Behavioral and Welfare Effects of Tournaments and Fixed Performance Contracts: Some Experimental Evidence

Using experimental economics, we compare the efficiency and welfare effects of tournaments and fixed performance contracts. Our subjects (agents) were generally better off under fixed performance contracts, but the advantage of the fixed performance contract disappears if the relative magnitude of the standard deviation of the common shock exceeds a critical value. Efficiency wise, agents tend to exert higher effort under fixed performance contracts, on average. Additionally, an increase in the common shock standard deviation appeared to be associated with lower effort under tournaments. Our results shed light on the potential impact of legislative proposals to ban tournament contracts.     

Courts and contract enforcement in transition agriculture: theory and evidence from Poland

The paper investigates theoretically and empirically the role of courts for contract enforcement in transition agriculture. In a survey of 306 Polish farmers conducted in 1999, only 38.5% respondents reported to believe that they could use courts to enforce contracts with their most important customer. Furthermore, those who believed the legal system could be used would accept significant financial losses before taking action. We develop a theoretical model, based on the costs and benefits of court enforcement, which captures the boundary between contracts to be regarded as 'enforceable' and 'not-enforceable' and, simultaneously, the threshold of taking legal action. The empirical analysis strongly supports our model: (1) the farmers' responses can be explained by cost-benefit calculations regarding the use of courts, (2) the legal 'enforceability' of contracts depends not only on the efficiency of the legal system but also on the attributes of the transaction, the contracts and the relationship between buyer and seller and (3) the threshold of taking legal action is significantly influenced by indirect costs of court enforcement, such as the disruption of a valuable business relationship, and by the availability of alternative enforcement mechanisms.     

Tournaments, Fairness, and Risk

We estimate willingness to pay (WTP) to operate under two types of contracts—tournaments (Ts) and fixed performance-standard contracts (F). Our results are consistent with the notion that subjects having social preferences for fairness and care about risk. That is, when subjects experience greater inequity under tournaments relative to fixed performance contracts, or experience greater revenue risk under tournaments, the gap between WTP for fixed performance and tournament contracts increases, ceteris paribus. Our results provide an explanation for grower dissatisfaction with tournament compensation schemes independent of possible concerns regarding opportunistic behavior by integrators.     

Microeconometric analysis of wine grape supply contracts in Australia*

This paper examines wine grape supply contracts used in the main grape growing regions of Australia. An empirical analysis provides insight into specific aspects of contract design and implementation. Statistical analyses of sample data reveal differences between regions in contract specifications. Lower quality grape growing regions place a greater reliance on grape quality assessment to determine bonus/penalty payments compared to higher quality regions. Contracts in higher quality regions place greater emphasis on explicit winery involvement and direction in vineyard management. Results indicate that longer duration contracts are more inclusive in terms of the number of clauses included. Evidence of risk shifting (i.e., winery to grower) for high quality grapes is reported, where the price received by growers is determined by the bottle price of the wine produced.     

Cattle sharing and rental contracts in an Agrarian economy: evidence from Ethiopia

Empirical evidence on the role of cattle sharing and rental contracts in agrarian economies is limited. This article is an investigation of different types of cattle sharing and rental contracts producers in rural Ethiopia adopt. It also investigates why households in rural Ethiopia rely on these contracts that are vulnerable and therefore subject to potential moral hazard problems described in earlier literature. We apply random effect probit and control function econometric methods to household panel data collected in 2005 and 2007 from two agro‐ecological zones in Ethiopia. Controlling for the endogeneity of access to livestock credit, we find that contracts are spatially fragmented and better developed where population density is high and credit and insurance markets are poorly developed. We also find that contracts help cash poor and credit constrained households to improve their herd dynamics, to get access to nonlivestock resources (land, labor and cash) and share risks that could have been difficult without the contract. We show that contracts are rational responses of residents in rural communities characterized by imperfect credit and insurance services, since households with better access to credit are less likely to rely on contracts.     

Customs and Incentives in Contracts

This article examines contractual practices that are often assumed customary. In particular it examines discreteness in agricultural contracts, and focuses on the distinction between the use of simple discrete fraction terms in cropshare contracts and the nearly continuous payment terms used in cash rent contracts. We show that the pattern of shares is best explained as a response to moral hazard problems spread over large numbers of inputs. A contracting model explains the pattern of shares, the difference in flexibility with cash rent contracts, and the lower bound on shares. Empirical analysis using micro data on over 3,000 contracts are used to test implications of the model. A wide range of support is found for a model based on moral hazard and measurement costs.     

New evidence regarding the effects of contract farming on agricultural labor use

Contractual agreements between smallholder farmers and agribusiness companies have gained in importance in many developing countries. While productivity and income effects of contracting in the small farm sector were analyzed in many previous studies, labor market and employment effects are not yet well understood. This is an important research gap, especially against the background of continued population growth and structural transformation. Here, we investigate the effects of two types of contractual agreements between large international processing companies and smallholder farmers on agricultural labor use, household labor allocation, and hired labor demand in Ghana's palm oil sector. We use cross‐sectional survey data and a willingness‐to‐pay approach to control for unobserved heterogeneity between farmers with and without contracts. We find that agricultural labor intensity is substantially reduced through the contracts, because contracting in Ghana is associated with the adoption of labor‐saving procedures and technologies. Simple marketing contracts lead to reallocation of the saved household labor to off‐farm employment, whereas resource‐providing contracts lead to a stronger reallocation of labor within the farming enterprise. Household labor is more affected by labor savings than hired labor.     

Reverse tenancy in Romania: Actors’ rationales and equity outcomes

Following the implementation of the land reform in the 1990s, land rentals have developed in Romania, mainly in a reverse tenancy configuration. The paper provides an analysis of contractual practices in this configuration, based on empirical data collected through intensive field work in Transylvania. The paper depicts the reverse tenancy configuration and the conditions of its emergence in Romania, following the implementation of transition reforms in the agricultural sector. Characterizing the negotiation and enforcement of contracts in this configuration shows that in a situation where no effective enforcement mechanism is available, the market structure is such that tenants can choose “very incomplete” contracts or default on their contractual obligations. The analysis of the landowners’ perspective, taking into account their perception of the contractual relationship, contributes to explain why contractual practices persist in this context. The article concludes with a discussion, from a policy perspective, of the equity-enhancing role of the land lease market in such a reverse tenancy configuration.     

Hog Producer Preferences for Marketing Contract Attributes

We use a stated preference instrument to elicit producer preferences for the attributes of risk-shifting hog marketing contracts and express acceptable producer trade-offs between contract attributes in a convenient dollar metric. Respondents value an increase in a window contract's price ceiling three to five times more than the same increase in the price floor, which suggests that hog producers dislike contracts that limit up-side price potential (limit positive skewness). The contractor's organizational form is also important. Cooperative forms are preferred by many respondents, particularly those who state that trust in the contractor is an important antecedent for any contractual relationship.     

论地质调查项目合同管理

合同制度是市场经济下实现商品等价交换的法定形式。从法律规范化的角度，对地质调查项目合同与可比性有名合同作了类似性分析，在此基础上，论证了地质调查项目合同的法律定位及其管理目标模式的建立。     

How private contract enforcement mechanisms can succeed where public institutions

The enforcement of contracts is necessary for efficient exchange and investment in economic activities. Contracts can be enforced through a variety of mechanisms, both public and private. However, in many developing and transitional countries these public institutions are either absent or ineffective in ensuring contract enforcement. Under such conditions, private enforcement mechanisms may provide a suitable replacement for public enforcement institutions. This may be done externally through a third party or internally through self-enforcing agreements. This paper analyzes the use of "self-enforcing" arrangements or "internal" private enforcement mechanisms. Using a case study of an agri-business in a transition economy — Juhocukor a.s., a Slovakian sugar processor — we show that the use of "internal" private contract enforcement mechanisms can have a significant positive effect on output and efficiency for both partners to the exchange transaction in an environment characterized by the absence or ineffectiveness of public enforcement institutions.     

Small forest landowner preferences for working forest conservation contract attributes: A case of Washington State,USA

In Washington State, small forest landowners (SFLO) play an important role in maintaining forest cover on the landscape as well as associated ecosystem services. This paper examines landowner preferences for the attributes of working forest conservation contracts (WFCC) using a choice experiment. The attributes examined are contract duration (from 10 years to perpetuity), forest management requirements, and the extent of forestland covered under the contract. We find that contract attributes are valued very differently depending on landowner objectives and harvesting behavior. Landowner characteristics and forestland spatial characteristics including distances to development and large public forestlands were found to significantly influence the likelihood of contract acceptance. While a significant portion of preference heterogeneity remains unobserved, we identify several key sources of landowner preference heterogeneity which allows for a better understanding of which landowners are likely to enroll in voluntary forest conservation contracts and may have implications for improved targeting of contracts.     

Formal and informal contract farming in Mozambique: Socially embedded relations of agricultural intensification

This paper explores the role of contract farming arrangements in agricultural intensification in sub-Saharan Africa, combining secondary literature and original case material from Mozambique. The paper extends the scope of “contract farming” beyond the formal contracts between large companies and small-scale producers to include less formal credit agreements between farmers and traders. It argues that such informal contract arrangements are evidence of farmers' agency in “real markets.” In the studied cases, farmers use contract farming opportunities to intensify agricultural production by investing in irrigation and inputs. While informal contracts typically concern locally consumed crops, thus with more possibilities for side selling than formal contracts for export crops with company-controlled markets, informal contract compliance reflects closely knit social ties between the contracting parties. In both formal and informal contracts, purchasers tend to seek out producers who are already irrigating, thus obtaining gains from farmers' earlier investments. This also implies contract farming as a mechanism for accelerating social differentiation arising from unequal access to irrigation. The paper argues that the significance of informal contracts in the studied cases raises the possibility that informal contract farming by local traders plays a more important role in agrarian transformation in Africa than formal contract farming by large companies.     

Contract farming,contract design and smallholder livelihoods*

Contract farming has gained in importance in many developing countries. Previous studies analysed effects of contracts on smallholder farmers’ welfare, yet mostly without considering that different types of contractual relationships exist. Here, we examine associations between contract farming and farm household income in the oil palm sector of Ghana, explicitly differentiating between two types of contracts, namely simple marketing contracts and more comprehensive resource-providing contracts. Moreover, we look at different income sources to better understand how both contracts are linked to farmers’ livelihood strategies. We use cross-sectional survey data and regression models. Issues of endogeneity are addressed through measuring farmers' willingness-to-participate in contracts and using this indicator as an additional covariate. Farmers with both types of contracts have significantly higher household incomes than farmers without a contract, yet with notable differences in terms of the income sources. Farmers with a marketing contract allocate more household labour to off-farm activities and thus have higher off-farm income. In contrast, farmers with a resource-providing contract have larger oil palm plantations and thus higher farm incomes. The findings suggest that the two contract types are associated with different livelihood strategies and that disaggregated analysis of different income sources is important to better understand possible underlying mechanisms.     

Cooperatives, regulation and competition in Norwegian agriculture

This article analyses the efficiency of current market regulations and market structure in Norwegian agriculture. Based on their potential to coordinate farmers' supplies, large marketing cooperatives are assigned a market regulation role. However, market prices frequently tend to fall below target prices, spurring costly additional market regulations. This is not necessarily a result of inefficient coordination by the cooperative. Using a mixed market model, the study shows that over production may be explained by the competition between marketing cooperatives and investor-owned wholesalers (IOW), typically weakening the cooperatives' ability to coordinate market supply. This conclusion is robust over a variety of IOW contracts. However, to what extent competition is to blame, depends on the target price level and the contract structure of the IOW. Moreover, it is shown that current market interventions to remove excess supplies may induce further incentives to increase production.     

试析民事合同欺诈与合同诈骗罪的区别--以一起林权转让纠纷为例

从一起林权转让纠纷的定性为切入点,深入探讨民事合同欺诈与合同诈骗罪的含义、特征,分析二者的区别,即民事合同欺诈与合同诈骗罪在主观目的、客观表现、数额要求、法律责任等方面不同,指出执法实践中特别应注意审查欺诈行为人主体资格是否属实,弄清欺诈行为人客观上有无实际履约能力,查清欺诈行为人有无实际履约行为,核实行为人不履行合同的原因,查明行为人资金和财务流向等问题。     

Variation in Output Shares and Endogenous Matching in Land Rental Contracts: Evidence from Ethiopia

We investigate the extent of variation in output sharing in land rental contracts and alternative hypotheses to explain this variation. Close to half of the rental contracts in our study in northern Ethiopia have output shares that deviate from the dominant 50–50 equal sharing. Variation in land quality, the relative bargaining power of landlords and tenants, production risks and shocks are hypothesised to influence output shares. Matched data of landlords and tenants are used. The importance of endogenous matching of landlords and tenants is investigated by assessing how endogenous tenant characteristics are correlated with landlord characteristics. We find evidence of negative assortative matching for key resource characteristics. A control function approach is used to control for endogenous matching in the output share models. The results reveal that production risks, as well as relative bargaining power, affect output shares in the reverse tenancy setting where tenants are relatively wealthier and more influential than landlords.     

Self-enforcing contracts in agriculture

This article examines a self-enforcing contract between a risk-neutralprincipal and a risk-averse agent who is able to hold up valuesex post. It shows that risk aversion and variance can only partlyexplain the contract's incentive intensity. Ex post bargainingpower and outside options will also determine contract choice.If the agent's ex post bargaining position is weak, the principalcannot commit to high-powered incentives, whereas if the agent'sex post bargaining position is good, the agent cannot committo low-powered incentives. The model may thus explain some puzzlesin agricultural contracts, in particular why risk-averse agentssometimes accept to be governed by high-powered incentive contractsthat are quite similar to fixed rental contracts, and why risk-neutralagents are sometimes offered share contracts with lower-poweredincentives.     

Panama disease and contract farming in the Philippines: Towards a political ecology of risk

Despite the vast research on contract farming by agrarian scholars, little is known about interactions between biological risks and the social–political effects of contracts. This study analysed contract farming arrangements in the export banana industry in the Philippines amidst an expanding epidemic of Panama disease. We developed a political ecology of risk approach to investigate how ideas about technological and biological risks are influenced by contractual arrangements, and we borrowed from Cultural Theory the insight that risk and blame are connected concepts, always political, and disadvantage marginalized groups through disproportionate risk burdens. Data collection involved the study of contracts, interviews with decision‐makers, and focus group discussions with agrarian cooperatives. The views of both large corporations as well as organized smallholders were recorded. We found that the former contractually compel the latter to bear the burden of the disease, while blaming them for its spread. Risk decisions were embedded in the dynamics of agrarian social relationships, and economic and political arrangements between actors influenced possibilities and limitations for disease control. We argue that the contractual stipulations, in concert with blaming processes, create a discursive environment that both allow inequitable relations to remain unquestioned, and constrain possibilities for control of Panama disease.     

The roles of risk preferences,selection, and uncertain returns on land contracts

Using panel data on a statistically representative sample of Iowa farmland parcels from 1997 to 2017, we analyze the factors determining whether land is farmed by the owner or rented out under a cash rent or crop share contract. The landowner's decision to rent or operate the land depends on the distribution of expected net returns to the land, and so estimates of the factors affecting rental terms will be biased if the sample only includes rental contracts and excludes the owner-operator. Land with higher mean and/or lower variance of expected net returns is most likely to be rented out. Participants in the rental market will include the most risk-averse landowners and the least risk-averse tenants, while the least risk-averse landowners operate their own land. Our empirical results suggest that the rising use of cash rent contracts and declining incidence of owner-operation and crop-share rental contracts is consistent with falling coefficient of variation in expected net returns per acre.