Effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on Bank Capital Requirements for SMEs

Using data from three countries (US, Italy and Australia) and surveying related studies from several other countries in Europe, we investigate the effects of the New Basel Capital Accord on bank capital requirements for small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs). We find that, for all the countries, banks will have significant benefits, in terms of lower capital requirements, when considering small and medium sized firms as retail customers. But they will be obliged to use the Advanced IRB approach and to manage them on a pooled basis. For SMEs as corporate, however, capital requirements will be slightly greater than under the existing Basel I Capital Accord. We believe that most eligible banks will use a blended approach (considering some SMEs as retail and some as corporate). Through a breakeven analysis, we find that for all of our countries, banking organizations will be obliged to classify as retail at least 20% of their SME portfolio in order to maintain the current capital requirement (8%). JEL classification: G21, G28     

CP3's Standardized Approach for Credit Risk and Current Capital Requirements

This paper reports estimated risk-weighted assets at 27 New York banks after applying the provisions of the Standardized Approach, both singly and in combination. The provisions that lead to estimated decreases in risk-weighted assets had greater impact than provisions that lead to estimated increases. This finding implies that using Standardized Approach elements to make capital requirements more risk-sensitive will lead to lower levels of required capital, unless regulators also impose a capital charge for operational risk. The effect of the different provisions varied across the 27 institutions, but the results, on average, are consistent with those reported in the third Quantitative Impact Study.     

The Impact of Capital Requirements and Managerial Compensation on Bank Charter Value

This paper examines the joint impact of capital requirements and managerial incentive compensation on bank charter value and bank risk. Most of the previous literature in the area of banking and agency theory has focused on asymmetric information between either banks and regulators, (and therefore on the role of bank capital), or between bank shareholders and bank managers, (and therefore on the role of managerial ownership). In this paper we unify these issues and present empirical results from the regression of capital requirements jointly with measures of incentive compensation on Tobin's Q, our proxy for bank charter value, and on the standard deviation of total return, our proxy for bank risk. In a sample of 102 bank holding companies we find that capital levels are consistently a significant positive factor in determining bank charter value and a significant negative factor in determining risk. On the other hand, we find our six measures of incentive compensation to be generally insignificant relative to charter value but do provide some evidence consistent with a theory relating types of incentive compensation with risk.     

Minimizing Basel III Capital Requirements with Unconditional Coverage Constraint

The new Basel III framework increases the banks’ market risk capital requirements. In this paper, we introduce a new risk management approach based on the unconditional coverage test to minimize the regulatory capital requirements. Portfolios optimized with our new minimum capital constraint successfully reduce the Basel III market risk capital requirements. In general, portfolios with value-at-risk and conditional-value-at-risk objective functions and underlying empirical distribution yield better portfolio risk profiles and have lower capital requirements. For the optimization we use the threshold-accepting heuristic and the common trust-region search method.     

Bank Capital: Lessons from the Financial Crisis

Using a multicountry panel of banks, we study whether better capitalized banks experienced higher stock returns during the financial crisis. We differentiate among various types of capital ratios: the Basel risk‐adjusted ratio, the leverage ratio, the Tier 1 and Tier 2 ratios, and the tangible equity ratio. We find several results: (i) before the crisis, differences in capital did not have much impact on stock returns; (ii) during the crisis, a stronger capital position was associated with better stock market performance, most markedly for larger banks; (iii) the relationship between stock returns and capital is stronger when capital is measured by the leverage ratio rather than the risk‐adjusted capital ratio; (iv) higher quality forms of capital, such as Tier 1 capital and tangible common equity, were more relevant.     

Capital, Portfolio, and Growth: Bank Behavior Under Risk-Based Capital Guidelines

This paper examines banks' capital, portfolio and growth decisions from 1986 to 1995, when risk-based capital guidelines were proposed and implemented. Overall, we observe complementarity between equity financing and risk. We find no systematic differences in pre- and postregulation behavior consistent with banks reacting to risk-based capital standards implementation. We do find significant differences, however, between low-capital banks and other banks. For example, increases in equity generally do not lead to increases in assets unless the bank has low capital. We also find that the impact of regulatory variables, such as the ratio of equity to total assets or the of ratio risk-weighted assets to total assets, have the predicted, significant effects for low-capital banks but not necessarily for other banks.     

新巴塞尔协议及其对我国银行业的影响

自 1999年 6月首次征求意见稿面世以来 ,新巴塞尔协议已引起国际银行界的普遍关注。与1988年协议相比 ,新协议的内容更广泛、更复杂 ,这充分地反映了银行业的进步。毫无疑问 ,新协议的实施与推广也必将给银行业带来深刻的影响。本文在简要介绍新协议主要更新内容的基础上重点分析了它给我国银行业所带来的影响。     

Bank Failure,Mark‐to‐market and the Financial Crisis

This paper is concerned with the allegation that fair value accounting rules have contributed significantly to the recent financial crisis. It focuses on one particular channel for that contribution: the impact of fair value on the actual or potential failure of banks. The paper compares four criteria for failure: one economic, two legal and one regulatory. It is clear from this comparison that balance sheet valuations of assets are, in two cases, crucial in these definitions, and so the choice between ‘fair value’ or other valuations can be decisive in whether a bank fails; but in two cases fair value is irrelevant. Bank failures might arise despite capital adequacy and balance sheet solvency due to sudden shocks to liquidity positions. Two of the most prominent bank failures cannot, at first sight, be attributed to fair value accounting: we show that Northern Rock was balance sheet solvent, even on a fair value basis, as was Lehman Brothers. The case study evidence is augmented by econometric tests that suggest that mark‐to‐market accounting has had only a very limited influence on the perceived failure risk of banks.     

The role of regulatory capital in international bank mergers and acquisitions

When investigating the role of regulatory capital in bank mergers and acquisitions (M&As) we finds that US targets are better capitalized than their acquirers and non-acquired peers and that US banks maintain higher capital levels than European banks. Thus, US banks strategically raise their capital levels to avoid regulatory scrutiny. Furthermore, more value is created for targets with high excess capital and in M&As involving targets with considerably higher excess-capital ratios than their acquirers. Thus, the excess regulatory capital hypothesis is supported. Finally, market prices reflect the influence that capital has on the probability of the merger's regulatory approval.     

The Impact of Basel II on Lending to Small- and Medium-Sized Firms: A Regulatory Policy Assessment Based on Spanish Credit Register Data

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the impact on bank credit exposures to small- and medium-sized Spanish firms of the current proposal for reform of the 1988 Capital Accord using information from the Spanish Credit Register. Capital requirements for exposures to those firms, according to the various revisions of the proposed capital reform (from the January 2001 consultative document to the April 2003 one), are calculated to analyze whether the existing pattern of bank financing of small- and medium-sized firms might be altered. Finally, the incentives for individual banks to adopt the advanced internal ratings-based approach proposed by Basel II are evaluated.     

银行监管与企业融资的跨国实证分析

依据世界银行对各国银行监管与微观企业调查的跨国数据,运用实证分析方法,考量巴塞尔协议三大银行监管手段对企业融资的影响。结果发现：资本充足率要求与私营部门监测均会降低融资可得性,且对中小型企业的影响更大;而政府部门监管权力能提高企业融资可得性。鉴于此,监管机制设计应充分考虑不同政策的相互影响,特别是对中小型企业融资的冲击,慎重调整资本充足率与对私人监测程度的监管要求,妥善应用政府监测程度监管权力来实现金融稳定与企业融资的双赢,增强金融服务实体经济能力。     

资产规模、资本状况与商业银行资产组合行为——基于中国银行业面板数据的实证分析

本文立足于我国转型期内的经济金融特征,构造了一个银行资产组合行为的局部均衡模型。在对中国银行业按照资产规模和资本状况进行分类的基础上,本文的实证分析证明了模型的基本含义:由于银行间的异质性,紧缩性货币政策之后商业银行的资产组合行为体现出了截面效应。基于此,本文提出了确立以银行资产组合行为为基础的货币政策决策体系,加强货币政策与监管政策之间的协调等政策建议,以提高货币政策的有效性。     

Procyclicality,Bank Lending,and the Macroeconomic Implications of a Revised Basel Accord

Bank regulators are in the process of implementing revised regulatory capital standards. However, the macroeconomic effects of a revised Basel Accord are uncertain. Examining the various channels through which the revised Accord may influence economic output suggests that making the buffer stock of capital positively related to the business cycle is necessary to reduce procyclicality. This can be accomplished by bank regulators using either enhanced supervisory powers or increased financial disclosure.     

贷款证券化、监管资本套利与资本监管改进

巴塞尔协议的资本充足率指标可以反映银行部门吸收风险损失的能力,但是无法监测和控制银行体系外的贷款总额和累积的信用风险。20世纪70年代的贷款证券化创新导致银行进行监管资本套利,并使得资本充足率监管趋于失效。本文基于贷款证券化下银行贷款余额与社会贷款余额的差异,分析银行监管资本套利的微观机制并提出改进资本监管的建议。     

A Prudential Paradox: The Signal in (Not) Restricting Bank Dividends

By restricting dividends in the weakest banks, prudential regulators counterintuitively induce more capital payouts in marginal banks. The potential for bank runs exacerbates the incentive to signal strength through dividend payments. Regulatory restrictions on those payments can be used to achieve the first-best outcome, but only if the prevailing capital requirements are sufficiently high. In a crisis, the optimal dividend policy is more restrictive, since it allows the weak but solvent banks to pool with the strong. Finally, we show that the optimal release of regulatory bank information depends critically on the regulator's information and dividend restriction policies.     

Capital Adequacy, Bank Mergers, and the Medium of Payment

We examine how banks' capital requirements affect the way bank mergers are financed, as well as the stock-market reaction to the merger announcement. We find that the capital position of the acquirer is one of the two factors most strongly influencing the choice of financing method; the other is the relative size of the merging banks. The smaller the acquirer in relation to the target bank and the higher the acquirer's capital adequacy ratio, the more likely it is that the acquisition will be financed by a stock swap. The capital requirements also affect the market reaction, through their effect on the financing method choice. The value of the acquirer's equity decreases more at the time of the merger announcement if the method of payment is stock. Like prior studies, we find that the abnormal return on the target banks' stock is positive.     

新资本协议下经济资本计量的实用方法

经济资本是新资本协议下银行信用风险控制与管理的重要手段,但在实践中却远未成熟。本文辨析了非预期损失和经济资本的关系,从符合监管要求和便于操作实施的角度出发,介绍了基于期权定价理论和基于新资本协议资本计提公式的实用计量方法．从理论依据、计算步骤和应用评价三个维度进行了阐述。最后,对商业银行实施经济资本计量提出了若干建议。     

Bank Leverage Limits and Regulatory Arbitrage: Old Question-New Evidence

Banks are regulated more than most firms, making them good subjects to study regulatory arbitrage (avoidance). Their latest arbitrage opportunity may be the new leverage rule covering the largest U.S. banks; leverage rules require equal capital against assets with unequal risks, so banks can effectively relax the leverage constraint by increasing asset risk. Consistent with that conjecture, we find that banks covered by the new rule shifted to riskier, higher yielding securities relative to control banks. The shift began almost precisely when the rule was finalized in 2014, well before it took effect in 2018. Security level analysis suggests banks actively added riskier securities, rather than merely shedding safer ones. Despite the risk shifting, overall bank risk did not increase, evidently because the banks most constrained by the new leverage rule significantly increased leverage capital ratios.     

金融发展、边界资本配置与经济增长

传统金融发展理论认为,金融发展以提高社会资本配置效率促进经济增长。但 是,该理论忽略了国民经济需要产业部门协调发展的事实,使得央行的结构信贷政策受到质 疑。本文针对这一理论缺陷提出“边界资本配置效率”的概念,并通过实证研究发现：我国金 融发展对经济增长的促进作用,不仅表现在总量上,而且表现在结构上,即央行的结构信贷政 策整体有效。上述结论有助于央行完善实施定向降准政策的商业银行筛选标准。     

中国式财政分权影响资本配置效率研究

高度集中的政治管理体制下的财政分权使得中国财政分权对地方政府行为所产生的激励与西方国家不同。使用2002～2009年数据,对中国财政分权与资本配置效率进行理论研究与实证分析,结果表明:财政分权程度的提高对资本配置效率产生了阻碍作用,中国式分权所引致的地方政府规模扩张等行为扭曲是导致财政分权与资本配置效率负相关的主要原因。为此,应改革政绩考核指标、完善税收体系、调整财权分配制度。