An evaluation of excess demand,actual cost and normal cost pricing hypotheses using non-nested tests

This paper has emperically analyzed three versions(zero lag,geometric lag and almon lag) of three price change hypotheses – namely the excess demand, actual cost and the normal cost hypothesis – the goal being to select the hypothesis that describes the underlying price dynamics for manufactured goods. The rival models are specified as non-nested alternatives and each version is estimated by using an efficient estimator. The traditional discrimination criteria which clearly reject the zero lag version, are found to be impotent in discriminating between the dynamic versions of the models. A sequential cross-evaluation of the two dynamic versions using both pairwise and multiple non-nested hypothesis tests proposed by Davidson and MacKinnon reveals a systematic domination by the almon version of normal cost pricing over both the excess demand and the actual cost pricing mechanisms in the Canadian manufacturing sector during the period 1961:1–87:4. This result is robust under alternative specifications of the desired stock of inventories for the excess demand model. The finding implies that short–run variations in demand conditions or in actual unit costs arising from temperoary changes in productivity may not paly a significant role in manufactured goods pricing decisions.     

Consumption externalities and upward-sloping demand

The law of demand states that individual demand curves are negatively sloped. To date, the Giffen Paradox represents the only analytically valid exception to the law under standard assumptions. This article shows that if consumption externalities exist, it is possible for the individual's demand curve to slope upward. In particular, the condition under which demand becomes upward-sloping can be delineated in terms of measures of elasticity of demand. Research grants (Grant #2056/99H and Grant #FRG99-00/II-12) from the Research Grant Council of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong Baptist University are gratefully acknowledged.     

Voluntary import expansions with non‐stationary demand

Abstract.  In this paper the effect of voluntary imports expansions (VIEs) on welfare in a dynamic game is analysed. It is found that (1) there exists a Markov perfect Nash equilibrium (MPNE) and a unique stable steady state; (2) with habit formation in consumption, the welfare and output for each firm are higher than that without habit formation; and (3) VIEs can increase an importing country's welfare with raised consumption and lowered price. Therefore, VIEs can be voluntary to an importing country. JEL classification: F13, F12     

Tariffs versus quotas in the presence of imperfect competition and cross‐border externalities

Abstract.  We consider trade policies intended to affect the production of a foreign monopolist that generates negative externalities. We derive the optimal tariff and optimal import quota and examine which policy measure should be used to maximize domestic welfare. We find that if the domestic government does not have full information on the foreign firm's production method and if cross‐border externalities exist, import quotas are in some cases preferable to tariffs. Otherwise, however, tariffs are preferable to quotas. JEL Classification: F13, F18     

Dynamic demand and noncompetitive pricing strategies

This paper studies optimal noncompetitive pricing strategies when the evolution of demand is the result of intertemporal considerations. Two different hypotheses of price expectations (myopia and perfect foresight) are treated. The major implication is that the slight modification from an instantaneous to a very fast consumer reaction may completely modify a monopolist's price strategy. More precisely, the price strategy should be volatile if the equilibrium demand is convex, independent whether the consumers act myopically or employ rational expectations. On the other hand, asynchronous dynamics (e.g., due to competitive fringe supply or different segments of demand) cannot explain even damped price oscillations. The equilibrium price strategy of the noncompetitive supplier exceeds the static rule if consumers employ myopic expectations; rational expectations may lead to prices above or below the static rule depending on the rate of discount.I am grateful for the helpful and elaborate comments from three anonymous referees.     

Network externalities and long-run market shares

We study a dynamic duopoly model with network externalities. The value of the product depends on the current and past network size. We compare the market outcome to a planner. With equal quality products, the market outcome may result in too little standardization (i.e. too many products active in the long run) but never too much. The potential inefficiency is non-monotonic in the strength of the network effect, being most likely for intermediate levels. When products differ in quality, an inferior product may dominate even when the planner would choose otherwise, but only if the discount factor is sufficiently large     

Public pricing of final and intermediate goods in the presence of externalities

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of externalities on pricing decisions by a public or a private regulated firm selling both final and intermediate goods. The externalities generate feedbacks in demand that affect both consumers and producers. The model is very general in that it does not impose constant returns to scale on private production, allows for distributional effects of both the publicly determined prices and private sector profits, and captures the general equilibrium effects of public pricing. Socially optimal pricing rules are derived, and the relation of the results with previous models of pricing in the presence of externalities is investigated.     

Ticket pricing and the impression of excess demand

If willingness to pay depends on characteristics of other attendees, a monopolist will use a lineup as a screening mechanism only if a consumer's characteristic is inversely related to her cost of lining up. No capacity constraint is necessary.     

The CES‐‐Translog Production Function, Returns to Scale and AES

The translog functional form imposes no a priori restrictions on the substitution possibilities between the factor inputs, by relaxing the assumption of strong separability, and the CES–translog cost function specification allows for testing homothetic technology with Hicks‐neutral technical change. In this paper an n ‐factor CES–translog production function is presented which develops the parameters to directly assess scale effects from those due to technology in the production structure. In addition, by applying Shephard's lemma it was possible to derive the input demand functions, as well as the partial elasticities of substitution and the cross‐partial price elasticities of demand for a generalized CES–translog production structure.     

Determining demand, supply, and pricing for emerging markets based on disruptive process technologies

A model for forecasting the likely market size and demand for an early-stage emerging process technology is considered. This method takes into account markets, supply, demand, supply/demand gap, pricing, implications to government policy, corporate strategy, and value of intellectual property. For the purpose of illustration, forecasting of microsystems is considered.     

A Simple Characterization of the Second‐best Two‐part and Block‐rate Tariffs Theory and Applications

The general necessary optimality conditions for second‐best discrete multipart tariffs are rather complex. In this paper, we derive a simplified characterization of these conditions for two‐part tariffs and for block‐rate tariffs for given thresholds of these tariffs. The simplified necessary optimality conditions are equivalent to the necessary conditions for a Ramsey‐optimum for goods with continuously variable individually demanded quantities. We demonstrate that this characterization of second‐best multipart tariffs can be helpful, when applying the usual regulatory mechanisms to these tariffs. In particular, we consider Vogelsang–Finsinger (1979) regulation as well as a particular form of price‐cap regulation which is related to the Laspeyres index of prices.     

Ecosystems,externalities, and economies

This paper incorporates an ecosystem model into a model of a simple economy. The decisionmaking agents in the ecosystem are individual organisms aggregated to the species level. A species may provide utility directly to humans, or it may provide utility indirectly because it is used either as a raw material in goods fabrication or as sustenance for other species. We describe a comparative static equilibrium of the ecosystem where species' demands for other species are equal to the supplies of those other species, and energy is conserved. The ecosystem is then embedded in the economy so that the effects of human intervention can be traced through both the ecosystem and the economy. Human intervention creates ecosystem externalities such that ecosystem equilibria are shifted and the new equilibria affect the utility or the production processes of other humans. This framework allows us to describe in principle which ecosystem services can be efficiently usurped by humans, which waste flows can be efficiently allowed into ecosystems, and which ecosystem organisms and physical attributes can be efficiently maintained.     

Consumption externalities, production externalities, and efficient capital accumulation under time non-separable preferences

The effects of consumption and production externalities on economic performance under time non-separable preferences are examined both theoretically and numerically. We show that a consumption externality alone has long-run distortionary effects if and only if labor is supplied elastically. With fixed labor supply, it has only transitional distortionary effects. Production externalities always generate long-run distortions, irrespective of labor supply. The optimal tax structure to correct for the distortions is characterized. We compare the implications of this model with those obtained when the consumption externality is contemporaneous. While some of the long-run effects are robust, there are also important qualitative and quantitative differences, particularly along transitional paths.     

Exotic betting opportunities,pricing policies and the demand for parimutuel horse race wagering

Parimutuel horse race wagering has been declining steadily for the past several decades. This has resulted in lower revenues to state governments, recetracks adn horseman. To retard or reverse this trend, attempts have been made to implement a number of pricing and marketing strategies. Among these has been the introduction of a variety of exotic wagering opportunities. Over the years the number and type of exotic wagers offered has been increased. Furthermore, the prices of both straight and exotic wagers have been increased and, in addition, the price of exotic wagers has generally been set at a higher rate than that for straight wagers. The paper examines the effectiveness of these policies.     

Eco‐labelling scheme, environmental protection, and protectionism

Abstract.  In this paper a model of international duopoly is developed involving competition in both prices and levels of environmental friendliness, and the implications of government policies are studied. It is shown that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, a regulatory increase in the minimum required level of environmental friendliness of imported goods may harm the home firm and may result in a rise in the volume of imported goods. Whether consumers lose or gain from such a regulatory increase depends on consumption spillover effects. We also show that, under certain conditions, the duopoly's equilibrium choice of levels of environmental friendliness is socially optimal.JEL Classification: F00     

Network externalities and interconnection: the case of information intrastructures

Information infrastructures are characterized by the existence of direct and indirect network externalities. However, the presence of externalities poses two types of problem: they create phenomena of overproduction (consumption) and under-production (consumption); and they require the operators reach a critical size of subscribers quickly. Facing this question of critical size, the interconnection makes it possible for the networks to develop by relying on network externalities. However, the justification of interconnection does not concern the externalities solely but is also based on the existence of essential facilities. The first part examines the various types of network externalities, whose implications are presented in the second part. The third part deals with the stakes of the interconnection.