The Determinants of Corruption: Cross‐Country‐Panel‐Data Analysis

This study explores the determinants of corruption, utilizing the Hausman and Taylor's technique to estimate a random effects model that incorporates both the effects of corruption determinants that vary over time and those that are time‐invariant, and using a larger panel dataset and a comprehensive set of corruption determinants. The first interesting result is that perception of strong support for rule of law is strongly correlated with reduced corruption, suggesting that a better quality of law enforcement reduces corruption. Rich countries have lower corruption, and the perception of free expression and accountability strongly decreases corruption, indicating that providing greater opportunities for citizens to participate in selecting their government, more freedom of expression, and free media are effective ways of curbing corruption. Conversely, natural resource abundance, country population size, country's dominant religious tradition, ethnic fractionalization, and political stability are unimportant determinants of corruption, while previous research has suggested they are important.     

The Effect of Whistle-Blowing Incentives on Collusion: An Experimental Study of Leniency Programs

Policymakers are increasingly using whistle-blowing incentives aimed at curtailing illegal or unethical behavior. We theoretically and experimentally investigate one version of whistle-blowing incentive: leniency programs aimed at curbing anticompetitive activities by firms, by reducing the punishment faced by a cartel member who reports the cartel's behavior. The theoretical model captures the two important effects of whistle-blowing incentives: the direct effect, a reduction in the stability of cartels, and the counterproductive indirect effect, an increase in the incentives to form cartels in the first place by lowering the cost of exiting them. As these point in opposite directions, the net theoretical effect is indeterminate. Our laboratory experiment compares two leniency programs—full immunity from fines and partial immunity—against a baseline with no whistle-blowing incentives in place. We find evidence of the direct effect but not the indirect effect, and thus both programs reduce the extent of price fixing and the damage associated with it.     

The Impact of Political Influence on Appointees: Evidence from the Small Business Administration Disaster Loan Program

Presidential disaster declarations provide disaster aid through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and are known to be motivated by political factors as well as by need. The extent to which politics influence the Small Business Administration (SBA) disaster declaration decision, made by a presidential appointee, has not been previously measured. We use new data covering 1960–2013 to show that SBA declarations are subject to the same political influences as presidential declarations. Disasters occurring during reelection years, as well as those occurring in electorally important states, are more likely to receive SBA declarations. The effect of politics is stronger in the period prior to the passage of the Stafford Act in 1988, showing that the two types of declarations are substitutes for political purposes.     

The Effect of Subtracting a Constant from all Payoffs in a Hawk‐Dove Game: Experimental Evidence of Loss Aversion in Strategic Behavior

Economists and psychologists have documented patterns of individual decision‐making behavior (e.g., loss aversion) whereby losses and gains are treated differently. However, there has been little evidence of such patterns in multiplayer games. I report results showing the strongest evidence I know of that this phenomenon is present in games. Experimental subjects play two hawk‐dove games that are identical up to a constant; in one, all payoffs are positive, while in the other, payoffs are negative if and only if both players choose “hawk.” Under both fixed pairs and random matching, differences between the games are substantial, significant, and consistent with loss aversion.     

Corruption and Technological Progress: A Takeoff Theory of Good Governance

Corruption is known to be a function of its return relative to productive activity. But the idea that corruption might itself respond to technological progress has not been emphasized. This paper presents an approach for thinking about institutional features that lower corruption by lowering its relative return. Policies that promote productivity growth in market exchange may cause the relative reward to rent-seeking to decline. The evolutionary development of anti-corruption efforts may be a normal part of modernization, much as changes in income distribution and urbanization.     

Compensation for Regulatory Takings with a Redistributive Government

Richard Epstein has argued that governments should pay compensation for regulatory actions that impose costs on a subset of society. I develop a model in which there are two groups, one of whom benefits from a regulation, and one of whom bears the costs. A potentially biased government sets the level of the regulation and also redistributes income across the two social groups via the tax system. When taxes are nondistortionary, the government chooses the efficient level of the regulation to maximize wealth and then uses the tax system to distribute this wealth according to its preferences. If the government is forced to pay compensation for the costs of the regulation, it simply undoes this via the tax and transfer system. When taxes are distortionary, societal wealth is monotonically decreasing in the degree of compensation to be paid, so that the optimal level of compensation is zero.     

Corruption and Entrepreneurship: Cross-Country Evidence from Formal and Informal Sectors

While the impact of institutional quality on formal entrepreneurial activity has been well documented in the literature, whether and to what extent corruption influences entrepreneurship in the informal sector is less forthcoming. In this article, we analyze the effect of corruption on entrepreneurship in the formal and informal sectors. Using unique cross-country data on formal and informal entrepreneurship, we find that corruption deters entrepreneurship in the formal sector and promotes informal entrepreneurship. These results remain robust even after conducting a series of sensitivity analyses.     

Contests and the Private Production of Public Goods

The private provision of public goods generally suffers from two types of efficiency failures: sorting problems (the wrong individuals contribute) and quantity problems (an inefficient amount is provided). Embedding the provision game into a contest that rewards larger contributions with higher probabilities of winning a prize may remedy such failures. Applications include tenure decisions at universities, electoral competition among politicians, etc. We identify a tradeoff between the value of the prize and the decisiveness of the contest. High‐powered incentives in contests may cause an overprovision of the public good or wasteful participation of unproductive individuals in the contest.     

The Max‐Min Group Contest: Weakest‐link (Group) All‐Pay Auction

We investigate a group all‐pay auction in which each group's effort is represented by the minimum among the effort levels exerted by the group members and the prize is a group‐specific public good. We fully characterize the symmetric equilibria for two groups. There are four types of equilibria: the pure strategy equilibria in which all (active) players exert the same effort; the semi‐pure strategy equilibria in which the players in a group play the same pure strategy whereas those in the other group play the same mixed strategy; the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with continuous support; and the nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria with discontinuous support. We then analyze a general contest with n groups.     

Public Spending and the Paradox of Supermajority Rule

This article examines the paradox that a supermajority rule in a legislature promotes excessive government spending. We propose a simple conjecture: If rent‐seeking coalitions dominate legislative politics and if individual legislators' demands for rent‐seeking activities are price‐inelastic, a change of legislative rules from simple majority to a supermajority will lead to greater public spending, other things equal. Using data from U.S. state legislatures, 1970 to 2007, we find that the adoption of a supermajority rule has a robust, positive impact on various types of tax revenues and government expenditures.     

Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n

This article proposes an empirical framework based on a synthesis of the seminal “Law of 1/n” and “Leviathan” theories, which models the relationship between government spending and the number of jurisdictions in a federal system as determined by the interplay of the costs related to centralized government (which fall as the number of jurisdictions increases) and the costs of distributive politics (which rise as the number of jurisdictions increases). Using a panel of U.S. state and local government spending data, empirical tests based on this combined framework show that the effect of intergovernmental competition predicted by the Leviathan model is partially offset by the Law of 1/n. This result helps explain the inconsistent findings in the previous empirical literature.     

Genuine Wealth Per Capita as a Measure of Sustainability and the Negative Impact of Corruption on Sustainable Growth in Sub‐Sahara Africa

In this paper, we argue that the answer to the question of whether the impact of corruption on development is homogenous, is no. Our optimism rest on how development may be conceptualised. When equated to a narrow measure in economic‐wise which fundamentally ignores critical issues, then there is a possibility the outlook could be positive. But when conceptualised using a broad‐based approach such as sustainable development, then the outlook could be negative. We assess a panel of 22 economies in Sub‐Sahara Africa with the most recent dataset (1996–2013) from the World Bank and other reputable agencies. Our finding is quite robust. It holds in pooled OLS, Fixed effects and GMM within IV settings; and it also holds for different measures of institutions and different measures of development using growth per capita GDP and genuine wealth per capita, respectively. Taking stock of major policy blue‐prints of selected countries in the region on the fight against corruption, we are able to point out that institutions play important role in insulating citizens against the devastation caused by corruption. Overall, through this comparison, we are able to signal that both incidental and systematic corruption poses a long‐term threat to sustainable development.     

Men,women, and the ballot: Gender imbalances and suffrage extensions in the United States

Women's suffrage led to one of the greatest enfranchisements in history. Voting rights, however, were not won by force or threats thereof, a fact leading political economy theories find hard to explain. Studying the timing of suffrage extensions in US states between 1869 and 1919, we find that a scarcity of women strongly promoted early transitions to women's suffrage. Such scarcity significantly reduced the political costs and risks for male grantors of the suffrage. It might also have made women's suffrage attractive as a means to attract more women.     

Assessing the effects of the Mexican Drug War on economic growth: An empirical analysis

Mexican President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006. From the outset, his government deployed an aggressive security policy to fight drug trafficking organizations in what became known as the “Mexican Drug War.” The policy earned considerable criticism since a heavy number of unintended casualties resulted from the frontal assault waged against the drug cartels. In this article, we evaluate the effects of the Mexican Drug War on Mexican states’ economic growth. To do so, we study the effects of the rise in the homicide rate and changes in a state-level approximation of the military budget on economic growth. Using dynamic panel data econometrics, we find that while the growth in the number of homicides had negative and significant effects on state GDP growth, state military expenditures aimed at fighting drug trafficking had a positive and significant effect on the per capita economic growth rate.     

Protection versus Free Trade: Lobbying Competition between Domestic and Foreign Firms

This article considers how political interaction between policymakers and domestic and foreign firms endogenously determines tariff rates. We show that because of lobbying competition between foreign and domestic firms, even a less competitive foreign firm can successfully elicit a tariff reduction under reasonable conditions. Moreover, lobbying competition may also increase the level of aggregate domestic welfare when the market powers of the competing firms are sufficiently alike.     

Regulating the Anticommons: Insights from Public‐Expenditure Theory

This article offers a new interpretation of the traditional Cournot complements problem, or anticommons, by using the theory of public goods to gain a perspective on the problem. Specifically, I examine the pricing strategies and regulation of multiple monopolies that produce products which consumers view as perfect complements. I show that collusion by the firms increases total social welfare and that the collusion problem can be reinterpreted as a problem of provision of public goods from the point of view of the firms. I take this insight further and derive the familiar concepts of the Samuelson marginal condition and the ratio equilibrium for the firms. I compare these outcomes to the first best solution and then apply incentive‐compatible mechanisms to strategically implement the Pareto superior ratio‐equilibrium outcome and the optimal marginal‐cost pricing outcome. Finally, I show how this methodology can be applied to the more familiar Cournot model of oligopoly.     

New Products and Corruption: Evidence from Indian Firms

It has been shown that corruption has a negative effect on firm growth, but what about its impact on product innovation? I find that corruption, functioning as a bribe tax, diminishes the probability of new products being introduced. I use a World Bank Enterprise Survey conducted in India in 2005, with 1,600 firms answering both whether they introduced a new product to the firm, and whether and how much was paid in bribes. Controlling for innovation determinants and firm characteristics, sector‐state bribery averages have a negative and significant impact on product innovation.     

The Consistency of Merger Decisions at the South African Competition Commission

The South African Competition Commission's merger decisions for fiscal year (FY) 2002 through FY2009 are analysed to empirically identify the factors historically influencing prohibition, conditional approval and unconditional approval, as well as the factors historically influencing whether merger applications are deemed non‐complex, complex or very complex. The focus of the analysis is on whether or not the historical process has remained consistent through time, and whether or not that process can be obviously linked to the provisions of the 1998 Competition Act. Initial results point to behaviour that is not consistent over the time period considered; however, those inconsistencies are removed, once additional measures of market contestibility, associated with the 1998 Competition Act are included in the analysis. The final results suggest that the commission is less likely to approve mergers that they link to markets that are less contestable. In addition to protecting competition, the commission is simultaneously protecting other public interests. Therefore, our research supports the hypothesis that the commission consistently applies its legislative remit.     

The Political Economy of Public Expenditures in Agriculture: Applications of Concepts to Mozambique

This paper undertakes an investigation of agricultural public investments in Mozambique, drawing on insights from qualitative field interviews conducted in Mozambique, secondary data analysis and examination of the existing empirical literature, and by situating these insights within a political economy conceptual framework. We explore the driving factors behind the amount and allocation of public funds to agriculture, and behind the differential attention that various types of public investments receive in the process of making decisions on resource allocation. Agricultural public investments are more likely to be made that have two key features: higher attributability to politicians and donors of the output of public spending, and a shorter lag time between expenditures incurred and outputs produced. Evidence on geographical targeting of agricultural public funds corresponds more closely with theories suggesting that resources are used to sway communities opposed to the ruling party, rather than to reward political supporters. Examination of the effect of actors' and organisations' incentives and constraints on resource allocation in agriculture points to the importance of not treating “government,” “the ruling party” and other institutions as monolithic bodies; the paper instead highlights how differentiated interests within seemingly coherent institutions drive what gets public expenditure attention in the agricultural sector.