those in both the Peer and Stranger treatments. This is due to a negative effect on the followers' giving when the leaders contribute a small amount in the Leader treatment.  相似文献   

15.
    
We investigate whether social preferences are stable across contexts using a field population of low‐income Americans. We develop and demonstrate a simplified, visually‐based experimental methodology appropriate for this population. We show that choices in a laboratory public goods game predict giving in real donation experiments, as well as self‐reported donations and volunteering outside the lab. At the same time, choices vary systematically by individual characteristics and decision context. Thus, our results provide evidence both for an underlying stable social preference and for the role of context in influencing the expression of that preference.  相似文献   

16.
    
In this article, we evaluate the role of elections in governors' state tax policy making. Does it matter for state taxes whether the governor is a Democrat or Republican and whether she is eligible for re‐election or faces a binding term limit? Using a Regression Discontinuity Design and a panel of U.S. states, we find that the manner in which governors of different parties implement different tax policies turns crucially on the incumbent's eligibility for re‐election. Re‐electable Democratic governors increase income taxes relative to similarly situated Republicans, yielding divergence between party policy positions. However, governors facing a binding term limit exhibit the reverse policy difference, resulting in a movement of policy back together.  相似文献   

17.
    
We investigate the impact of rebates and refunds on contributions to threshold public goods using evidence from a field experiment conducted in conjunction with an Australian charity, Life Goes On. We find that offering rebates and refunds has a significant positive impact on both participation and average donations in the absence of seed money. Our results suggest that offering rebates and refunds, and the existence of seed money may, to some extent, play substitute roles in encouraging giving behavior. Seed money has a significant positive effect on participation only. Seed money's impact on average donations may be mitigated by a threshold effect.  相似文献   

18.
Familiar inefficiencies arise with competing interests over private goods in Stackelberg and investment games. Private good experiments reveal whether reciprocity enhances cooperative outcomes. Familiar social dilemmas arise with voluntary provision of public goods and voluntary appropriation from common pools. Experiments with pairs of payoff‐equivalent provision and appropriation games reveal whether reciprocity is more or less effective in ameliorating under‐provision or over‐appropriation. Experiments with asymmetric provision and appropriation games also yield insight into the effects of the Indian caste system on inefficiency from social dilemmas. Experiments with three types of games, with a private good, public good or common pool, provide diagnostic tests of the homo reciprocans model.  相似文献   

19.
    
Economists and psychologists have documented patterns of individual decision‐making behavior (e.g., loss aversion) whereby losses and gains are treated differently. However, there has been little evidence of such patterns in multiplayer games. I report results showing the strongest evidence I know of that this phenomenon is present in games. Experimental subjects play two hawk‐dove games that are identical up to a constant; in one, all payoffs are positive, while in the other, payoffs are negative if and only if both players choose “hawk.” Under both fixed pairs and random matching, differences between the games are substantial, significant, and consistent with loss aversion.  相似文献   

20.
    
In a controlled laboratory experiment, we study the causal effect of alcohol on economic decision making. A treatment group was given a dose of alcohol designed to target a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of 0.08 while the BAC of those in the control group remained 0.00. We investigate the behavior of control and treatment groups in the following types of tasks: math, uncertainty, overconfidence, strategic games, food choice, anchoring, and altruism. Our results indicate that alcohol consumption has little systematic effect on economic behavior, at least for the BAC level considered. Further, there is little evidence that alcohol differentially impacts the choices of male and female subjects.  相似文献   

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