An evaluation of excess demand,actual cost and normal cost pricing hypotheses using non-nested tests

This paper has emperically analyzed three versions(zero lag,geometric lag and almon lag) of three price change hypotheses – namely the excess demand, actual cost and the normal cost hypothesis – the goal being to select the hypothesis that describes the underlying price dynamics for manufactured goods. The rival models are specified as non-nested alternatives and each version is estimated by using an efficient estimator. The traditional discrimination criteria which clearly reject the zero lag version, are found to be impotent in discriminating between the dynamic versions of the models. A sequential cross-evaluation of the two dynamic versions using both pairwise and multiple non-nested hypothesis tests proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon reveals a systematic domination by the almon version of normal cost pricing over both the excess demand and the actual cost pricing mechanisms in the Canadian manufacturing sector during the period 1961:1–87:4. This result is robust under alternative specifications of the desired stock of inventories for the excess demand model. The finding implies that short–run variations in demand conditions or in actual unit costs arising from temperoary changes in productivity may not paly a significant role in manufactured goods pricing decisions.     

Consumption externalities and upward-sloping demand

The law of demand states that individual demand curves are negatively sloped. To date, the Giffen Paradox represents the only analytically valid exception to the law under standard assumptions. This article shows that if consumption externalities exist, it is possible for the individual's demand curve to slope upward. In particular, the condition under which demand becomes upward-sloping can be delineated in terms of measures of elasticity of demand. Research grants (Grant #2056/99H and Grant #FRG99-00/II-12) from the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Baptist University are gratefully acknowledged.     

Consumption externalities and direct versus indirect corrective pricing

In a competitive economy with consumption externalities arising only if some commodities are put to particular uses and where individual marginal contributions to the level of the externality may differ among individuals, a first best Pareto-optimum can be attained through a set of Pigouvian taxes discriminating between users and uses of the externality-generating commodities. In the present paper we shall discuss the optimal structure of commodity taxes in the case that policy discrimination is not possible or feasible. If policy discrimination between users or uses is not possible, we show that apart from taxing or subsidizing the direct sources of externalities, it may be optimal to impose taxes or subsidies on related goods, i.e., indirect corrective pricing.     

Voluntary import expansions with non‐stationary demand

Abstract.  In this paper the effect of voluntary imports expansions (VIEs) on welfare in a dynamic game is analysed. It is found that (1) there exists a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) and a unique stable steady state; (2) with habit formation in consumption, the welfare and output for each firm are higher than that without habit formation; and (3) VIEs can increase an importing country's welfare with raised consumption and lowered price. Therefore, VIEs can be voluntary to an importing country. JEL classification: F13, F12     

Tariffs versus quotas in the presence of imperfect competition and cross‐border externalities

Abstract.  We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government does not have full information on the foreign firm's production method and if cross‐border externalities exist, import quotas are in some cases preferable to tariffs. Otherwise, however, tariffs are preferable to quotas. JEL Classification: F13, F18     

Network technologies,communication externalities and total factor productivity

The main aim of this paper is to determine the factors which enhance or temper firms’ private incentives to use communications technologies that are characterised by network externalities and allow firms to influence their rate of technological change or total factor productivity (TFP). As regards the impact of the network effect on TFP, we find that when the externality parameter is low, a slightly negative effect appears, but this effect is reversed when the externality is higher. This relationship is valid regardless of the number of firms. Our result is particularly interesting because it offers a possible explanation for the Solow productivity paradox. We conclude that, in addition to the degree of network effects, market structure, consumer preferences and the number of users also have a very important influence on TFP and technological change.     

Dynamic demand and noncompetitive pricing strategies

This paper studies optimal noncompetitive pricing strategies when the evolution of demand is the result of intertemporal considerations. Two different hypotheses of price expectations (myopia and perfect foresight) are treated. The major implication is that the slight modification from an instantaneous to a very fast consumer reaction may completely modify a monopolist's price strategy. More precisely, the price strategy should be volatile if the equilibrium demand is convex, independent whether the consumers act myopically or employ rational expectations. On the other hand, asynchronous dynamics (e.g., due to competitive fringe supply or different segments of demand) cannot explain even damped price oscillations. The equilibrium price strategy of the noncompetitive supplier exceeds the static rule if consumers employ myopic expectations; rational expectations may lead to prices above or below the static rule depending on the rate of discount.I am grateful for the helpful and elaborate comments from three anonymous referees.     

Manufacturer's pricing strategy in a two-level supply chain with competing retailers and advertising cost dependent demand

The paper studies a two-echelon supply chain comprising one manufacturer and two competing retailers with advertising cost dependent demand. The manufacturer acts as the Stackelberg leader who specifies wholesale price for each retailer. The two retailers compete with each other in advertising and they have different sales costs. The manufacturer uses one of the following two pricing strategies: (i) setting the same wholesale price for both the retailers irrespective of the difference in their sales costs; (ii) setting different wholesale prices for the retailers depending on their sales costs. Two models are developed. In the first model, the manufacturer shares a fraction of each retailer's advertising cost while in the second model, the manufacturer does not share any retailer's advertising expenses. In both the models, we derive the retailers' and manufacturer's optimal strategies. A numerical example is given to illustrate the theoretical results developed in each model. Computational results show that it is always beneficial for the manufacturer to adopt different wholesale pricing strategy for the retailers.     

Resource extraction and anticipated demand shifts

Linking together two optimal control theory problems through Bellman's equation we derive closed form solutions for an extractive industry when a shift in the demand curve is perfectly foreseen. Monopoly and competition are compared.     

Network externalities and long-run market shares

We study a dynamic duopoly model with network externalities. The value of the product depends on the current and past network size. We compare the market outcome to a planner. With equal quality products, the market outcome may result in too little standardization (i.e. too many products active in the long run) but never too much. The potential inefficiency is non-monotonic in the strength of the network effect, being most likely for intermediate levels. When products differ in quality, an inferior product may dominate even when the planner would choose otherwise, but only if the discount factor is sufficiently large     

Peak-load pricing with continuous and interdependent demand

Issues concerning time-of-use (TOU) pricing with continuous and interdependent demand are examined in a context where increasing marginal costs of production, as opposed to capacity constraints, provide the major incentive for flattening the load curve. The analysis develops the underlying consumer preferences sufficient to insure a continuously varying load curve and generalizes previous considerations of the peak load pricing problem by simultaneously considering continuous and interdependent demand in determining optimal prices and pricing period lengths. A profit incentive for TOU pricing as a form of price discrimination is revealed, which is tempered as substitution across pricing periods allows limited intertemporal arbitrage. The profit incentive leads a price-regulated firm, ceteris paribus, to choose a peak pricing period longer than the social optimum.     

Non-linear pricing and the law of demand

An analogue of the law of consumer demand is developed for changes in an outlay schedule with continuously and/or discontinuously varying marginal rates and lump sum payments required from or paid to the consumer at specific consumption levels.     

Consumption externalities,production externalities,and long-run macroeconomic efficiency

We analyze the effects of consumption and production externalities on capital accumulation. We show that the importance of consumption externalities depends upon the elasticity of labor supply. If the labor supply is inelastic, consumption externalities cause no long-run distortions. Whether there are distortions along the transitional path depends upon consumer preferences. The effects of production externalities are more pervasive; they exert long-run distortionary effects irrespective of labor supply. The optimal taxation to correct for the distortions created by the externalities is characterized. We analyze both stationary and endogenously growing economies, and while there are many parallels in how externalities impact, there are also important differences.     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.     

The CES‐‐Translog Production Function, Returns to Scale and AES

The translog functional form imposes no a priori restrictions on the substitution possibilities between the factor inputs, by relaxing the assumption of strong separability, and the CES–translog cost function specification allows for testing homothetic technology with Hicks‐neutral technical change. In this paper an n ‐factor CES–translog production function is presented which develops the parameters to directly assess scale effects from those due to technology in the production structure. In addition, by applying Shephard's lemma it was possible to derive the input demand functions, as well as the partial elasticities of substitution and the cross‐partial price elasticities of demand for a generalized CES–translog production structure.     

Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand

If willingness to pay depends on characteristics of other attendees, a monopolist will use a lineup as a screening mechanism only if a consumer's characteristic is inversely related to her cost of lining up. No capacity constraint is necessary.     

Spatial-dynamic seawater intrusion and pumping cost externalities in a confined aquifer

This paper analytically develops the economic theory of seawater intrusion in confined aquifers and, in the process, creates generally applicable solution methods for illuminating steady-state spatial externality relationships for other spatial-dynamic diffusion resource management issues. By linking a confined aquifer and its unconfined recharge region with a dynamic boundary condition neglected in the economics literature, we introduce the physical realities that generate spatial externalities in all renewable confined aquifers. We derive spatial-dynamic first-order conditions for optimal extraction and characterize the policy relevant spatial-dynamic pumping cost and seawater intrusion cost externalities with hydrological assumptions appropriate to the different dynamic timescales of system components and the focus on seawater intrusion. For confined aquifers, we prove the marginal seawater intrusion cost externality decreases linearly in distance from the coast. Moreover, we demonstrate that the marginal seawater intrusion cost externality generally exceeds marginal pumping costs near the coast, implying substantial divergence between optimal and common property extraction near the coast, and significant divergence may extend to the inland aquifer boundary depending on both the magnitude and shape of the revenue function relative to extraction costs and aquifer parameters.     

Average cost and marginal cost pricing in Marshall: Textual analysis and interpretation

Abstract

This paper proposes a textual analysis of Marshall's theory of firm pricing behavior under competitive conditions. Average cost and marginal cost pricing theories have very distinct origins as they are rooted, respectively, in the classical and marginalistic theory of competition. I analyze to what extent and under which circumstances the two theories joined in the work of Alfred Marshall; and I argue that, even though only partial evidence can be found to support the adoption of the notion of marginal cost pricing by Marshall, he developed some concepts, such as the distinction between short and long periods and the notion of quasi-rents, which turned out to be fundamental for the joint acceptance of marginal cost and average cost pricing principles by the Marshallian school.