Preemptive collusion among corruptible law enforcers

This paper considers collusion between a supervisor and an agent within a Principal–Supervisor–Agent model. Other papers consider the possibility of collusion after the supervisor has exerted costly effort to obtain hard (“verifiable”) evidence regarding the agent’s actions, information which, if reported would result in the agent being fined with a certain probability. That is, collusion occurs because the supervisor may accept a bribe in exchange for hiding the information he has obtained. This paper allows the supervisor and the agent to enter into a collusive contract either before or after the supervisor has exerted effort to find verifiable information regarding the agent’s actions. The former type of collusion, which occurs after the supervisor has exerted effort, entails ex-post corruption, while the latter, which occurs before the supervisor has exerted effort, entails preemptive corruption. This paper shows that although raising the supervisor’s reward discourages ex-post corruption, it can simultaneously encourage preemptive corruption. Hence, raising the supervisor’s reward will not always discourage collusion. This result further implies that though privatizing law enforcement can always be used to eliminate ex-post corruption, it cannot be used to eliminate preemptive corruption. Furthermore, when compared to ex-post collusion, an equilibrium without corruption is always socially preferred. However, when compared to preemptive collusion, an equilibrium without corruption may not always be socially preferred.     

On the value of human resources

One challenge for planners is to discover conditions under which a society has a positive and growing “net worth” in terms of its human resources and to bring about and maintain those conditions. We discuss the utility and validity of the concept of people as “assets” or “liabilities”, the structure and cultural contexts for a proposed model of the dynamics of value that account for opportunity costs; and links between information technologies and human resources management, including planned development of these resources.     

Can Japan succeed in “Chigyo-ka” (intelprise-formation)?

There are two aspects in today's information revolution that started in the late 1970s. The first is an aspect referred to as “the third industrial revolution,” which triggers the transition to the “21st century system of Industrialization.” The information revolution in this sense brings the creation of new “breakthrough industries (new multimedia industries).” And the second aspect of the information revolution possesses the characteristics of both a technological revolution and a social revolution and brings about the arrival of the third phase of the historical evolutionary process of the modern civilization, which proceeds through three phases, namely “militarization, industrialization, and then informatization.”If the bearers of modern industrialization are a “group of enterprises” that have been engaged in the race in order to gain “wealth” (generalized means of exchange/exploitation power), and if these enterprises' activities have been exercised in the world market where their products have been sold, then it is appropriate to call the bearers of informatization a “group of intelprises.” They will be engaged in the race to gain “wisdom” (generalized means of persuasion/induction power), then stages of their activities can be called a “global intelplace” where “sharables,” that is, information and knowledge, will be disseminated. And now, toward the 21st century, the third phase of modernization, which can be called the “informatization/intelprise formation” or the “wisdom game” (intellectualism), is about to begin.Japan's “ie society (a society based on the ie principle—literally, it means “house” but here it is interpreted as cultural principle for organizing a society), which has been going through the process of evolution on the Japan Archipelago, has developed a network-based organization with little stratification within its infrastructure. In this sense, Japanese society can be characterized as a “network-oriented society” in which intelprises and an intelplace in the broad sense have functioned as the essential components of the society since Middle Ages. In general, an intelplace and intelprises that operate actively within this framework serve as the flexible bases for different types of social relations and institutions, such as states and markets and eventually integrate these into the society to a certain extent. In fact, it took place quite regularly during the modernization “in the narrow sense,” or Westernization of Japanese society after the Meiji Restoration. There exist some problems, however. Some of the characteristics found in Japanese society may become obstacles to activities aimed at the sharing and promotion of information and knowledge in the global intelplace and Japanese participation in the “wisdom game.” Badly needed are serious efforts for Japanese intelprise-formation to reduce these obstacles as much as possible.     

A Primer on Logistic Growth and Substitution: The Mathematics of the Loglet Lab Software

This article describes the mathematics underlying the Loglet Lab software package for loglet analysis. “Loglet analysis” refers to the decomposition of growth and diffusion into S-shaped logistic components, roughly analogous to wavelet analysis, popular for signal processing and compression. The term “loglet” joins “logistic” and “wavelet.” Loglet analysis comprises two models: the first is the component logistic model, in which autonomous systems exhibit logistic growth. The second is the logistic substitution model, which models the effects of competitions within a market. An appendix describes the current status of the software.     

Influence of decision styles on use of decision models

This article discusses how the “decision style” of an administrator influences the adoption and use of particular decision models. Several “interactive” and “analytical” decision models often used to guide decision making are described and critiqued to point out their virtues and deficiencies. Propositions are suggested that contend that “systematic,” “judicial”, “speculative”, and “intuitive” styles have clear-cut preferences for a particular decision model. This model seems to be used, even when another would be more suitable. Effective decision makers are postulated to adapt their styles, or at least to see the benefits of different styles. Mixed-mode models are proposed that seem to simulate the behavior of successful decision makers.     

Equilibria in systems of social interactions

In this paper, we establish existence and uniqueness results for equilibria in systems with an infinite number of agents and with local and global social interactions. We also examine the structure of the equilibrium distribution and derive a “Markov”property for the equilibrium distribution of a class of spatially homogeneous systems.     

A model of “coupled” technology transfer : A logistic curve approach

This article presents a mathematical model relating to the technology transfer problem. The origin of the problem stems from the existing trade-offs between the strategies of “technological progressiveness” and “static efficiency” employed by firms or countries defined as “leaders” and “followers,” respectively. The formulation of the model is based on the assumption that the technological development of a firm or a country follows a logistic growth curve when related to a specific technology. During the process of a “coupled” technology transfer, the development of the follower changes and its behavior is described by a first order nonhomogenous deferential equation. Different scenarios of the “coupled” technology transfer between the leader and the follower are being discussed.     

On optimality in collective institutional choice

Conditions are investigated under which democratic choice of the division of land between collective and “private” use and of the distribution of collective income between “needs” and “work” payments will produce a Pareto-optimal land allocation and optimal collective labor incentives. Sen's optimal rule for the degree of “needs” distribution is found to result from self-interested voting on this parameter when the distribution of labor inputs is unskewed or when votes are weighted by labor contributions. This in turn increases the optimality of land allocation, which can be further improved by a simple rental scheme. J. Comp. Econ., Dec. 1981, 5(4), pp. 392–403. Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island.     

Topological games at Princeton, a mathematical memoir

The games of the title are “Nash” (or Hex), “Milnor” (or Y), “Shapley” (or Projective Plane) and “Gale” (or Bridg-It) all of which were discovered (or re-discovered) in Princeton in 1948–1949. After giving the basic topological connections, I will discuss more recent ramifications related to computational complexity theory. A recurrent theme will be non-constructive proofs, or how we can know something can be done without having the slightest idea of how to do it.     

The research strategy in management of technological innovation

The increasing importance of technology in the application world has imposed high demand on the research community for insightful and useful principles about “management of technological innovation” (MTI). This paper examines the academic legacy in terms of conceptual categories, causal relationships and taxonomy of relevant systems, and asserts from a system perspective that MTI as an applied science is still in its infancy.Based on methodological argument, this paper warns of the danger of hasty compromise of strategically important topics to “popular” definition of “researchability,” and suggests several research guidelines and approaches for this young interdisciplinary discipline:

1. (1)To explore new frontiers, use “proximate variables,” consider contextual factors and causation in broad terms, conceptualize “independently,” and pay more attention to case study method.

2. (2)To understand driving forces, be aware of practice, and focus on internal dynamics.

3. (3)To transcend complexity, adopt a hierarchical structure perspective and state-and-flow concept, and condense findings into configurations.

Finally, this paper urges the formation of an overall research strategy to accelerate the accumulation of MTI grounded knowledge.     

Optimality and Robustness of the English Auction

In Milgrom and Weber's (1982, Econometrica50, 1089–1122) “general symmetric model,” under a few additional regularity conditions, the English auction maximizes the seller's expected profit within the class of all posterior-implementable trading procedures and fails to do so among all interim incentive-compatible procedures in which “losers do not pay.” These results suggest that appropriate notions of robustness and simplicity which imply the optimality of the English auction for a risk-neutral seller must impose “bargaining-like” features on the set of feasible trading mechanisms. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, D82.     

At the crossroads of “futurism” and “prospective”: Towards a Canadian synthesis?

North American “future studies” and the French concept of “prospective” have been integrated to provide the basis for an attempted “Canadian Synthesis” in the approach developed by the Montreal-based think-tank, the Gamma Institute. In this paper the founding president of Gamma outlines the four stages of the approach in a conceptual framework entitled the “Chronospace” and illustrates its applicability by referring to some of Gamma's projects in the last 12 years.     

On the dynamic effects of using hired labor in the Kibbutz—theory and case studies

This study analyzes the effect of employing hired labor in the Kibbutz. The main motivations are the premises contained in the newly emerging “The Change” or “The New Kibbutz” approach. Using the traditional LMF model with heterogeneous labor, we show that, although using hired labor will improve the economic situation of the Kibbutz in the short-run, in the long-run Kibbutz membership will consist of only those types of labor to which the “Self Labor” principle applies.     

Exact arbitrage, well-diversified portfolios and asset pricing in large markets

For a market with an atomless continuum of assets, we formulate the intuitive idea of a “well-diversified” portfolio, and present a notion of “exact arbitrage”, strictly weaker than the more conventional notion of “asymptotic arbitrage”, and necessary and sufficient for the validity of an APT pricing formula. Our formula involves “essential” risk, one based on a specific index portfolio constructed from factors and factor loadings that are endogenously extracted to satisfy an optimality property involving a finite number of factors. We illustrate how our results can be translated to markets with a large but finite number of assets.     

Fashion statement

We study bilateral matching under private information about agents' characteristics. Assortative matching is the only equilibrium outcome in the absence of private information. When an information friction is present, the matching process can be improved if a payoff-irrelevant variable which we term “fashion” is introduced. Informed agents choose to adopt fashion as a signaling device. If success in matching is observed, other agents can imitate the signal. Thus, for fashion to be useful, it must constantly change. If there are more than two types of agents, both “high” and “low” fashion are needed to facilitate assortative matching.     

Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why “pack and crack” does not work

We show that optimal partisan redistricting with geographical constraints is a computationally intractable (NP-complete) problem. In particular, even when voter's preferences are deterministic, a solution is generally not obtained by concentrating opponent's supporters in “unwinnable” districts (“packing”) and spreading one's own supporters evenly among the other districts in order to produce many slight marginal wins (“cracking”).     

Anonymous yes–no voting with abstention and multiple levels of approval

Symmetric (3,2) simple games serve as models for anonymous voting systems in which each voter may vote “yes,” abstain, or vote “no,” the outcome is “yes” or “no,” and all voters play interchangeable roles. The extension to symmetric (j,2) simple games, in which each voter chooses from among j ordered levels of approval, also models some natural decision rules, such as pass–fail grading systems. Each such game is determined by the set of (anonymous) minimal winning profiles. This makes it possible to count the possible systems, and the counts suggest some interesting patterns. In the (3,2) case, the approach yields a version of May's Theorem, classifying all possible anonymous voting rules with abstention in terms of quota functions. In contrast to the situation for ordinary simple games these results reveal that the class of simple games with 3 or more levels of approval remains large and varied, even after the imposition of symmetry.     

Quasi-weightings, Trading, and Desirability Relations in Simple Games

We investigate the problem of simultaneously characterizing various classes of simple games in three different ways: (i) the existence of “quasi-weightings” in which smaller numerical values are assigned to losing coalitions than are assigned to winning ones, (ii) the robustness of “winningness” with respect to trades involving groups of players, and (iii) the acyclicity of certain strict “orderings” that intuitively correspond to the idea of one player being more desirable than another.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Number: C71.     

Consistent representative democracy

We study axioms which define “representative democracy” in an environment in which agents vote over a finite set of alternatives. We focus on a property that states that whether votes are aggregated directly or indirectly makes no difference. We call this property representative consistency. Representative consistency formalizes the idea that a voting rule should be immune to gerrymandering. We characterize the class of rules satisfying unanimity, anonymity, and representative consistency. We call these rules “partial priority rules.” A partial priority rule can be interpreted as a rule in which each agent can “veto” certain alternatives. We investigate the implications of imposing other axioms to the list specified above. We also study the partial priority rules in the context of specific economic models.