大股东侵害与中小股东利益保护:一个模型分析

大股东侵害中小股东利益的现象已引起社会的广泛关注,但已有文献缺乏对大股东侵害成因和程度的研究。依据公共选择理论和产业组织理论,本文模型指出实施监督职能但没有得到相应投资收益是大股东侵害中小股东利益的重要原因,大股东的侵害包括以补偿监督成本为目的的第I类侵害、要求监督成本的支出取得合理投资回报为目的的第II类侵害和大股东利用公司内部信息以最大化其收益为目的的第III类侵害,且不同类型的侵害对大股东和公司的意义不同。为有效解决大股东侵害问题,并提高大股东的监督水平,就应对大股东的第I类和第II类侵害进行补偿,并对第III类侵害进行惩罚。     

以受证监会处罚的“ST宝硕”为例的相关问题研究

对于国企改制的上市公司,由于股权结构问题带来的大股东侵害一直对中小股东利益存在着威胁,有些企业,其背后所隐藏的不透明的关联方交易和企业资产的转移往往令人担忧。由于大股东的绝对地位,中小股东很难形成对大股东的监督与控制,本文以"ST宝硕"为例,探索如何能够尽早的识别企业内部人控制的风险,从而保护中小股东利益。另一方面,当大股东侵害的事件曝光后,对于面临破产的企业,如何选择企业重生的方式才能真正解决企业财务困境,又是中小股东另一焦点问题。     

中小股东保护的升级——试析公司法修改对股东利益平衡问题的处理

大股东和中小股东之间存在利益冲突。在原公司法中,大股东对董事会以及对公司人事和管理的控制会容易就演变侵占中小股东利益的权利滥用,这严重损害了股东间的利益平衡。基于此,去年底新修改的公司法从保护中小股东利益的角度出发,双管齐下,制约大股东的权利,并从管理、监督以及法律救济三大方面对中小股东的权利和其保护做了全方位的改进。尽管仍存在不足,但是修改后的公司法在处理大股东和中小股东利益平衡的问题上确实卓有成效。     

浅谈我国上市公司大股东侵害行为与解决方案

在我国,大股东占有绝大数股份,拥有着公司的实际控制权。大股东们利用这些控制权直接或间接的侵害中小股东利益,且这种侵害方式有许多种。如直接占用资金、关联交易、违规担保等。这些行为严重侵害了中小股东利益,阻碍了社会主义资本市场的健康发展。本文通过对大股东侵害行为的表现形式进行阐述与分析,并提出了一些相关建议,来规范大股东的侵害行为。     

股权融资大股东控制权收益的博弈分析

我国上市公司股权结构可以看成由拥有控制权的大股东和众多分散的中小股东构成.在股权融资中,大股东可以凭借其控股权剥夺中小股东利益,获得控制权收益.本文建立博弈模型分析了大股东和中小股东的行为,给出大股东获取控制权收益的条件,并就如何防止其侵害中小股东利益提出相应建议.     

浅谈上市公司关联交易中小股东利益救济

上市公司中,大股东利用非公允关联交易侵害中小股东利益时有发生,中小股东的权益,在资本多数决背景下难以得到有效的维护,中小股东利益救济问题便成为公司治理中的一大弊病。本文,从法律控制角度,探讨我国上市公司非公允关联交易中小股东的利益救济问题,试图提出制度建议。     

大股东侵权行为分析

当前,由于上市公司"内部人控制"现象突出,监督、制约功能不全,中小投资者利益受损害的情况屡见不鲜。且由于法律对投资者缺乏足够的保护,中国上市公司中的大股东利用其控制权严重侵害着中小股东的利益。通过分析了大股东行为产生的机理,并提出了相关解决问题的政策建议。     

试论新公司法对中小股东利益的保护制度

旧公司法在保护中小股东的权利上有许多不足,这就使他们的利益往往会受到大股东的侵害。新公司法大胆的引进和增设的制度,加强了对他们的保护,更好地平衡了各方的利益关系,为公司中小股东在自身利益受到侵害时提供了法律武器。     

上市公司大股东违规侵权问题研究

近年来,我国资本市场大股东违规侵害中小股东权益现象日益频繁。上市公司大股东与中小股东之间利益冲突已成为公司治理中的一大问题。大股东凭借其控制地位,对上市公司与广大中小股东进行肆意的掠夺,掏空上市公司以攫取利益。这种行为严重伤害了广大股民的投资热情和投资信心,阻挠了我国资本市场的健康发展。本文首先描述了大股东掏空行为的现状及危害,然后剖析了掏空行为的原因所在,最后从公司内部与外部两个方面提出遏制大股东掏空行为的建议。     

浅谈公司法中公司小股东的权利保护

在公司多方利益体和资本多数决的运行规则下,小股东在某种程度上处于弱势地位,部分公司的控股股东或者大股东有时会利用其优势地位侵犯小股东的利益,影响到小股东投资的积极性和公司的健康发展。随着改革开放的深入,越来越多的理论和实践更加注重保护公司中小股东的合法权益。由于中小股东的股权比较分散、易受侵害,如何平衡和保护中小股东的利益备受关注,随着新公司法的出台,对中小股东的权益起到了一定的保护作用,但其中也存在着很多的不足之处,本文提出一些建议来完善小股东权利保护机制,以期能对我国公司小股东权利保护有所裨益。     

Shareholders and Social Responsibility

The article presents an analysis and critique of Milton Friedman’s argument that the social responsibility of business is merely to increase its profits. The analysis uncovers a central claim that Friedman implies, but does not explicitly defend, namely that the shareholders of a corporation have no duty to direct that corporation’s management to exercise social responsibility. An argument against this claim is then advanced by way of a convergence strategy, whereby multiple influential moral approaches are shown to align themselves against Friedman. The convergence strategy shows that Friedman’s position lies on the lonely fringes of Western moral thought, and that at least some of Friedman’s professed adherents appear to offer incoherent moral views. The convergence strategy is shown to suggest, but not entail, a stakeholder model of the corporation. The article concludes by considering two objections.     

Shareholders as Norm Entrepreneurs for Corporate Social Responsibility

This article advances the idea that shareholders who seek to influence corporate behaviour can be understood analytically as norm entrepreneurs. These are actors who seek to persuade others to adopt a new standard of appropriateness. The article thus goes beyond studies which focus on the influence of shareholder activism on single instances of corporate conduct, as it recognises shareholders’ potential as change agents for more widely shared norms about corporate responsibilities. The article includes the empirical example of US internet technology companies who, in their Chinese operations, face conflicts of norm systems in regard to freedom of expression on the internet. Shareholders have been active in seeking to persuade these companies to adopt a norm of adhering to global standards for human rights over restrictions implied by authoritarian regimes to which they deliver services.     

Shareholders and Corporate Community Involvement in Britain

Corporate community involvement is attracting increasing interest in Britain, but what do shareholders feel about this use of company assets? This timely survey of top UK corporate donors provides interesting data on current practice and explores the degree to which shareholders are consulted. The author is a member of the Department of Business Studies in the Faculty of Management and Business of The Manchester Metropolitan University, Aytoun Building, Aytoun Street, Manchester M1 3GH; e–mail j.clarke@mmu.ac.uk.     

机构投资股东的内涵与外延

机构投资股东是以“社会投资人的专业代理投资者”的身份持有股份的主体,一般指各类代客理财型的非银行金融股东。他们偏好股份的收益性,有别于本身有产品经营业务的企业法人股东。对机构投资股东内涵与外延的正确认识和理解,将有助于股市规制政策的制定与改进,有利于机构投资股东的健康发展。     

小股东保护与公司治理

小股东在公司结构中处于弱势地位,其权益极易受到公司控股股东及公司管理层的侵害。目前,我国的小股东保护制度还不完善,不利于公司治理目标的实现。一些在国外被证明行之有效的制度在我国的法律上还没有规定,有些制度虽有规定但不完备,缺乏可操作性。因此,借鉴国外成功经验完善我国小股东权益保护制度有着特别重要的意义。     

The Largest and Dominant Shareholders in the Russian Industry

Abstract

The paper analyses evolution of ownership structures and patterns of control at Russian privatized firms. The data are provided by three surveys, conducted by The Russian Economic Barometer in 1995, 1997 and 1999. According to results obtained, ownership profile of the Russian industry continues to be skewed in favor of insiders. However, in most cases the first largest shareholders are outside investors. Companies with medium concentration of shareholdings are more successful than companies with dispersed or highly concentrated ownership structure and firms under control of managers or financial outsiders outperform firms controlled by employees, non-financial outsiders or the state.     

Do Shareholders Have Obligations to Stakeholders?

The question of whether, and to what extent, business managers have obligations to stakeholders has been the principal theme in much of recent business ethics literature. The question of whether shareholders have obligations to stakeholders, however, has not been addressed sufficiently. I provide some needed attention to this matter by examining the positions of shareholders in the contemporary world of investing. Their positions are considerably different than that often envisioned by business ethicists and economists where shareholders determine the directions of corporate activities through their voting decisions. Typical contemporary investors rarely control corporate activities. If they own corporate securities directly, generally they own too small an interest to exercise control. And, in most cases, they do not even own corporate securities directly, but, rather, own shares in funds. Because of the positions of shareholders today, it is highly questionable whether most have obligations to stakeholders. This has a significant implication for business managers. Whether or not shareholders have obligations to stakeholders, business managers have a greater obligation to educate shareholders about how corporate activities affect stakeholders. I provide a justification for that obligation and comment on how business managers might begin to fulfill it.     

控股股东控制、管理层激励与公司过度投资

本文基于我国上市公司大小股东间严重代理冲突、控股股东政府性质,以及股权分置改革的制度背景,从公司过度投资的视角对管理层激励效应进行理论分析,并以2004-2009年上市公司为样本,检验了控股股东两权分离程度及其性质对于管理层激励抑制过度投资效应的影响。研究发现,不论是货币薪酬激励还是管理层持股激励都起到了抑制过度投资的作用,但上市公司控股股东的两权分离程度会削弱管理层激励的这种治理效应;而且,公司的政府控制性质在弱化管理层激励抑制过度投资作用的同时,还会强化控股股东两权分离对管理层激励效应的负面影响。考虑股权分置改革影响的进一步研究表明,股改强化了管理层激励对于公司过度投资的抑制作用,同时又弱化了控股股东的两权分离对管理层激励治理效应的负面影响。研究结果不仅为现有文献关于管理层激励与企业绩效关联的结论分歧提供新的解释,对于理解我国上市公司管理层激励的有效性,以及切实改进管理层激励契约等,具有重要参考价值,同时也从新的视角为我国股改的有效性提供了证据。     

大股东资产注入与上市公司长期业绩下滑

近年来大股东纷纷将所属场外资产注入其控股的上市公司,文章从产业链整合与利益侵占两个角度分析了大股东资产注入的动机及影响,并实证检验大股东资产注入的经济后果,发现:资产注入后上市公司的长期市场业绩出现下滑,投资者在资产注入后购买上市公司股票并持有1年以上将会遭受损失,该结果支持大股东资产注入的利益侵占动机。另外,发现注入资产类型直接影响上市公司的长期业绩表现,注入相关资产的长期业绩好于注入非相关资产,支持相关资产注入的产业链整合动机。     

控股股东代理冲突与审计师选择

<正>一、研究背景从审计发展的历史来看,近、现代审计都形成了国家审计、外部审计和内部审计三足鼎立的格局。特别是在现代审计阶段,外部审计独领风骚。改革开放以来,随着城