共查询到20条相似文献,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1.
"孔雀开屏"机构是由电机驱动,链传动带动齿轮运动,齿轮运动带动四杆机构运动,四杆带动叶片,最后达到开屏的效果。其关键技术为四杆机构带动叶片开、收屏。本文介绍了四杆机构的设计方案与具体实施方法。 相似文献
2.
产品市场竞争、代理成本及代理效率:一个经验分析 总被引:4,自引:0,他引:4
文章以我国2004-2005年深沪两市上市公司为样本,检验我国产品市场竞争与代理成本及代理效率之间的经验关系。研究发现:产品市场竞争能够有效降低企业代理成本,提高企业代理效率,并且对于我国国有企业作用效果尤其显著。 相似文献
3.
Trust in Agency 总被引:6,自引:1,他引:5
Existing models of the principal–agent relationship assume the agent works only under extrinsic incentives. However, many observed agency contracts take the form of a fixed payment. For such contracts to work, the principal must trust the agent to work in the absence of incentives. I show that agency fosters the advent of intrinsic motivation and trustworthy behavior. Three distinct motivational schemes are analyzed: norms, ethical standards, and altruism. I identify conditions under which these mechanisms arise and show how they promote trust. The analysis alters several important predictions of conventional models: (1) Better outcomes may ensue in highly uncertain environments; (2) the principal is better off the more the agent is risk averse; and (3) larger equilibrium extrinsic incentives need not be associated with larger effort or larger total surplus . 相似文献
4.
5.
This paper considers an agency model in which a principal delegates an agent authority to choose investment projects. The performance of the project depends stochastically on the agent's evaluation and operating efforts. The paper examines the conditions under which the principal prefers to assign production to a second agent. It is shown that the tasks will be assigned to two agents of the agent chooses an unobservable operating effort. The tasks will be assigned to one agent if the agent's evaluation and operating efforts are both unobservable and if disutilities of efforts are large relative to the profit from the risky project. 相似文献
6.
7.
In the context of (one-sided) delegated bargaining, we analyze how a principal (a seller) should design the delegation contract in order to provide proper incentives for her delegate (an intermediary) and gain strategic advantage against a third party (a buyer). We consider situations in which there are both moral hazard and adverse selection problems in the delegation relationship and where the seller tries to gain strategic advantage by imposing a minimum price above which she pays the delegate a commission. It is shown that incentives and commitment are substitutes. A low-type agent is given less discretion in dealing with the buyer and weaker incentives, while a high-type agent is given more discretion and stronger incentives . 相似文献
8.
Saku Mantere 《Journal of Management Studies》2008,45(2):294-316
abstract Based on an analysis of 262 interviews, I argue that role expectations have the potential to both enable and constrain middle manager strategic agency. To explain why the same role expectations have contradictory effects on agency, I analyse enabling conditions corresponding to four strategic role expectations, based on Floyd and Wooldridge's work on middle manager roles. After presenting eight enabling conditions for strategic agency, specific to the four role expectations, I argue that the dominant functionalist view of strategic roles should be augmented from a middle manager viewpoint. I suggest a reciprocal view of strategic role expectations, which elucidates the tensions between dialogue, legitimacy and rationality within a set of strategic roles. 相似文献
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
以2004至2018年我国A股上市公司为研究样本,考察了公司内部治理、代理成本对非效率投资的影响。研究结果表明,经理与外部股东的代理冲突所产生的代理成本对过度投资存在显著影响,但代理成本对投资不足的影响不显著;股权治理、董事会治理和高管激励总体上未能有效发挥公司治理作用,抑制过度投资。 相似文献
15.
Nicole Torka 《International Journal of Human Resource Management》2013,24(7):1570-1585
This study explores the understanding that Dutch agency workers (i.e. workers affiliated with a temporary-help service firm) have of organisation's commitment to its workers (OCW). Semi-structured interviews with 33 Dutch agency workers aimed to answer two questions: (1) what do agency workers believe the agency and the client should offer if they are aiming for perceived OCW and (2) who are the potential messengers of agency and client OCW? If agencies and clients want to get rewarded by agency workers with perceived OCW, they have to carry a shared responsibility for many aspects of fair and favourable human resource management. However, agency workers link some aspects exclusively to one of the two organisational parties: agency workers seem to associate promotion with the client organisation, and certain aspects of job characteristics (e.g. autonomy and performance feedback) solely with the client OCW. Other elements related to job characteristics were only associated with agency OCW (current and future person–task fit, job-satisfaction concerns and job-related problems), as well as keeping in touch and problem solving (e.g. job dissatisfaction) solely with agency OCW. Moreover, agency workers personify all the mentioned responsibilities: organisational member's actions concerning these responsibilities represent OCW. Agency consultants seem to be the sole representatives of perceived agency OCW, whereas several agents (e.g. top managers, direct supervisors, co-workers, clients' ‘clients’) serve as potential representatives of client organisations' commitment. 相似文献
16.
Entrepreneurial Financing, Advice, and Agency Costs 总被引:1,自引:1,他引:0
We develop a model to study the interplay between advice and agency costs in entrepreneurial financing. We demonstrate a tension between the entrepreneur's motivation for effort and the investor's willingness to finance the project. Advice to the entrepreneur exacerbates this tension. Consequently, optimal financing contracts may involve full, partial, or no advice. With partial advice, information flows need to be controlled carefully. Such control is better when advice and finance are integrated as observed by venture capitalists. 相似文献
17.
肖成民 《上海立信会计学院学报》2010,24(5)
现代企业在降低交易成本的同时,也产生了代理成本。基于缓解代理成本目的而提出公司治理概念在实证层面具有多个度量维度,并非所有维度下的公司治理对于代理冲突都具有相同的效应。基于国内外文献,文章分析了基于表现形式、行为主体和与制度环境关系的公司治理度量与代理冲突之间的关系。清晰认识公司治理的度量维度及与代理冲突之间的关系,有助于完善公司治理相关研究的假设的提出、度量变量的选择和研究结果的解释。 相似文献
18.
代理成本与资本结构分析 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
企业实行委托代理制,就会有代理问题及代理成本。企业的代理成本,涉及到企业的治理结构,又影响到企业的资本结构。本文在加利·贝克尔和乔治·斯蒂格勒的委托-代理模型的基础上,对于经营者从事道德风险及其影响因素进行了分析,并且分析了经营者从事道德风险活动对于企业价值的影响。 相似文献
19.
20.