Robustness and U.S. Monetary Policy Experimentation

We study how a concern for robustness modifies a policymaker's incentive to experiment. A policymaker has a prior over two submodels of inflation‐unemployment dynamics. One submodel implies an exploitable trade‐off, the other does not. Bayes' law gives the policymaker an incentive to experiment. The policymaker fears that both submodels and his prior probability distribution over them are misspecified. We compute decision rules that are robust to misspecifications of each submodel and of the prior distribution over submodels. We compare robust rules to ones that Cogley, Colacito, and Sargent (2007) computed assuming that the models and the prior distribution are correctly specified. We explain how the policymaker's desires to protect against misspecifications of the submodels, on the one hand, and misspecifications of the prior over them, on the other, have different effects on the decision rule.     

The Effects of Monetary Policy on Unemployment Dynamics under Model Uncertainty: Evidence from the United States and the Euro Area

This paper explores the role that the imperfect knowledge of the structure of the economy plays in the uncertainty surrounding the effects of rule-based monetary policy on unemployment dynamics in the euro area and the United States. We employ a Bayesian model averaging procedure on a wide range of models which differ in several dimensions to account for the uncertainty that the policymaker faces when setting the monetary policy and evaluating its effect on real economy. We find evidence of a high degree of dispersion across models in both policy rule parameters and impulse response functions. Moreover, monetary policy shocks have very similar recessionary effects on the two economies with a different role played by the participation rate in the transmission mechanism. Finally, we show that a policymaker who does not take model uncertainty into account and selects the results on the basis of a single model may come to misleading conclusions not only about the transmission mechanism, but also about the differences between the euro area and the United States, which are on average essentially small.     

Inflation,Employment, and Monetary Policy: Objectives and Outcomes in the UK and U.S. Compared

This paper explores how sensitive is monetary policy to the precise preferences of the central bank over inflation and economic activity. It does so in order to address a puzzle—which is that the U.S. Fed and the Bank of England appear to have quite different objectives and yet have adopted strikingly similar policies in recent years. I use a calibrated model to assess how policy might be sensitive to attaching different weights to inflation, output, and the output gap in central bank objectives. I find that a wide range of weights can give rise to rather similar monetary policies.     

Monetary Policy, Determinacy, and Learnability in a Two-Block World Economy

We study how determinacy and learnability of worldwide rational expectations equilibrium may be affected by monetary policy in a simple, two-country, New Keynesian framework under both fixed and flexible exchange rates. We find that open economy considerations may alter conditions for determinacy and learnability relative to closed economy analyses and that new concerns can arise in the analysis of classic topics such as the desirability of exchange rate targeting and monetary policy cooperation.     

99 Luftballons: Monetary policy and the house price boom across U.S. states

We use a dynamic factor model estimated on quarterly state-level data from 1986 to 2005 via Bayesian methods to disentangle the relative importance of the common component in OFHEO house price movements from local (state- or region-specific) shocks. We find that historically movements in house prices were mainly driven by the local component. The recent period (2001-2005) has been different: the increase in house prices is a national phenomenon. We use a VAR to investigate the extent to which expansionary monetary policy is responsible for this phenomenon. We find the impact of policy shocks on house prices to be small in comparison with the magnitude of recent fluctuations.     

Phillips Curve Instability and Optimal Monetary Policy

Empirical evidence suggests the Phillips curve has flattened over the past few decades. To capture this feature of the data, I develop a framework where firms face a changing cost of price adjustment, which produces a Phillips curve with a slope coefficient that varies over time. To evaluate the implications for monetary policy, I construct the utility‐based welfare criterion where the relative weight on output gap deviations changes synchronously with the slope of the Phillips curve. The systematic component of the rule that implements optimal policy is constant under discretion and commitment.     

U.S. Monetary Regimes and Optimal Monetary Policy in the Euro Area

Monetary policy in the United States has been documented to have switched from reacting weakly to inflation fluctuations during the 1970s, to fighting inflation aggressively from the early 1980s onward. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the U.S. monetary policy regime switches on the Eurozone. I construct a New Keynesian two‐country model where foreign (U.S.) monetary policy switches regimes over time. I estimate the model for the U.S. and the Euro Area using quarterly data and find that the United States has switched between those two regimes, in line with existing evidence. I show that foreign regime switches affect home (Eurozone) inflation and output volatility and their responses to shocks, substantially, as long as the home central bank commits to a time‐invariant interest rate rule reacting to domestic conditions only. Optimal policy in the home country instead requires that the home central bank reacts strongly to domestic producer‐price inflation and to international variables, such as imported goods relative prices. In fact, I show that currency misalignments and relative prices play a crucial role in the transmission of foreign monetary policy regime switches internationally. Interestingly, I show that only marginal gains arise for the Euro Area when the European Central Bank (ECB) adjusts its policy according to the monetary regime in the United States. Thus, a simple time‐invariant monetary policy rule with a strong reaction to Producer Price Index (PPI) inflation and relative prices is enough to counteract the effects of monetary policy switches in the United States.     

The Interaction between Capital Requirements and Monetary Policy

The interaction between capital requirements and monetary policy is assessed by means of simple rules in a dynamic general equilibrium model featuring a banking sector. In “normal” times, when economic dynamics are driven by supply shocks, an active use of capital requirements generates modest benefits in terms of volatility of the target variables compared to the case in which only the central bank carries out stabilization policies. The lack of cooperation between the two policymakers may result in excessive volatility of the monetary policy rate and capital requirements. The benefits of introducing capital requirements become sizeable when financial shocks, which affect the supply of loans, are important drivers of economic dynamics; the availability of capital requirements as a policy tool yields a significant gain in terms of macroeconomic stabilization, regardless of the type of interaction between monetary and capital requirements policies.     

Credit Markets and the Propagation of Monetary Policy Shocks

This paper analyzes the propagation of monetary policy shocks through the creation of credit in an economy. Models of the monetary transmission mechanism typically feature responses that last for a few quarters contrary to what the empirical evidence suggests. To propagate the impact of monetary shocks over time, these models introduce adjustment costs by which agents find it optimal to change their decisions slowly. This paper presents another explanation that does not rely on any sort of adjustment costs or stickiness. In our economy, agents own assets and make occupational choices. Banks intermediate between agents demanding and supplying assets. Our interpretation is based on the way banks create credit and how the monetary authority affects the process of financial intermediation through its monetary policy. As the central bank lowers the interest rate by buying government bonds in exchange for reserves, high productive entrepreneurs are able to borrow more resources from low-productivity agents. We show that this movement of capital among agents sets in motion a response of the economy that resembles an expansionary phase of the cycle.     

Testing Commitment Models of Monetary Policy: Evidence from OECD Economies

Inflation in many Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries was low in the 1960s, rose for a time before peaking in the 1970s or early 1980s, and then fell back to initial levels. This paper shows that a simple time inconsistency model of monetary policy does not explain OECD inflation outcomes, except in the United States. The hypothesis that time inconsistency mattered only in earlier decades fits the data no better than the baseline model. We find some, albeit limited support for a model in which inflation spills over from the United States into other countries as a result of exchange rate targeting.     

U.S. Monetary Policy and International Bond Markets

This paper analyzes how U.S. monetary policy affects the pricing of dollar‐denominated sovereign debt. We document that yields on dollar‐denominated sovereign bonds are highly responsive to U.S. monetary policy surprises—during both the conventional and unconventional policy regimes—and that the passthrough of unconventional policy to foreign bond yields is, on balance, comparable to that of conventional policy. In addition, a conventional U.S. monetary easing (tightening) leads to a significant narrowing (widening) of credit spreads on sovereign bonds issued by countries with a speculative‐grade credit rating but has no effect on the corresponding weighted average of bilateral exchange rates for a basket of currencies from the same set of risky countries; this indicates that an unanticipated tightening of U.S. monetary policy widens credit spreads on risky sovereign debt directly through the financial channel, as opposed to indirectly through the exchange rate channel. During the unconventional policy regime, yields on both investment‐ and speculative‐grade sovereign bonds move one‐to‐one with policy‐induced fluctuations in yields on comparable U.S. Treasuries. We also examine whether the response of sovereign credit spreads to US monetary policy differs between policy easings and tightenings and find no evidence of such asymmetry.     

Monetary Policy and the Natural Rate of Interest

It is most important for monetary policy to track the natural rate of interest when interest rates take large and sustained swings away from their long‐run equilibrium values. Here, we study two models: a standard New Keynesian model and one in which government bonds provide liquidity. Policy rules that cannot track the natural rate perform poorly in both models, but are especially bad in the second because of sustained movements in the natural rate induced by fiscal shocks. First difference rules, on the other hand, do surprisingly well. When model uncertainty is taken into account, the dominance of the first difference rule is even more pronounced.     

Information Content of Wages and Monetary Policy

We examine whether it is sufficient for central banks to observe and forecast nominal variables only. Analyzing the interplay of wage-setting unions and a central bank we show that although central banks may not gain more information by directly acquiring data about indicators of real shocks in the economy, such activities are nevertheless beneficial for central banks and yield lower social losses. Moreover, the extent of research activities by central banks should depend on the process of union formation.     

Technology Shocks and Monetary Policy: Revisiting the Fed's Performance

Would the U.S. economy's dynamic response to permanent technology shocks have been different from the actual responses if monetary authorities' systematic response to these shocks had been optimal? To answer this question, we characterize the dynamic effects of permanent technology shocks and the way in which U.S. monetary authorities reacted to these shocks over the sample 1955(1)–2002(4) using a structural VAR. A sticky price–sticky wage model is developed and estimated to reproduce these responses. We then formally compare these responses with the outcome of the optimal monetary policy.     

Pricing Models: A Bayesian DSGE Approach for the U.S. Economy

This paper compares and estimates three pricing mechanisms in the context of a small DSGE model of the U.S. economy. We interpret our results as favoring the pricing mechanism presented in Wolman (1999 Wolman model) over the New Keynesian model with indexation ( Gali and Gertler 1999 , Smets and Wouters 2004a ) and the sticky information model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) . The key factor that explains the performance of the Wolman model is that the data reject the key assumption of the New Keynesian model that the firm's probability of price change is constant over time and independent of the contract's vintage. Our results also show that incorporating indexation in the New Keynesian model represents a poor expedient in matching the autocorrelation function of the inflation process over the last 20 years.     

International Transmission of U.S. Monetary Policy Shocks: Evidence from Stock Prices

This paper analyzes intraday changes in firm‐level equity prices around interest rate announcements to assess the transmission of U.S. monetary policy to the global economy. We document that foreign firms on average are roughly as sensitive to U.S. monetary policy as U.S. firms, although we also find considerable cross‐sectional variation across firms. In particular, foreign stocks in cyclically sensitive industries show stronger responses to interest rate surprises, consistent with a demand channel of policy transmission. In addition, transmission of U.S. policy appears to be stronger to economies with fixed exchange rates. Evidence for a credit channel is weaker.     

Monetary Policy and Stock Prices in an Open Economy

This paper studies monetary policy in a two-country model where agents can invest their wealth in both stock and bond markets. In our economy the foreign country hosts the only active equity market where also residents of the home country can trade stocks of listed foreign firms. We show that, in order to achieve price stability, the Central Banks in both countries should grant a dedicated response to movements in stock prices driven by relative productivity shocks. Determinacy of rational expectations equilibria and approximation of the Wicksellian interest rate policy by simple monetary policy rules are also investigated.     

Collateral in Monetary Policy Operations

We present a portfolio decision model for banks that permits us to estimate the costs associated with the need to collateralise loans from the central bank. This allows us to calibrate the difference between a restrictive collateral eligibility framework for open market operations, such as that applied by the FED, with a more flexible approach such as that of Eurosystem. We also document that there could potentially appear relevant cost differences between the various collateral mobilisation procedures (pooling and earmarking) that currently coexist in the eurozone.     

Optimal Fiscal Policy Rules in a Monetary Union

This paper investigates the importance of fiscal policy in providing macroeconomic stabilization in a monetary union. We use a microfounded New Keynesian model of a monetary union, which incorporates persistence in inflation and non-Ricardian consumers, and derive optimal simple rules for fiscal authorities. We find that fiscal policy can play an important role in reacting to inflation, output, and the terms of trade, but that not much is lost if national fiscal policy is restricted to react, on the one hand, to national differences in inflation and, on the other hand, to either national differences in output or changes in the terms of trade. However, welfare is reduced if national fiscal policy responds only to output, ignoring inflation.     

Monetary Policy in a Forward-Looking Input–Output Economy

This paper examines the implications for monetary policy of sticky prices in both final and intermediate goods in a New Keynesian model. Both optimal policy under commitment and discretionary policy under simple loss functions are studied. Household utility losses under alternative loss functions are compared; additionally, the robustness of policy performance to model and shock misperceptions and parameter uncertainty is examined. Targeting inflation in both consumer and intermediate goods performs better than targeting inflation in one sector; targeting price levels of both final and intermediate goods performs significantly better. Moreover, targeting price levels in both sectors yields superior robustness properties.