Inflation,Employment, and Monetary Policy: Objectives and Outcomes in the UK and U.S. Compared

This paper explores how sensitive is monetary policy to the precise preferences of the central bank over inflation and economic activity. It does so in order to address a puzzle—which is that the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England appear to have quite different objectives and yet have adopted strikingly similar policies in recent years. I use a calibrated model to assess how policy might be sensitive to attaching different weights to inflation, output, and the output gap in central bank objectives. I find that a wide range of weights can give rise to rather similar monetary policies.     

Phillips Curve Instability and Optimal Monetary Policy

Empirical evidence suggests the Phillips curve has flattened over the past few decades. To capture this feature of the data, I develop a framework where firms face a changing cost of price adjustment, which produces a Phillips curve with a slope coefficient that varies over time. To evaluate the implications for monetary policy, I construct the utility‐based welfare criterion where the relative weight on output gap deviations changes synchronously with the slope of the Phillips curve. The systematic component of the rule that implements optimal policy is constant under discretion and commitment.     

The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy

The interaction between capital requirements and monetary policy is assessed by means of simple rules in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector. In “normal” times, when economic dynamics are driven by supply shocks, an active use of capital requirements generates modest benefits in terms of volatility of the target variables compared to the case in which only the central bank carries out stabilization policies. The lack of cooperation between the two policymakers may result in excessive volatility of the monetary policy rate and capital requirements. The benefits of introducing capital requirements become sizeable when financial shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics; the availability of capital requirements as a policy tool yields a significant gain in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, regardless of the type of interaction between monetary and capital requirements policies.     

Monetary Policy and the Natural Rate of Interest

It is most important for monetary policy to track the natural rate of interest when interest rates take large and sustained swings away from their long‐run equilibrium values. Here, we study two models: a standard New Keynesian model and one in which government bonds provide liquidity. Policy rules that cannot track the natural rate perform poorly in both models, but are especially bad in the second because of sustained movements in the natural rate induced by fiscal shocks. First difference rules, on the other hand, do surprisingly well. When model uncertainty is taken into account, the dominance of the first difference rule is even more pronounced.     

Testing Commitment Models of Monetary Policy: Evidence from OECD Economies

Inflation in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was low in the 1960s, rose for a time before peaking in the 1970s or early 1980s, and then fell back to initial levels. This paper shows that a simple time inconsistency model of monetary policy does not explain OECD inflation outcomes, except in the United States. The hypothesis that time inconsistency mattered only in earlier decades fits the data no better than the baseline model. We find some, albeit limited support for a model in which inflation spills over from the United States into other countries as a result of exchange rate targeting.     

U.S. Monetary Policy and International Bond Markets

This paper analyzes how U.S. monetary policy affects the pricing of dollar‐denominated sovereign debt. We document that yields on dollar‐denominated sovereign bonds are highly responsive to U.S. monetary policy surprises—during both the conventional and unconventional policy regimes—and that the passthrough of unconventional policy to foreign bond yields is, on balance, comparable to that of conventional policy. In addition, a conventional U.S. monetary easing (tightening) leads to a significant narrowing (widening) of credit spreads on sovereign bonds issued by countries with a speculative‐grade credit rating but has no effect on the corresponding weighted average of bilateral exchange rates for a basket of currencies from the same set of risky countries; this indicates that an unanticipated tightening of U.S. monetary policy widens credit spreads on risky sovereign debt directly through the financial channel, as opposed to indirectly through the exchange rate channel. During the unconventional policy regime, yields on both investment‐ and speculative‐grade sovereign bonds move one‐to‐one with policy‐induced fluctuations in yields on comparable U.S. Treasuries. We also examine whether the response of sovereign credit spreads to US monetary policy differs between policy easings and tightenings and find no evidence of such asymmetry.     

Technology Shocks and Monetary Policy: Revisiting the Fed's Performance

Would the U.S. economy's dynamic response to permanent technology shocks have been different from the actual responses if monetary authorities' systematic response to these shocks had been optimal? To answer this question, we characterize the dynamic effects of permanent technology shocks and the way in which U.S. monetary authorities reacted to these shocks over the sample 1955(1)–2002(4) using a structural VAR. A sticky price–sticky wage model is developed and estimated to reproduce these responses. We then formally compare these responses with the outcome of the optimal monetary policy.     

Pricing Models: A Bayesian DSGE Approach for the U.S. Economy

This paper compares and estimates three pricing mechanisms in the context of a small DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We interpret our results as favoring the pricing mechanism presented in Wolman (1999 Wolman model) over the New Keynesian model with indexation ( Gali and Gertler 1999 , Smets and Wouters 2004a ) and the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) . The key factor that explains the performance of the Wolman model is that the data reject the key assumption of the New Keynesian model that the firm's probability of price change is constant over time and independent of the contract's vintage. Our results also show that incorporating indexation in the New Keynesian model represents a poor expedient in matching the autocorrelation function of the inflation process over the last 20 years.     

An investigation of the gains from commitment in monetary policy

We propose a simple framework for analyzing a continuum of monetary policy rules characterized by differing degrees of credibility, in which commitment and discretion become special cases of what we call quasi-commitment. The monetary policy authority is assumed to formulate optimal commitment plans, to be tempted to renege on them, and to succumb to this temptation with a constant exogenous probability known to the private sector. By interpreting this probability as a continuous measure of the (lack of) credibility of the monetary policy authority, we investigate the welfare effect of a marginal increase in credibility. Our main finding is that, in a simple model of the monetary transmission mechanism, most of the gains from commitment accrue at relatively low levels of credibility.     

Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Customer Markets

We present a model in which some goods trade in “customer markets” and advertising facilitates long‐lived relationships. We estimate the model on U.S. data and find a large congestion externality in the pricing of customer market goods. This motivates the analysis of optimal policy. Under a complete set of taxes, fiscal policy eliminates the externalities with large adjustments in tax rates on customer markets goods, while labor tax volatility remains low. Constraining the instruments to the interest rate and labor tax, the optimal labor tax displays large and procyclical fluctuations, but monetary policy is little changed compared to a model with no customer markets.     

Interest rate expectations and uncertainty during ECB Governing Council days: Evidence from intraday implied densities of 3-month EURIBOR

This paper analyses changes in short-term interest rate expectations and uncertainty during ECB Governing Council days. For this purpose, it extends the estimation of risk-neutral probability density functions up to tick frequency. In particular, the non-parametric estimator of these densities, which is based on fitting implied volatility curves, is applied to estimate intraday expectations of 3-month EURIBOR 3 months ahead. Estimates of the noise impact on the statistical moments of the densities enhance the interpretation. In addition, the paper assesses the impact of the ECB communication during Governing Council days. The results show that the whole density may react to the communication and that such repositioning of market participants’ expectations will contain information beyond that of changes in the consensus view already observed in forward rates. The results also point out the relevance of the press conference in providing extra information and triggering an adjustment process for interest rate expectations.     

The Risk‐Taking Channel of Monetary Policy in the U.S.: Evidence from Corporate Loan Data

To study the presence of a risk‐taking channel in the U.S., we build a comprehensive data set from the syndicated corporate loan market and measure monetary policy using different measures, most notably Taylor (1993) and Romer and Romer (2004) residuals. We identify a negative relation between monetary policy rates and bank risk‐taking, especially in the run up to the 2007 financial crisis. However, this effect is purely supply‐side driven only when using Taylor residuals and an ex ante measure of bank risk‐taking. Our results highlight the sensitivity of the potency of the risk‐taking channel to the measures of monetary policy innovations.     

Monetary Policy and the Asset Risk‐Taking Channel

How important is the risk‐taking channel for monetary policy? To answer this question, we develop and estimate a quantitative monetary DSGE model where banks choose excessively risky investments, due to an agency problem that distorts banks' incentives. As the real interest rate declines, these distortions become more important and excessive risk taking increases, lowering the efficiency of investment. We show theoretically that this novel transmission channel generates a new monetary policy trade‐off between inflation and real interest rate stabilization, whereby the central bank may prefer to tolerate greater inflation volatility in order to lower excessive risk taking.     

Effects of Monetary and Macroprudential Policies—Evidence from Four Inflation Targeting Economies

We examine the effects of monetary and macroprudential policies in the Asia‐Pacific region, where many inflation targeting economies have adopted macroprudential policies in order to safeguard financial stability. Using structural panel vector autoregressions that identify both monetary and macroprudential policy actions, we show that tighter macroprudential policies used to contain credit growth also have a significant negative impact on macroeconomic aggregates such as real GDP and the price level. The similar effects of monetary and macroprudential policies may suggest a complementary use of the two policies at normal times. However, they could also create challenges for policymakers, especially during times when low inflation coincides with buoyant credit growth.     

Power‐Sharing in Monetary Policy Committees: Evidence from the United Kingdom and Sweden

Committees may make better monetary policy decisions than individuals; however, the benefits of group decision making could be lost if committee members cede power to a chairman. We develop an econometric model to describe intracommittee power‐sharing across members. Estimation of the model permits us to classify monetary policy committees into the typology developed by Blinder ( 2004 , 2007 ). We estimate our model for the United Kingdom's Bank of England (BOE) and Sweden's Riksbank. Results for the BOE suggest that the Governor has little influence over other committee members, while those for the Riksbank indicate that the Governor is highly influential.     

State‐Dependent Transmission of Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

We estimate a logit mixture vector autoregressive model describing monetary policy transmission in the euro area over the period 1999–2015. In contrast to other classes of nonlinear vector autoregressive models, regime affiliation is neither strictly binary, nor binary with a transition period, and based on multiple variables. We show that monetary policy transmission in the euro area can be described as a mixture of two states. In both states, output and prices are found to decrease after contractionary monetary policy shocks. However, the effects of monetary policy are less enduring in the “crisis state.”     

Monetary Policy Implementation in a Negative Rate Environment

To analyze monetary policy implementation in a negative rate environment, we add the option to exchange central bank reserves for cash to the standard workhorse model of monetary policy implementation (Poole 1968). Importantly, we show that monetary policy can be constrained when the target overnight rate is below the yield on cash. At this point, the overnight rate equals the yield on cash instead of the target rate. Modifications to the implementation framework, such as a reserve requirement that varies with cash withdrawals, can help restore the implementation of monetary policy such that the overnight rate equals the target rate.     

Hot Money and Quantitative Easing: The Spillover Effects of U.S. Monetary Policy on the Chinese Economy

We develop a factor‐augmented vector autoregression (FA‐VAR) model to estimate the effects that unanticipated changes in U.S. monetary policy and economic policy uncertainty have on the Chinese housing, equity, and loan markets. We find the decline in the U.S. policy rate since the Great Recession has led to a significant increase in Chinese housing investment. One possible reason for this effect is the substantial increase in the inflow of “hot money” into China. The responses of Chinese variables to U.S. shocks at the zero lower bound are different from those responses in normal times.     

Differences in Interest Rate Policy at the ECB and the Fed: An Investigation with a Medium-Scale DSGE Model

Using two estimated models for the euro area and the United States, this paper investigates whether the observed difference in the amplitude of the interest rate cycle since 1999 in both areas is due to differences in the estimated monetary policy reaction function, differences in the structure of the economy or differences in the size and nature of the shocks hitting both economies. The paper concludes that differences in the type, size and persistence of shocks in both areas can largely explain the different interest rate setting.     

Asymmetric Preferences and the Stability Problem for Optimal Monetary Policy Rules

This paper evaluates the stability properties of optimal monetary policy rules when professionals under adaptive learning have asymmetric preferences. The asymmetric preferences require volatility estimates in real time. An expectations‐based rule can stabilize the economy, while a fundamentals‐based rule leads to instability.