Capital regulation,heterogeneous monitoring costs,and aggregate loan quality

This paper develops a banking-sector framework with heterogeneous loan monitoring costs. Banks are exposed to the moral hazard behavior of borrowers and endogenously choose whether to monitor their loans to eliminate this exposure. After analyzing an unregulated banking system, we examine several cases in which regulatory capital requirements bind the notional loan supplies of various subsets of banks. To gauge the impact of capital requirements, we define loan ‘quality’ in terms of either the ratio of monitored to total loans or the ratio of monitoring banks to total bank population. Under the assumption of a specific cross-sectional distribution of banks, our simulations show that the imposition of binding capital requirements on a previously unregulated banking system unambiguously increases the market loan rate and reduces aggregate lending, but has an ambiguous effect on loan ‘quality’. Nevertheless, once capital requirements are in place, the simulations indicate that regulators can contribute to higher overall loan ‘quality’ by toughening capital requirements.     

COMMERCIAL BANK RISK: MARKET,INTEREST RATE,AND FOREIGN EXCHANGE

Because of recent structural changes in the balance sheets of banks, regulatory changes in the risk-based capital requirements, and the recent adoption of mark-to-market accounting changes, interest rate risk remains an important issue for commercial banks and an important regulatory concern. Market, interest rate, and foreign exchange risk are estimated for a sample of commercial banks using ordinary least squares from 1986 to 1991. Consistent with earlier studies, the estimated coefficients continue to be unstable. We find that interest rate risk decreases and foreign exchange risk increases. Moreover, the results differ depending on practices of the bank (money center, superregional, or regional). We find evidence consistent with earlier studies that theorize foreign exchange risk is explained by unhedged foreign loan exposure.     

Optimal credit risk transfer, monitored finance, and banks

We examine the implications of optimal credit risk transfer (CRT) for bank-loan monitoring, and the incentives for banks to engage in optimal CRT. In our model, properly designed CRT instruments allow banks to insure themselves against loan losses precisely in those states that signal monitoring. We find that optimal CRT enhances loan monitoring and expands financial intermediation, in contrast to the findings of the previous literature. Optimal CRT instruments are based on loan portfolios rather than individual loans and have credit-enhancement guarantees, pretty much as banks do in practice. But the extent of credit enhancement needs to be precisely delimited. Above that exact level, monitoring incentives are undermined (loan quality deteriorates) and wealth is transferred from the bank's financiers to the bank. Properly designed risk-based capital requirements are shown to prevent such a wealth transfer and to provide banks with the incentive to engage in optimal CRT.     

Does Macro‐Prudential Regulation Leak? Evidence from a UK Policy Experiment

The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro‐prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using a unique data set. In the UK, regulators have imposed time‐varying, bank‐specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK‐owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This “leakage” is substantial, amounting to about one‐third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change.     

Loan pricing under Basel capital requirements

We analyze the loan pricing implications of the reform of bank capital regulation known as Basel II. We consider a perfectly competitive market for business loans where, as in the model underlying the internal ratings based (IRB) approach of Basel II, a single risk factor explains the correlation in defaults across firms. Our loan pricing equation implies that low risk firms will achieve reductions in their loan rates by borrowing from banks adopting the IRB approach, while high risk firms will avoid increases in their loan rates by borrowing from banks that adopt the less risk-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only a very high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed IRB capital charges, partly because the net interest income from performing loans is not counted as a buffer against credit losses. A net interest income correction for IRB capital requirements is proposed.     

Growth fixation and the performance of bank initial public offerings, 1983–1991

Numerous banks and thrifts went public amid the favorable regulatory climate and strong capital market of the mid-1980s. A sample of 393 bank initial public offerings from 1983 to 1991 lagged three benchmarks of returns over a five-year post-offering holding period. This poor performance is concentrated among larger institutions with more aggressive loan growth. Following the IPO, many of these banks also recorded dramatic increases in loan losses. The evidence suggests the market may have fixated on the rapid growth of these institutions or did not adequately account for changes in the post-IPO risk of their loan portfolios.     

Stress testing credit risk: The Great Depression scenario

By employing Moody’s corporate default and rating transition data spanning the last 90 years we explore how much capital banks should hold against their corporate loan portfolios to withstand historical stress scenarios. Specifically, we will focus on the worst case scenario over the observation period, the Great Depression. We find that migration risk and the length of the investment horizon are critical factors when determining bank capital needs in a crisis. We show that capital may need to rise more than three times when the horizon is increased from 1 year, as required by current and future regulation, to 3 years. Increases are still important but of a lower magnitude when migration risk is introduced in the analysis. Further, we find that the new bank capital requirements under the so-called Basel 3 agreement would enable banks to absorb Great Depression-style losses. But, such losses would dent regulatory capital considerably and far beyond the capital buffers that have been proposed to ensure that banks survive crisis periods without government support.     

Why do banks choose to finance with equity?

A majority of U.S. banks between 1973 and 2012 held equity capital significantly beyond the required minimum. We study the risk-return tradeoff in connection with a bank’s capital structure, and identify several new significant market factors that drive the level of equity capital in banks. During normal growth periods, bank leverage is negatively related to a level of competition and loan portfolio diversification, while high bank leverage is associated with low past liquidity. During recessions and expansions, the roles of those factors change following distortions in risk-return tradeoff. In distress, when banks approach regulatory capital requirements, market determinants of book leverage lose their significance; however, leverage does not decrease until a bank is within 1% of the minimal capital threshold.     

The Impact of SFAS No. 114 on the Linear Information Dynamic for Commercial Banks

Increase (decrease) in loan loss provisions would decrease (increases) bank earnings, but increase (decreases) regulatory capital. Previous studies have separately documented earnings and capital management behavior via loan loss provisions by commercial banks. However, it is difficult to isolate a bank's demand for increasing earnings from its demand for regulatory capital because earnings is a source of capital. Based on the objective bank function, this study investigates the impact of SFAS No. 114 on the information content of loan loss provisions in relation to both earnings quality and capital adequacy in a linear information dynamic framework. Test results show that the association between market value with loan loss provisions became significantly stronger for commercial banks in the post- than in the pre-adoption period. As a result, SFAS No. 114 is also found to positively affect the association of market value with both bank earnings and regulatory capital through the clean surplus relation because of the higher value relevance of loan loss provisions. The findings thus provide empirical evidence that SFAS No. 114 has significantly complemented banking regulations in enhancing (reducing) the (dispersion from the) accounting measurement construct of loan loss provisions.     

贷款证券化、监管资本套利与资本监管改进

巴塞尔协议的资本充足率指标可以反映银行部门吸收风险损失的能力,但是无法监测和控制银行体系外的贷款总额和累积的信用风险。20世纪70年代的贷款证券化创新导致银行进行监管资本套利,并使得资本充足率监管趋于失效。本文基于贷款证券化下银行贷款余额与社会贷款余额的差异,分析银行监管资本套利的微观机制并提出改进资本监管的建议。     

A model of the monetary sector with and without binding capital requirements

Bank equity is exogenous in the standard deposit-and-loan-expansion multiplier model, so that model is inappropriate for analyzing the interaction between monetary and bank regulatory policies. This paper examines the effect of a binding capital requirement on the loan expansion process. We evaluate how the conflict between the monetary and regulatory authorities evolves when bank equity adjusts to a binding capital requirement. We find that capital requirements are not innocuous for monetary policy. Nevertheless, the monetary authority can assert control over the loan expansion process in the long run, although multiplier values will differ considerably from those in the standard multiplier model.     

The Basel Committee proposals for a new capital accord: implications for Italian banks

Following a few general considerations on the recently proposed revision of the Basel Agreement on capital adequacy, this paper focuses on the first pillar of the Basel Committee proposals, the handling of capital requirements for credit risk in the banking book. The Basel Committee envisages an approach alternatively based on external ratings or on internal rating systems for the determination of the minimum capital requirement related to bank loan portfolios. This approach supports a system of capital requirements that is more sensitive to credit risk. On the basis of specific assumptions, these requirements provide a measure of the value at risk (VaR) produced by models used by major international banks. We first address the impact of the standardised and (internal ratings-based) IRB foundation approach using general data on Italian banks loans' portfolios default rates. We then simulate the impact of the proposed new rules on the corporate loan portfolios of Italian banks, using the unique data set of mortality rates recently published by the Bank of Italy. Three main conclusions emerge from the analysis: (i) the standardised approach implicitly penalizes Italian banks in their interbank funding as their rating is generally below AA/Aa, (ii) the average default rate experienced by Italian banks is higher than the one implied in the benchmark risk weight (BRW) proposed by the Basel Committee for the IRB foundation approach, thereby potentially leading to an increase in the regulatory risk weights, and (iii) the risk-weight is based on an average asset correlation that is significantly higher than the one historically recorded within the Italian banks' corporate borrowers. These findings support the need for a significant revision of the basic inputs and assumptions of the Basel proposals. Finally, in relation to the conditions that allow the capital market to effectively discipline banks, we comment on the proposals advanced in relation to the third pillar of the new capital adequacy scheme.     

Capital shocks, bank asset allocation, and the revised Basel Accord

In contrast to the 1988 Basel Accord (Basel I), the revised risk-based capital standards (Basel II) propose regulatory capital requirements based on credit ratings. This paper develops a theoretical model to analyze how banks will adjust their low and high credit risk commercial loans under the proposed newer standard. Capital-constrained banks respond to an adverse capital shock by reducing high credit risk loans, while under certain circumstances, low credit risk loans may actually increase. When compared to Basel I, it is shown that high-risk loans are reduced more under Basel II, but whether a bank reduces total lending more under Basel I or under the revised standards depends on a complex interaction of factors.     

Structural effects of asset-backed securitization

This paper analyses the potential changes in the operational structure of deposit-taking financial institutions that securitize assets. Findings indicate that banks can create an asset securitization pipeline structure that enables them to increase their return on capital. In other words, through securitization banks can expand their loan provision business without increasing their liabilities or their capital levels. Using a contingent claims model, four factors that impact on the bank's decision to securitize are highlighted and analysed: (i) the level of deposit insurance; (ii) capital adequacy requirements; (iii) insolvency risk; and, (iv) the risk of credit enhancements. Furthermore, we identify key accounting and regulatory challenges that emerge for banks from the process of asset backed securitization.     

Bank Capital Ratios Across Countries: Why Do They Vary?

This paper extends the literature on bank capital structure by modeling capital structure as a function of important public policy and bank regulatory characteristics of the home country, as well as of bank specific variables, country macro-economic conditions and country level financial characteristics. The model is estimated with annual data for an unbalanced panel of the 78 largest private banks in the world headquartered in 12 industrial countries over the period between 1992 and 2005. The results indicate that bank capital ratios are significantly affected in the hypothesized directions by most of the bank-specific variables. Several of the country characteristic and policy variables are also significant with the predicted sign: banks maintain higher capital ratios in home countries in which the bank sector is relatively smaller and in countries that practice prompt corrective actions more actively, have more stringent capital requirements, and have more effective corporate governance structures.     

The bank capital channel and bank profits

This paper develops a microeconomic model of banking to highlight an endogenous loan creation process that emerges from bank profits via the capital accumulation of retained earnings and uses a simple bank capital‐loan multiplier to illustrate constraints on lending. The study also analyzes how sufficient net interest margins are important for banks to maintain lending portfolios and avoid financial fragility. The model offers support to bank capital channel (BKC) economists by illustrating how changes in interest rates may influence bank lending through the bank's internal capital accumulation growth rate and on a bank's portfolio choices.     

Bank Ownership and Lending: Does Bank Ownership Matter?

Using the Central and Eastern European (CEE) bank-level data covering 2004–12, this article examines the differences in foreign-owned banks’ loan growth and its determinants in comparison with privately-owned domestic banks. The results indicate the greatest differences in the context of bank capital and liquidity. Bank capital remains an important loan growth determinant only for domestic private banks during the non-crisis periods and bank liquidity is of greater importance to domestic private banks during the crisis periods. This highlights local regulatory authorities’ limited ability to harness loan growth and excessive risk-taking during the non-crisis periods and points at the benefits of multinational banking groups’ internal capital markets during the crisis periods.     

Loan pricing under Basel II in an imperfectly competitive banking market

The new Basel II Accord (2006), established new and revised capital requirements for banks. In this paper we analyze and estimate the possible effects of the new rules on the pricing of bank loans. We relate to the two approaches for capital requirements (internal and standardized) and distinguish between retail and corporate customers. Our loan-equation is based on a model of a banking firm facing uncertainty operating in an imperfectly competitive loan market. We use Israeli economic data and data of a leading Israeli bank. The main results indicate that high quality corporate and retail customers will enjoy a reduction in loan interest rates in (big) banks which, most probably, will adopt the IRB approach. On the other hand high risk customers will benefit by shifting to (small) banks that adopt the standardized approach.     

The pass-through of bank capital requirements to corporate lending spreads

We study the impact of higher bank capital requirements on corporate lending spreads using granular bank- and loan-level data. Our empirical strategy employs the heterogeneity in capital requirements across banks and time of implementation in Switzerland. We find that changes in the capital deviation from the regulatory minimum affect lending spreads asymmetrically. In response to a reduction in the capital deviation, banks with deficits with respect to their risk-weighted capital requirement raise spreads relative to banks with surpluses and de-leverage. Banks respond to higher requirements by raising spreads and, for deficit banks, by cutting lending.     

Bank capital buffers in a dynamic model

We estimate a dynamic structural banking model to examine the interaction between risk-weighted capital adequacy and unweighted leverage requirements, their differential impact on bank lending, and equity buffer accumulation in excess of regulatory minima. Tighter risk-weighted capital requirements reduce loan supplies and lead to an endogenous fall in bank profitability, reducing bank incentives to accumulate equity buffers and, therefore, increasing the incidence of bank failure. Alternatively, tighter leverage requirements increase lending, preserve bank charter value, and incentives to accumulate equity buffers leading to lower bank failure rates.