城镇化建设中城市土地租赁机制发展的分析与新思考

随着城镇化建设进程的不断加快,城市对建设用地的需求量增加迅猛,建设用地需求与建设用地供应的矛盾日益尖锐,各地"地王"频现、房价猛涨等与土地相关的经济社会问题,引发了对城镇土地有偿使用采用招标、拍卖与挂牌出让为主的城市土地供应方式的思考。城市土地租赁机制是土地有偿使用机制的有效补充和重要组成部分。     

On the Sub-optimality of Entry Fees in Auctions With Entry

We study a variation of Myerson’s (1981) model in which we allow for uncertainty about the number of bidders. In our set-up, an appropriate reserve price in a standard auction maximizes the auctioneer’s expected revenue. However, entry fees can be optimal only under some special conditions. Basically, there must be some homogeneity in bidders’ beliefs about the number of bidders and the auctioneer must know, to some extent, these beliefs.     

上海市土地使用权出让机制改革研究——基于拍卖理论和上海市土地市场的实证检验

2007年上海市规定住宅用地挂牌出让的现场竞价规则由公开叫价改为一次性书面报价,旨在降低上海市住宅用地的价格.本文在价值相容和可显示信息的假设下,分别建立两阶段升价拍卖模型和混合拍卖模型,刻画改革前后的挂牌机制,指出:竞标者的均衡策略可解释土地挂牌出让中开发商集中在现场竞价阶段内出价,且更倾向在混合拍卖中隐藏信息的行为;当竞价过程中更易于显示信息时,混合拍卖的期望收入低于两阶段升价拍卖,这表明混合拍卖方式能够降低土地价格.上海市的土地交易数据也证明了这一结论.     

房地产开发用地招拍挂制度的市场绩效研究

我国的土地出让招拍挂制度是具有重大意义的市场竞争性交易制度和社会资源配王方式.论文运用拍卖理论简要回顾了土地招拍挂制度影响市场绩效的经济学原理,对全国(2003-2005)和北京(2005-2007)城市土地有偿出让市场进行了分类统计,并以此数据为基础对招标、拍卖和挂牌三种不同出让方式的市场绩效进行了对比分析,得出了我国土地出让市场中存在理论和实践并不一致的结论,并指出了造成该问题的原因是政府对招拍挂制度的干预,最后提出了提高招拍挂制度绩效的建议.     

作业成本法在工程计价中的应用

工程项目计价体系中,间接费是按直接费比例进行分配的,该方法所致的费用信息的精确性令人质疑。而随着科技的发展,施工(生产)过程中间接费用比例的增大,使得计价方法的改变成为焦点。作业成本法作为一种先进企业会计成本计算方法,在西方许多行业都有一定程度的运用。本文通过对作业成本法原理的介绍、传统成本发与作业成本法优劣的比较以及在工程计价体系中应用作业成本法的实例分析,表达了将作业成本法引入工程项目计价体系的思想。试图得到更精确的费用信息,为施工企业管理、决策和以后的企业核算提供依据。     

Neutrality of buyer and seller commissions to auction house profit

This paper presents an examination of optimal revenue management of a monopoly auction house through which a seller sells goods via a second‐price auction. The house charges commissions to both the buyer and seller. Results demonstrate that a continuum of combinations of optimal buyer and seller commission rates exists, all of which yield the same expected profit of the house. Additionally, we discuss several possible factors that lead to the prevailing custom of zero buyer commission, such as commission aversion of buyers, the house's incentive to maximize the hammer price, and seller and buyer preferences for apparently lowered commission rates.     

盈余管理，审计风险与非对称审计收费——基于2008年中国沪市上市公司制造业的证据

本文选取2008年制造业的601家上市公司作为研究样本,从审计师所承担的审计风险的角度出发,鉴于上市公司不同方向的盈余管理行为封审计收费的影响作出了研究。结果表明,尽管存在非对称诉讼风险,由于中国特有的监管制度,审计收费与向上的盈余管理行为正相关,与向下的盈余管理行为也正相关。同时发现,在中国的股票市场上,看似处于高速增长阶段的上市公司,其向上的盈余管理行为与审计费用的正相关关系并不显着。     

中小企业板块上市公司审计费用决定因素分析

本文根据现有的理论及文献,对我国中小企业板块上市公司审计费用决定因素进行了分析。着重探讨了审计公司规模,初次审计合约,审计任期,审计风险以及审计客户规模和复杂程度对中小企业板块上市公司审计费用产生的影响。     

Application fee manipulations in matching markets

In some well-known hospital–intern type of matching markets, hospitals impose mandatory application fees on internship applicants to consider their applications. Motivated by this real-life phenomenon, we study the application fee overreporting incentives of hospitals in centralized matching markets by assuming that interns have finite budgets to spend on such fees. Our main theorem shows that no stable mechanism is immune to application fee manipulations. Interestingly, under any stable rule, hospitals might not only obtain better matchings but also increase their application fee revenues through overreporting their application fees. In the restricted domains in which either side has homogeneous preferences or each hospital has only one available position, every stable mechanism turns out to be immune to application fee overreportings.     

NONPARAMETRIC ESTIMATION OF ENTRY COST IN FIRST‐PRICE PROCUREMENT AUCTIONS

In this paper, I investigate Samuelson's low‐price auction model with entry costs. The model's equilibrium implies that the distribution of bids is truncated at the threshold for participation. I use the model to estimate the cost of participation in Michigan highway procurement auctions. The null hypothesis of zero entry costs is rejected. Using my empirical results, I then construct an estimate of the optimal auction, which employs regular policy tools such as entry fees. Finally, I demonstrate the savings that the Michigan government could have made on payments if optimal auctions had been employed. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

供给侧结构性减税降费的思考

根据新供给经济学的观点,刺激经济发展最有效的手段是减税降费,因为减税降费不仅可以使企业降低成本、增加利润,进而扩大生产规模和投资科技创新领域,而且可以增加员工收入,提高员工积极性,使其更好地投入生产,这与供给侧结构性改革侧重于对生产者的激励不谋而合。中国经济进入新常态后,出现了如产业结构不合理、创新能力不强等问题,而需求侧宏观经济政策不能解决这些问题。基于此,论文就供给侧结构性减税降费进行了思考。     

我国矿产资源税费征收现状及存在的问题

我国矿产资源行业存在着国家财产权利没有得到充分体现和矿山企业税费负担过重的双重问题,严重制约了矿业经济的可持续发展。文章借鉴国外矿产资源税费制度,提出要建立科学的矿产资源税费制度,以完善矿产资源税费理论。     

Parasitism and Internet auction fraud: An exploration

Most research on Internet auction fraud focuses exclusively on the relationship between the con-artist and victim. However, the con-artist and victim are situated in an ecology comprising the auction house, police, and auction community. This paper employs the ‘parasite’ metaphor as a way of building theory about Internet auction fraud. We begin by describing the parasite metaphor. We then introduce three theories from the parasitism literature and demonstrate the insights these theories can produce. The first theory, the competitive exclusion principle, highlights how separate auction markets evolve their own species or types of fraud. It also warns us that fraud elimination may be neither desirable nor feasible relative to constraining fraud to acceptable levels. The second theory details various parasite infection mechanisms to show that on-line fraud is composed of two processes; the actual deception and escape. Finally, virulence theory provides one way to predict how much harm a particular kind of fraud will cause to an individual victim. Virulence theory is also used to suggest that the auction infrastructure encourages low virulence vis-à-vis other kinds of fraud like Nigerian letter fraud.     

会计师事务所的行业专门化投资与审计定价——以我国首次公开发行证券的审计市场为视角

通过对2001年—2009年中国首次公开发行证券的审计相关数据进行模型检验后发现,在中国首次公开发行证券的审计中,行业专门化的审计师通过实施差异化的竞争战略获取审计收费溢价,进而获得超额利润,行业专门化的发展道路可以成为会计师事务所行之有效的一种竞争战略。     

供应链分销网络运输费率优化模型研究

建立了一个确定运输费率的线性规划模型,模型假设运输费率取决于产品的重量和运输距离,并且考虑随机需求。模型能够确保每个分销商从生产商那里获得的期望补偿能够覆盖他的预期总分销成本,并且可以增加一些限制条件使模型确定的费率更可信。按模型确定的运输费用不仅可以减少生产商的分销成本,同时也为分销商提供比较公平的补偿。     

家族企业国际化对审计收费的影响研究

以我国2010—2020年沪深A股上市家族企业为研究样本,实证检验家族企业国际化与审计收费之间的关系。研究结果发现,家族企业国际化程度的加深会使得审计收费提高。代际传承和家族董事席位分别在两者之间发挥正向和负向调节作用。机制检验表明,家族企业开展国际化经营增加了企业的经营风险,提高了审计师对于风险的评估,从而导致审计收费的提高。进一步研究发现,家族企业国际化与审计收费之间的正向影响在不具有海外背景高管的企业以及不存在国有持股的企业中更为突出。研究结论为从审计师视角加强对家族企业国际化的监管提供理论依据和经验证据。     

An options-based approach to analyze auction guarantees in the art market

Auction-house guarantees are becoming a common feature in the art market. We analyze these guarantees within the framework of financial options. This approach allows us to derive analytical (closed-form) expressions to value these positions, considering both, the case in which the painting is sold, and the case in which the painting goes unsold (“bought in”). In addition, we present several risk metrics that are useful to describe from an intuitive viewpoint the exposure of the auction house, and that of a third party (in case the auction house decides to layoff, fully or partially, the risk associated with offering such guarantees). We demonstrate that the expressions we derive satisfy the put-call parity relationship, and we further validate these formulas with a Monte Carlo simulation applied to a realistic example. We also show that the risk associated with such guarantees is lower than what is commonly believed by market practitioners, and we expose the dangers of relying on the Black-Scholes model to value such guarantees. Finally, having explicit expressions to assess the risk involved in these guarantees helps to bring more transparency to a notoriously opaque segment of the art market.     

研发投资、舞弊风险与审计费用

以2007—2018年中国A股市场研发投资额大于零的非金融类上市公司为研究对象,实证研究研发投资强度对财务舞弊风险和审计费用的影响以及CPA审计治理效果。研究结果表明：研发投资强度与财务舞弊风险和审计费用均正相关,并且财务舞弊风险在研发投资强度对审计费用的影响中存在部分中介效应。使用工具变量法进行内生性分析发现,研发投资强度在前三种度量方式（研发投入额÷总资产、研发投入额÷净资产、研发投入额÷公司员工数）下具有很强的外生性,而在第四种度量方式（研发投入额÷营业收入）下是内生的。对审计治理效果进行分析发现,虽然高审计收费保证了CPA较高的执业努力程度,但与审计合谋正相关的异常审计费用的存在使得CPA审计治理效果并不佳,并且对研发投资强度大的客户、财务舞弊风险高的客户和高新技术企业收取更高的异常审计费用通常与更高的审计合谋倾向有关。     

Optimal disclosure of costly information packages in auctions

In an independent, private values, second-price auction with entry fees we discuss the way in which a seller should optimally spread costly information among the bidders. We find that marginal gross revenues do not generally behave monotonically in total information release. In the two bidder case, essentially, any asymmetric allocation of information dominates the symmetric information allocation. Even the bidder who gets less information is willing to pay a higher entry fee for asymmetric information allocations than for the symmetric one. His entry fee coincides with that of the better informed bidder. Losses from allocating an amount of information non-optimally can be substantial.