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1.
This paper develops a utility indifference model for evaluating various prices associated with forward transactions in the housing market, based on the equivalent principle of expected wealth utility derived from the forward and spot real estate markets. Our model results show that forward transactions in the housing market are probably not due to house sellers?? and buyers?? heterogeneity, but to their demand for hedging against house price risk. When the imperfections of real estate markets and the risk preferences of market participants are taken into consideration, we are able to show that the idiosyncratic risk premium, which mainly depends on the participants?? risk preferences and the correlation between the traded asset and the real estate, is a remarkable determinant of house sellers?? and buyers?? forward reservation prices. In addition, we also find that the market clearing forward price usually will not converge toward the expected risk-neutral forward price. The sellers?? or buyers?? risk aversion degrees and market powers are also identified to play crucial roles in determining the clearing forward price. 相似文献
2.
We examine the impact of seller??s Property Condition Disclosure Laws on residential real estate values. A disclosure law may address the information asymmetry in housing transactions shifting risk from buyers and brokers to the sellers and raising housing prices as a result. We combine propensity score techniques from the treatment effects literature with a traditional event study approach. We assemble a unique set of economic and institutional attributes for a quarterly panel of 291 US Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs) across 50 US States spanning 21?years from 1984 to 2004. The study finds that the average sales price of houses in a metropolitan area increases by an additional 3 to 4% over a 4?year period if the state adopts a Property Condition Disclosure Law, which is consistent with approximately a 19 basis point or 6.4% reduction in the risk premium associated with purchasing owner-occupied housing. When we compare the results from parametric and semi-parametric (propensity score) event analyses, we find that the semi-parametric analysis generates moderately larger estimated effects of the law on housing prices. 相似文献
3.
Kenneth W. Soyeh Jonathan A. Wiley Ken H. Johnson 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2014,48(2):380-396
The impact of incentives on marketing duration is examined for residential real estate using data from the Multiple Listing Service during a real estate downturn. The focus is on incentives offered directly by sellers to potential homebuyers. The evidence suggests that incentives are not capitalized into the selling price during the softened market conditions. Alternatively, incentives are found to have a significant reduction in marketing time, however this is found to be true only for closing costs and not for other incentive classifications. The benefit of reduced expected market time from offering incentives is quickly diminished when the seller initially overprices the listing by a large amount. 相似文献
4.
Randy I. Anderson Raymond T. Brastow Geoffrey K. Turnbull Bennie D. Waller 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2014,49(3):434-450
This paper examines how seller pricing decisions influence listing contract length and how these decisions affect price and liquidity in housing markets. Because list price affects broker effort required to sell the property, brokers respond to seller overpricing by increasing the negotiated listing contract length. At the same time, sellers respond to longer listing contracts by adjusting their list price strategy. Both list price and length of marketing time affect broker sales effort and therefore a property’s realized selling price and liquidity. Analysis of house transaction data from Virginia indicates that greater over-pricing by sellers prompts brokers to pursue longer listing contracts, which subsequently lengthen marketing time but increase selling price. The results reveal a novel transmission mechanism from higher list price (which induces longer contracts) to selling price and liquidity. 相似文献
5.
Raymond T. Brastow Thomas M. Springer Bennie D. Waller 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2012,45(4):1041-1061
The literature on broker intermediation in residential real estate has shown positive pricing effects associated with the use of a broker and mixed results as far as the pricing effects of nonstandard commission structures. On the premise that real estate broker incentives emanate from two primary sources, factors that increase broker operating efficiency and negotiable features arising from the relationship between the listing broker and the seller, this study assesses the degree to which these incentives affect the marketing time, probability of sale, and selling price of single-family houses. Of particular interest, this study investigates efficiency and broker intermediation effects on residential property associated with a broker concentrating his listings into a service area. Empirical results show that properties within an individual broker??s GIS-determined service area are more likely to sell, sell faster, and sell with an associated price premium. These effects are more concentrated in the market for higher priced homes. Also, additional compensation favorably motivates the broker with higher-priced properties, but has no effect on the sale of lower-priced properties. 相似文献
6.
Wayne Carroll 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》1989,2(4):349-365
If home sellers cannot monitor real estate brokers' efforts on their behalf, fixed-percentage brokerage commissions can promote welfare by giving brokers an incentive to tailor their services to their clients' demands. This article shows how a competitive broker optimally allocates selling effort across clients who pay different commissions. There is an equilibrium in which clients who value brokerage services more highly offer to pay larger commissions and consequently receive more selling effort from the broker. If clients who are selling higher-priced houses tend to value brokerage services more highly, then this result helps explain the prevalence of fixed-percentage commissions in the residential real estate brokerage industry and suggests that they could emerge in a competitive setting. 相似文献
7.
Siu Kei Wong C. Y. Yiu K. W. Chau 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2012,45(1):49-62
George Akerlof??s asymmetric information theory explains why lemons are rarely, if at all, transacted. We extend his theory to explain liquidity in the second-hand real estate market. The idea is to decompose real estate into two components: land and the building structure. While sellers may know more about the quality of their structures than buyers, information on land, predominantly its locational attributes, is much more transparent. Without assuming any credit constraints or loss aversion behaviour, our information asymmetry model shows that: 1) the liquidity of real estate increases with the share of its land value; 2) there is a positive relationship between real estate prices and turnover rates when land supply is more inelastic than the supply of structures; 3) the positive relationship is stronger when the land value component gets smaller; and 4) while the availability of first-hand real estate may divert demand away from the second-hand market, such a substitution effect is weaker when the land value component is large. These four implications were confirmed with panel data analysis using Hong Kong??s housing transactions from 1992 to 2008 across 50 districts. 相似文献
8.
This study investigates whether or not non-traditional marketing has an effect on the prices paid for residential real estate. Non-traditionally broker-marketed properties are defined as those properties that are sold with the aid of a real estate broker, but not marketed through a Multiple Listing Service (MLS). An analysis of properties that sold in this fashion offers further insight into the intermediation role of the real estate broker, as well as an opportunity to further investigate the efficiency of residential real estate markets. Specifically, we can assess whether MLS participation generates higher prices by determining whether like-kind properties price equivalently despite differences in their mode of marketing. The results show a significant and positive impact by non-traditionally broker-marketed properties on property price suggesting, for this sample, a premium of over 6% compared to like-kind properties marketed through the MLS. This premium may be a result of brokers intermediating a better matching of buyers and sellers. The observed premium also suggests a degree of market inefficiency. 相似文献
9.
Kimberly R. Goodwin Ken H. Johnson Leonard V. Zumpano 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2012,45(2):471-490
In the past few years, many states have responded to the increasing number of limited service brokers by passing minimum service requirements. Limited service brokers can be viewed as those brokers who are offering their marketing and representative services A La Carte as opposed to the more traditional full-services brokers offering of a Table D??h?te (one size fits all) for their services. Supporters claim the legislation is necessary to protect consumers who are otherwise hurt by limited service brokers, but critics assert that this legislation is anti-competitive and not necessary. This study provides empirical evidence that sellers using limited service brokers experience a trade-off between a higher selling price and longer marketing spans with accompanying lower probabilities of finding a buyer during a given marketing period. 相似文献
10.
Thomas J. Miceli Katherine A. Pancak C. F. Sirmans 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2007,35(1):7-22
This study examines the traditional compensation model for real estate brokers under which both the listing and buyer brokers
are paid by the seller based on a percentage of the property sales price. We argue that this model has not evolved to reflect
contemporary legal agency relationships and technology-driven information availability. It therefore creates substantial transactional
inefficiencies for buyers and sellers at both the matching and bargaining stages of a transaction. While there is evidence
that market forces are pushing for a change in the status quo, there is also evidence that the brokerage industry is resisting
this change by pursuing anti-competitive policies and laws. We explore the economics of the current and alternative compensation
structures and suggest policy implications regarding anti-competitive behavior in the brokerage industry.
相似文献
C. F. SirmansEmail: |
11.
In standard principal-agent problems, the issue at hand is how to align the interests of the agent with those of her principal.
A commonly used contract involves the principal paying the agent a percentage of the sale price as commission. With respect
to real estate brokerage contracts, it has been argued that percentage commission contracts fail to provide sufficient incentives
to the agent. This paper re-evaluates the standard solution to a one seller, one agent agency problem by introducing more
than one agent. It is shown that percentage commission contracts can induce first-best effort levels from agents. The result
is due to the negative externalities created by the winner-takes-all race among agents. The optimal commission rates in this
model are inconsistent, however, with the observed uniformity in commission rates across markets in the USA. 相似文献
12.
Residential real estate brokerage as a principal-agent problem 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:1
We analyze the terms of the brokerage contract between a house seller and his agent, using the established literature on the principal-agent problem. Considering the influence of moral hazard and adverse selection, we predict a number of features of the contract. Many of these features are not present in observed contracts. To account for this discrepancy, we discuss certain aspects of the real estate market which are not included in the standard principal-agent model but may explain the difference. Standard principal-agent theory neglects important contract design considerations, namely robustness and costs of complexity. In general, the commission contract performs poorly by failing to allocate risk efficiently or to provide agent incentives. It favors established agents and precludes contractual diversity. Finally, we contrast the brokerage contract for real estate with the dealership contract for used cars, but find no compelling answer as to why there are few used house dealers. 相似文献
13.
Agency and brokerage of real assets in competitive equilibrium 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Brokerage contracts for many categories of real assets are characterizedby a common, constant commission rate payable upon sale, exclusiveagency, and contractual asking prices. For a large market insteady state, these conventional contracts produce in equilibriumno agency problem between a broker and his clients. Each brokerspends the same time or effort selling each client's asset asthe broker would spend on his own assets. As in standard agencyproblems, extra effort by a broker generates first-order stochasticallydominant distributions of bids by potential buyers. Unlike standardagency problems, each broker can allocate his time or effortbetween selling the assets of his multiple clients and searchingfor new clients in competition with other brokers. Because brokers'time spent searching for new sellers is dissipative, entry bybrokers is excessive in equilibrium. 相似文献
14.
Andres Jauregui Alan Tidwell Diane Hite 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》2017,54(1):117-137
We extend the literature on house price cash differentials in important ways. First, our paper is the first to employ methods to correct for sample selection bias, using both switching regression and propensity score matching of cash vs. non-cash transactions. We use selection models to produce price counterfactuals for cash and noncash buyers. We also include both average treatment effect and a propensity score weighted selection models. From the selection models, we find that previous studies likely overstate the cash discount. Results from counterfactual tests examining cash discounts suggest amplified cash discounts in areas with close proximity to an environmental hazard; and also a pricing differential based on CBG level income, with purchasers in high income areas more likely to pay a cash premium compared to market participants in areas with comparably lower income, where a cash discount is detected. These results provide useful insights for market participants including real estate appraisers, brokers, and buyers and sellers of real estate. 相似文献
15.
Leonard V. Zumpano Harold W. Elder Edward A. Baryla 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》1996,13(2):169-181
This study examines the factors that affect the decision by home buyers to use real estate brokers and the subsequent effect this decision has on home prices. Buyers with high opportunity costs and the least amount of information about local market conditions are the most likely to use brokers; a finding consistent with the role of the real estate broker as a market intermediary. Not surprisingly, these were some of the same factors that also have a positive impact on selling price. An important finding of this study is that when selection bias is adequately controlled, the real estate broker has no appreciable, independent impact on selling price. This, in turn, suggests a nonsegmented, highly competitive housing market. 相似文献
16.
《Financial Services Review》1995,4(2):81-95
The intramonth pattern of broker commission earnings is examined/or a sample of one hundred brokers from a national brokerage firm. It is hypothesized that the structure of broker commissions leads to distortions in trading. The evidence shows that in the last five days of the production month, more than one-fourth of the brokers earned a significantly higher proportion of their monthly commissions than would be expected if trading were uniform across the month. This suggests that the structure of the commission system may lead some brokers to encourage individual investors to unnecessarily trade securities near the end of the production month to boost their commission income. 相似文献
17.
Thomas M. Springer 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》1996,13(3):237-254
Factors such as relocation and financial distress motivate the seller of a single-family home to facilitate sale by posting a lower list price, communicating the motivations to the marketplace, or offering sales incentives to agents. Impacts of seller motivations on selling prices and marketing times are estimated using data for single-family homes sold in Arlington, Texas, from 1991 to 1993. Results show selling price discounts for houses with sellers who are either eager, motivated, or anxious, houses with sellers who have relocated, foreclosures, and vacant houses. Only foreclosure houses show the reduced marketing time expected for properties with motivated sellers. The results further suggest that the list price is the seller's primary mechanism for selling the property. Reducing the list price fosters faster sales at the sacrifice of the selling price. 相似文献
18.
List Price Information in the Negotiation of Commercial Real Estate Transactions: Is Silence Golden?
We examine the use (and non-use) of list price information in the process of marketing commercial real estate. While housing market research suggests that list prices can serve as a strong anchor and/or signal, list price information is included in less than one-third of the commercial property sales and is less likely to be included as part of the sellers’ offering information for larger and more complex properties. Given the potentially powerful effect of list prices (first offers) on outcomes, the non-use of list price information is a puzzle. We speculate that the limited use of list prices may be due to the sellers’ interests in both maintaining their informational advantage and not truncating higher than expected offers, especially during periods of economic growth or with more complex properties. Using a two-stage selection correction model, we find that office properties which provide list price information are, on average, associated with lower price outcomes (ceteris paribus) and that these outcomes vary by price cohort and economic condition. It is important to note, however, that while these findings identify a correlation, they do not necessarily imply causation. Our results support the notion that asymmetric information and information signaling play a dominant role in explaining the sellers’ strategic non-use of list price information in the commercial real estate market and that the signaling effect is more pronounced in higher priced properties and during periods of strong economic growth. 相似文献
19.
John D. Benjamin N. Edward Coulson Shiawee X. Yang 《The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics》1993,7(2):151-157
We examine the effect of the 1988 increase in the Philadelphia real estate transfer tax on the sale price of residential property. We find that sales prices fell, as expected. While sampling variability is slightly higher than desirable, the point estimate of the key coefficient indicates a decrease in house price far greater than what would be expected with perfect capital markets. This may be attributed to either capital market imperfections or the news value of the tax increase. The burden of the transfer tax thus rests on the seller. 相似文献
20.
Andrei Hagiu 《The Rand journal of economics》2006,37(3):720-737
I study pricing and commitment by platforms in two‐sided markets with the following characteristics: (i) platforms are essential bottleneck inputs for buyers and sellers transacting with each other; (ii) sellers arrive before buyers; and (iii) platforms can charge both fixed fees and variable fees (royalties). I show that a monopoly platform may prefer not to commit to the price it will charge buyers at the same time it announces its seller price if it faces unfavorable seller expectations. With competing platforms, commitment makes the existence of an exclusive equilibrium (in which sellers register with only one platform) less likely, but it has no impact on multi‐homing equilibria (in which sellers support both platforms) whenever these exist. 相似文献